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Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors

Rust

fix(upgrade): unblock Linux native self-upgrade review findings

Ruben Licio Reis3287daf7644e
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 847c5799..697f4717 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -38,6 +38,17 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
model ids, and which model goes through the Responses endpoint (#763).
### Fixed
+- Native `ai-memory upgrade` no longer refuses every Linux install by probing
+ the running executable for write (Linux `ETXTBSY`); it only requires the
+ parent directory to be writable for rename-based replace. (#802)
+- Native `ai-memory upgrade` accepts release archives whose entries are
+ `./`-prefixed (`tar -C … -czf … .` as in `release.yml`), instead of
+ rejecting `Component::CurDir` as an unsafe path. (#802)
+- Native `ai-memory upgrade` treats Linuxbrew (`/home/linuxbrew/.linuxbrew/`)
+ as package-managed and refuses self-replace there. (#802)
+- Native `ai-memory upgrade` container refusal now uses the shared
+ `running_in_container` helper (`AI_MEMORY_IN_CONTAINER`, `/.dockerenv`,
+ `/run/.containerenv` / Podman), matching staged-hooks detection. (#802)
- The Windows Docker wrapper (`bin/ai-memory.ps1`) now forwards the same
provider credentials and host-config env vars as the POSIX wrapper into the
helper container. A host-exported `GEMINI_API_KEY` / `GOOGLE_API_KEY`,
diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/upgrade.rs b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/upgrade.rs
index 0e760029..e0e3c62b 100644
--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/upgrade.rs
+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/src/commands/upgrade.rs
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ fn classify_install(exe: &Path) -> Result<InstallClass> {
}
fn container_refusal() -> Option<String> {
- if Path::new("/.dockerenv").exists() {
+ if ai_memory_wiki::backup::running_in_container() {
Some(
"refusing to self-upgrade inside a container; run `ai-memory upgrade` on the \
host Docker wrapper, or replace the image with `docker pull`"
@@ -250,7 +250,9 @@ fn unwritable_refusal(exe: &Path) -> Result<Option<String>> {
let parent = exe
.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("executable has no parent directory"))?;
- if is_writable_dir(parent) && is_writable_file(exe) {
+ // Only the parent directory must be writable: atomic replace uses rename,
+ // and Linux returns ETXTBSY when opening a running executable for write.
+ if is_writable_dir(parent) {
return Ok(None);
}
Ok(Some(format!(
@@ -264,6 +266,7 @@ fn package_managed_prefixes() -> &'static [&'static str] {
&[
"/opt/homebrew/",
"/usr/local/Cellar/",
+ "/home/linuxbrew/.linuxbrew/",
"/usr/bin/",
"/bin/",
"/sbin/",
@@ -287,10 +290,6 @@ fn is_writable_dir(path: &Path) -> bool {
}
}
-fn is_writable_file(path: &Path) -> bool {
- fs::OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(path).is_ok()
-}
-
fn release_base_url(config: &Config) -> String {
config
.release_base_url
@@ -418,9 +417,7 @@ fn is_regular_file(entry_type: tar::EntryType) -> bool {
}
fn validate_release_entry(path: &Path, entry_type: tar::EntryType) -> Result<()> {
- if !path.components().all(|c| matches!(c, Component::Normal(_))) {
- bail!("release archive contains unsafe path: {}", path.display());
- }
+ let normalized = normalize_release_entry_path(path)?;
if entry_type.is_symlink() || entry_type.is_hard_link() {
bail!(
"release archive contains unsupported link entry: {}",
@@ -433,7 +430,15 @@ fn validate_release_entry(path: &Path, entry_type: tar::EntryType) -> Result<()>
path.display()
);
}
- if !is_allowed_release_path(path) {
+ // `tar -C dist/$artifact -czf … .` (release.yml) emits `./` as the
+ // archive root — empty after stripping CurDir; allow that directory only.
+ if normalized.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+ if entry_type.is_dir() {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ bail!("release archive contains unsafe path: {}", path.display());
+ }
+ if !is_allowed_release_path(&normalized) {
bail!(
"release archive contains unexpected path: {}",
path.display()
@@ -442,6 +447,20 @@ fn validate_release_entry(path: &Path, entry_type: tar::EntryType) -> Result<()>
Ok(())
}
+/// Drop `Component::CurDir` (release tarballs use `./ai-memory`); reject
+/// anything that is not a normal component after that.
+fn normalize_release_entry_path(path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+ let mut out = PathBuf::new();
+ for component in path.components() {
+ match component {
+ Component::CurDir => {}
+ Component::Normal(part) => out.push(part),
+ _ => bail!("release archive contains unsafe path: {}", path.display()),
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(out)
+}
+
fn is_allowed_release_path(path: &Path) -> bool {
let path_str = path.to_string_lossy();
path_str == BINARY_NAME
@@ -852,6 +871,19 @@ mod tests {
Ok(())
}
+ #[test]
+ fn homebrew_is_package_managed() {
+ let exe = Path::new("/opt/homebrew/bin/ai-memory");
+ assert!(package_managed_refusal(exe).is_some());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn linuxbrew_is_package_managed() {
+ let exe =
+ Path::new("/home/linuxbrew/.linuxbrew/Cellar/ai-memory/2.4.0/bin/ai-memory");
+ assert!(package_managed_refusal(exe).is_some());
+ }
+
#[test]
fn classify_accepts_writable_user_prefix() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
@@ -863,8 +895,9 @@ mod tests {
fs::set_permissions(&exe, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755))?;
}
let class = classify_install(&exe)?;
- // In CI containers /.dockerenv may exist — then Unsupported is correct.
- if Path::new("/.dockerenv").exists() {
+ // In CI containers (or when AI_MEMORY_IN_CONTAINER is set) Unsupported
+ // is correct — do not depend on /.dockerenv alone.
+ if ai_memory_wiki::backup::running_in_container() {
assert!(matches!(class, InstallClass::Unsupported(_)));
} else {
assert_eq!(class, InstallClass::Supported);
@@ -890,6 +923,39 @@ mod tests {
Ok(())
}
+ #[test]
+ fn validate_accepts_dot_slash_prefixed_binary() -> Result<()> {
+ validate_release_entry(Path::new("./ai-memory"), tar::EntryType::Regular)?;
+ validate_release_entry(Path::new("./"), tar::EntryType::Directory)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn extracts_archive_built_like_release_yml() -> Result<()> {
+ let src = tempfile::tempdir()?;
+ fs::write(src.path().join(BINARY_NAME), b"bin")?;
+ fs::create_dir_all(src.path().join("hooks/claude-code"))?;
+ fs::write(src.path().join("hooks/claude-code/x.sh"), b"#!/bin/sh")?;
+ let out = tempfile::tempdir()?;
+ let archive = out.path().join("a.tar.gz");
+ // Same invocation as .github/workflows/release.yml. COPYFILE_DISABLE
+ // keeps macOS tar from injecting AppleDouble `._*` sidecars that Linux
+ // release runners never produce.
+ let status = std::process::Command::new("tar")
+ .env("COPYFILE_DISABLE", "1")
+ .arg("-C")
+ .arg(src.path())
+ .arg("-czf")
+ .arg(&archive)
+ .arg(".")
+ .status()?;
+ assert!(status.success());
+ let dest = tempfile::tempdir()?;
+ extract_release_archive(&fs::read(&archive)?, dest.path())?;
+ assert!(dest.path().join(BINARY_NAME).is_file());
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
#[test]
fn extract_and_verify_round_trip() -> Result<()> {
let mut tar_bytes = Vec::new();