Skip to content

Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors

Rust

docs(backup): add wiki-content security section before push recipe

Renato Junior2ff91881549a
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index a200dd99..e93e0e69 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -11,11 +11,15 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
- `docs/backup.md` documents the remote-git-mirror backup pattern for a
single-user install: what to include, what to exclude (derived SQLite index,
models cache, logs, secrets), how to schedule with a `systemd --user` timer,
- how to restore, and the security posture per `SECURITY.md`. A worked example
- ships under `docs/examples/backup/` (snapshot script, `.service` and
- `.timer` unit files, `.gitignore` for the mirror repo). Pointers added
- from `docs/deploy.md#backups`, `docs/airgapped-install.md`, and the
- README docs table. The on-box `ai-memory backup --to <tarball>` command
+ how to restore, and the security posture per `SECURITY.md`, including a
+ "what ends up in your wiki" section that names the exposure (sanitized
+ prompts, tool I/O, page bodies) and lists encrypted-archive alternatives
+ (`age`, `restic`, `borg`, `git-crypt`) for cases where a private mirror
+ repo is not enough. A worked example ships under `docs/examples/backup/`
+ (snapshot script, `.service` and `.timer` unit files, `.gitignore` for
+ the mirror repo). Pointers added from `docs/deploy.md#backups`,
+ `docs/airgapped-install.md`, and the README docs table. The on-box
+ `ai-memory backup --to <tarball>` command
(`docs/lifecycle-ops.md#backup`) is unchanged. (#950)
### Fixed
diff --git a/docs/backup.md b/docs/backup.md
index 7df46e15..55b91f78 100644
--- a/docs/backup.md
+++ b/docs/backup.md
@@ -47,6 +47,76 @@ running `reindex` after a restore), pair the git mirror with a periodic
(external disk, network share, or on WSL2 the Windows-side filesystem via
`/mnt/c/`).
+## Security: what ends up in your wiki
+
+Read this before configuring a remote — decide what is acceptable to have
+off your machine, then pick the shape of backup that matches.
+
+The wiki captures **everything the coding agent sees during a session**
+that ai-memory's sanitizer classifies as observations to store: user
+prompts, tool inputs and outputs, page bodies written by consolidation.
+The sanitizer strips obvious credentials (see `SECURITY.md`), but it
+cannot prove that every prompt or tool response was safe to store. In
+practice this means: if any user has ever pasted an API key, a password,
+a private client name, a customer record, or a file path they consider
+sensitive into a captured session, it is on disk in the wiki tree, and
+whatever you push will carry it.
+
+For any remote target — even a private repository on a service you
+control — assume an operator or administrator on the receiving side
+could read the contents. Employer-managed cloud repositories
+(GitHub Enterprise, GitLab self-hosted, Bitbucket Data Center) may be
+routinely audited by administrators, and a repository private to you on
+a shared account is still readable by whoever administers the account.
+
+**Suggested exclusions**, in addition to the derived-state and
+secret-file rules already covered above. The mirror repository's
+`.gitignore` should carry at least:
+
+```
+# Provider credentials and OAuth material — never push
+config/*.env
+config/*.key
+config/*.pem
+config/auth.json
+config/.secrets
+
+# Derived index and downloadable state
+data/models/
+data/db/
+data/logs/
+data/.serve.lock
+```
+
+The example `.gitignore` under [`docs/examples/backup/`](examples/backup/README.md)
+ships this list already; expand it for anything install-specific
+(host-side certificates, private CA bundles, cloud credential files,
+site-specific env files).
+
+**Alternatives when the wiki content is too sensitive to store as text
+on a remote** — pick whichever fits the threat model:
+
+- **Encrypted archive to object storage.** `restic` or `borg` snapshots
+ of the data dir to a private object store (S3, Backblaze B2, Wasabi,
+ or a self-hosted MinIO) with a passphrase-derived encryption key. The
+ content leaves the host encrypted; the object-store operator sees
+ ciphertext.
+- **Selective encryption inside the mirror repo.** `git-crypt` on paths
+ known to carry sensitive material (for example `data/wiki/**/*.md`)
+ keeps the git-remote workflow but encrypts blobs before push. Set up
+ keys before the first commit; retro-encryption of history is manual.
+- **`age`-encrypted tarball to a second location.** Simpler than
+ `restic`/`borg`, no state file: pipe `tar czf - <data-dir>` through
+ `age -R <recipients>` and drop the ciphertext onto an external disk
+ or a network share.
+- **Local-only backup, no remote.** Rotate encrypted tarballs onto an
+ external USB drive that lives off-site; give up remote-git
+ convenience for zero third-party exposure.
+
+If none of the wiki content is more sensitive than what already lives
+in your project's source repository, a private mirror repo is fine —
+this section is for the case where it is.
+
## Backing up the wiki to a remote git repository
The wiki is already a git repository. If your only goal is off-site *wiki*