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Agent Mesh

docs: document the egress floor, and stop promising it without one

HosniBelfekife7b1e450df4
diff --git a/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md b/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md
index 91160e21..2b9cd1c6 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md
@@ -135,5 +135,5 @@ When deploying SAM for mission-critical, sovereign agent operations:
2. **Maintain Root Cryptographic Key Custody:** Generate, manage, and hold your own Ed25519 root signing keys (via KMS/Cloud EKM or HSMs).
3. **Use Your Own OIDC Identity Provider:** Point `--issuer` to your internal Keycloak, Dex, or corporate IdP.
4. **Declare & Attest Sovereignty Labels:** Declare `labels: {jurisdiction: eu, region: <your-region>}` in each node's `sam-node.yaml` and configure control plane roles with `allowed_labels`.
-5. **Enforce Jurisdictional Egress:** Direct agents to specify `X-Sam-Required-Labels: jurisdiction=eu` on all inference and MCP requests to guarantee zero data leakage beyond authorized perimeters.
+5. **Enforce Jurisdictional Egress:** Set `egress.require_labels` in `sam-node.yaml` (e.g. `jurisdiction: eu`) so every provider must attest the boundary before the node sends it anything. Agents may narrow further per request with `X-Sam-Required-Labels`, but cannot widen past the floor or waive it by omitting the header — the two are checked independently and every pair of the floor must hold.
6. **Set Local Attenuation Vetoes:** Configure local node `attenuation.policies` to retain final destination-side access control.
diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md
index 05e8da68..07af2184 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md
@@ -141,6 +141,28 @@ The `call_remote_tool` MCP tool accepts the same requirement via its `required_l
Enforcement is fail-closed and cryptographic: gossiped labels only rank candidate providers, and before any request data leaves your node the sidecar verifies the provider's control-plane-signed Biscuit and checks its attested `label()` facts. Providers that return no identity or lack a matching fact are rejected.
+### Requiring labels of every provider (operator floor)
+
+The header above is the caller's requirement, and a caller that sends no header is unconstrained. To hold a boundary the caller cannot waive, set a floor in the node config:
+
+```yaml
+egress:
+ require_labels: # every pair must hold, and callers cannot widen it
+ jurisdiction: eu
+ compliance: gdpr
+```
+
+Every remote provider must then attest all of these before the node sends it anything, whether or not the caller asked for labels. A caller may still narrow the choice further with `X-Sam-Required-Labels`; the two are checked independently, so a caller naming an unrelated label cannot stand in for the floor.
+
+Note the difference in meaning between the two, which follows from what each is for:
+
+| | Semantics |
+|---|---|
+| `X-Sam-Required-Labels` (caller) | **any** pair is enough — the caller is choosing among acceptable providers |
+| `egress.require_labels` (operator) | **every** pair must hold — the operator is drawing a boundary |
+
+A floor naming a label no provider attests reaches nothing, which makes it a usable egress kill switch. Omit the block entirely to keep the previous behaviour, where the requirement is whatever the caller supplied.
+
### Restricting callers by label (provider)
Because every enrolled node's token carries its attested label facts, a provider can require callers to hold a label with a single local check in its `attenuation` block: