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Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors

Rust

Merge branch 'main' into release/2.7

AkitaOnRails5ab6b485021a
diff --cc CHANGELOG.md
index 9d4189f7,87bd2d84..9e0c1ffa
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@@ -7,125 -7,52 +7,170 @@@ and this project adheres to [Semantic V
## [Unreleased]
+### Added
+- `memory_write_page` accepts `expected_page_id` (write only if that is still
+ the page's latest version) or `create_only` (write only if the page does not
+ exist), and `memory_delete_page` accepts `expected_page_id`. A precondition
+ that no longer holds fails with `reason: "precondition_failed"` and the
+ current version, and changes nothing. `memory_read_page` returns the version
+ as `page_id` and `/api/v1` pages as `id`. This is the compare-and-write the
+ team-wiki sync needed (#986).
+- The `ai-memory-wikisync` companion gained CI and post-merge integration
+ (#986, slice 5): `sync --check` writes nothing and exits 0 in sync, 3 on
+ drift and 4 on conflicts or refusals (a clone without sync state compares
+ the repository with the server directly), and `install-hook` /
+ `uninstall-hook` manage a marked git `post-merge` block that runs `sync`
+ after each merge — a dry-run report unless `--on-merge apply`, never with
+ `--prefer`, and never with a stored token. The cookbook has a GitHub
+ Actions recipe. (#986)
+- The `ai-memory-wikisync` companion now propagates deletes with
+ `sync --propagate-deletes` (#986, slice 4): a file deleted in the repository
+ deletes its server page through `memory_delete_page`, and a page deleted on
+ the server deletes its file, when the other side is unchanged since the last
+ sync. A delete against an edit is a conflict that `--prefer` resolves, more
+ than `--max-deletes` (default 10) refuses the run, and a pinned page is
+ deleted only with `--prefer repo`. Every sync write and delete now carries
+ the page version it was planned against, so a page changed during the run is
+ reported and left alone while the rest apply, and `sync --apply` refuses a
+ server older than 2.7. Without the flag deletes are still only reported.
+ (#986)
+- `ai-memory doctor` now reports three silent capture failures: an unreachable
+ server (reported instead of aborting the check), a hook spool that is full and
+ evicting undelivered events, and installed ai-memory Codex hooks that Codex
+ skips because they are untrusted or changed since they were trusted (asked
+ of Codex itself through `codex app-server`). `ai-memory status` no longer says
+ queued events will be delivered once the spool has started evicting them.
+- Added two-way sync to the `ai-memory-wikisync` companion (#986, slice 3):
+ `sync` imports repository edits and new pages through the public
+ `memory_write_page` MCP tool and exports server edits, comparing each
+ page with the last sync. A page changed on both sides is a conflict until
+ `--prefer repo` or `--prefer server`; deletes are reported, not synced.
+ It is a dry-run without `--apply`, refuses files without frontmatter,
+ refuses to overwrite server pages whose metadata a write would clear, and
+ re-reads each page right before writing it. (#1164)
+- `finalize-session --agent antigravity-cli` now replays the session's typed
+ prompts from `agy`'s `history.jsonl` before its synthetic session-end, so
+ live Antigravity sessions — whose hooks carry no prompt event — get a summary
+ page titled by the first prompt, a handoff with "Started/Last", and prompts
+ that `memory_query` and `memory_recent` can find. Only lines whose
+ conversation and workspace match the session are read; each prompt carries
+ the key `backfill` mints for it, so a repeated `--reopen` stores it once and a
+ prompt typed after the first finalize arrives with the next one. A checkout
+ the capture allowlist does not admit and `--all-owners` runs replay nothing,
+ and a missing `history.jsonl` only warns. (#1160)
+- `ai-memory run` accepts `copilot` (alias `copilot-cli`) and manages GitHub
+ Copilot CLI as a workstream harness: a fresh session gets a generated
+ `--session-id`, a returning one is resumed with `--resume=<id>`, user
+ selectors (`--resume`, `--continue`, `--session-id`, `--connect`) win,
+ utility subcommands pass through, and `--yolo` maps to Copilot's native
+ `--yolo`. Visible messages, tool calls and results, and compaction summaries
+ are imported read-only from `$COPILOT_HOME/session-state/<uuid>/events.jsonl`
+ (system prompts, hidden reasoning, hook output, and telemetry are excluded),
+ and the existing SessionStart hook delivers the workstream context. The
+ first managed launch auto-wires Copilot's hooks and MCP, and `doctor` now
+ counts its local sessions. Verified against Copilot CLI 1.0.92. (#1040)
+- GitHub Copilot CLI is now a first-class routing target:
+ `install-skills --agent copilot-cli` (and `install-instructions
+ --skills-agent copilot-cli`) writes the managed Agent Skills to the
+ repository's `.github/skills` or, globally, to `$COPILOT_HOME/skills`
+ (default `~/.copilot/skills`); `memory_install_self_routing` returns
+ `copilot_cli` filename and skill-root hints; the routing snippet, the
+ routing-install skill, and the MCP instructions name Copilot CLI with
+ `AGENTS.md`; and `uninstall` sweeps both Copilot roots, removing only
+ marker-bearing ai-memory skills. (#1040)
+- Added `ai-memory recover` and a bounded local recovery journal for server
+ outages. Offline managed launches now record only uniquely correlated native
+ session locators; recovery quarantines overlapping spool entries before exact
+ `/hook/batch` transcript replay, journals harnesses without transcript export
+ as spool-only without calling their exporter, retains bounded recovery dedup
+ keys with their sessions,
+ fails closed on terminal drops, and lets only the original owner finish an
+ expired unsuperseded managed run through exact idempotent replay. Backfill
+ and recovery replay now use reserved `recovery_*` idempotency keys, so
+ re-running `backfill --force` over sessions imported by ai-memory ≤2.6.0 (or
+ plain-backfilling a recovery-replayed session) can duplicate those older
+ observations. (#1125)
+- Added `AI_MEMORY_LLM_COMPAT_DISABLE_THINKING` for the `openai-compat`
+ provider (opt-in, off by default, ignored by every other provider): when
+ set, every chat request carries
+ `chat_template_kwargs: {"enable_thinking": false}`, so thinking-capable
+ local engines (vLLM / SGLang serving Qwen3-class models) spend the output
+ budget on the structured payload instead of a reasoning pass. (#1130)
+- Added the `cursor` LLM provider. Consolidation calls the logged-in Cursor
+ Agent CLI (`agent --print --mode ask`) so a Cursor subscription can drive
+ summaries without an API key. The default model is `cursor-grok-4.6-high`
+ ("Grok 4.6"). `AI_MEMORY_CURSOR_AGENT` overrides the binary. The provider never passes
+ `--yolo` or `--force`, because the prompt is captured session text. (#1127)
+- Added `applies_to` and `enforced_by` arguments to `memory_write_page`, and
+ `--applies-to` / `--enforced-by` to `ai-memory write-page`, for profile
+ entries. Both fields were documented as profile-entry frontmatter, but no
+ tool could set them, so scoping an entry to a stack or keeping it out of the
+ digest meant editing the wiki file by hand, and the next tool rewrite of the
+ entry dropped the value. A tag the profile cannot detect in any project
+ (`typscript`) is refused instead of silently hiding the entry, and both
+ arguments are refused on any page the digest does not read: one outside
+ `profile/`, or a `profile/` path in an ordinary project. (#1178)
+
+- Added the server version to the footer of every signed-in `/web` page (the
+ public login and change-password pages leave it out), on the right
+ side opposite "ai-memory · read-only", so you can tell which build a browser
+ tab is talking to without running `ai-memory status`. (#1171)
+
+### Changed
+- Changed `ai-memory-wikisync` files to carry a small frontmatter (`title`,
+ plus `tags`, `pinned` and a non-default `tier` when set) above the body,
+ so metadata survives a round trip. The first run after upgrading rewrites
+ unedited files of an earlier export in place. (#1164)
+
### Fixed
+- Fixed structured LLM responses stopped at the output budget
+ (`finish_reason = "length"`) or returned without usable content: they now
+ fail with redacted terminal errors, without copying the response. (#1130)
+ - Fixed generated TypeScript integrations (OpenCode, OpenCode 2, OMP,
+ Pi, OpenClaw) flashing a console window on Windows.
+ `discoverRemoteIdentity` spawned `git config --get remote.<name>.url`
+ without `windowsHide`. The spawn now passes `windowsHide: true`, as
+ the repo-root probe's two git spawns already do (#1169).
+ - Fixed `AI_MEMORY_LLM_REASONING_EFFORT` being ignored for
+ `claude-haiku-5-5`: the Anthropic provider dropped effort and thinking
+ fields for every Haiku model because Haiku 4.5 rejects them, so Haiku 5.5
+ always ran adaptive thinking at its default `medium` effort. Haiku 5.5 and
+ later now receive `output_config.effort`, adaptive thinking, and
+ `thinking: disabled` for `none`, like the other current Claude models
+ (#1180).
+ - Documented that Anthropic currently refuses Claude Free/Pro/Max subscription
+ tokens from third-party apps, so `anthropic-oauth` usually fails with a
+ `429 rate_limit_error` on every request. That is a policy refusal, not a
+ real rate limit; the docs now point to the `anthropic` provider with a
+ Console API key or another provider. Also corrected the claim that
+ `claude setup-token` writes `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`: it only prints the
+ token, which you export yourself. (#1170)
+ - Documented that Zero runs hook commands inside its sandbox, whose default
+ policy blocks network (loopback included) and writes outside the
+ workspace, so hook events stay in the spool instead of reaching the
+ server. The `install-hooks --agent zero` and `setup-agent` notes and the
+ Zero install docs now name the global `~/.config/zero/config.json`
+ `sandbox` keys that allow delivery, their tradeoff, and the
+ `ai-memory hook-drain` fallback. (#1172)
+ - Fixed a global `~/.codex/AGENTS.md` reaching the cross-project profile as
+ the user's own words. Codex injects its instruction files as a user message
+ headed `# AGENTS.md instructions for <cwd>` when a project `AGENTS.md`
+ contributes, and `# AGENTS.md instructions` with no directory when only the
+ global file does. The transcript import recognized only the first heading,
+ so `backfill` stored the global file as a user prompt in every project, and
+ the profile harvest admitted its "always"/"never" lines, which repeat across
+ projects by construction. The import now recognizes both headings. (#1173)
+ - Fixed the profile harvest reading text the user did not write as the
+ user's words: a user-prompt observation that is a harness turn, such as
+ Claude Code's `<task-notification>` blocks or Codex's injected
+ instructions, is now skipped, and ai-memory's own routing and
+ recalled-history blocks inside a prompt are left out, including a block the
+ 16 KiB prompt cap cut before its end marker. `profile rebuild` also skips
+ Codex instructions an earlier version stored as prompts, but it keeps the
+ candidates already harvested from them, so those lines can still show as
+ waiting in `profile review`. An entry an earlier version already admitted,
+ or one those candidates reach later, stays until `ai-memory profile forget`
+ removes it. (#1173)
- Fixed Cursor tool calls being stored with no title or content: Cursor's own
hooks, and the Claude Code hooks Cursor also runs, send Claude's
`tool_name`/`tool_input` fields, but Cursor was missing from the tool-capture
diff --cc docs/security-boundaries.md
index 35e4290e,b5e39fe5..c2df657f
--- a/docs/security-boundaries.md
+++ b/docs/security-boundaries.md
@@@ -84,8 -82,8 +84,8 @@@ boundary not yet built
| 14 | Per-project authorization (#708) | `ai-memory-store/src/project_authz.rs` `authorize_project` / `ProjectAuthz::authorize` choke point (V68 `project_grants` + `projects.access_mode`, default `open`; V69 `projects.created_by` feeds `is_creator`); `scope.rs` `ScopeResolver::with_project_authz` (reader pool for reads, writer actor for writes) and its free forms `authorize_scope_for` / `*_guarded`, attached for every DB user by `ai-memory-mcp` `scope_resolver_as`, `ai-memory-web` `authorize_read` / `lookup_project`, and `ai-memory-hooks` (`grants.rs` `authorize_resolved` for run/workstream ids, the capture check in `router.rs`); read-shaped mutations resolve at `ProjectAccess::Write` (`resolve_existing_args(.., need)`); unscoped reads filtered before `LIMIT` by `reader.rs` `readable_repository_sql`; `WriterHandle::authorize_project` as defense in depth. Page ids are never taken from a caller (only derived from already-authorized hits), so there is no page-id entry point to guard; incremental `recent` resolves and authorizes the requested project before decoding its scope-bound cursor; batch outcomes do not bypass the capture grant or session owner check | `tests/suite/project_authz.rs` (decision matrix, ship-inert, resolver gate); `tests/suite/access_mode.rs` `every_caller_against_both_modes`, `a_restricted_project_admits_the_team_and_refuses_the_outsider`, `new_projects_follow_the_server_default_and_admit_their_creator`; `scope.rs` `the_argument_shape_does_not_decide_the_level`, `a_user_reaches_only_what_they_were_granted`, `creating_authorizes_against_a_project_that_already_exists`, `a_refused_scope_fails_the_search_instead_of_shortening_it`; `grants.rs` `search_finds_only_what_the_viewer_may_read`, `the_limit_counts_only_what_the_viewer_may_see`, `the_workspace_handoff_comes_only_from_readable_repositories`; `ai-memory-mcp` `server.rs` `a_reader_may_read_everything_and_change_nothing`, `bob_cannot_read_alices_page_in_a_restricted_project`, `bob_cannot_find_alices_page_by_searching_in_a_restricted_project`, `bob_cannot_consolidate_a_session_in_alices_repository`, `a_restricted_projects_queues_need_write`; `ai-memory-hooks` `a_capture_needs_writer_on_the_repository_it_lands_in`, `session_start_delivers_nothing_from_a_repository_the_viewer_cannot_read`, `run_and_workstream_ids_only_answer_someone_who_may_reach_the_repository` (foreign raw workstream id refuses populated provenance; granted reader receives the source record and tool correlation); `ai-memory-web` `web_reads_honour_grants_in_a_restricted_project`, `metadata_shows_only_what_the_viewer_may_read` — each with a granted or open-project control, and proven to fail with the choke point (18 tests) or the SQL filter (9 tests) neutralized; `routes.rs` `api_recent_incremental_rechecks_restricted_scope_on_cursor` (a valid cursor cannot bypass a revoked grant; granted control passes), `api_recent_incremental_paginates_over_120_pages_and_binds_cursor`; `mcp_stateless_http.rs` `generic_machine_client_writes_queries_and_claims_a_handoff` (real machine key, foreign scope and partial scope refused); `router.rs` `an_unauthorized_batch_item_is_consumed_rather_than_retried`, `batch_acknowledges_foreign_collision_then_commits_next_item` (refused foreign item followed by a legitimate stored item) | STRONG — slice 3 closed both bypass classes (unscoped reads, raw-id entry points) and added the root-only management surface. Out of scope by design: per-project administrators (granting/restricting is root-only), and access modes, creators and grants live only in SQLite, so `reindex` resets them |
| 14aa | Companion capture privacy before persistence and delivery | `companions/ai-memory-client/src/lib.rs` `reject_sensitive`, `sanitize_external_value`, `check_body`; `src/scrub.rs` `sanitize_external_text`; relay `identity::validate`, `check_scope`, `relay::init` and `flush_locked`; importer `plan_external_conversation`, `planned_hook_event`, `truncate_utf8`, `ImportClient::post_hook_batch` | SDK secret-position, nested key, numeric metric (11 names plus numeric `*_tokens` counts; string values still redact), bounded schema and literal-marker tests; relay `sensitive_envelope_is_rejected_before_enqueue_with_clean_control`, `new_native_bodies_are_sanitized_before_hash_enqueue_and_exact_retry`, `unsafe_legacy_pending_is_dropped_locally_and_never_blocks_its_session`, `unsafe_legacy_native_identity_is_dropped_and_its_session_continues`, `legacy_binding_scope_spaces_are_preserved_on_delivery`; importer `sensitive_native_identity_is_refused_before_manifest_and_http_with_unicode_control`, `shared_key_sanitation_precedes_plan_manifest_transport_and_exact_retry`, `preview_and_manifest_use_scrubbed_bodies_and_digest`, `forged_body_authority_is_refused_before_transport`, `sanitized_redaction_markers_survive_utf8_byte_caps_in_bodies_and_titles`. Controls preserve opaque native Unicode IDs, metric representation and untrusted provenance. An unsafe item queued before these checks never reaches the wire (body or request line); it leaves the queue as a local `dropped_policy` receipt so the rest of its session ships. Guard-removal runtime probes target the final formatted sources and restore identical hashes. | Client-side privacy only; server scope, auth, admission and capture-policy guards remain authoritative |
| 14ap | Managed-run mutation owner and current project access (finish, cancel, heartbeat, native-session link, context acceptance) | `hooks/src/workstream.rs` `authorize_run_owner` derives `ManagedRunAuthority` only from authenticated middleware extensions and checks the real run before any mutation — for finish before status/payload/segment handling; cancel, heartbeat, link and context acceptance go through the same helper, so none is a side door around finish's rule; `ReaderPool::authorize_managed_run` and `store/src/workstream.rs` `authorize_run_mutation` use a read snapshot and the existing writer transaction, respectively. Strict resolution (`project_authz.rs` `resolve_project_authz_strict`, the canonical decision with a fail-closed resolution mode, so the reserved global-scope write gate applies here too) requires the actual workspace/project pair, current user existence and current Write decision for DB principals. The private trusted-proxy policy requires authenticated User capability, a canonical identity, no DB principal and server proxy configuration; it retains legacy project admission after strict scope validation, with ownership still enforced. Human-login disable does not revoke API keys. The legacy resolver and auth middleware remain unchanged. Both writer entry paths, including finished retries, require the same authority; no cross-owner bypass | MCP `auth.rs` `owner_finish_http_refuses_another_writer_before_payload_or_segment`, `owner_finish_http_trusted_proxy_preserves_restricted_lifecycle`, `owner_finish_http_active_api_key_survives_disabled_human_login`; store `multi_session.rs` `owner_finish_store_refuses_another_writer_including_finished_retry`, `owner_finish_store_rechecks_write_after_preflight`, `owner_finish_store_refuses_a_deleted_user_after_preflight`, `owner_finish_store_proxy_policy_requires_server_and_authenticated_identity`, `owner_finish_store_raw_ids_use_the_actual_project_and_workspace`, `owner_finish_store_topology_reload_and_phase_controls`, `owner_finish_store_strict_resolution_refuses_pairing_missing_and_sql_failure`, `owner_finish_store_keeps_qualified_identity_namespaces`; hooks `workstream.rs` `owner_finish_revocation_between_preflight_and_both_writer_paths`; MCP `auth.rs` `owner_finish_http_real_auth_rungs_shared_and_project_controls`, `owner_finish_http_preserves_late_active_terminal_and_missing_phases`; hooks `workstream.rs` `run_mutation_routes_refuse_another_operator` (another operator and root under another identity refused on heartbeat/link/accept/cancel, run left active; owner admitted); store `project_authz.rs` `strict_resolution_shares_the_global_gate_and_fails_closed_on_a_gap`. Guard-neutralization recipes and results accompany the local frozen patch | SQL refusal is atomic within finish's writer transaction; a revocation after preflight can leave an unindexed raw segment. Cancel, heartbeat, link and acceptance check one read snapshot immediately before a single-row update (a run's owner never changes). A later hook event carrying `AI_MEMORY_RUN_ID` links its native session only through `link_native_session_in_scope`, which applies the SessionStart boundary (`ManagedRunBoundaryRow::admits`: the run's own project and operator) and refuses a foreign run id while the event itself is still captured (`router.rs` `hook_event_links_a_managed_run_only_from_its_operator`, `hook_event_in_another_project_does_not_link_the_run`, control `hook_event_links_a_shared_run_on_a_single_operator_server`; #1082). Shared NULL ownership, trusted-proxy project admission and late still-active finishes remain intentional |
-| 14au | Exact native managed identity and privacy (invariant #16) | `core/src/workstream.rs` `NativeSessionIdentity` validates original bytes and exact scrub equality; `workstream/src/harness.rs` and `transcript.rs` retain selector/path restrictions; CLI `run.rs` validates old-server prepare/status, planned selectors and finish transport; hooks `workstream.rs` checks payload and selected identity before raw segments, with the existing owner/current Write preflight first; `router.rs` validates both managed auto-links while preserving legacy shared capture; store `workstream.rs` carries validated identities into link/finish SQL after finish authority and before mutation. Store, HTTP search and CLI search project invalid historical identity to empty String without rewriting history | Core `native_identity_original_bytes_limits_privacy_and_collisions`; harness `native_identity_selector_rejects_original_before_resume_arguments`; transcript `native_identity_adapter_preserves_exact_and_rejects_privacy_changes`, `claude_transcript_is_located_by_the_real_folder_name` (a server-linked Claude id probed across project folders still resolves only to a transcript whose own header names this checkout; another checkout's transcript and a subagent sidechain with the same id are refused); store multi-session `native_identity_store_link_refuses_original_dirty_bytes`, `native_identity_store_adoption_refuses_before_link`, `native_identity_store_finish_refuses_without_sql_or_index_mutation`, `native_identity_store_history_projects_unknown_without_rewriting`; hooks `native_identity_http_link_refuses_before_status_or_sql`, `native_identity_http_finish_refuses_before_segment_or_sql`, `native_identity_http_event_guard_and_configured_history_projection`, `native_identity_http_stored_identity_refuses_before_raw_segment`, router `native_identity_managed_start_refuses_but_keeps_shared_legacy_capture`; CLI `native_identity_run_preflight_refuses_before_resume_or_private_path`, `native_identity_run_old_server_refusal_prevents_child_and_transport`, `native_identity_finish_transport_refuses_before_request_and_preserves_exact_control`, `native_identity_run_status_and_expected_refuse_before_discovery`, `native_identity_run_configured_selector_refuses_before_link_or_child`, `native_identity_run_configured_old_status_refuses_before_native_io_and_finish`, `native_identity_run_configured_discovery_refuses_before_export`, suite `native_identity_search_old_server_json_projects_unknown_and_keeps_history` | Representation/privacy only: no native authenticity, file-existence, run/event correlation or outcome proof. Original legacy rows and shared observation semantics remain intact; parent finish owner/current Write rules remain mandatory |
+| 14au | Exact native managed identity and privacy (invariant #16) | `core/src/workstream.rs` `NativeSessionIdentity` validates original bytes and exact scrub equality; `workstream/src/harness.rs` and `transcript.rs` retain selector/path restrictions; CLI `run.rs` validates old-server prepare/status, planned selectors and finish transport; hooks `workstream.rs` checks payload and selected identity before raw segments, with the existing owner/current Write preflight first; `router.rs` validates both managed auto-links while preserving legacy shared capture; store `workstream.rs` carries validated identities into link/finish SQL after finish authority and before mutation. Store, HTTP search and CLI search project invalid historical identity to empty String without rewriting history | Core `native_identity_original_bytes_limits_privacy_and_collisions`; harness `native_identity_selector_rejects_original_before_resume_arguments`; transcript `native_identity_adapter_preserves_exact_and_rejects_privacy_changes`, `copilot_discovery_requires_uuid_directory_header_and_checkout` (another checkout's session, a `session.start` naming a different session than its directory, and non-UUID or `../` ids refused; exact-checkout control), `claude_transcript_is_located_by_the_real_folder_name` (a server-linked Claude id probed across project folders still resolves only to a transcript whose own header names this checkout; another checkout's transcript and a subagent sidechain with the same id are refused); store multi-session `native_identity_store_link_refuses_original_dirty_bytes`, `native_identity_store_adoption_refuses_before_link`, `native_identity_store_finish_refuses_without_sql_or_index_mutation`, `native_identity_store_history_projects_unknown_without_rewriting`; hooks `native_identity_http_link_refuses_before_status_or_sql`, `native_identity_http_finish_refuses_before_segment_or_sql`, `native_identity_http_event_guard_and_configured_history_projection`, `native_identity_http_stored_identity_refuses_before_raw_segment`, router `native_identity_managed_start_refuses_but_keeps_shared_legacy_capture`; CLI `native_identity_run_preflight_refuses_before_resume_or_private_path`, `native_identity_run_old_server_refusal_prevents_child_and_transport`, `native_identity_finish_transport_refuses_before_request_and_preserves_exact_control`, `native_identity_run_status_and_expected_refuse_before_discovery`, `native_identity_run_configured_selector_refuses_before_link_or_child`, `native_identity_run_configured_old_status_refuses_before_native_io_and_finish`, `native_identity_run_configured_discovery_refuses_before_export`, suite `native_identity_search_old_server_json_projects_unknown_and_keeps_history` | Representation/privacy only: no native authenticity, file-existence, run/event correlation or outcome proof. Original legacy rows and shared observation semantics remain intact; parent finish owner/current Write rules remain mandatory |
- | 14b | Repository identity routing (#708) | `ai-memory-store/src/ops.rs` `resolve_project_by_identity` — one transaction; an identity already on a project is never overwritten; an unclaimed project is claimed only when the capturing user may write it (the choke point's `resolve_project_authz` on the same transaction), otherwise it is returned unclaimed; a different identity under the same name splits into a new project with no shared `repo_path`; when a Phase-5 client explicitly sends `IdentityStyle::Path` (#1033) a project it creates takes `path_style_name` only while no different full identity in the workspace claims that canonical key (checked in the same transaction), so the same path on another forge falls back instead of being merged; authorized captures can claim/promote compatible legacy rows in that transaction while preserving UUID, but handoff/static reads never rename; explicit `host_path` remains the opt-out; `ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs` `cache_key_for` keys the path cache by identity and style; `ai-memory-core/src/repository_identity.rs` strips credentials from remote URLs client-side, and the server accepts only the routing rungs (`explicit`, `git_remote`) from the wire | `tests/suite/identity_resolution.rs` `an_outsider_cannot_take_an_unclaimed_projects_identity` (control: `an_existing_project_is_claimed_in_place`), `two_unrelated_repositories_with_one_folder_name_stay_apart`, `a_created_or_split_project_admits_its_creator`, `the_same_path_on_another_forge_falls_back_instead_of_merging`, `an_unclaimed_project_holding_the_path_name_is_not_taken`, `old_client_omitted_style_stays_host_path_and_does_not_promote`, `explicit_path_capture_claims_and_promotes_an_identityless_legacy_name_in_one_transaction`, `unauthorized_capture_cannot_claim_or_promote_an_identityless_legacy_name`, and `explicit_path_capture_falls_back_when_another_identity_claims_the_canonical_key` (controls: `the_path_style_names_a_new_project_from_the_host_less_path`, `opting_in_leaves_existing_projects_where_they_are`), `multi_session.rs` `two_operators_on_two_clones_of_one_repository_share_its_path_named_project`; `router.rs` `the_path_style_names_a_new_repository_and_never_merges_another_forge`, `one_path_with_two_remotes_is_two_projects`, `two_api_checkouts_with_different_remotes_get_two_projects` (a manifest rung on the wire is ignored); `repository_identity.rs` credential and normalisation tables — the claim guard and the cache key each proven to fail their test when removed | STRONG — first claimant wins: in a restricted workspace a user who creates a project under a remote identity first holds it until root grants others |
+ | 14b | Repository identity routing (#708) | `ai-memory-store/src/ops.rs` `resolve_project_by_identity` — one transaction; an identity already on a project is never overwritten; an unclaimed project is claimed only when the capturing user may write it (the choke point's `resolve_project_authz` on the same transaction), otherwise it is returned unclaimed; a different identity under the same name splits into a new project with no shared `repo_path`; when a Phase-5 client explicitly sends `IdentityStyle::Path` (#1033) a project it creates takes `path_style_name` only while no different full identity in the workspace claims that canonical key (checked in the same transaction), so the same path on another forge falls back instead of being merged; authorized captures can claim/promote compatible legacy rows in that transaction while preserving UUID, but handoff/static reads never rename; explicit `host_path` remains the opt-out; `ai-memory-hooks/src/workstream.rs` `resolve_run_scope` sends a managed run through the same transaction (identity holder, else the `$HOME`-guarded cwd-prefix candidate, inside the requested workspace only) only when the wire identity derives the requested name, then authorizes Write (#1182); `ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs` `cache_key_for` keys the path cache by identity and style; `ai-memory-core/src/repository_identity.rs` strips credentials from remote URLs client-side, and the server accepts only the routing rungs (`explicit`, `git_remote`) from the wire | `tests/suite/identity_resolution.rs` `an_outsider_cannot_take_an_unclaimed_projects_identity` (control: `an_existing_project_is_claimed_in_place`), `two_unrelated_repositories_with_one_folder_name_stay_apart`, `a_created_or_split_project_admits_its_creator`, `the_same_path_on_another_forge_falls_back_instead_of_merging`, `an_unclaimed_project_holding_the_path_name_is_not_taken`, `old_client_omitted_style_stays_host_path_and_does_not_promote`, `explicit_path_capture_claims_and_promotes_an_identityless_legacy_name_in_one_transaction`, `unauthorized_capture_cannot_claim_or_promote_an_identityless_legacy_name`, and `explicit_path_capture_falls_back_when_another_identity_claims_the_canonical_key` (controls: `the_path_style_names_a_new_project_from_the_host_less_path`, `opting_in_leaves_existing_projects_where_they_are`), `multi_session.rs` `two_operators_on_two_clones_of_one_repository_share_its_path_named_project`; hooks `workstream.rs` `managed_run_by_remote_identity_refuses_a_viewer_without_write`, `managed_run_identity_never_claims_a_restricted_legacy_project`, `managed_run_identity_never_redirects_another_project_name`; `router.rs` `the_path_style_names_a_new_repository_and_never_merges_another_forge`, `one_path_with_two_remotes_is_two_projects`, `two_api_checkouts_with_different_remotes_get_two_projects` (a manifest rung on the wire is ignored); `repository_identity.rs` credential and normalisation tables — the claim guard and the cache key each proven to fail their test when removed | STRONG — first claimant wins: in a restricted workspace a user who creates a project under a remote identity first holds it until root grants others |
| 14bb | Local marker aliases cannot cross repository or workspace boundaries (#1033) | `ai-memory-core/src/repository_identity.rs` owns the bounded `MarkerAliases` type and exact one-line/root-level portable grammar; native/POSIX/PowerShell/generated TypeScript clients forward one normalized JSON-array query value only with marker provenance and a hostful git-remote identity; `ai-memory-store/src/project_coordinates.rs` probes exact names only inside the selected workspace, deduplicates by UUID, and requires the selected row's full stored git-remote identity; `ops.rs` authorizes in the writer transaction and reuses Phase 1 `promotion_target`, additionally requiring marker `project` to equal the canonical path-style name derived from that remote; handoff uses the read-only path and capture uses the write-authorized path; `router.rs` includes aliases, provenance, and read/write mode in its cache key | Core/CLI shared `marker_aliases` fixture parity covers duplicate keys, table placement, multiline arrays, trailing junk/comma, escapes, max length and duplicate-heavy over-count; store `marker_aliases_require_same_remote_identity_and_preserve_uuid`, `marker_aliases_cannot_promote_to_an_arbitrary_marker_project`, `hostile_ambiguous_and_cross_workspace_marker_aliases_fail_closed`; hooks `hook_and_handoff_queries_validate_aliases_identically`, `malformed_aliases_are_rejected_before_subagent_scope_resolution`, `empty_aliases_preserve_marker_project_precedence`, `capture_promotes_an_alias_but_handoff_only_reads_it`, `project_cache_separates_alias_sets`; shell `marker aliases keep canonical project and forward remote identity`; Windows PowerShell parity and capture-only marker transparency run in Windows CI; OpenClaw `openclaw_runtime_preserves_marker_and_home_identity_precedence` proves no-marker remote routing sends explicit `path`, ordinary project markers keep name precedence and omit identity, while alias markers and home identity routes forward it | STRONG: hostile arbitrary-name, different-identity and ambiguous aliases refuse or resolve without rename with a legitimate canonical same-identity control; another workspace is never searched; no alias table or persistent fallback exists |
| 14bb2 | Operator-home route selectors cannot silently cross repository or path boundaries (#1033) | `ai-memory-cli/src/marker.rs` returns a typed invalid result for malformed/oversized maps; command scope resolution propagates it unless both CLI scope fields are explicit, while native hooks drop before spool/network. The native, POSIX, PowerShell, generated TypeScript and OpenClaw parsers enforce the shared 64-route/64-KiB/512-byte grammar, recognize malformed `[routes`, `routes =`, `routes.`, and orphan `route_*` syntax before any no-routes return, preserve legacy parsing for malformed root-only settings without route syntax, apply global duplicate-field/raw-selector/normalized-path checks, require exact hostful identities (including host-edge-dot refusal), match paths component-wise, and enforce a no-escape boundary for `~/` selectors. A route replaces only routing fields; root privacy/behavior flags survive. Bounded native/PowerShell/TypeScript reads reject before full-file allocation where their APIs permit. | `ai-memory-core/fixtures/home_route_cases.json` is executed by native `marker.rs`, POSIX, PowerShell, generated TypeScript, and OpenClaw runtime parity, including malformed route syntax and root-only malformed legacy behavior; shell `test_lib.sh` also exercises route selection, sibling refusal, root-setting retention and invalid-map drop; Windows `powershell_marker_aliases.rs` executes drive and UNC path routing independently of identity; generated TypeScript runtime tests assert marker versus repo-root `project_src`; CLI tests prove unscoped/partial refusal and complete-explicit bypass. | STRONG for native/POSIX/generated TypeScript/OpenClaw on this platform; PowerShell runtime evidence is enforced on Windows CI and skipped where PowerShell is unavailable |
| 14bc | Project-coordinate diagnostics are root-only, read-only and credential-safe (#1033) | `ai-memory-store/src/reader.rs` `diagnose_project_coordinate` and `project_coordinates.rs` share one bounded indexed matcher and the write path's canonical-only promotion predicate; `ai-memory-mcp/src/admin.rs` mounts `GET /admin/project-coordinate` behind the shared `Capability::Admin` middleware and returns no stored identity value; `ai-memory-cli/src/marker.rs` and `commands/hook_capture.rs` provide one strict typed local inspection consumed by `doctor`, which reports only marker/source classes, identity source/style and derived names. Ambiguous count lookup keeps local rows and marks captured counts unavailable | Store `identity_resolution.rs` `coordinate_diagnostic_classifies_exact_canonical_legacy_and_missing_without_mutation`, `coordinate_diagnostic_reports_cross_forge_and_identityless_collisions`; `project_coordinates.rs` `shared_candidate_query_deduplicates_before_bound_and_uses_only_indexes`; MCP `admin_status_search.rs` `project_coordinate_reports_all_statuses_and_never_mutates`, `project_coordinate_is_root_only_after_multiuser_enablement`, `project_coordinate_single_user_admin_contract_remains_open`, plus the shared all-admin 403/401 route matrix; CLI `doctor.rs` `project_coordinate_renders_promotion_and_cross_forge_fallback_concisely`, `local_coordinate_reports_marker_precedence_invalid_toml_and_no_credentials`; `marker.rs` strict inspection tests; `doctor_e2e.rs` `ambiguous_coordinate_keeps_local_sessions_and_marks_capture_unavailable` | STRONG: project/audit/user/grant/page counts, names and manifest bytes are snapshotted; DB-user/anonymous refusal has a root control; sentinel repo paths, identities, users, grants, pages, malformed marker text, absolute marker paths and credential-bearing remotes do not appear in output; an ambiguous preferred candidate remains contextual only and is never rename-eligible |