Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors
Rust
feat(hooks): drop listed tool events server-side (#1241)
AkitaOnRails040c5f3fb3a0
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex 74a49091..c503f12a 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -307,6 +307,13 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0- `ai-memory status` and `ai-memory doctor` now show the server's authposture, and for an unauthenticated loopback server print`auth: none (loopback)` with the fix, `ai-memory auth enable`.+- Added a server-side drop list for tool events: `[ingest]+ drop_tool_use_id_prefixes` and `drop_tool_names` (both empty by default, at+ most 64 entries of 128 characters). A PreToolUse or PostToolUse event whose+ tool-use id starts with a listed prefix, or whose tool name matches exactly,+ is answered with 202 and counted as a policy drop in `/hook` and+ `/hook/batch`, before it is sanitized, rate-limited or stored. The lists+ apply to every project on the server. (#1241)### Changed- Changed scoped `/api/v1/search` (a single `workspace` + `project`, ordiff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/backfill.rs b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/backfill.rsindex 99f89b7b..a877e429 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/backfill.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/backfill.rs@@ -1515,6 +1515,7 @@ mod tests {per_user_slots: false,mid_session_routing: ai_memory_core::MidSessionRouting::default(),profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings::default(),+ ingest_drop_list: ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::default(),};let endpoint = ServerEndpoint::for_hook_target("http://localhost".into(), None);let sid = "native-session-with-a-very-long-identifier-that-would-break-the-old-key";@@ -1714,6 +1715,7 @@ mod tests {per_user_slots: false,mid_session_routing: ai_memory_core::MidSessionRouting::default(),profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings::default(),+ ingest_drop_list: ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::default(),};let endpoint = ServerEndpoint::for_hook_target("http://localhost".into(), None);let sid = "native-session-resumed-across-two-offline-intervals";diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/serve.rs b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/serve.rsindex 9cb12848..4dba5368 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/serve.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/serve.rs@@ -1588,6 +1588,7 @@ pub async fn run(config: &Config, args: ServeArgs) -> Result<()> {trusted_proxy_identity: trusted_proxy_identity_enabled(&config.auth),mid_session_routing: config.routing.mid_session,profile: config.profile.clone(),+ ingest_drop_list: config.ingest.drop_list.clone(),});let workstreams = workstream_router(WorkstreamState {writer: store.writer.clone(),diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/config.rs b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/config.rsindex 80245fa2..06403332 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/config.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/config.rs@@ -601,6 +601,8 @@ pub struct Config {pub routing: RoutingSettings,/// Client-side hook spool retry policy.pub hook_spool: HookSpoolSettings,+ /// `[ingest]` — server-side drop list for tool events (#1241).+ pub ingest: IngestSettings,/// Env-backed alias for hook ingest tokens per second per source.pub hook_rate_per_sec: f64,/// Env-backed alias for hook ingest burst tokens per source.@@ -1193,6 +1195,22 @@ pub struct RoutingSettings {pub mid_session: ai_memory_core::MidSessionRouting,}+/// `[ingest]`: tool events the server drops whatever the client sends+/// (#1241). Both lists are empty by default and apply to every project on the+/// server. Validated once by [`Config::load`] into [`Self::drop_list`].+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]+#[serde(default)]+pub struct IngestSettings {+ /// Drop a tool event whose `tool_use_id` starts with one of these.+ pub drop_tool_use_id_prefixes: Vec<String>,+ /// Drop a tool event whose tool name equals one of these exactly.+ pub drop_tool_names: Vec<String>,+ /// The validated list the hook router checks. Set by [`Config::load`];+ /// never read from or written to a config file.+ #[serde(skip)]+ pub drop_list: ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList,+}+/// Client-side hook spool retry policy.#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize)]#[serde(default)]@@ -1282,6 +1300,7 @@ impl Default for Config {auto_scope: AutoScopeSettings::default(),routing: RoutingSettings::default(),hook_spool: HookSpoolSettings::default(),+ ingest: IngestSettings::default(),hook_rate_per_sec: 0.0,hook_rate_burst: 0.0,allowed_hosts: vec!["localhost".into(), "127.0.0.1".into(), "::1".into()],@@ -2224,6 +2243,11 @@ impl Config {if let Err(message) = config.search.fts.validate() {anyhow::bail!("{message}");}+ config.ingest.drop_list = ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::new(+ config.ingest.drop_tool_use_id_prefixes.clone(),+ config.ingest.drop_tool_names.clone(),+ )+ .map_err(|message| anyhow::anyhow!(message))?;// A4 entropy filter thresholds: reject an unusable threshold at startup// rather than silently ignoring it on the first experience pass.if let Err(message) = config@@ -4442,6 +4466,42 @@ input_token_safety_margin = {margin}/// rather than written out, so the test keeps meaning "the smallest/// accepted budget round-trips" when the floor moves (#1234) instead of/// pinning a number the floor happens to allow today.+ /// `[ingest]` is read once into the validated drop list the hook router+ /// checks, and an out-of-bounds entry fails startup instead of being+ /// silently ignored (#1241).+ #[test]+ fn ingest_drop_lists_load_into_the_router_list_and_reject_bad_entries() {+ let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let config_path = tmp.path().join("config.toml");+ std::fs::write(+ &config_path,+ "[ingest]\ndrop_tool_use_id_prefixes = [\"toolu_plugin_\"]\ndrop_tool_names = [\"mcp__noisy__poll\"]\n",+ )+ .unwrap();+ let config = Config::load(Some(&config_path), Some(tmp.path().to_path_buf())).unwrap();+ assert_eq!(+ config.ingest.drop_list,+ ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::new(+ vec!["toolu_plugin_".into()],+ vec!["mcp__noisy__poll".into()]+ )+ .unwrap()+ );++ std::fs::write(&config_path, "[ingest]\ndrop_tool_names = [\" \"]\n").unwrap();+ let error = Config::load(Some(&config_path), Some(tmp.path().to_path_buf())).unwrap_err();+ assert!(+ format!("{error:#}").contains("drop_tool_names"),+ "{error:#}"+ );++ // Default: empty, so nothing is dropped.+ assert_eq!(+ Config::default().ingest.drop_list,+ ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::default()+ );+ }+#[test]fn load_accepts_a_small_context_consolidation_budget() {let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/templates/config.default.toml b/crates/ai-memory-cli/templates/config.default.tomlindex a68b0063..43b627cf 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/templates/config.default.toml+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/templates/config.default.toml@@ -43,6 +43,15 @@ log_level = "info"# --capture-assistant`. Env equivalent: `AI_MEMORY_CAPTURE_ASSISTANT=true`.# capture_assistant = false+# Server-side drop list for tool events (#1241): the server acknowledges and+# discards a matching PreToolUse/PostToolUse event before it is sanitized or+# stored, whatever the client sends. Applies to every project on this server.+# At most 64 entries per list, 128 characters each. Example: Claude Code marks+# plugin tool calls with their own tool-use id prefix.+# [ingest]+# drop_tool_use_id_prefixes = ["toolu_plugin_"]+# drop_tool_names = ["mcp__noisy__poll"]+# Strip root-level anyOf/oneOf/allOf from MCP tool input schemas on every# tools/list, even without a `?flavor=moonshot` / `?flavor=bedrock` marker.# Generic MCP clients (OpenCode, Cursor) never send that marker yet forwarddiff --git a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/drop_list.rs b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/drop_list.rsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..359cdb41--- /dev/null+++ b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/drop_list.rs@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@+//! Server-side drop list for tool events (`[ingest]`, #1241).+//!+//! An operator can name tool calls the server should never store, whatever the+//! client sends: tool-use ids by prefix (Claude Code marks plugin tool calls+//! with their own id prefix) and tool names exactly. A matching event is+//! acknowledged like any other policy drop, before it reaches the sanitizer,+//! the rate limiter, the ingest semaphore or storage. The lists are read once+//! at startup and bounded, so the check stays cheap on the hook path.++use crate::payload::{HookEnvelope, HookEvent};++/// Most entries either list may hold.+pub const MAX_DROP_ENTRIES: usize = 64;+/// Longest entry, in characters.+pub const MAX_DROP_ENTRY_CHARS: usize = 128;++/// Tool events the server drops by tool-use id prefix or exact tool name.+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]+pub struct IngestDropList {+ tool_use_id_prefixes: Vec<String>,+ tool_names: Vec<String>,+}++impl IngestDropList {+ /// Validate and build the list.+ ///+ /// # Errors+ /// Returns a message naming the offending list when either holds more than+ /// [`MAX_DROP_ENTRIES`] entries, or an entry that is blank, longer than+ /// [`MAX_DROP_ENTRY_CHARS`] characters, or contains a control character.+ pub fn new(tool_use_id_prefixes: Vec<String>, tool_names: Vec<String>) -> Result<Self, String> {+ validate("drop_tool_use_id_prefixes", &tool_use_id_prefixes)?;+ validate("drop_tool_names", &tool_names)?;+ Ok(Self {+ tool_use_id_prefixes,+ tool_names,+ })+ }++ /// Whether this tool event is on the list. Only tool events can match.+ #[must_use]+ pub fn matches(&self, env: &HookEnvelope) -> bool {+ if self.tool_use_id_prefixes.is_empty() && self.tool_names.is_empty() {+ return false;+ }+ if !matches!(env.event, HookEvent::PreToolUse | HookEvent::PostToolUse) {+ return false;+ }+ let tool_use_id = crate::payload::event_tool_use_id(&env.raw);+ if let Some(id) = tool_use_id.as_deref()+ && self+ .tool_use_id_prefixes+ .iter()+ .any(|prefix| id.starts_with(prefix.as_str()))+ {+ return true;+ }+ crate::payload::event_tool_name(&env.raw)+ .is_some_and(|name| self.tool_names.contains(&name))+ }+}++fn validate(list: &str, entries: &[String]) -> Result<(), String> {+ if entries.len() > MAX_DROP_ENTRIES {+ return Err(format!(+ "[ingest].{list} holds {} entries; the limit is {MAX_DROP_ENTRIES}",+ entries.len()+ ));+ }+ for entry in entries {+ if entry.trim().is_empty() {+ return Err(format!("[ingest].{list} has a blank entry"));+ }+ if entry.chars().count() > MAX_DROP_ENTRY_CHARS {+ return Err(format!(+ "[ingest].{list} has an entry longer than {MAX_DROP_ENTRY_CHARS} characters"+ ));+ }+ if entry.chars().any(char::is_control) {+ return Err(format!(+ "[ingest].{list} has an entry with a control character"+ ));+ }+ }+ Ok(())+}++#[cfg(test)]+mod tests {+ use super::*;+ use crate::payload::HookQuery;++ fn event(name: &str, body: serde_json::Value) -> HookEnvelope {+ HookEnvelope::from_query_and_body(+ HookQuery {+ event: name.into(),+ agent: Some("claude-code".into()),+ ..Default::default()+ },+ body,+ )+ }++ fn list() -> IngestDropList {+ IngestDropList::new(+ vec!["toolu_plugin_".into()],+ vec!["mcp__noisy__poll".into()],+ )+ .unwrap()+ }++ #[test]+ fn a_tool_use_id_prefix_or_exact_tool_name_matches() {+ let by_id = event(+ "post-tool-use",+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "s", "tool_name": "Read", "tool_use_id": "toolu_plugin_42" }),+ );+ assert!(list().matches(&by_id));+ let by_name = event(+ "pre-tool-use",+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "s", "tool_name": "mcp__noisy__poll", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01" }),+ );+ assert!(list().matches(&by_name));+ }++ #[test]+ fn other_tools_prefixes_inside_ids_and_non_tool_events_do_not_match() {+ let ordinary = event(+ "post-tool-use",+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "s", "tool_name": "Read", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01abc" }),+ );+ assert!(!list().matches(&ordinary));+ // A prefix matches at the start only, and a name only exactly.+ let embedded = event(+ "post-tool-use",+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "s", "tool_name": "mcp__noisy__poll_more", "tool_use_id": "x_toolu_plugin_1" }),+ );+ assert!(!list().matches(&embedded));+ let prompt = event(+ "user-prompt-submit",+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "s", "tool_name": "mcp__noisy__poll", "prompt": "hi" }),+ );+ assert!(!list().matches(&prompt));+ assert!(!IngestDropList::default().matches(&ordinary));+ }++ #[test]+ fn entries_are_bounded_and_must_be_printable() {+ assert!(IngestDropList::new(vec![" ".into()], Vec::new()).is_err());+ assert!(IngestDropList::new(Vec::new(), vec!["a\nb".into()]).is_err());+ assert!(+ IngestDropList::new(vec!["x".repeat(MAX_DROP_ENTRY_CHARS + 1)], Vec::new()).is_err()+ );+ let too_many = (0..=MAX_DROP_ENTRIES).map(|i| format!("t{i}")).collect();+ assert!(IngestDropList::new(Vec::new(), too_many).is_err());+ assert!(IngestDropList::new(vec!["x".repeat(MAX_DROP_ENTRY_CHARS)], Vec::new()).is_ok());+ }+}diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/lib.rs b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/lib.rsindex 9b63ac73..38f366f7 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/lib.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/lib.rs@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@pub mod antigravity;mod assistant_capture;pub mod capture_policy;+pub mod drop_list;mod grants;pub mod log;pub mod payload;@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ pub use capture_policy::{absolute_tool_location_paths, capture_lookup_locations, describe_invalid_capture_config,glob_segment_matches, glob_walk, repository_admits_capture, tool_call_payload, valid_call_id,};+pub use drop_list::IngestDropList;pub use payload::{HookEnvelope, HookEvent, NOTIFICATION_EXCERPT_MAX_BYTES, POST_COMPACTION_EXCERPT_MAX_BYTES,USER_PROMPT_EXCERPT_MAX_BYTES, agent_from_payload, cap_lifecycle_body_for_client,diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/payload.rs b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/payload.rsindex 680689a6..e06a00a8 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/payload.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/payload.rs@@ -957,6 +957,16 @@ fn antigravity_edit_content(agent: AgentKind, raw: &serde_json::Value) -> Option)}+/// The tool a tool event names, under the keys the observation title uses.+pub(crate) fn event_tool_name(raw: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {+ extract_string(raw, &["tool", "tool_name", "name"])+}++/// The tool-use id a tool event carries (Claude-family payloads).+pub(crate) fn event_tool_use_id(raw: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {+ extract_string(raw, &["tool_use_id"])+}+fn extract_string(value: &serde_json::Value, keys: &[&str]) -> Option<String> {for key in keys {for candidate in extraction_candidates(value) {diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rsindex 9c404948..0539b207 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs@@ -549,6 +549,10 @@ pub struct HookState {/// (`docs/design-cross-project-profile.md`). Held here because the hooks/// crate makes no config reads.pub profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings,+ /// `[ingest]` drop list: tool events matching a listed tool-use id prefix+ /// or tool name are acknowledged and dropped before any capacity is spent+ /// (#1241). Empty by default.+ pub ingest_drop_list: crate::drop_list::IngestDropList,}/// The owner to stamp on the session and handoff rows this event creates@@ -688,6 +692,12 @@ async fn admit_hook(HookProcessingOutcome::DroppedInvalid.record(&state.ingest_metrics);return (StatusCode::ACCEPTED, "cursor draft placeholder dropped");}+ // The operator's server-side drop list (#1241): acknowledged as a policy+ // drop before the rate limiter or the semaphore, so it costs nothing.+ if state.ingest_drop_list.matches(&env) {+ HookProcessingOutcome::DroppedPolicy.record(&state.ingest_metrics);+ return (StatusCode::ACCEPTED, "ingest drop list");+ }// Accept-but-drop subagent captures (incl. the unmarked tail of tracked// subagent sessions) when the operator opts in. Returning 202 (not an error)// means the client treats the event as delivered and never retries/spools@@ -965,6 +975,16 @@ async fn handle_hook_batch(accepted_indices.push(idx);continue;}+ // Server-side drop list (#1241), acknowledged like a policy drop.+ if state.ingest_drop_list.matches(&env) {+ HookProcessingOutcome::DroppedPolicy.record(&state.ingest_metrics);+ results.push(HookBatchResult {+ index: idx,+ outcome: HookProcessingOutcome::DroppedPolicy,+ });+ accepted_indices.push(idx);+ continue;+ }// Accept-but-drop subagent captures (see `handle_hook`): count the item// as committed so the client clears it from its spool, but do not store// it. Keeps the contiguous-prefix ack contract intact.@@ -6049,6 +6069,7 @@ mod tests {per_user_slots: false,mid_session_routing: MidSessionRouting::default(),profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings::default(),+ ingest_drop_list: crate::drop_list::IngestDropList::default(),}}@@ -8462,6 +8483,108 @@ mod tests {/// the subagent tail-drop. They are separate call sites in/// `handle_hook_batch`, so a single-branch case would leave the other/// silently uncounted — the exact failure this change exists to fix.+ fn with_drop_list(state: &mut HookState) {+ state.ingest_drop_list = crate::drop_list::IngestDropList::new(+ vec!["toolu_plugin_".into()],+ vec!["mcp__noisy__poll".into()],+ )+ .unwrap();+ }++ /// #1241: a listed tool event is acknowledged and dropped before any+ /// capacity is spent. With the semaphore exhausted, the listed event+ /// still answers 202 while an ordinary one gets the 429 (control).+ #[tokio::test]+ async fn the_ingest_drop_list_drops_before_any_capacity_is_spent() {+ let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let mut state = make_state(&tmp).await;+ with_drop_list(&mut state);+ state.ingest_semaphore = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(0));+ let metrics = state.ingest_metrics.clone();+ let state = Arc::new(state);+ let query = || HookQuery {+ event: "post-tool-use".into(),+ agent: Some("claude-code".into()),+ ..Default::default()+ };++ let (status, reason) = admit_hook(+ state.clone(),+ query(),+ None,+ None,+ None,+ HeaderMap::new(),+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "drop-1", "tool_name": "Read", "tool_use_id": "toolu_plugin_9" }),+ )+ .await;+ assert_eq!((status, reason), (StatusCode::ACCEPTED, "ingest drop list"));+ let (status, _) = admit_hook(+ state.clone(),+ query(),+ None,+ None,+ None,+ HeaderMap::new(),+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "drop-1", "tool_name": "mcp__noisy__poll" }),+ )+ .await;+ assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::ACCEPTED);++ let (status, _) = admit_hook(+ state.clone(),+ query(),+ None,+ None,+ None,+ HeaderMap::new(),+ serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "drop-1", "tool_name": "Read", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01" }),+ )+ .await;+ assert_eq!(+ status,+ StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,+ "control: an unlisted event needs capacity"+ );+ let snap = metrics.snapshot();+ assert_eq!(snap.dropped_by_policy, 2);+ }++ /// The batch route drops listed items as committed (so the client clears+ /// them from its spool) and stores the rest.+ #[tokio::test]+ async fn the_ingest_drop_list_applies_to_hook_batches() {+ let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let mut state = make_state(&tmp).await;+ with_drop_list(&mut state);+ let metrics = state.ingest_metrics.clone();+ let item = |body: serde_json::Value| HookBatchItem {+ url: "http://h/hook?event=post-tool-use&agent=claude-code".into(),+ body,+ };+ let response = handle_hook_batch(+ State(Arc::new(state)),+ None,+ None,+ None,+ HeaderMap::new(),+ Json(vec![+ item(serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "drop-b", "tool_name": "Read", "tool_use_id": "toolu_plugin_1" })),+ item(serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "drop-b", "tool_name": "mcp__noisy__poll" })),+ item(serde_json::json!({ "session_id": "drop-b", "tool_name": "Read", "tool_use_id": "toolu_02" })),+ ]),+ )+ .await+ .into_response();+ assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);+ let snap = metrics.snapshot();+ assert_eq!(+ snap.dropped_by_policy, 2,+ "both listed items are policy drops"+ );+ assert_eq!(snap.accepted, 1, "control: the unlisted item is ingested");+ }+#[tokio::test]async fn handle_hook_batch_records_dropped_by_policy() {let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/admin_metrics.rs b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/admin_metrics.rsindex 153af370..85c129b0 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/admin_metrics.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/admin_metrics.rs@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ async fn harness() -> Harness {per_user_slots: false,mid_session_routing: ai_memory_core::MidSessionRouting::default(),profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings::default(),+ ingest_drop_list: ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::default(),subagent_sessions: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(SubagentSessionSet::default())),ingest_rate: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(ai_memory_hooks::IngestRateLimiter::disabled(),diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/autoscope_multiuser.rs b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/autoscope_multiuser.rsindex 8ca5769f..7e791078 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/autoscope_multiuser.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/autoscope_multiuser.rs@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ impl MultiUserHarness {per_user_slots: false,mid_session_routing: ai_memory_core::MidSessionRouting::default(),profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings::default(),+ ingest_drop_list: ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::default(),subagent_sessions: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(SubagentSessionSet::default())),ingest_rate: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(ai_memory_hooks::IngestRateLimiter::disabled(),diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/stress_autoscope.rs b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/stress_autoscope.rsindex 042c71e5..4f0ac47b 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/stress_autoscope.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/tests/suite/stress_autoscope.rs@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ impl Harness {per_user_slots: false,mid_session_routing: ai_memory_core::MidSessionRouting::default(),profile: ai_memory_core::profile::ProfileSettings::default(),+ ingest_drop_list: ai_memory_hooks::IngestDropList::default(),subagent_sessions: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(SubagentSessionSet::default())),ingest_rate: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(ai_memory_hooks::IngestRateLimiter::disabled(),diff --git a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.mdindex 21a5ba70..00adbb1f 100644--- a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md+++ b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md@@ -1165,6 +1165,12 @@ max_attempts = 8 # failed drain passes before dropping an event# only this limit. Age (7 days) and spool size (10,000 files)# still bound retention. Runtime env wins when set:# AI_MEMORY_HOOK_SPOOL_MAX_ATTEMPTS++[ingest] # server-side drop list for tool events (#1241)+drop_tool_use_id_prefixes = [] # e.g. ["toolu_plugin_"]: drop a tool event whose id starts so+drop_tool_names = [] # exact tool names to drop; both lists apply to every project,+ # at most 64 entries of 128 characters, checked before the+ # sanitizer, rate limiter and ingest semaphore```The zero-LLM `query_intent` router also recognizes explicit Brazilian Portuguesediff --git a/docs/security-boundaries.md b/docs/security-boundaries.mdindex 19b24ead..96d31d33 100644--- a/docs/security-boundaries.md+++ b/docs/security-boundaries.md@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ means the boundary is not built yet.| 11h | Docker-wrapper capture-policy capability (#1002) | `bin/ai-memory` routes ordinary Linux/macOS `install-hooks` and upgrade refreshes through the stable checksum-verified native host client, so the hook process executes the capture-policy boundary in 11b before spool/network. Only an explicit `AI_MEMORY_HOOK_PLATFORM=posix|windows` retains the documented script compatibility path and its warning; `AI_MEMORY_NATIVE_BIN` may not point back to the wrapper. For a server initialized on the named volume, `bin/ai-memory` `refresh_volume_token` (run only by `install-hooks`) copies `/data/auth-tokens/default` (only when `/data/config.toml` names it) to an owner-only `native-runner/server-token` through the helper's stdout, and `use_volume_token` points the native client at that copy (the managed host commands and `mcp-bridge` only read it and never enter the container engine) with `AI_MEMORY_AUTH__BEARER_TOKEN_FILE`, so it is a file-sourced token (never rendered into a harness config) and never an argv; a bind-mounted `AI_MEMORY_DATA_DIR` is read directly and an explicit `AI_MEMORY_AUTH_TOKEN` wins | `scripts/check-native-packaging.sh` `Checking host-launch wrapper routing`: a default allowlist install reaches the fake native client while a Docker executable that always fails proves no container fallback occurred; the explicit `posix` control reaches fake Docker and adds no native invocation; the self-referential native override is refused; `Checking the wrapper hands host commands the volume's root bearer`: for `mcp-bridge`, `install-hooks` and `run` the fake native client receives the token file (mode 600, right content) and the token is absent from its argv; controls: a bind-mounted data dir and an explicit `AI_MEMORY_AUTH_TOKEN` make no copy and ask no container (bite: dropping the export fails the check); `auth_default_e2e.rs` `a_host_client_given_the_token_file_by_env_authenticates` (the native side of the handoff, with a no-variable control) | STRONG on the shipped Linux/macOS wrapper. Windows and remote/manual script installers remain explicitly outside capture-policy v1 || 11j | Offline recovery journal and transcript replay | `ai-memory-cli/src/commands/recovery.rs` keeps bounded locators, ordered semantic transcript digests, pre-launch cursors and persistent correlated-delivery/loss evidence in an atomic journal, refuses a symlinked data dir and any symlinked component inside it (ancestors above the data dir are trusted, so macOS `/var` → `/private/var` works), sanitizes/caps failure reasons, and bounds each replay plus the whole pass; `hook_spool` coordinates enqueue and quarantine with short filesystem locks, canonically resolves partial scope from the recorded cwd, bounds per-file reads and current global occupancy across the main spool and recovery directories, sweeps completed tombstones, and holds correlated events outside drain until replay succeeds or restores them on failure; degraded resumes use `ai-memory-workstream`'s adapter-validated delta export, whose blocking parse and baseline scans are capped by record, event-count, source-byte and serialized-byte totals; `backfill::import_exact_session` chunks by item and byte limits and requires per-item durable acknowledgements; `run.rs` journals every session launch, including explicit spool-only evidence for unsupported exporters, and journals a resumed export only after capturing its exact pre-launch cursor; `workstream.rs` `/recover/finish` retains owner/project authorization, rejects superseded runs, and validates a finished retry by durable transcript/native/cursor/exit identity without regenerating its checkpoint; validated recovery ingest keys bind session, agent, event kind and sanitized event identity until session purge | `transcript.rs` `persisted_baseline_exports_only_offline_append_and_rejects_rewrite`, parser/baseline cap and ordered-semantic digest tests; CLI `run_offline.rs` real degraded spool-only and overlap/idempotency tests; `recovery.rs` `spool_only_without_correlated_evidence_never_auto_clears`, `a_dropped_spool_event_stays_lost_on_the_next_empty_pass`, loss/time-budget tests, `symlinked_journal_and_ancestor_are_refused`, `a_symlinked_ancestor_of_the_data_dir_is_trusted`, `a_symlink_inside_a_data_dir_under_a_symlinked_ancestor_is_refused`; `hook_spool.rs` partial-scope late enqueue, completion-race, occupancy churn/active-cap, bounded-read and tombstone-sweep tests, plus interval isolation (`completed_tombstone_keeps_a_later_resume_of_the_same_session` proves a post-interval resume hook is delivered, `completing_one_recovery_interval_leaves_the_other_intervals_entries_intact` proves one interval's completion never consumes another's evidence and ambiguous entries fail closed into the main spool); `backfill.rs` `two_sequential_recovery_intervals_on_one_resumed_session_replay_exactly_once` proves the second interval's content and session-end are stored with end-of-session effects while reruns stay pure replays; `transcript.rs` `an_oversized_first_record_is_skipped_by_session_listing_caps` proves the first-record byte caps bite before allocation; store `insert_observation_ingest_dedups_on_key` rejects cross-session and changed-event preclaims; hooks `expired_run_recovery_is_owner_only_and_refuses_superseded_runs` proves changed transcript refusal and changed-checkpoint no-op | STRONG on Unix integration coverage; Unix lock opens use no-follow and atomic replacement rechecks the destination. Windows owner-only ACL/reparse and lock semantics require the PR `windows` lane || 11i | OpenCode executable probing and generated-config cleanup (#1097) | `ai-memory-cli/src/config.rs` captures the full process environment once in typed `RuntimeEnv`; `run.rs` overlays explicit `run --env` values with platform key semantics and uses that same effective environment for executable resolution, probing, and launch without rereading process environment; `opencode_dialect.rs` invokes only direct argv `--version`, caps output and time, and rejects malformed/future majors. Automatic launch skips only OpenCode on probe failure; explicit OpenCode fails. `install_hooks.rs` quarantines the incompatible sibling before reading its exact ownership markers, restores unowned content with an atomic no-replace link, and never deletes or overwrites a concurrent replacement; `install_mcp.rs` owns the shared dual-schema endpoint/token inference used by both installers, rejects conflicting generated V1/V2 entries before mutation, and migrates an alternate-major entry only when endpoint, generated shape, and absent-or-Authorization-only headers match, preserving custom headers and ambiguous entries; auto-wire migrates MCP before hooks infer from that exact config path and skips hook mutation when transition preflight fails | `run.rs` `automatic_opencode_probe_failure_keeps_another_harness_available`, `opencode_executable_probe_selects_v2_for_launch_and_autowire`, effective-child-environment PATH casing controls, fake V1/V2/env-derived-major/malformed/future/timeout executable tests, `setup-agent` V1/V2 no-probe integration controls; `install_hooks.rs` `opencode_plugin_cleanup_removes_only_exact_owned_incompatible_sibling`, `opencode_plugin_cleanup_preserves_a_concurrent_user_replacement`, `opencode_plugin_restore_moves_quarantine_when_destination_is_free`, `opencode_plugin_restore_preserves_an_existing_replacement`, `opencode_plugin_restore_does_not_replace_a_file_created_at_restore_window`, `opencode_plugin_cleanup_does_not_escape_custom_target_directory`; `install_mcp.rs` `opencode_install_reuses_owned_endpoint_and_token_across_major_transitions`, `opencode_install_refuses_conflicting_owned_transition_entries`, `opencode_install_does_not_infer_from_a_user_owned_transition_entry`, `opencode_mcp_migration_moves_only_owned_alternate_shape`, `opencode_mcp_migration_preserves_ambiguous_user_entry`, `opencode_mcp_migration_preserves_custom_headers`, `opencode_mcp_migration_accepts_only_historical_generated_headers` | STRONG for Unix process probes and platform-neutral ownership gates; exact Windows executable resolution remains covered by `run.rs` resolver tests and requires the PR `windows` label |+| 11k | Server-side tool drop list (#1241) | `ai-memory-hooks/src/drop_list.rs` `IngestDropList::matches`, checked in `router.rs` `admit_hook` and the `handle_hook_batch` loop right after the client capture protocol and before the rate limiter, the ingest semaphore, the sanitizer and storage; lists from `[ingest] drop_tool_use_id_prefixes` / `drop_tool_names`, validated once in `Config::load` (at most 64 entries of 128 printable characters each). Only tool events match: a tool-use id by prefix, a tool name exactly. A drop answers 202 and counts as `dropped_by_policy`; the matched value is never logged | `router.rs` `the_ingest_drop_list_drops_before_any_capacity_is_spent` (with the semaphore exhausted a listed event still answers 202; control: an unlisted one gets 429) and `the_ingest_drop_list_applies_to_hook_batches` (listed items acknowledged as policy drops, the unlisted item ingested); `drop_list.rs` unit tests (prefix only at the start, names only exact, non-tool events never match, bounds refused). Both router tests fail with `matches` forced to `false` | STRONG. The list applies to every project on the server; it narrows what is stored and never widens access || 12 | Network/auth posture, including auth on by default for new installs (an existing install keeps loopback no-auth until `ai-memory auth enable`) | `config.rs` loopback `DEFAULT_BIND`; `serve.rs` `validate_http_exposure`, `require_allowed_host`; `auth.rs` `require_bearer`; `serve.rs` mounts `/identity` inside the host and machine-auth gates even with web disabled; `nix/nixos-module.nix` treats only literal `127.0.0.1`/`::1` as loopback, requires exactly one secret environment source for other binds, keeps secret auth and `llm_headers` values out of the Nix store, and brackets IPv6 in `ExecStart`; new-install default: `commands/init.rs` `root_bearer_for_new_config` mints a root bearer only on a fresh data dir (no config file and no database) and only when no bearer is supplied otherwise, via `local_auth.rs` `provision_root_token` (`auth-tokens/` `0700`, file `0600`, atomic, reused when present) and records the relative `[auth].bearer_token_file`; `config.rs` `apply_bearer_token_file` reads it once (`AI_MEMORY_AUTH_TOKEN` wins, inline + file together refused, a missing or blank file leaves no bearer) and `discover_root_token` lets a packaged install's client commands use `<data_dir>/auth-tokens/default` only with no config file at the probed path, a loopback server URL and no registered `default` profile; `serve.rs` `refuse_a_missing_token_file` stops a server whose configured file holds no token; `AuthSettings::renderable_bearer_token` keeps a file-sourced token out of every renderer: `install_mcp.rs` `route_file_token` (Claude Code gets the session-aware `ai-memory mcp-bridge` entry, Codex and Prime Agent name `AI_MEMORY_AUTH_TOKEN`, every other client a `stdio_bridge_entry` that runs `mcp-bridge --no-session-id` in its documented stdio shape, Pi keeps its extension, ZCode (HTTP-only) is refused) and `mcp_bridge.rs`, which authenticates with the config-resolved bearer and connects upstream before serving stdio, so a refused token ends it with `401 Unauthorized` instead of hanging; `uninstall.rs` `mcp_entry_is_ours` / `toml_mcp_entry_targets` recognise bridge entries by `install_mcp::bridge_entry_url`; `auth_enable.rs` `rewire_clients` re-registers every client whose entry targets this server, `install_hooks.rs` (persisted to the hook credential files, never inlined, not even on the F5 persist-failure fallback), `setup_agent.rs`, `run_autowire.rs`, `setup.rs` (runs `init`, adopts the minted token in memory through `adopt_token_file`, and calls the installers with no explicit token; the rendered user unit carries none; `user_service.rs` `is_rendered_by_setup` lets `uninstall` stop and delete only a unit carrying `setup`'s identity line whose SHA-256 still matches, never a hand-written or edited one); `local_auth.rs` `seed_hook_credential` gives hooks the token through `auth-token`/`auth-header` and keeps a different stored credential; `uninstall.rs` keeps the root bearer (`server_profiles::clear_tokens` `keep`); `commands/auth_enable.rs` is the idempotent opt-in | `serve.rs` host-guard (missing→400 / forged→403), non-loopback-requires-token; `auth.rs` wrong-token 401; `serve.rs` `machine_identity_remains_authenticated_with_web_disabled_and_expired_keys` (wrong and expired keys refused, valid machine key accepted, web remains disabled); `flake.nix` `nixos-module-eval` refuses `localhost` and `0.0.0.0` without a secret source, refuses two secret sources, `settings.auth` secrets, and `settings.llm_headers`, with literal IPv4/IPv6 loopback and one-source controls; `cli/tests/suite/auth_default_e2e.rs` against the shipped binary: `a_fresh_install_requires_the_token_and_its_own_clients_still_work` (after `init`, unauthenticated `/mcp`, `/hook`, `/api/v1/projects`, `/admin/status` → 401 and `/healthz` → 200; the same requests with the token succeed; the native hook delivers with no token in its environment, `status` authenticates through config, `mcp-bridge` lists tools; the token is in neither process's `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`; after `install-hooks`, `install-mcp --apply` for every client it writes (21, by default config path under the test home), a refused ZCode install and `auth enable` twice, a scan of the whole home finds the token nowhere and a scan of the data dir finds it only in the token file and the two hook credential files), `an_existing_install_is_unchanged_until_auth_enable` (control: a pre-default install serves every route open and `status` names the fix; `auth enable` twice is idempotent, rewires Claude Code to the bridge, and after a restart the routes refuse and the hook still delivers), `a_packaged_install_with_an_external_config_wires_its_clients`, `uninstall_keeps_the_root_bearer_and_a_missing_one_stops_the_server`, `a_host_client_given_the_token_file_by_env_authenticates`; `init.rs` `a_fresh_init_mints_a_root_bearer_the_loader_reads`, `init_on_an_existing_install_does_not_turn_auth_on`, `init_with_a_supplied_bearer_mints_nothing`, `re_running_init_keeps_the_same_root_bearer`; `config.rs` `a_relative_bearer_token_file_resolves_against_the_data_dir`, `a_missing_or_blank_bearer_token_file_is_reported_not_guessed`, `the_env_token_wins_over_the_bearer_token_file`, `an_inline_bearer_and_a_bearer_token_file_together_are_refused`, `a_client_without_a_config_file_discovers_the_root_bearer`, `root_bearer_discovery_is_refused_outside_its_narrow_case` (existing config, remote URL, `default` profile, env token); `auth_default_e2e.rs` `a_session_less_bridge_serves_any_client_without_holding_the_token` (`tools/list` and a scoped `memory_query` through `mcp-bridge --no-session-id` against a fresh auth-on server, the token in neither the bridge's `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` nor its `/proc/<pid>/environ`; control: the session-aware mode still refuses to start without `CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID`) and `a_bridge_without_the_token_is_refused_cleanly_not_hung` (exits promptly naming `401 Unauthorized`); `mcp_bridge.rs` `only_the_session_aware_mode_forwards_and_requires_a_session_id`, `a_session_less_upstream_config_carries_no_session_header`, `stdio_bridge_forwards_tools_and_session_header_in_both_http_modes` (control); `install_mcp.rs` `a_file_sourced_token_wires_every_client_without_entering_its_config` (every written client: no token, no header, an entry that reaches the server; ZCode refused and unwritten), `stdio_bridge_entries_follow_each_clients_documented_shape`, `inline_and_explicit_tokens_still_embed_as_before` (control); `uninstall.rs` `bridge_entries_are_recognised_by_their_upstream_url` (JSON, OpenCode array and TOML shapes; a bridge to another server and a foreign command are kept); `install_hooks.rs` `a_file_sourced_token_is_persisted_but_never_embedded`; `auth_enable.rs` `enable_twice_is_idempotent_and_leaks_the_token_into_no_harness_config` (every client pre-wired over HTTP is re-registered, ZCode reported as manual, the second run byte-identical), `enable_leaves_an_entry_for_another_server_alone`, `enable_refuses_while_a_default_profile_would_share_the_token`; `local_auth.rs` `the_root_bearer_is_owner_only`, `seeding_never_replaces_a_different_hook_credential`; `setup_e2e.rs` `setup_installs_wires_is_idempotent_and_uninstall_removes_its_unit` (one `setup --yes` in a fresh temp home: the token is in no file under the home but the token file and the two hook credential files, not in the user unit and not in `setup`'s output; the self-check's `memory_status` and a hook event authenticate through the file; `uninstall` then disables and deletes the unit once and a second `uninstall` calls nothing), `uninstall_leaves_a_unit_it_did_not_write` (adversarial: the packaged unit copied by hand is kept, no `systemctl` call); `user_service.rs` `a_foreign_or_edited_unit_is_left_alone`, `rendered_units_carry_an_identity_that_survives_only_unedited` | STRONG. Bite checks for the new-install default: with fresh-install minting disabled the fresh e2e routes answer without a token and the `init` tests fail; with `renderable_bearer_token` returning the file token, `install-mcp`, `install-hooks`, `auth enable` and the e2e scans find it in harness configs; without the `serve` refusal a server whose token file was deleted keeps running (the e2e times out on it); without the hook seeding the fresh e2e hook is refused; without `clear_tokens` `keep` uninstall deletes the root bearer; with `route_file_token` no longer choosing the stdio bridge the every-client and `auth enable` tests fail; with `auth enable` skipping the re-registration its test fails; with the session-less mode forwarding an inherited id the bridge unit test fails; without the 401 naming the refusal e2e fails; without bridge-entry recognition the uninstall test fails; with `setup` handing the token to `install-mcp` its scan finds it in `.claude.json`; with `is_rendered_by_setup` accepting any unit, the foreign-unit tests fail; with discovery removed the packaged e2e gets 401, and with each discovery guard removed the matching case of `root_bearer_discovery_is_refused_outside_its_narrow_case` fails. Residual: a hand-edited `servers.toml` that adds a `default` profile after the root bearer exists would read the root bearer as that profile's token (`server add` refuses it, `auth enable` refuses while it exists); ZCode takes only HTTP entries and is refused, so it needs a manual entry; the stdio entries for Zero, Muse Code and DeepSeek Harness follow their documented or source-level format but were not run against those clients || 12b | Managed-workstream provenance privacy, stable replay identity and server event namespace | `ai-memory-core/src/workstream.rs` `scrub_workstream_provenance`; `ai-memory-hooks/src/workstream.rs` `finish_run` reserved client-id check and `sanitize_events` before immutable segments, with `sanitize_events` and `append_boundary_events` scrubbing event/checkpoint/losses content *before* the 64 KiB cap so a cap-straddling secret is never cut into an unmatchable prefix (#1113); `ai-memory-store/src/workstream.rs` `finish_run` stable identity check and `stored_event`, scrubbing content with the explicitly supplied configured sanitizer before its 16 KiB store-boundary bound; no changes to the typed observation boundary | `store/tests/suite/workstream_provenance.rs` `workstream_provenance_is_bounded_scrubbed_and_idempotent_before_storage` (hostile and oversized source ids, unknown metadata, legitimate correlation, retry and distinct event ids), `workstream_provenance_legacy_reads_strip_secrets_and_unknown_metadata` (search and tail, malformed/oversized legacy JSON), `workstream_provenance_reused_event_id_retains_data_and_refuses_identity_change` (first indexed version retained, identity refusal and batch rollback), `workstream_provenance_replay_survives_sanitizer_changes` (new extra patterns and removal of a built-in-pattern allowlist exemption, with identity-refusal control), `workstream_provenance_replay_preserves_legacy_rows_above_bounds`, `workstream_provenance_finished_run_ignores_late_events`, `workstream_provenance_retry_with_marker_matching_pattern_is_idempotent`, `workstream_content_is_scrubbed_before_the_store_cap` (a credential straddling the 16 KiB store cap is redacted, not persisted as an unmatchable prefix; benign control verbatim; #1113); `hooks` `workstream_provenance_finish_scrubs_before_raw_segment_and_search` (custom sanitizer, immutable segment, SQL recovery and finished-run no-op), `workstream_provenance_client_cannot_use_server_event_ids` (reserved ids refused before raw writes, normal client event and server-generated checkpoint/loss controls), `finish_run_scrubs_event_content_before_the_byte_cap` and `finish_run_scrubs_boundary_events_before_the_byte_cap` (a credential straddling the 64 KiB event cap is redacted in the raw segment and never reaches the index; checkpoint/losses and benign controls; #1113); `cli/tests/suite/workstream_provenance.rs` (text/JSON and old server DTOs) | STRONG: privacy, stable-identity and reserved-namespace regressions fail with their guards bypassed; an isolated allowlist bypass fails on the unknown key, and bypassing the raw-id search authorization returns 200 where its test requires 403. No provenance is emitted in startup packets, and old raw segments are not rewritten || 12c | Browser cross-origin writes refused on an unauthenticated server (a foreign page in the operator's browser, DNS rebinding, and a LAN host where browsers send no fetch metadata) | `serve.rs` `refuse_cross_origin_browser_requests` / `is_cross_origin_browser_request`, layered on the machine (`/mcp`, `/hook*`, `/handoff`, `/workstream/*`, `/identity`) and admin (`/admin/*`) routes when auth is off: `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` → 403, or, without fetch metadata, an `Origin` whose authority is not the `Host` → 403; and `is_non_script_browser_request`: any `Sec-Fetch-Dest` other than `empty` (case-insensitive; non-UTF-8 refused) → 403 whatever `Sec-Fetch-Site` says, so links, images, navigations, iframes and form posts are refused even as `same-origin` or `none`. Browsers send fetch metadata over plain HTTP only to a potentially trustworthy host, so on any other `Host` (a LAN address or name in the allowlist, `0.0.0.0`, `host.docker.internal`; `is_loopback_host` admits only `localhost`, `*.localhost`, `127.0.0.0/8` and `[::1]`) `handoff_fetch_lacks_client_marker` also refuses `GET`/`HEAD /handoff` without a non-empty `X-AI-Memory-Client` header (`ai_memory_hooks::CLIENT_MARKER_HEADER`) → 403 whose body names both remedies (re-stage hooks, or set a bearer token). A page cannot add that header without a preflight these routes never answer. `/handoff` is the one state-changing `GET` on these routes; the other `GET`s are reads a foreign page cannot see the answer to, and every cross-origin `POST` carries `Origin`. Every first-party client sends the marker: the native hook (`hook_capture.rs` `post_hook`/`post_batch`/`get_handoff`), CLI subcommands (`http_client.rs` `ServerEndpoint::authenticate`), every curl in `hooks/_lib.sh`, both header tables in `hooks/lib/ai-memory-hook.ps1`, and the generated TypeScript integrations (`render_shared.rs` `ts_auth_headers_fn` plus the spool drain). Loopback hosts keep accepting a fetch without it, so hooks staged before the header existed still work on a default install, except that a request carrying any proxy forwarding header (`Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-For`/`-Host`/`-Proto`/`-Server`/`-Port`, `X-Original-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `Via`; `PROXY_HEADERS`) counts as non-loopback, since a plain-HTTP proxy can rewrite `Host` to loopback while the browser behind it sent no fetch metadata. No first-party client sends those headers. Hooks, the CLI and MCP clients send none of these headers; the web UI's same-origin `/admin/pending-writes` calls are `fetch()` (`Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty`) and pass. Behind it, axum `Json` and rmcp's `Content-Type: application/json` check refuse the preflight-free content types (`text/plain`, form-urlencoded, multipart) with 415; `require_allowed_host` (and rmcp `allowed_hosts` on `/mcp`) refuses a rebinding `Host`; machine/admin routes carry no CORS layer, so a preflight never comes back permissive. A stored wiki page viewed in the built-in web UI could otherwise turn the guard's same-origin allowance into a claim: `ai-memory-web/src/markdown.rs` `safe_image_url` / `is_safe_image_target` render as `#` any image target that is root-relative, a network path, carries a `..` segment (also percent-encoded), or, for a UI mounted at the base-path root, starts with a server route segment Every `/web` surface (built-in pages including `/web/pending`, the login page, a custom SPA and `/api/v1`) answers `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` (`ai-memory-web/src/mount.rs` `deny_framing`), because a framed page's own Approve/Reject `fetch()` is same-origin and the guard rightly lets it through | `cli/tests/suite/cross_origin_e2e.rs` `browser_cross_origin_requests_cannot_write_to_an_unauthenticated_loopback_server`, against the shipped `serve`: every write route (`/hook`, `/hook/batch`, MCP `memory_write_page`/`memory_delete_page`/`memory_message_send`/`memory_handoff_accept`, `/admin/write-page`/`delete-page`/`purge-project`/`messages/send`, `/workstream/runs`) × each simple content type × modern, Origin-only and fetch-metadata-only browser shapes → 4xx; body-less `GET /handoff` (which claims the single-use baton), `POST /admin/profile/rebuild` and `POST /admin/backup` → 403; a rebinding `Host` → 403; preflights answer no `Access-Control-Allow-*`; `GET /handoff` as a same-origin `document` or `image` and as a `Sec-Fetch-Site: none` `document` → 403 with the baton still open. Then a canary scan of the whole data dir, page/project/handoff survival, and legitimate controls (JSON MCP calls, a JSON hook → 202, the web UI's same-origin `/admin/pending-writes` list and approve reach their handlers, the anonymous active-project pointer is unmoved after the refused `/handoff` fetches while the closing hook-style fetch claims the baton and moves it). `serve.rs` `cross_origin_browser_request_detection` and `non_script_browser_request_detection` (header tables) and `cross_origin_browser_guard_applies_only_without_auth` (same-origin `image` and `none` `document` refused, same-origin `empty` passes, both pass with auth on); `ai-memory-web` `markdown.rs` `neutralises_images_that_reach_server_routes` (`/handoff?…`, `/admin/backup`, `//host/…`, `../` and `%2e%2e/` traversal, root-mounted route names refused) with `preserves_relative_images` as the legitimate control. `cross_origin_e2e.rs` `handoff_fetch_on_a_lan_host_requires_the_client_marker`, against a `serve` that allowlists a LAN name and address: `GET` and `HEAD /handoff` through either without the marker, and with an empty one → 403 carrying the remedy text, with the baton still open and the active-project pointer unmoved; controls: a marked fetch through the LAN name claims the baton, and a marker-less fetch through `127.0.0.1` (a hook staged before the marker) claims the next one; then a `127.0.0.1` fetch carrying each proxy forwarding header and no marker → 403 with the baton still open, and the same fetch with the marker claims it. `serve.rs` `loopback_host_detection`, `handoff_fetch_client_marker_decision` (incl. a loopback `Host` with each proxy header, refused without the marker and admitted with it, and a named row per header so none can drop out of the list) and `handoff_client_marker_guard_on_lan_hosts_and_under_a_base_path` (also under a `--base-path` nest; inactive with auth on). Front-door parity: `hook_capture.rs` `every_native_hook_request_carries_the_client_marker` (handoff GET, hook POST, batch POST), `http_client.rs` `authenticate_no_token_sets_only_the_client_marker`, the client-marker block of `tests/hooks/test_lib.sh` (every curl branch of the GET, the POST and the drain, plus a static check that every PowerShell header table carries it and every `Invoke-WebRequest` passes one), `render_shared.rs` `assert_every_ts_request_carries_client_marker` run for OpenCode, OpenCode 2, OMP, Pi and OpenClaw, `external_capture_ts.rs` (the rendered OpenCode plugin under Node sends no unmarked request) and `external_capture_powershell.rs` `every_request_carries_the_client_marker` (Windows leg); `ai-memory-web/src/mount.rs` `web_surfaces_refuse_to_be_framed` (`/web`, `/web/pending`, `/web/login`, `/api/v1/projects` all carry both headers; bites with `deny_framing` neutralized) | STRONG with listed residuals. Bite checks: with the marker check disabled, the LAN e2e marker-less `GET /handoff` returns 200 and the unit layer test fails; with the proxy-header rule disabled, the proxied loopback e2e fetch claims the baton and the unit decision test fails; dropping the marker from the native handoff GET, the shell token-drain curl, a PowerShell header table or the TypeScript spool drain fails the matching front-door test. With the guard removed, the cross-origin `GET /handoff` returns 200, consumes the baton and moves the active-project pointer (the pre-fix behaviour); with the guard treating `same-origin` as foreign, the web UI control gets 403; with the `Sec-Fetch-Dest` check removed, the same-origin `document` `GET /handoff` returns 200 and the unit guard test lets a same-origin image through; with the host layer removed, a rebound `/hook` returns 202; a permissive `CorsLayer` fails the preflight assertion; reverting `is_safe_image_target` to the pre-fix rule fails the markdown test on `/handoff?…`, dropping the percent-decoding fails it on `%2e%2e/`, and emptying the route list fails it on a root-mounted `handoff`. To reproduce the bite on the 415 layer, remove the guard and make `/hook` read a raw body instead of `Json`: a `text/plain` hook then returns 202 and the test fails. Residual, closed by setting a bearer token: a browser that sends no fetch metadata even to a loopback host (Safari before 16.4) sends no `Sec-Fetch-*` header and no `Origin` on an image `GET` or a link click, so such a request to a loopback host still reaches `/handoff` (loopback keeps accepting marker-less legacy hooks) and the other, read-only `GET` routes. On a non-loopback host the marker requirement closes `/handoff` for every browser. A plain-HTTP proxy that rewrites `Host` to its loopback upstream and adds no forwarding header (nginx's default `proxy_pass`) looks exactly like a local client, so in front of an unauthenticated server it must add `X-Forwarded-For` or keep `proxy_set_header Host $host`, or the server must sit behind TLS or use a bearer token (`security.md`, `https-via-proxy.md`). Browsers that send fetch metadata no longer have the earlier link residuals: a link opened from another app (`Sec-Fetch-Site: none`) and a link clicked in a stored page (`same-origin` navigation) both carry a non-`empty` destination and are refused. With auth on, the bearer token and the session CSRF token are the gate and this layer is a no-op |diff --git a/docs/security.md b/docs/security.mdindex 93d7e7c5..479123b6 100644--- a/docs/security.md+++ b/docs/security.md@@ -123,6 +123,13 @@ second per actor/session source) and optionally `AI_MEMORY_HOOK_RATE_BURST` tobound one runaway session without blocking unrelated hook sources. Unset or `0`rate leaves the limiter disabled.+To stop the server from storing particular tool calls whatever the client+sends, list them in `[ingest]`: `drop_tool_use_id_prefixes` (for example+`["toolu_plugin_"]`, the id prefix Claude Code gives plugin tool calls) and+`drop_tool_names` (exact names). A matching PreToolUse or PostToolUse event is+acknowledged and discarded before it is sanitized, rate-limited or stored. The+lists apply to every project on the server.+For shared servers where each developer should authenticate their own hookwrites, native Claude Code hooks can use a stored OIDC device token instead ofembedding a shared static token: