Build and run agents you can see, understand and trust.
Python agentchatbotlarge-language-modelsllmllm-agentmcpmulti-agentmulti-modalreact-agentrealtime-agentvoice-agentvoice-assistant
fix(tool): resolve symlinks before the dangerous-path check (#3033)
Daveeadb16f3d97b
diff --git a/src/agentscope/tool/_base.py b/src/agentscope/tool/_base.pyindex b0a61517c..3ea982e45 100644--- a/src/agentscope/tool/_base.py+++ b/src/agentscope/tool/_base.py@@ -467,8 +467,8 @@ class ToolBase(ABC):False"""- # Normalize path- abs_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(file_path))+ # Resolve symlinks so an alias is judged by its target+ abs_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(file_path))# Split path into segmentspath_parts = Path(abs_path).partsdiff --git a/tests/permission_engine_test.py b/tests/permission_engine_test.pyindex ee71c1f96..14294fa2c 100644--- a/tests/permission_engine_test.py+++ b/tests/permission_engine_test.py@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ covers rule priority, rule pattern matching (Bash / file glob), dangerouspath detection, suggestion generation, Bash read-only command analysis,and bypass-immune safety checks."""+import osimport sys+import tempfileimport unittestfrom unittest.async_case import IsolatedAsyncioTestCase@@ -439,6 +441,39 @@ class PermissionEngineDangerousPathTest(IsolatedAsyncioTestCase):# Should NOT be a safety checkself.assertNotIn("safety", decision.decision_reason.lower())+ async def test_symlink_to_dangerous_file_still_asks(self) -> None:+ """A symlink aliasing a sensitive file is judged by its target."""+ with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:+ real = os.path.join(tmp, ".bashrc")+ with open(real, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:+ f.write("export PATH=/tmp\n")+ link = os.path.join(tmp, "innocent.txt")+ os.symlink(real, link)++ decision = await self.engine.check_permission(+ Write(),+ {"file_path": link},+ )++ self.assertEqual(decision.behavior, PermissionBehavior.ASK)+ self.assertIn("safety", decision.decision_reason.lower())++ async def test_symlink_into_dangerous_directory_asks(self) -> None:+ """A symlinked path into ``.ssh`` is judged as dangerous too."""+ with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:+ real_dir = os.path.join(tmp, ".ssh")+ os.mkdir(real_dir)+ link = os.path.join(tmp, "innocent")+ os.symlink(real_dir, link)++ decision = await self.engine.check_permission(+ Write(),+ {"file_path": os.path.join(link, "authorized_keys")},+ )++ self.assertEqual(decision.behavior, PermissionBehavior.ASK)+ self.assertIn("safety", decision.decision_reason.lower())+async def asyncTearDown(self) -> None:"""Clean up test fixtures."""self.engine = None