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Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors

Rust

Merge main into #1001 (resolve CHANGELOG against the stamped [2.5.1])

AkitaOnRails949b5ae657c7
diff --cc CHANGELOG.md
index 0071b607,a8c29885..4eb97786
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@@ -7,16 -7,57 +7,66 @@@ and this project adheres to [Semantic V
## [Unreleased]
+### Fixed
- - The shell and PowerShell session-start hooks for Claude Code, Codex,
- Cursor, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Command Code, Devin and Antigravity CLI now
- send the marker's `[briefing]` keys (`briefing`, `briefing_budget`) on the
- handoff request, so a repository with `inject_on_session_start = true` gets
- its compiled brief at session start on script installs too, as
- `docs/marker-file.md` describes. Only the native `ai-memory hook` command
- and the Kiro CLI and Kimi Code scripts sent them before, so Docker and
- `setup-agent` installs silently received the handoff without the brief.
- (#998)
++- Fixed the shell and PowerShell session-start hooks for Claude Code, Codex,
++ Cursor, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Command Code, Devin, and Antigravity CLI not
++ sending the marker's `[briefing]` keys (`briefing`, `briefing_budget`) on the
++ handoff request, so a repository with `inject_on_session_start = true` got
++ the handoff without its compiled brief on script installs (Docker wrapper,
++ `setup-agent`). Only the native `ai-memory hook` command and the Kiro CLI and
++ Kimi Code scripts sent them; all now match `docs/marker-file.md`. (#998)
++
+ ## [2.5.1] - 2026-10-01
+
+ ### Fixed
+ - Fixed `ai-memory run --yolo`'s ai-jail re-exec aborting when the wrapped
+ command carried a flag that ai-jail also defines: `run claude --yolo --env
+ GH_TOKEN=…` failed with "flag --env after command would be passed to the
+ child". The invocation now separates ai-jail's sandbox flags from the
+ wrapped command with `--`; forwarding such a flag also needs ai-jail 2.4.2 or
+ later, whose guard honors the separator.
+ - Fixed the `--yolo` ai-jail offer appearing when accepting it could not
+ work. It is now shown only on Linux/macOS when both ai-jail and its sandbox
+ backend (`bwrap` / `sandbox-exec`) are present — never on Windows, even with a
+ file named `ai-jail` on `PATH` — and otherwise the run proceeds without the
+ question. The re-exec runs the exact binary that was found, so a
+ `~/.local/bin`-only ai-jail no longer fails to exec after the user accepted.
+ - Fixed `--true-yolo`. It now implies `--yolo` (the warning, the ai-jail
+ offer, and each harness's dangerous mode), so passing it alone no longer
+ bypassed Claude's permissions with no warning; it is interchangeable with
+ `--yolo` for non-Claude harnesses instead of printing "ignoring it"; and it is
+ recognized after native arguments (`run claude --model opus --true-yolo`)
+ instead of being passed to Claude as an unknown option. The `claude_true_yolo`
+ config key now
+ only upgrades an explicit `--yolo`/`--true-yolo` launch, as documented,
+ rather than applying `bypassPermissions` to every managed Claude run.
+ - Fixed relaunching right after an interrupted `ai-memory run` failing with
+ "workstream is already active: owned by … until …" when the previous
+ launcher could not release its lease (killed, terminal closed, or an
+ ai-jail sandbox torn down). An interactive launch now names the holder and
+ waits for that lease to lapse (at most one ~90-second lease; Ctrl-C aborts),
+ then starts by itself. A holder that renews the lease meanwhile is reported
+ as a launcher still running — never displaced — and non-interactive launches
+ keep the short retry window.
+ - Fixed `--true-yolo` claiming protections it never provided. It set three
+ `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_*RM*` environment variables that Claude Code does not
+ read, and passed an empty `permissions.ask` array that cannot clear `ask`
+ rules from other settings scopes (Claude Code unions them). Both were
+ removed; true-yolo now forces only `bypassPermissions`, and the docs state
+ that Claude still honors your own `ask` rules and command-safety checks in
+ every mode.
+
+ ### Security
+ - Fixed GHSA-vh98: a capture-exclusion candidate or shell argument spelled
+ with a leading `//` (e.g. `//repo/secret/token.txt`) self-classified as a
+ Windows UNC path regardless of the actual host, so it matched zero POSIX
+ `ignore_paths` patterns (a flavor mismatch) and was captured instead of
+ dropped. Path flavor for an untrusted candidate is now derived from the
+ host (the cwd) rather than the candidate string alone, both in the native
+ hook (`ai-memory-hooks` `capture_policy.rs`) and the generated
+ OpenCode/OMP/Pi/OpenClaw TypeScript integrations
+ (`ai-memory-cli` `render_shared.rs`); a genuine Windows/UNC host's UNC
+ candidates are unaffected.
## [2.5.0] - 2026-09-30