Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
docs: document the egress floor, and stop promising it without one
HosniBelfekife7b1e450df4
diff --git a/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md b/site/content/docs/sovereignty.mdindex 91160e21..2b9cd1c6 100644--- a/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md+++ b/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md@@ -135,5 +135,5 @@ When deploying SAM for mission-critical, sovereign agent operations:2. **Maintain Root Cryptographic Key Custody:** Generate, manage, and hold your own Ed25519 root signing keys (via KMS/Cloud EKM or HSMs).3. **Use Your Own OIDC Identity Provider:** Point `--issuer` to your internal Keycloak, Dex, or corporate IdP.4. **Declare & Attest Sovereignty Labels:** Declare `labels: {jurisdiction: eu, region: <your-region>}` in each node's `sam-node.yaml` and configure control plane roles with `allowed_labels`.-5. **Enforce Jurisdictional Egress:** Direct agents to specify `X-Sam-Required-Labels: jurisdiction=eu` on all inference and MCP requests to guarantee zero data leakage beyond authorized perimeters.+5. **Enforce Jurisdictional Egress:** Set `egress.require_labels` in `sam-node.yaml` (e.g. `jurisdiction: eu`) so every provider must attest the boundary before the node sends it anything. Agents may narrow further per request with `X-Sam-Required-Labels`, but cannot widen past the floor or waive it by omitting the header — the two are checked independently and every pair of the floor must hold.6. **Set Local Attenuation Vetoes:** Configure local node `attenuation.policies` to retain final destination-side access control.diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.mdindex 05e8da68..07af2184 100644--- a/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md+++ b/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md@@ -141,6 +141,28 @@ The `call_remote_tool` MCP tool accepts the same requirement via its `required_lEnforcement is fail-closed and cryptographic: gossiped labels only rank candidate providers, and before any request data leaves your node the sidecar verifies the provider's control-plane-signed Biscuit and checks its attested `label()` facts. Providers that return no identity or lack a matching fact are rejected.+### Requiring labels of every provider (operator floor)++The header above is the caller's requirement, and a caller that sends no header is unconstrained. To hold a boundary the caller cannot waive, set a floor in the node config:++```yaml+egress:+ require_labels: # every pair must hold, and callers cannot widen it+ jurisdiction: eu+ compliance: gdpr+```++Every remote provider must then attest all of these before the node sends it anything, whether or not the caller asked for labels. A caller may still narrow the choice further with `X-Sam-Required-Labels`; the two are checked independently, so a caller naming an unrelated label cannot stand in for the floor.++Note the difference in meaning between the two, which follows from what each is for:++| | Semantics |+|---|---|+| `X-Sam-Required-Labels` (caller) | **any** pair is enough — the caller is choosing among acceptable providers |+| `egress.require_labels` (operator) | **every** pair must hold — the operator is drawing a boundary |++A floor naming a label no provider attests reaches nothing, which makes it a usable egress kill switch. Omit the block entirely to keep the previous behaviour, where the requirement is whatever the caller supplied.+### Restricting callers by label (provider)Because every enrolled node's token carries its attested label facts, a provider can require callers to hold a label with a single local check in its `attenuation` block: