Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors
Rust
fix(sanitize): redact secret names one step outside KEY/TOKEN, and dotless eyJ tokens
luisfnicolau4927e9f3c924
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex c0229db6..5d7ffe58 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0provider. (#1026)### Fixed+- The sanitizer now redacts `*_KEY_ID`, `*_PASSPHRASE`, `*_SIGNING_KEY`,+ `*_PEPPER` and `*_SALT` assignments (e.g. an S3 `…_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, an auth+ token pepper) and dotless base64 JSON tokens such as Cloudflare tunnel+ tokens (`eyJ…`, 40+ characters); SHAs, UUIDs and short `eyJ` fragments are+ left alone.- Fixed interrupted launchers blocking an immediate managed-workstream restartby adding explicit `ai-memory run --force-unlock` recovery. The serveratomically expires and replaces only a lease attributed to the samediff --git a/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rs b/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rsindex d2a5d179..51be49dc 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rs@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@//! Facebook Graph EAA…, Telegram bot tokens, GoHighLevel pit-…, Slack//! xoxb/xoxp…, AWS AKIA/ASIA…), PEM-bracketed private//! keys, URL-embedded credentials (`postgres://user:pass@host`), and-//! anything matching the generic `*_(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|-//! CREDENTIAL)=value` shape. Operators can extend the list via+//! dotless base64 JSON tokens (Cloudflare tunnel tokens), and anything+//! matching the generic `*_(KEY|KEY_ID|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|+//! PEPPER|SALT|…)=value` shape. Operators can extend the list via//! `[sanitize].extra_patterns` and exempt substrings via//! `[sanitize].allowlist` — the allowlist is checked *per match*, so a//! pattern still runs but an allowlisted span survives unchanged.@@ -134,6 +135,13 @@ const BUILTIN_PATTERNS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}","jwt",),+ // A base64 JSON object with no dots: Cloudflare tunnel tokens+ // (`cloudflared service install eyJ…` is how the dashboard hands one out)+ // and other opaque `{"…` blobs the JWT rule's three segments miss. `eyJ` is+ // only base64 for `{"`, so the 40-character floor is what separates a+ // credential from a short encoded fragment; config that long is pasted as+ // JSON, not base64.+ (r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-+/]{40,}={0,2}", "base64_json_token"),// PEM private key blocks — multi-line, lazy match.(r"(?s)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",@@ -174,9 +182,13 @@ const BUILTIN_PATTERNS: &[(&str, &str)] = &["env_secret",),// Generic env-var catch-all: any *_KEY / *_TOKEN / *_SECRET /- // *_PASSWORD / *_CREDENTIAL[S] / *_PRIVATE_KEY assignment.+ // *_PASSWORD / *_CREDENTIAL[S] / *_PRIVATE_KEY assignment, plus the+ // suffixes one step outside those: `*_KEY_ID` (the other half of an S3+ // pair, e.g. `LITESTREAM_ACCESS_KEY_ID`), `*_PASSPHRASE`, `*_SIGNING_KEY`,+ // and `*_PEPPER` / `*_SALT`, which turn a stolen hash table into a usable+ // one.(- r#"(?i)\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|CREDENTIALS|PRIVATE_KEY)"?\s*[=:]\s*\S+"#,+ r#"(?i)\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(KEY|KEY_ID|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PASSPHRASE|CREDENTIAL|CREDENTIALS|PRIVATE_KEY|SIGNING_KEY|PEPPER|SALT)"?\s*[=:]\s*\S+"#,"env_secret",),// Filesystem paths that commonly contain credentials. The separator@@ -485,6 +497,58 @@ mod tests {Sanitizer::builtin()}+ #[test]+ fn scrubs_the_suffixes_one_step_outside_key_and_token() {+ // Fixtures are FAKE shapes, not real values.+ for (input, secret) in [+ (+ "LITESTREAM_ACCESS_KEY_ID=fake0000fake0000fake0000fake0000",+ "fake0000fake0000fake0000fake0000",+ ),+ (+ "AI_MEMORY_AUTH_TOKEN_PEPPER=fakepepperfakepepperfakepepper00",+ "fakepepperfakepepperfakepepper00",+ ),+ ("PASSWORD_SALT: fakesaltfakesalt00", "fakesaltfakesalt00"),+ ("GPG_PASSPHRASE=correct-horse-fake", "correct-horse-fake"),+ ("RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY=fakesigningkey000", "fakesigningkey000"),+ ] {+ let out = s().scrub(input);+ assert!(!out.contains(secret), "{input} -> {out}");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:env_secret]"), "{input} -> {out}");+ }+ }++ #[test]+ fn scrubs_a_dotless_base64_json_token() {+ // The shape of a Cloudflare tunnel token: base64 of `{"a":"…","t":"…"}`+ // with no dots, handed out as a shell command rather than an assignment.+ let token = "eyJhIjoiRkFLRUZBS0VGQUtFRkFLRUZBS0VGQUtFIiwidCI6IkZBS0VGQUtFIn0=";+ let out = s().scrub(&format!("cloudflared service install {token}"));+ assert!(!out.contains(token), "{out}");+ assert_eq!(+ out,+ "cloudflared service install [REDACTED:base64_json_token]"+ );+ }++ #[test]+ fn ordinary_identifiers_survive_the_wider_rules() {+ for keep in [+ // A git SHA, a SHA-256 digest, a UUID and a version string.+ "commit 1f0775428a9e4b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c",+ "sha256 9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08",+ "request 3b58f2d3-c1ac-81b2-b387-dd04ff9a3d11",+ "version 2.4.2",+ // `eyJ` is only base64 for `{"`: a short run is not a credential.+ "payload eyJhIjoi",+ // The suffixes are words in prose, not assignments.+ "add a pinch of SALT and a KEY_ID column",+ ] {+ assert_eq!(s().scrub(keep), keep);+ }+ }+#[test]fn scrubs_bearer_token() {let out = s().scrub("Authorization: Bearer abcdef0123456789ABCDEF0123456789");