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Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors

Rust

docs(security): record the import project-scope and prompt checks

AkitaOnRails2bf30b89b3e2
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 39c1c9f8..5591cce6 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -60,11 +60,17 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
judged under the hook's name, each event is judged from the working directory
its own record names, and a call or event the live hook would deliver to
another checkout is imported only when that checkout would capture it and
- sends to the same server. The output of a Claude Code `!` shell command,
- which live capture never receives, is no longer imported. A tool ai-memory
- does not recognize, such as an MCP tool, is imported as a record that it ran
- without its arguments or output, which is all live capture stores for it.
- (GHSA-gcpc-88hm-3xqr)
+ sends to the same server and project; events recorded in, or calls reaching
+ into, a checkout of another project are left out instead of being filed
+ under the importing project. The output of a Claude Code `!` shell command,
+ which live capture never receives, is no longer imported. Claude Code's
+ background-task notifications (a monitored command's output, a finished
+ background command or agent) are no longer imported as prompts, and its
+ compaction summary is imported as a compaction record instead of a prompt.
+ A tool ai-memory does not recognize, such as an MCP tool, is imported as a
+ record that it ran without its arguments, output or name, which is all live
+ capture stores for it, and so is a result whose call is not in the
+ transcript. (GHSA-gcpc-88hm-3xqr)
- Fixed a web page open in the operator's browser being able to act on an
unauthenticated server (the loopback default, no token), such as claiming a
project's pending handoff or starting admin jobs. With auth off, the machine
diff --git a/docs/design-boot-backfill.md b/docs/design-boot-backfill.md
index 0688a657..4eea5c4c 100644
--- a/docs/design-boot-backfill.md
+++ b/docs/design-boot-backfill.md
@@ -193,17 +193,29 @@ Retroactive text is exactly as untrusted as live hook text, since it is old mode
reroute to another checkout, and an event whose record cwd lies outside this
checkout, must pass that checkout's admission gate (`checkout_admits_capture`) and
resolve to the same server-profile route as this checkout
- (`delivers_to_same_server`), or it is dropped; a rerouted call also answers to the
- destination's policy. A Claude Code `!` command's output, recorded as user messages
- made only of `<bash-stdout>`/`<bash-stderr>` or `<local-command-stdout>` blocks, is
- dropped, since live capture never receives it. A tool the matcher does not recognize
- (unknown family) keeps only its family with or without a policy, as the live server
- stores for it, and so does a result with no call to inherit from. A Drop removes both the call and its result before anything is posted; a
+ (`delivers_to_same_server`) and the same project (`routes_to_same_project`: the
+ same routing hints from `hook_scope`, and, when those leave the project to the
+ server, the same repository and marker boundary, or the same directory outside a
+ repository), or it is dropped; the import files every event under one project, so
+ an event the hook would file under another is left out rather than misfiled. A
+ rerouted call also answers to the destination's policy. Compaction, checkpoint and
+ annotation events answer to the same record-cwd checks. A Claude Code `!` command's
+ output, recorded as a user message opening with a `<bash-stdout>`/`<bash-stderr>` or
+ `<local-command-stdout>` block, is dropped whatever the block holds, since live
+ capture never receives it. The Claude Code adapter leaves out the user turns the
+ harness writes itself for background tasks (`origin.kind` `task-notification`, or a
+ `<task-notification>` block: a monitored command's output, a finished background
+ command or agent), which no prompt hook receives, and records the compaction summary
+ (`isCompactSummary`) as a compaction event, which backfill does not post. A tool the
+ matcher does not recognize (unknown family) keeps only its family with or without a
+ policy, as the live server stores for it, and so does a result whose id matches no
+ recorded call or that has no call at all; a ledger placeholder keeps only the family
+ and a call id the server's validation accepts, never the tool's name. A Drop removes both the call and its result before anything is posted; a
metadata-only decision posts the hook's metadata-only body with its
`_ai_memory_capture` protocol, which the server validates and rebuilds from its
allowlist. A result is paired with its call by native id; without one it takes the
- strictest decision of every call since the last user message, and a result with no
- call is dropped under a policy. Kept events carry no protocol: their body is a
+ strictest decision of every call since the last user message, and a result whose id
+ matches no call, or with no call, is dropped under a policy. Kept events carry no protocol: their body is a
normalized transcript record, not the native payload the server's re-inspection
reads, and the server never receives the ignore patterns. The `ai-memory run` ledger
applies the same decisions before its segments are uploaded. Both also apply the
diff --git a/docs/security-boundaries.md b/docs/security-boundaries.md
index 2538a698..560254db 100644
--- a/docs/security-boundaries.md
+++ b/docs/security-boundaries.md
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ means the boundary is not built yet.
| 10e | Reconcile-tombstone of a disk-deleted page is opt-in, soft, scope-bound, and false-positive-guarded (invariant #16, #929 delete-half) | `ai-memory-wiki/src/watcher.rs` — off by default (`[maintenance] reconcile_tombstones_deleted_pages`); a page is tombstoned only after its file is observed missing on two consecutive passes (streak resets if the path's `PageId` changed), re-verified against the live filesystem immediately before acting, with reserved/indexed-but-unwalked paths (`bootstrap.md`, `_meta.md`, `_pending/`, `sessions/*.md`) excluded and a circuit breaker that skips a whole scope when `> max(3, 50%)` of its pages look missing or a non-partial walk finds nothing; `ai-memory-store/src/ops.rs` `soft_delete_for_reconcile_if_latest` is a soft tombstone (`is_latest=0` + `superseded_at`, decay's shape) through the single writer actor in one transaction — never a filesystem write — scoped to the page's own `(workspace_id, project_id)` | `watcher.rs` `reconcile_delete_disabled_by_default_never_tombstones_a_missing_page`, `reconcile_delete_cross_project_isolation` (project A's deletion never tombstones project B's same-path page), `reconcile_tombstone_refuses_a_stale_latest_id`, `reconcile_tombstone_refuses_when_the_file_still_exists`, `reconcile_tombstone_never_touches_the_filesystem`; `ops.rs` `reconcile_tombstone_resurrects_instead_of_orphaning_on_recreate` | STRONG |
| 10f | Session-time repair is scope-bound (no cross-project timestamp rewrite) | `ai-memory-store/src/ops.rs` `repair_session_times` — every candidate is read back and updated with `WHERE id=? AND workspace_id=? AND project_id=?`; a row outside that 3-tuple is reported `NotFound` and untouched, same code path as an id that does not exist at all; `ai-memory-mcp/src/admin.rs` `handle_repair_session_times` passes the caller's `(workspace, project)` straight through, never the candidate's own | `ops.rs` `repair_session_times_does_not_touch_a_session_of_another_project` (control: sibling session in-scope repaired in the same batch); `admin_repair_session_times.rs` `cross_project_session_is_not_found_and_untouched`; both bite-checked by dropping the `project_id` filter | STRONG |
| 11a | Hook backpressure (202/429) + bounded fan-out (invariant #5) | `ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs` semaphore→429, 202 immediately, `MAX_HOOK_BATCH_ITEMS`, bounded LRU limiter; batch acknowledgements retain only processed indices and classify terminal drops without consuming capacity | `router.rs` `handle_hook_returns_429_when_ingest_saturated`, `ingest_rate_limiter_is_bounded`; `router.rs` `handle_hook_batch_skips_rate_limited_first_item_and_accepts_later_source`, `handle_hook_batch_reports_failed_index_after_rate_limited_skip`, `handle_hook_batch_drops_subagent_events_before_capacity_check` (each asserts result indices and includes an accepted control) | STRONG |
-| 11b | Capture exclusions drop before storage | `ai-memory-hooks` `capture_policy.rs` `inspect`→`Drop` (before semaphore/spawn), including shell commands whose arguments name an ignored path (`match_command`; argv elements matched whole and tokenized, and every word that holds several words, such as a quoted `sh -c` script or a `"$(…)"` substitution, re-split to four levels by `ShellCommand::split`/`push_nested_words`, a deeper script metadata-only; ANSI-C strings decoded and a backslash before an ordinary letter dropped (`shell_words`, `push_word`); backslash-newline continuations joined (`shell_words`); a parameter default's operand, a value glued to a short flag and a `file:` URL's path read as candidates (`parameter_operands`, `shell_arguments`, `file_url_path`); PowerShell and cmd escape characters read out under the `PowerShell` tool or on a Windows host (`without_windows_escapes`); `~+` resolved to the cwd and a `~-`/`~N`/`~name` prefix metadata-only (`names_unknown_directory`); shell and interpreter options that take a value skipped while looking for a `-c` script or inline code (`takes_shell_value`, `runs_inline_code`, which also lists `lua`/`Rscript`/`osascript -e`, and `su -c`/`script -c` as script runners); paths compared without regard to case on a macOS host (`fold_case`, set by `resolve`; client-only, the server's sentinel re-inspection never depends on it); the path of a git `REV:path` object name tried from the cwd and the marker directory (`git_object_path`); Antigravity `run_command` resolved from its `Cwd`); an invalid marker makes file and shell calls metadata-only; an active one makes a shell call metadata-only when a word uses unquoted brace expansion, a bracket class (a leading `]` included), a zsh glob group or extglob, or a numeric/control ANSI-C escape (`has_unevaluated_expansion`, also run on scripts given to `sh -c`, `eval` or a substitution), or when it runs inline interpreter code (`runs_inline_code`: `python -c`, `node -e`, `ruby -e`, `perl -e`, `php -r`, `deno eval`), and either makes tools that read back an earlier command's output metadata-only (`reads_earlier_output`: `BashOutput`, `TaskOutput`, `write_stdin`, `process`, `read_bash`/`write_bash` and PowerShell twins); the server admits a metadata-only shell or unknown-family body only under an active or invalid marker, with no paths and an `extracted` state (`router.rs` `metadata_protocol_is_legal`), and its own re-inspection strips an older client's keep for either; a Gemini `read_many_files` literal entry is also read as `entry/**` (`glob_matches_below`), and Copilot CLI's runtime `view`/`create`/`str_replace_editor` are file tools for that agent only (`agent_family`); generated OpenCode/OMP/Pi/OpenClaw integrations mirror it in `render_shared.rs` `ts_capture_policy_v1` (`captureMatchCommand`, `captureShellSplit`, `captureUnevaluatedExpansion`, `captureInlineCode`, `captureGitObjectPath`, `captureGlobBelow`, the `reader` flag). Candidate/argument flavor (`Flavor::Posix` vs `Flavor::Windows`, used to pick which `ignore_paths` patterns even apply) is derived from the **host** (the cwd), never from the candidate string alone — a POSIX-host candidate spelled with a leading `//` is collapsed to a single `/` before flavor detection (`normalize_candidate`; TS `captureNormalize`'s `windowsHost` parameter, sourced from `captureHostWindows(cwd)`), fixing GHSA-vh98 (a `//`-prefixed candidate used to self-classify as `Flavor::Windows` regardless of host, matching zero POSIX patterns and being captured instead of dropped); a genuine Windows/UNC host (cwd itself windows-flavored) is unaffected; `hook.rs` `--check-capture` preflight uses the same capture policy before any spool or spawn; transcript imports (`ai-memory backfill`, including the automatic first-boot run, and the `ai-memory run` ledger upload) apply the same decision table through `commands/transcript_capture.rs`: each recorded tool call is rebuilt in its agent's hook shape (`capture_policy.rs` `tool_call_payload`) and inspected by the checkout's policy, and by a reroute destination's policy too; a Drop removes the call and its result (paired by native id, else the strictest call of the turn; a call-less result drops under a policy), metadata-only posts the hook's metadata-only body with its protocol (backfill) or a withheld placeholder (ledger), and a shell call whose recorded arguments cannot be parsed drops; both imports also apply the hook's repository admission gate (`hook.rs` `checkout_admits_capture`: persisted capture mode, marker opt-in, readable routing marker — the same helpers the hook's own gate uses), so under allowlist mode an unmarked checkout imports nothing, prompts included: `backfill` stops before contacting the server and the run ledger finishes with no events; a tool the transcript names differently from the hook is rebuilt under the hook's name and fields (`capture_policy.rs` `hook_tool_call`: Codex `exec_command` `{cmd, workdir}` → `Bash` `{command, workdir}`); the Claude Code and Codex JSONL adapters label each event with its record's cwd (`transcript.rs` `stamp_record_cwd`, `RECORD_CWD_KEY`), from which the import resolves arguments, policy and reroutes, falling back to the session cwd, and which is removed before a ledger upload; a rerouted call, and an event whose record cwd lies outside the checkout, must pass that directory's admission gate and resolve to the same server-profile route as the checkout (`transcript_capture.rs` `admits_elsewhere` → `hook.rs` `checkout_admits_capture` + `delivers_to_same_server`, which compares two `resolve_hook_route` results and never matches a refused selection), else it drops with its result; Claude Code `!` shell-mode output (user messages made only of `<bash-stdout>`/`<bash-stderr>`/`<local-command-stdout>` blocks) is dropped (`shell_mode_output`); a tool the matcher does not recognize (unknown family: MCP tools, Codex `view_image`, …) keeps only its family whatever the policy, as the live server stores for it (`EventCapture::Unrecognized`: backfill posts title `tool unknown` and body `tool_family: unknown`, the ledger a withheld placeholder), and so does a result with no call to inherit from (GHSA-gcpc-88hm-3xqr) | `capture_policy.rs` per-agent `…honors_exclusions` tests, `shell_fixture_vectors` (shared `capture-policy.json` `shell` drop/keep vectors: tool aliases incl. OpenClaw/Devin `exec` and `PowerShell`, `workdir`, glob directories, Windows paths, and a POSIX-host leading-`//` command via `/{root}/docs/adr/x.md`), `shell_tool_shapes_of_every_adapter_honor_exclusions`, `claude_code_powershell_honors_ignored_paths_on_a_windows_host` (#1186: Windows-spelled and `-Param:value` paths drop, public-path and `git status` controls kept, invalid marker metadata-only), `gemini_cli_shell_and_read_many_files_honor_ignored_paths` (Gemini `run_shell_command` incl. `dir_path`/`directory`, and `read_many_files` globs via `match_globs`: excluded literal, mixed public+excluded, `docs/*`, recursive `**` and case-variant entries drop, an `exclude` list cannot rescue them, unsupported glob syntax and malformed lists are metadata-only, public entries kept, POSIX and Windows hosts) and `globstar_reaches_lets_double_star_span_any_depth`, `fixture_vectors` (incl. TS-adapter `bash`/`exec` vectors, and `normalization`'s leading-`//` POSIX vectors alongside the kept Windows-cwd UNC vectors as the no-regression control); `shell_matching_is_off_when_inactive_and_fails_closed_when_invalid_or_over_budget`; `router.rs` `capture_protocol_shell_decisions_survive_server_reinspection`, `capture_protocol_invalid_marker_shell_is_metadata_only` (active metadata-only shell admitted for an unevaluated expansion, inactive refused, older client's invalid-marker keep stripped, commandless control kept), `capture_protocol_unparseable_marker_strips_shell_events` (server fallback for an unparseable marker), `capture_protocol_invalid_shell_metadata_claim_must_be_canonical` (a stripped shell claim with a path count or non-`extracted` state is refused); `capture_policy.rs` `invalid_marker_strips_shell_calls_with_unparseable_commands`, `long_bash_lc_script_in_argv_is_not_dropped_by_the_match_budget`, **`a_leading_double_slash_candidate_does_not_escape_posix_ignore_paths_via_flavor_mismatch`** (GHSA-vh98 adversarial: attempts the `//repo/secret/...` violation on a POSIX host, proves it now drops, with a plain-single-slash control and a Windows-hosted genuine-UNC control both still correct — fails on the pre-fix code); `hook.rs` `shell_command_reading_an_ignored_path_is_dropped_before_spool`, `gemini_cli_shell_and_read_many_files_exclusions_drop_before_spool` (pre- and post-tool events with an excluded path are never spooled; public controls spool with their family); `capture_policy.rs` `read_many_files_directory_entries_cannot_reach_ignored_paths` (shared `read_many_files_directories` vectors: `docs`, `.`, `./`, `docs/`, case and `..` variants drop; `src`, `README.md`, `docs/adrx` kept), `output_reader_tools_are_metadata_only_only_under_a_policy` (active and invalid strip, inactive and an unrelated unknown tool keep), `copilot_cli_runtime_file_tools_are_scoped_to_copilot`, `unevaluated_shell_expansions_respect_quoting` (also leading-`]` classes, zsh groups and extglobs, ANSI-C numeric escapes; subshells, `$((…))`, `<(…)`, array assignments kept), the shell fixture's brace/class vectors (quoted, escaped, `${…}`, `{}`, `[ … ]`, `HEAD@{1}` controls kept); `quoted_scripts_in_string_commands_are_read_like_command_lines` (`sh -c`, `timeout … bash -c`, `"$(…)"`, `NAME="$(…)"`, backquotes, two nested shells and an inline-interpreter literal drop; `bash -c 'cargo test'` and `"$(git rev-parse HEAD)"` kept; four levels read, a fifth metadata-only), `inline_interpreter_code_is_metadata_only_under_an_active_policy` (inline code metadata-only, kept with no policy; modules, script files and `grep -e` unaffected), `git_object_names_are_path_candidates` (`HEAD:`, `:`, `:N:` and `@{n}` names drop, also from a subdirectory; drive letters, URLs, `NAME=a:b` and flags are not object names; a public object name kept), `ansi_c_strings_and_escaped_letters_are_read_like_the_shell`, `antigravity_run_command_resolves_arguments_from_its_cwd` (absolute and relative `Cwd` drop, a public `Cwd` kept, another agent's `Cwd` key ignored), `windows_escape_characters_are_read_on_a_windows_host` (caret and backquote spellings drop on a Windows host, public controls kept, a POSIX host reads both literally), `a_case_folding_host_matches_paths_without_regard_to_case` (file tool and shell drop with folding, keep without, public control kept; folding injected through `resolve_for_host` so it runs on every CI OS), the shell fixture's continuation, PowerShell/cmd escape, option-value, runner, interpreter, glued-flag, `file:` URL, tilde, parameter-default and `fold_case` vectors with their controls, the near-miss controls added to `common_commands_stay_kept_under_an_active_policy`, and the shell fixture's quoted-script, git-object, ANSI-C, escaped-letter and inline-interpreter vectors with their controls (`cargo test`, `git status`/`log`, `pytest`, `python3 -m pytest`, `node build.js`, `npm run test`, a quoted commit message with braces); `router.rs` `capture_protocol_active_keep_of_unprovable_output_is_stripped`; `hook.rs` `excluded_content_cannot_reach_the_spool_through_unevaluated_tool_shapes` (directory entries and Copilot `view`/`create` never spool, readers and brace shells spool without content, public controls spool with it); `render_shared.rs` `generated_capture_policy_v1_node_runtime_evidence` (runs the same fixture sections, including the GHSA-vh98 and Gemini `read_many_files`/`run_shell_command` vectors, plus unsupported-glob, empty-list and recursive-`**` checks, against the emitted TypeScript; `#[ignore]` locally, run with `--ignored` under Node 24 by the Linux CI test job); `hook.rs` `check_capture_refuses_partial_scope_and_excluded_content` (ignored-path and partial-scope violations refused, complete public-path control passes), `check_capture_bounds_marker_hints_and_refuses_oversized_scope` (513-byte hints refused, 512-byte control passes; native routing preserved); **`backfill.rs` `backfill_never_posts_tool_content_the_capture_policy_excludes`** (planted Claude transcript: the excluded read's call and output never reach `/hook/batch`, a malformed read posts only the metadata-only body, public read control posted) and **`run.rs` `ledger_upload_drops_tool_content_the_capture_policy_excludes`** (excluded call and output absent from the finish request, public control present, cursor still advances), both failing with the guard removed; `transcript_capture.rs` `an_excluded_read_drops_its_call_and_result_by_id`, `id_less_results_take_the_strictest_call_of_their_turn`, `unrecoverable_arguments_and_orphan_results_fail_closed_under_a_policy`, `a_call_into_another_checkout_honors_its_policy`, `ledger_events_are_dropped_or_stripped_before_upload`, `without_a_policy_every_event_is_kept` (control); `capture_policy.rs` `tool_call_payload_reaches_the_live_decision_for_every_supported_agent`; **`backfill.rs` `allowlist_mode_backfills_nothing_from_an_unmarked_checkout`** (no request reaches the server; marked-checkout and denylist controls do), **`run.rs` `ledger_upload_under_allowlist_mode_carries_nothing_from_an_unmarked_checkout`** (finish carries no prompt or tool content; marked and denylist controls upload both), `transcript_capture.rs` `allowlist_mode_admits_nothing_from_an_unmarked_checkout`, all failing with the admission gate removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_inspects_codex_exec_command_as_the_hook_shell_call`** and **`run.rs` `ledger_upload_inspects_codex_exec_command_as_the_hook_shell_call`** (a planted Codex `exec_command` whose `workdir`-relative argument names an ignored file never posts its call or output; the same command from a public `workdir` does), `capture_policy.rs` `codex_transcript_exec_command_is_inspected_as_the_hook_bash_call` (absolute, relative and absent `workdir` and an argv `cmd` drop, public control kept, the `workdir` locates the call, another agent's `exec_command` stays unknown), all failing with `hook_tool_call` removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_resolves_each_call_from_its_record_cwd`** (`cat adr/x.md` recorded from `docs/` never posts; the same command from the root does) and `transcript.rs` `jsonl_events_carry_their_record_cwd` (Claude per line, Codex per turn context, a relative cwd ignored), failing with the record cwd ignored or unstamped; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_drops_reroutes_the_live_hook_would_not_deliver_here`** (under allowlist mode, reads rerouted to an unmarked git repository, to a marker selecting an unregistered profile, and to a marker selecting a registered profile while the source uses the install default are never posted; a read in a marked checkout with no server selection is the posted control), failing with either the admission check or the route comparison removed (each refused case checked on its own); `transcript_capture.rs` `a_record_cwd_answers_to_the_hook_admission_gate_there` (prompt, call and result recorded in an unmarked repository drop under allowlist; a subdirectory of the opted-in checkout is kept and its record cwd never reaches the ledger) and `claude_shell_mode_output_is_not_imported` (stdout, stderr, local-command and size-capped blocks drop; `<bash-input>`, a prompt quoting a tag, and another agent's message kept); **`backfill.rs` `backfill_posts_no_content_for_unrecognized_tools`** (a planted Codex MCP call's arguments and output never post, the call and output post as `tool unknown`; a recognized shell output is the posted control) and `transcript_capture.rs` `unrecognized_tools_keep_no_content_with_or_without_a_policy` (no policy and an active one; ledger content withheld; public read kept; a call-less result content-free), failing with the unknown-family rule removed, the backfill one also with its content-free body removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_keeps_reroutes_to_the_same_server_profile_only`** (a reroute into a checkout selecting the source's registered profile is posted; one selecting a different registered profile is not), failing with the profile comparison forced either way | STRONG with listed residuals. Matching is lexical by design, so these stay open: shell variables (`$VAR`, `FILE=… sh -c 'cat $FILE'`) and the output of a command substitution, a `cd` inside the command, a script read from a file or a heredoc fed to an interpreter (read only for the words it spells out), git's repository root approximated by the marker directory, symlinks (paths are never resolved on disk), a recursive search of a parent directory (`grep -r x docs`, `rg x`) through a shell, a tool's own directory option (`git -C`), script runners and interpreters the matcher does not list (their words are still read, but expansion or inline code in them is not recognized), a value glued after the first letter of a short-flag cluster, non-ASCII percent-escapes in a `file:` URL, and tools the matcher does not list, which keep their current unknown-tool behavior. Transcript imports add: assistant prose quoting an excluded file is kept (as live prompt/assistant capture keeps it), harnesses whose hook schema the matcher does not read (Crush, Kimi Code) keep their tool events as live capture would, adapters that record no per-record cwd (Pi, OMP, OpenCode, Crush, Kimi Code, Command Code, Kiro, Grok) judge every event from the session cwd, a Codex ledger upload resumed from a mid-file cursor judges the events before the next turn context from the session cwd, and id-less adapters over-drop a whole turn's results when one call is excluded; a metadata-only import keeps an `event_id` (ledger) and `ingest_key` (backfill) derived from a SHA-256 of the original content plus session and record ids, left in place because those ids are the retry-dedupe keys and a content-free id would merge distinct events — it only confirms a guess of low-entropy content. Under allowlist mode a refused checkout's `ai-memory run` still records repository checkpoint metadata (HEAD, branch, a status hash and changed-path names, never file content), which the run also sends at launch. Re-splitting quoted words over-drops a quoted message naming an ignored path, and inline interpreter code is metadata-only under an active policy. Mitigation: allowlist capture mode (`install-hooks --capture-mode allowlist`) for sensitive projects. Bite checks: removing the nested re-split, the git object path or its marker-root base, Antigravity's `Cwd` key, the leading-`]` rule, either zsh-group rule, ANSI-C decoding or its numeric-escape rule, the `\o` reading, the inline-code rule, the nesting-depth rule, the nested-script scan, the line-continuation join, the Windows escape reading, the shell-option and interpreter-option value skips, the added runners and interpreters, the glued-flag value, the `file:` URL path, the `~+` resolution, the unknown-tilde rule, the parameter-default reading or case folding each fails the Rust tests, and each TypeScript counterpart fails the Node evidence test |
+| 11b | Capture exclusions drop before storage | `ai-memory-hooks` `capture_policy.rs` `inspect`→`Drop` (before semaphore/spawn), including shell commands whose arguments name an ignored path (`match_command`; argv elements matched whole and tokenized, and every word that holds several words, such as a quoted `sh -c` script or a `"$(…)"` substitution, re-split to four levels by `ShellCommand::split`/`push_nested_words`, a deeper script metadata-only; ANSI-C strings decoded and a backslash before an ordinary letter dropped (`shell_words`, `push_word`); backslash-newline continuations joined (`shell_words`); a parameter default's operand, a value glued to a short flag and a `file:` URL's path read as candidates (`parameter_operands`, `shell_arguments`, `file_url_path`); PowerShell and cmd escape characters read out under the `PowerShell` tool or on a Windows host (`without_windows_escapes`); `~+` resolved to the cwd and a `~-`/`~N`/`~name` prefix metadata-only (`names_unknown_directory`); shell and interpreter options that take a value skipped while looking for a `-c` script or inline code (`takes_shell_value`, `runs_inline_code`, which also lists `lua`/`Rscript`/`osascript -e`, and `su -c`/`script -c` as script runners); paths compared without regard to case on a macOS host (`fold_case`, set by `resolve`; client-only, the server's sentinel re-inspection never depends on it); the path of a git `REV:path` object name tried from the cwd and the marker directory (`git_object_path`); Antigravity `run_command` resolved from its `Cwd`); an invalid marker makes file and shell calls metadata-only; an active one makes a shell call metadata-only when a word uses unquoted brace expansion, a bracket class (a leading `]` included), a zsh glob group or extglob, or a numeric/control ANSI-C escape (`has_unevaluated_expansion`, also run on scripts given to `sh -c`, `eval` or a substitution), or when it runs inline interpreter code (`runs_inline_code`: `python -c`, `node -e`, `ruby -e`, `perl -e`, `php -r`, `deno eval`), and either makes tools that read back an earlier command's output metadata-only (`reads_earlier_output`: `BashOutput`, `TaskOutput`, `write_stdin`, `process`, `read_bash`/`write_bash` and PowerShell twins); the server admits a metadata-only shell or unknown-family body only under an active or invalid marker, with no paths and an `extracted` state (`router.rs` `metadata_protocol_is_legal`), and its own re-inspection strips an older client's keep for either; a Gemini `read_many_files` literal entry is also read as `entry/**` (`glob_matches_below`), and Copilot CLI's runtime `view`/`create`/`str_replace_editor` are file tools for that agent only (`agent_family`); generated OpenCode/OMP/Pi/OpenClaw integrations mirror it in `render_shared.rs` `ts_capture_policy_v1` (`captureMatchCommand`, `captureShellSplit`, `captureUnevaluatedExpansion`, `captureInlineCode`, `captureGitObjectPath`, `captureGlobBelow`, the `reader` flag). Candidate/argument flavor (`Flavor::Posix` vs `Flavor::Windows`, used to pick which `ignore_paths` patterns even apply) is derived from the **host** (the cwd), never from the candidate string alone — a POSIX-host candidate spelled with a leading `//` is collapsed to a single `/` before flavor detection (`normalize_candidate`; TS `captureNormalize`'s `windowsHost` parameter, sourced from `captureHostWindows(cwd)`), fixing GHSA-vh98 (a `//`-prefixed candidate used to self-classify as `Flavor::Windows` regardless of host, matching zero POSIX patterns and being captured instead of dropped); a genuine Windows/UNC host (cwd itself windows-flavored) is unaffected; `hook.rs` `--check-capture` preflight uses the same capture policy before any spool or spawn; transcript imports (`ai-memory backfill`, including the automatic first-boot run, and the `ai-memory run` ledger upload) apply the same decision table through `commands/transcript_capture.rs`: each recorded tool call is rebuilt in its agent's hook shape (`capture_policy.rs` `tool_call_payload`) and inspected by the checkout's policy, and by a reroute destination's policy too; a Drop removes the call and its result (paired by native id, else the strictest call of the turn when the result has no id; a result whose id matches no call, or with no call, follows the orphan rule: dropped under a policy, content-free without one), metadata-only posts the hook's metadata-only body with its protocol (backfill) or a withheld placeholder keeping only the family and a call id that passes the server's `valid_call_id` (ledger), and a shell call whose recorded arguments cannot be parsed drops; both imports also apply the hook's repository admission gate (`hook.rs` `checkout_admits_capture`: persisted capture mode, marker opt-in, readable routing marker — the same helpers the hook's own gate uses), so under allowlist mode an unmarked checkout imports nothing, prompts included: `backfill` stops before contacting the server and the run ledger finishes with no events; a tool the transcript names differently from the hook is rebuilt under the hook's name and fields (`capture_policy.rs` `hook_tool_call`: Codex `exec_command` `{cmd, workdir}` → `Bash` `{command, workdir}`); the Claude Code and Codex JSONL adapters label each event with its record's cwd (`transcript.rs` `stamp_record_cwd`, `RECORD_CWD_KEY`), from which the import resolves arguments, policy and reroutes, falling back to the session cwd, and which is removed before a ledger upload; a rerouted call, and an event whose record cwd lies outside the checkout, must pass that directory's admission gate, resolve to the same server-profile route as the checkout and to the same project scope (`transcript_capture.rs` `admits_elsewhere` → `hook.rs` `checkout_admits_capture` + `delivers_to_same_server`, which compares two `resolve_hook_route` results and never matches a refused selection, + `routes_to_same_project`, which compares the two `hook_scope` hint sets and, when they leave the project to the server, the repository/marker anchor or the directory itself), else it drops with its result, since the import files every event under the importing project; compaction, checkpoint and annotation events answer to the same record-cwd checks; Claude Code `!` shell-mode output (a user message opening with a `<bash-stdout>`/`<bash-stderr>`/`<local-command-stdout>` block, whatever it holds) is dropped (`shell_mode_output`); the Claude Code adapter excludes harness-written background-task turns (`transcript.rs` `claude_task_notification`: `origin.kind` `task-notification` or a leading `<task-notification>` block) and records a compaction summary (`isCompactSummary`) as a compaction event, which backfill does not post; a tool the matcher does not recognize (unknown family: MCP tools, Codex `view_image`, …) keeps only its family whatever the policy, as the live server stores for it (`EventCapture::Unrecognized`: backfill posts title `tool unknown` and body `tool_family: unknown`, the ledger a withheld placeholder), and so does a result with no call to inherit from (GHSA-gcpc-88hm-3xqr) | `capture_policy.rs` per-agent `…honors_exclusions` tests, `shell_fixture_vectors` (shared `capture-policy.json` `shell` drop/keep vectors: tool aliases incl. OpenClaw/Devin `exec` and `PowerShell`, `workdir`, glob directories, Windows paths, and a POSIX-host leading-`//` command via `/{root}/docs/adr/x.md`), `shell_tool_shapes_of_every_adapter_honor_exclusions`, `claude_code_powershell_honors_ignored_paths_on_a_windows_host` (#1186: Windows-spelled and `-Param:value` paths drop, public-path and `git status` controls kept, invalid marker metadata-only), `gemini_cli_shell_and_read_many_files_honor_ignored_paths` (Gemini `run_shell_command` incl. `dir_path`/`directory`, and `read_many_files` globs via `match_globs`: excluded literal, mixed public+excluded, `docs/*`, recursive `**` and case-variant entries drop, an `exclude` list cannot rescue them, unsupported glob syntax and malformed lists are metadata-only, public entries kept, POSIX and Windows hosts) and `globstar_reaches_lets_double_star_span_any_depth`, `fixture_vectors` (incl. TS-adapter `bash`/`exec` vectors, and `normalization`'s leading-`//` POSIX vectors alongside the kept Windows-cwd UNC vectors as the no-regression control); `shell_matching_is_off_when_inactive_and_fails_closed_when_invalid_or_over_budget`; `router.rs` `capture_protocol_shell_decisions_survive_server_reinspection`, `capture_protocol_invalid_marker_shell_is_metadata_only` (active metadata-only shell admitted for an unevaluated expansion, inactive refused, older client's invalid-marker keep stripped, commandless control kept), `capture_protocol_unparseable_marker_strips_shell_events` (server fallback for an unparseable marker), `capture_protocol_invalid_shell_metadata_claim_must_be_canonical` (a stripped shell claim with a path count or non-`extracted` state is refused); `capture_policy.rs` `invalid_marker_strips_shell_calls_with_unparseable_commands`, `long_bash_lc_script_in_argv_is_not_dropped_by_the_match_budget`, **`a_leading_double_slash_candidate_does_not_escape_posix_ignore_paths_via_flavor_mismatch`** (GHSA-vh98 adversarial: attempts the `//repo/secret/...` violation on a POSIX host, proves it now drops, with a plain-single-slash control and a Windows-hosted genuine-UNC control both still correct — fails on the pre-fix code); `hook.rs` `shell_command_reading_an_ignored_path_is_dropped_before_spool`, `gemini_cli_shell_and_read_many_files_exclusions_drop_before_spool` (pre- and post-tool events with an excluded path are never spooled; public controls spool with their family); `capture_policy.rs` `read_many_files_directory_entries_cannot_reach_ignored_paths` (shared `read_many_files_directories` vectors: `docs`, `.`, `./`, `docs/`, case and `..` variants drop; `src`, `README.md`, `docs/adrx` kept), `output_reader_tools_are_metadata_only_only_under_a_policy` (active and invalid strip, inactive and an unrelated unknown tool keep), `copilot_cli_runtime_file_tools_are_scoped_to_copilot`, `unevaluated_shell_expansions_respect_quoting` (also leading-`]` classes, zsh groups and extglobs, ANSI-C numeric escapes; subshells, `$((…))`, `<(…)`, array assignments kept), the shell fixture's brace/class vectors (quoted, escaped, `${…}`, `{}`, `[ … ]`, `HEAD@{1}` controls kept); `quoted_scripts_in_string_commands_are_read_like_command_lines` (`sh -c`, `timeout … bash -c`, `"$(…)"`, `NAME="$(…)"`, backquotes, two nested shells and an inline-interpreter literal drop; `bash -c 'cargo test'` and `"$(git rev-parse HEAD)"` kept; four levels read, a fifth metadata-only), `inline_interpreter_code_is_metadata_only_under_an_active_policy` (inline code metadata-only, kept with no policy; modules, script files and `grep -e` unaffected), `git_object_names_are_path_candidates` (`HEAD:`, `:`, `:N:` and `@{n}` names drop, also from a subdirectory; drive letters, URLs, `NAME=a:b` and flags are not object names; a public object name kept), `ansi_c_strings_and_escaped_letters_are_read_like_the_shell`, `antigravity_run_command_resolves_arguments_from_its_cwd` (absolute and relative `Cwd` drop, a public `Cwd` kept, another agent's `Cwd` key ignored), `windows_escape_characters_are_read_on_a_windows_host` (caret and backquote spellings drop on a Windows host, public controls kept, a POSIX host reads both literally), `a_case_folding_host_matches_paths_without_regard_to_case` (file tool and shell drop with folding, keep without, public control kept; folding injected through `resolve_for_host` so it runs on every CI OS), the shell fixture's continuation, PowerShell/cmd escape, option-value, runner, interpreter, glued-flag, `file:` URL, tilde, parameter-default and `fold_case` vectors with their controls, the near-miss controls added to `common_commands_stay_kept_under_an_active_policy`, and the shell fixture's quoted-script, git-object, ANSI-C, escaped-letter and inline-interpreter vectors with their controls (`cargo test`, `git status`/`log`, `pytest`, `python3 -m pytest`, `node build.js`, `npm run test`, a quoted commit message with braces); `router.rs` `capture_protocol_active_keep_of_unprovable_output_is_stripped`; `hook.rs` `excluded_content_cannot_reach_the_spool_through_unevaluated_tool_shapes` (directory entries and Copilot `view`/`create` never spool, readers and brace shells spool without content, public controls spool with it); `render_shared.rs` `generated_capture_policy_v1_node_runtime_evidence` (runs the same fixture sections, including the GHSA-vh98 and Gemini `read_many_files`/`run_shell_command` vectors, plus unsupported-glob, empty-list and recursive-`**` checks, against the emitted TypeScript; `#[ignore]` locally, run with `--ignored` under Node 24 by the Linux CI test job); `hook.rs` `check_capture_refuses_partial_scope_and_excluded_content` (ignored-path and partial-scope violations refused, complete public-path control passes), `check_capture_bounds_marker_hints_and_refuses_oversized_scope` (513-byte hints refused, 512-byte control passes; native routing preserved); **`backfill.rs` `backfill_never_posts_tool_content_the_capture_policy_excludes`** (planted Claude transcript: the excluded read's call and output never reach `/hook/batch`, a malformed read posts only the metadata-only body, public read control posted) and **`run.rs` `ledger_upload_drops_tool_content_the_capture_policy_excludes`** (excluded call and output absent from the finish request, public control present, cursor still advances), both failing with the guard removed; `transcript_capture.rs` `an_excluded_read_drops_its_call_and_result_by_id`, `id_less_results_take_the_strictest_call_of_their_turn`, `unrecoverable_arguments_and_orphan_results_fail_closed_under_a_policy`, `a_call_into_another_checkout_honors_its_policy`, `ledger_events_are_dropped_or_stripped_before_upload`, `without_a_policy_every_event_is_kept` (control); `capture_policy.rs` `tool_call_payload_reaches_the_live_decision_for_every_supported_agent`; **`backfill.rs` `allowlist_mode_backfills_nothing_from_an_unmarked_checkout`** (no request reaches the server; marked-checkout and denylist controls do), **`run.rs` `ledger_upload_under_allowlist_mode_carries_nothing_from_an_unmarked_checkout`** (finish carries no prompt or tool content; marked and denylist controls upload both), `transcript_capture.rs` `allowlist_mode_admits_nothing_from_an_unmarked_checkout`, all failing with the admission gate removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_inspects_codex_exec_command_as_the_hook_shell_call`** and **`run.rs` `ledger_upload_inspects_codex_exec_command_as_the_hook_shell_call`** (a planted Codex `exec_command` whose `workdir`-relative argument names an ignored file never posts its call or output; the same command from a public `workdir` does), `capture_policy.rs` `codex_transcript_exec_command_is_inspected_as_the_hook_bash_call` (absolute, relative and absent `workdir` and an argv `cmd` drop, public control kept, the `workdir` locates the call, another agent's `exec_command` stays unknown), all failing with `hook_tool_call` removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_resolves_each_call_from_its_record_cwd`** (`cat adr/x.md` recorded from `docs/` never posts; the same command from the root does) and `transcript.rs` `jsonl_events_carry_their_record_cwd` (Claude per line, Codex per turn context, a relative cwd ignored), failing with the record cwd ignored or unstamped; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_drops_reroutes_the_live_hook_would_not_deliver_here`** (under allowlist mode, reads rerouted to an unmarked git repository, to a marker selecting an unregistered profile, and to a marker selecting a registered profile while the source uses the install default are never posted; a read in a marked checkout with no server selection is the posted control), failing with either the admission check or the route comparison removed (each refused case checked on its own); `transcript_capture.rs` `a_record_cwd_answers_to_the_hook_admission_gate_there` (prompt, call and result recorded in an unmarked repository drop under allowlist; a subdirectory of the opted-in checkout is kept and its record cwd never reaches the ledger) and `claude_shell_mode_output_is_not_imported` (stdout, stderr, local-command and size-capped blocks drop; `<bash-input>`, a prompt quoting a tag, and another agent's message kept); **`backfill.rs` `backfill_posts_no_content_for_unrecognized_tools`** (a planted Codex MCP call's arguments and output never post, the call and output post as `tool unknown`; a recognized shell output is the posted control) and `transcript_capture.rs` `unrecognized_tools_keep_no_content_with_or_without_a_policy` (no policy and an active one; ledger content withheld; public read kept; a call-less result content-free), failing with the unknown-family rule removed, the backfill one also with its content-free body removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_keeps_reroutes_to_the_same_server_profile_only`** (a reroute into a checkout selecting the source's registered profile and project is posted; one selecting a different registered profile is not, nor one of another project on the same profile, nor a prompt recorded there), failing with the profile comparison forced either way and with the project comparison removed; `transcript_capture.rs` `a_record_cwd_in_another_project_is_dropped` and `a_reroute_into_another_project_is_dropped` (prompt, call and result recorded in, or a read reaching into, a checkout declaring another project drop; one declaring the same project is kept), failing with `routes_to_same_project` removed; **`backfill.rs` `backfill_posts_no_task_notification_or_compact_summary_as_a_prompt`** and `transcript.rs` `claude_adapter_keeps_task_notifications_and_compact_summaries_out_of_prompts` (a monitored command's notification, a background agent's report and an origin-tagged notice are excluded, a compact summary becomes a compaction event; the typed prompt, also one quoting the tag, is the control), failing with either adapter rule removed; `transcript_capture.rs` `boundary_events_answer_to_the_record_cwd_admission_gate` (compaction and annotation recorded in a refused directory drop; in the checkout kept), `a_result_whose_id_matches_no_call_is_an_orphan` (an unmatched id cannot borrow a public read's keep; the read's own result kept), `claude_shell_mode_output_is_not_imported` (a block holding a literal closing tag drops) and `unrecognized_tools_keep_no_content_with_or_without_a_policy` (ledger keeps no tool name and no invalid call id), each failing with its rule reverted | STRONG with listed residuals. Matching is lexical by design, so these stay open: shell variables (`$VAR`, `FILE=… sh -c 'cat $FILE'`) and the output of a command substitution, a `cd` inside the command, a script read from a file or a heredoc fed to an interpreter (read only for the words it spells out), git's repository root approximated by the marker directory, symlinks (paths are never resolved on disk), a recursive search of a parent directory (`grep -r x docs`, `rg x`) through a shell, a tool's own directory option (`git -C`), script runners and interpreters the matcher does not list (their words are still read, but expansion or inline code in them is not recognized), a value glued after the first letter of a short-flag cluster, non-ASCII percent-escapes in a `file:` URL, and tools the matcher does not list, which keep their current unknown-tool behavior. Transcript imports add: assistant prose quoting an excluded file is kept (as live prompt/assistant capture keeps it), harnesses whose hook schema the matcher does not read (Crush, Kimi Code) keep their tool events as live capture would, adapters that record no per-record cwd (Pi, OMP, OpenCode, Crush, Kimi Code, Command Code, Kiro, Grok) judge every event from the session cwd, a Codex ledger upload resumed from a mid-file cursor judges the events before the next turn context from the session cwd, and id-less adapters over-drop a whole turn's results when one call is excluded, and when the routing hints leave the project to the server, events from anywhere inside one repository count as the importing project even where the server has a separate project registered for a subdirectory; a metadata-only import keeps an `event_id` (ledger) and `ingest_key` (backfill) derived from a SHA-256 of the original content plus session and record ids, left in place because those ids are the retry-dedupe keys and a content-free id would merge distinct events — it only confirms a guess of low-entropy content. Under allowlist mode a refused checkout's `ai-memory run` still records repository checkpoint metadata (HEAD, branch, a status hash and changed-path names, never file content), which the run also sends at launch. Re-splitting quoted words over-drops a quoted message naming an ignored path, and inline interpreter code is metadata-only under an active policy. Mitigation: allowlist capture mode (`install-hooks --capture-mode allowlist`) for sensitive projects. Bite checks: removing the nested re-split, the git object path or its marker-root base, Antigravity's `Cwd` key, the leading-`]` rule, either zsh-group rule, ANSI-C decoding or its numeric-escape rule, the `\o` reading, the inline-code rule, the nesting-depth rule, the nested-script scan, the line-continuation join, the Windows escape reading, the shell-option and interpreter-option value skips, the added runners and interpreters, the glued-flag value, the `file:` URL path, the `~+` resolution, the unknown-tilde rule, the parameter-default reading or case folding each fails the Rust tests, and each TypeScript counterpart fails the Node evidence test |
| 11c | Capture hook ≤200ms budget (invariant #5) | `hooks/_lib.sh` capture path `curl --max-time 0.2` (context-fetch 1.0s and background drain 2.0s are separate, larger-budget paths) | none (shell-script timeout; hard to unit-test) — watch on any capture-path change | WATCH |
| 11d | Hook server-profile routing: a marker-selected server gets only its own capture and its own token (#992) | `ai-memory-cli/src/server_profiles.rs` `resolve` (validated `ProfileName`, strict `servers.toml` parse, `roots` required once two profiles exist, component-wise root match) and `marker.rs` `find_server_selection` (inherited down the tree, any value shape counts); `commands/hook.rs` `resolve_hook_route` drops a `Rejected` route before spool, handoff and backfill, and hands the drainer no live token for a profile route; `commands/hook_spool.rs` `static_retry_token` (a profile entry retries only with its own stored token), the loopback reroot skip, and chunk splitting on `profile`; generated TS `captureServerRouted` drops a routed repository and gates `fetchHandoff`; `hooks/_lib.sh` `ai_memory_server_routed` (flag refused by `ai_memory_post_hook`/`ai_memory_get_handoff`) and `hooks/lib/ai-memory-hook.ps1` `Test-AiMemoryServerRouted` drop it in the script hooks; `--check-capture` refuses a rejected server-profile selection without printing its token or URL | `hook.rs` `each_repository_spools_to_its_own_profile_with_its_own_token`, `a_selection_that_does_not_resolve_emits_nothing` (unknown / tokenless / outside roots / roots required / invalid name, plus a resolving control), `session_start_handoff_comes_from_the_profile_server_only`, `a_repository_without_a_server_key_keeps_the_install_default`; `hook_spool.rs` `a_profile_entry_is_never_retried_with_the_install_live_token` (server B accepts exactly the install's live token and must still not get it), `a_profile_entry_recovers_with_its_own_rotated_token` (control), `a_profile_entry_on_a_dead_loopback_port_is_not_rerouted_to_the_default`, `profile_and_default_entries_at_one_address_ride_separate_batches`; `server_profiles.rs` roots/registry/name tests; `marker.rs` `nested_markers_without_server_inherit_the_ancestor_selection`; `install_hooks.rs` `generated_integrations_fail_closed_on_a_server_profile_marker`, `openclaw_plugin.rs` `openclaw_plugin_fails_closed_on_a_server_profile_marker`, and the `server-routed-*` checks in `generated_capture_policy_v1_node_runtime_evidence`; `hook.rs` `an_event_without_a_payload_cwd_routes_by_the_process_cwd`, `a_refused_route_prints_nothing_for_kimi_user_prompts`; `hook_spool.rs` `a_profile_entry_is_not_retried_with_a_token_issued_for_a_new_url`; `server_profiles.rs` `changing_the_url_without_a_token_discards_the_old_token`, `omitted_roots_keep_the_registered_ones`; `marker.rs` `outside_home_the_walk_reaches_a_marker_above_the_checkout_root`, `encoding_noise_cannot_hide_a_server_key`, `an_unreadable_marker_is_a_refused_selection`; `backfill.rs` `a_spawned_backfill_authenticates_like_the_hook_that_spawned_it`; `tests/hooks/test_lib.sh` "server profiles (#992)" section; `hook.rs` `a_mixed_spool_drains_each_event_only_to_its_own_server` (two token-gated servers, one spool, one drain: each server receives exactly its own event with exactly its own bearer); `tests/suite/server_profiles.rs` (the built binary: `server add` → `hook` spools to the profile with its token, unknown profile spools nothing, `uninstall` removes the tokens; `two_real_servers_each_receive_only_their_own_repository` runs two real `ai-memory serve` children with different root tokens and checks on each server which repository landed there); `ai-memory-hooks` `powershell_server_routed.rs` `server_routed_guard_mirrors_the_native_walk` (runs `Test-AiMemoryServerRouted` under real PowerShell: inherited, BOM, look-alike keys, the `$HOME` boundary with its control, past a checkout root outside home, current directory); `hook.rs` `a_selection_that_does_not_resolve_emits_nothing` (rejected routes refuse preflight; resolved profile control passes); `tests/hooks/test_lib.sh` and `powershell_home.rs` `a_trailing_separator_on_home_keeps_the_walk_boundary` (a `$HOME` ending in `/` or `\` keeps both script walks at home: a `server` marker above it routes nothing, with a root-home control that does) | STRONG for native hooks, generated TS, `.sh` and `.ps1` hooks. Known gap: an older binary draining a shared spool ignores `profile` |
| 11e | Native self-upgrade archive confinement (#1025) | `ai-memory-cli/src/commands/upgrade.rs` normalizes every tar/zip path, rejects links and special entries, extracts only the binary and `hooks/`, accepts only the exact non-runtime support layout emitted by `release.yml`, and caps both entry count and declared expanded bytes before writing | `upgrade.rs` `release_workflow_support_assets_are_exact_and_ignored` (shipped support paths admitted, near-miss docs/packaging/template paths refused), `extracts_archive_built_like_release_yml` and `extracts_zip_happy_path_with_hooks` (real workflow-shaped archives succeed but support assets are not written), `validate_rejects_path_traversal`, `zip_extract_rejects_path_traversal`, `tar_extract_rejects_declared_expansion_past_limit`, with binary/hooks extraction as the legitimate control | STRONG |