Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors
Rust
test(wrapper): cover the podman probe fallback and bootstrap gates
Rodrigo Palhares916b57a4a84d
diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rs b/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rsindex 4a52cf88..66366b68 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rs@@ -1011,6 +1011,20 @@ fn docker_wrapper_completions_preserve_helper_failure_without_partial_output() {// calls `docker info` *before* `docker run`, so this fake must dispatch on// $1: real stdout for `info` (read by the wrapper's `grep -q rootless`) vs.// logging argv to a file for `run` (read back by the test).+// How the fake `docker` binary answers `docker info --format …`. The two+// engines expose the same two facts under incompatible keys, and the wrapper+// has to read both, so the fake has to be able to impersonate either one.+#[cfg(unix)]+enum FakeInfo<'a> {+ // Docker: `{{.SecurityOptions}}` prints the security-options list.+ Docker(&'a str),+ // Podman, including the podman-docker `docker` shim: `.SecurityOptions`+ // is not a field of its info report, so the template fails and the+ // command exits non-zero with nothing on stdout. The equivalent facts+ // live under `.Host.Security.*`.+ Podman { rootless: bool, selinux: bool },+}+#[cfg(unix)]fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker(args: &[&str], docker_info_stdout: &str) -> String {run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_and_uname(args, docker_info_stdout, None)@@ -1024,7 +1038,7 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_and_claude_config() -> String {run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args,- docker_info_stdout,+ FakeInfo::Docker(docker_info_stdout),None,Some(claude_config_dir),None,@@ -1038,7 +1052,14 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_and_forwarded_env(docker_info_stdout: &str,forwarded_env: &[(&str, &str)],) -> String {- run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args, docker_info_stdout, None, None, None, forwarded_env)+ run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(+ args,+ FakeInfo::Docker(docker_info_stdout),+ None,+ None,+ None,+ forwarded_env,+ )}// The wrapper also shells out to `id -u` / `id -g` when choosing its default@@ -1054,7 +1075,14 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_and_uname(docker_info_stdout: &str,uname_stdout: Option<&str>,) -> String {- run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args, docker_info_stdout, uname_stdout, None, None, &[])+ run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(+ args,+ FakeInfo::Docker(docker_info_stdout),+ uname_stdout,+ None,+ None,+ &[],+ )}#[cfg(unix)]@@ -1065,7 +1093,27 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux() -> String {run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args,- docker_info_stdout,+ FakeInfo::Docker(docker_info_stdout),+ Some("Linux"),+ None,+ Some(selinux_mode),+ &[],+ )+}++// Rootless podman on an SELinux-enforcing host — the combination Fedora and+// openSUSE ship by default, and the one where the Docker-only probe answers+// nothing at all.+#[cfg(unix)]+fn run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(+ args: &[&str],+ rootless: bool,+ selinux: bool,+ selinux_mode: &str,+) -> String {+ run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(+ args,+ FakeInfo::Podman { rootless, selinux },Some("Linux"),None,Some(selinux_mode),@@ -1076,7 +1124,7 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(#[cfg(unix)]fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args: &[&str],- docker_info_stdout: &str,+ fake_info: FakeInfo<'_>,uname_stdout: Option<&str>,claude_config_dir: Option<&str>,selinux_mode: Option<&str>,@@ -1088,14 +1136,27 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(let uname = tmp.path().join("uname");let id = tmp.path().join("id");let getenforce = tmp.path().join("getenforce");+ let info_branch = match fake_info {+ FakeInfo::Docker(stdout) => format!(" printf '%s\\n' '{stdout}'\n exit 0\n"),+ FakeInfo::Podman { rootless, selinux } => format!(+ " case \"$*\" in\n\+ \x20 *Host.Security.Rootless*) printf '{rootless}\\n' ; exit 0 ;;\n\+ \x20 *Host.Security.SELinuxEnabled*) printf '{selinux}\\n' ; exit 0 ;;\n\+ \x20 esac\n\+ \x20 printf '%s\\n' \"Error: template: info:1:2: executing \\\"info\\\" at \+ <.SecurityOptions>: can't evaluate field SecurityOptions in \+ type system.infoReport\" >&2\n\+ \x20 exit 125\n"+ ),+ };std::fs::write(&docker,format!("#!/usr/bin/env bash\n\- if [ \"$1\" = info ]; then\n printf '%s\\n' '{}'\n exit 0\nfi\n\+ if [ \"$1\" = info ]; then\n{}fi\n\if [ \"$1\" = run ]; then\n shift\n printf '%s\\n' \"$@\" > {}\n exit 0\nfi\n\exit 0\n",- docker_info_stdout,+ info_branch,shell_path(&docker_args)),)@@ -1427,6 +1488,88 @@ fn powershell_wrapper_forwards_subscription_oauth_tokens_without_putting_values_}}+#[cfg(unix)]+#[test]+fn podman_rootless_and_selinux_are_detected_without_the_docker_only_field() {+ // Podman answers nothing for `{{.SecurityOptions}}`, so both gates used to+ // read as "rootful, no SELinux" and every host-file write died with+ // Permission denied. Both adjustments are required: neither alone makes+ // the write land.+ for subcommand in [+ "install-mcp",+ "install-hooks",+ "setup-agent",+ "install-instructions",+ "install-skills",+ "uninstall",+ "backup",+ ] {+ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(&[subcommand], true, true, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ args.contains("-u\n0:0"),+ "{subcommand} needs the rootless UID remap under podman too; got {args}"+ );+ assert!(+ args.contains("--security-opt\nlabel=disable"),+ "{subcommand} needs the scoped SELinux exception under podman too; got {args}"+ );+ }++ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(&["status"], true, true, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ !args.contains("-u\n0:0") && !args.contains("label=disable"),+ "thin-client commands touch only the named volume and must stay \+ confined under podman as well; got {args}"+ );+}++#[cfg(unix)]+#[test]+fn podman_gates_still_respect_engine_and_host_state() {+ // The fallback reports what podman reports; it must not hard-code "yes".+ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(&["install-mcp"], false, true, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ !args.contains("-u\n0:0"),+ "rootful podman maps the host UID directly and must keep it; got {args}"+ );++ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(&["install-mcp"], true, false, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ !args.contains("label=disable"),+ "an engine without SELinux support must not receive SELinux options; got {args}"+ );++ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(&["install-mcp"], true, true, "Permissive");+ assert!(+ !args.contains("label=disable"),+ "permissive hosts do not need a label exception; got {args}"+ );+}++#[cfg(unix)]+#[test]+fn bootstrap_gets_host_file_treatment_because_it_reads_the_repo() {+ // bootstrap only reads host files, but an unmapped UID blocks reads just+ // as hard: it degrades silently to "no .git found at /work" and then dies+ // with Permission denied. Same gates as the writers, on both engines.+ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_podman(&["bootstrap"], true, true, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ args.contains("-u\n0:0") && args.contains("--security-opt\nlabel=disable"),+ "bootstrap reads the repo bind-mounted at /work and needs both \+ adjustments; got {args}"+ );++ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(+ &["bootstrap"],+ "[name=seccomp,profile=default name=selinux name=cgroupns]",+ "Enforcing",+ );+ assert!(+ args.contains("--security-opt\nlabel=disable"),+ "the same read applies under Docker on an SELinux host; got {args}"+ );+}+#[test]fn macos_docs_use_valid_install_commands_and_release_body_points_to_them() {let docs = read_repo("docs/macos.md");