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Agent Mesh

test: validate policy documentation examples

Antonio Ojeaf781a51b29cd
diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go
index 0b4d6135..66e4fe08 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go
@@ -30,6 +30,70 @@ func TestLoadPolicyConfig(t *testing.T) {
wantErr bool
verify func(t *testing.T, config *api.PolicyConfig)
}{
+ {
+ name: "Valid comprehensive config from docs",
+ yamlContent: `
+version: "v1alpha1"
+
+# Bindings map OIDC identities (sub/user, email, groups) to SAM Roles.
+# Note: Kubernetes projected service account tokens do not carry 'groups' claims,
+# so they must be bound explicitly using their 'user' claim format.
+bindings:
+ # 1. Global Admins (Infrastructure SAs, Lead Architects)
+ - members: ["user:system:serviceaccount:sam-mesh:admin-sa"]
+ role: "admin"
+ - members: ["group:infrastructure-leads"]
+ role: "admin"
+
+ # 2. Software Developers
+ - members: ["group:software-engineering-team"]
+ role: "developer"
+
+ # 3. Data Scientists & AI Engineers
+ - members: ["group:data-science-team"]
+ role: "data-scientist"
+
+ # 4. Contractors / Read-Only Audits
+ - members: ["email:[email protected]"]
+ role: "auditor"
+
+# Roles define the allowed destinations (allowed_targets) and tools (allowed_services)
+roles:
+ # Admins have full, unrestricted access to the entire mesh
+ admin:
+ allowed_targets:
+ - "*"
+ allowed_services:
+ - "*"
+
+ # Developers can call development tools on dev nodes
+ developer:
+ allowed_targets:
+ - "group:dev-nodes" # Can only call nodes in the 'dev-nodes' target group
+ allowed_services:
+ - "mcp://code-reviewer" # Can call the code reviewer tool
+ - "mcp://git-helper" # Can call git helper tools
+ - "mcp://build-runner.*" # Wildcard: matches any build runner sub-service (e.g. build-runner.go)
+
+ # Data Scientists can call database tools and all AI inference endpoints
+ data-scientist:
+ allowed_targets:
+ - "group:data-nodes" # Can call nodes in the 'data-nodes' target group
+ - "node:12D3KooWSpecialNode" # Can call a specific high-compute node directly
+ allowed_services:
+ - "mcp://db-reader" # Can query databases
+ - "inference://*" # Wildcard: can access any LLM inference service
+
+ # Auditors can only query metadata catalogs and cannot call operational tools
+ auditor:
+ allowed_targets:
+ - "*"
+ allowed_services:
+ - "system://sam.catalog" # Strictly limited to tool discovery/metadata
+
+`,
+ wantErr: false,
+ },
{
name: "Valid config with exact services",
yamlContent: `
diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/config_test.go b/cmd/sam-node/config_test.go
index 3f2f356a..bb3e11be 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-node/config_test.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-node/config_test.go
@@ -14,6 +14,49 @@ func TestLoadNodeConfig(t *testing.T) {
wantErr bool
verify func(t *testing.T, config *NodeConfigComplete)
}{
+ {
+ name: "Valid comprehensive config from docs",
+ yamlContent: `
+version: "v1alpha1"
+
+# Static services hosted by this local node
+services:
+ - type: "mcp"
+ name: "db-reader"
+ description: "Read-only SQL execution tool"
+ target_url: "http://127.0.0.1:5001/mcp"
+
+ - type: "mcp"
+ name: "db-writer"
+ description: "Database modification tool"
+ target_url: "http://127.0.0.1:5002/mcp"
+
+# Local policies further restrict or override permissions on this specific node
+attenuation:
+ # local rules generate new facts based on existing ones
+ rules:
+ # e.g., 'is_off_hours() <- current_hour($h), $h >= 21;'
+
+ # local checks must be satisfied for any connection to succeed
+ checks:
+ # 1. Enforce strict TLS certificate expiry limit
+ - 'check if time($time), $time < 2026-12-31T23:59:59Z;'
+
+ # local policies can contain deny rules (to restrict Hub grants) or allow rules (to override implicit denies)
+ policies:
+ # 2. Block db-writer calls during off-hours (9 PM to 6 AM)
+ - 'deny if service("mcp", "db-writer"), current_hour($hour), $hour >= 21;'
+ - 'deny if service("mcp", "db-writer"), current_hour($hour), $hour < 6;'
+
+ # 3. Restrict contractors from accessing db-writer even if Hub granted it
+ - 'deny if service("mcp", "db-writer"), role("contractor");'
+
+ # 4. Explicitly allow local admin bypass
+ - 'allow if user("local-admin");'
+
+`,
+ wantErr: false,
+ },
{
name: "Valid config with multiple services and attenuation",
yamlContent: `