Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors
Rust
Merge main into #1001 (resolve CHANGELOG against the stamped [2.5.1])
AkitaOnRails949b5ae657c7
diff --cc CHANGELOG.mdindex 0071b607,a8c29885..4eb97786--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@@ -7,16 -7,57 +7,66 @@@ and this project adheres to [Semantic V## [Unreleased]+### Fixed- - The shell and PowerShell session-start hooks for Claude Code, Codex,- Cursor, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Command Code, Devin and Antigravity CLI now- send the marker's `[briefing]` keys (`briefing`, `briefing_budget`) on the- handoff request, so a repository with `inject_on_session_start = true` gets- its compiled brief at session start on script installs too, as- `docs/marker-file.md` describes. Only the native `ai-memory hook` command- and the Kiro CLI and Kimi Code scripts sent them before, so Docker and- `setup-agent` installs silently received the handoff without the brief.- (#998)++- Fixed the shell and PowerShell session-start hooks for Claude Code, Codex,++ Cursor, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Command Code, Devin, and Antigravity CLI not++ sending the marker's `[briefing]` keys (`briefing`, `briefing_budget`) on the++ handoff request, so a repository with `inject_on_session_start = true` got++ the handoff without its compiled brief on script installs (Docker wrapper,++ `setup-agent`). Only the native `ai-memory hook` command and the Kiro CLI and++ Kimi Code scripts sent them; all now match `docs/marker-file.md`. (#998)+++ ## [2.5.1] - 2026-10-01++ ### Fixed+ - Fixed `ai-memory run --yolo`'s ai-jail re-exec aborting when the wrapped+ command carried a flag that ai-jail also defines: `run claude --yolo --env+ GH_TOKEN=…` failed with "flag --env after command would be passed to the+ child". The invocation now separates ai-jail's sandbox flags from the+ wrapped command with `--`; forwarding such a flag also needs ai-jail 2.4.2 or+ later, whose guard honors the separator.+ - Fixed the `--yolo` ai-jail offer appearing when accepting it could not+ work. It is now shown only on Linux/macOS when both ai-jail and its sandbox+ backend (`bwrap` / `sandbox-exec`) are present — never on Windows, even with a+ file named `ai-jail` on `PATH` — and otherwise the run proceeds without the+ question. The re-exec runs the exact binary that was found, so a+ `~/.local/bin`-only ai-jail no longer fails to exec after the user accepted.+ - Fixed `--true-yolo`. It now implies `--yolo` (the warning, the ai-jail+ offer, and each harness's dangerous mode), so passing it alone no longer+ bypassed Claude's permissions with no warning; it is interchangeable with+ `--yolo` for non-Claude harnesses instead of printing "ignoring it"; and it is+ recognized after native arguments (`run claude --model opus --true-yolo`)+ instead of being passed to Claude as an unknown option. The `claude_true_yolo`+ config key now+ only upgrades an explicit `--yolo`/`--true-yolo` launch, as documented,+ rather than applying `bypassPermissions` to every managed Claude run.+ - Fixed relaunching right after an interrupted `ai-memory run` failing with+ "workstream is already active: owned by … until …" when the previous+ launcher could not release its lease (killed, terminal closed, or an+ ai-jail sandbox torn down). An interactive launch now names the holder and+ waits for that lease to lapse (at most one ~90-second lease; Ctrl-C aborts),+ then starts by itself. A holder that renews the lease meanwhile is reported+ as a launcher still running — never displaced — and non-interactive launches+ keep the short retry window.+ - Fixed `--true-yolo` claiming protections it never provided. It set three+ `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_*RM*` environment variables that Claude Code does not+ read, and passed an empty `permissions.ask` array that cannot clear `ask`+ rules from other settings scopes (Claude Code unions them). Both were+ removed; true-yolo now forces only `bypassPermissions`, and the docs state+ that Claude still honors your own `ask` rules and command-safety checks in+ every mode.++ ### Security+ - Fixed GHSA-vh98: a capture-exclusion candidate or shell argument spelled+ with a leading `//` (e.g. `//repo/secret/token.txt`) self-classified as a+ Windows UNC path regardless of the actual host, so it matched zero POSIX+ `ignore_paths` patterns (a flavor mismatch) and was captured instead of+ dropped. Path flavor for an untrusted candidate is now derived from the+ host (the cwd) rather than the candidate string alone, both in the native+ hook (`ai-memory-hooks` `capture_policy.rs`) and the generated+ OpenCode/OMP/Pi/OpenClaw TypeScript integrations+ (`ai-memory-cli` `render_shared.rs`); a genuine Windows/UNC host's UNC+ candidates are unaffected.## [2.5.0] - 2026-09-30