Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors
Rust
fix(wrapper): support SELinux host writes
AkitaOnRailsbc26d9c41ba4
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex fda686e4..11364b34 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0native commands and close the residual local-wire vector ([#196]).### Fixed+- The Linux Docker wrapper now detects an SELinux-enforcing host plus a+ SELinux-enabled daemon and adds `--security-opt label=disable` only to+ short-lived helper commands that write bind-mounted host files. This avoids+ `Permission denied` during `install-*`, `setup-agent`, `uninstall`, and+ `backup` without relabeling the user's home directory or changing the+ long-lived server container ([#212]).- Windows `.ps1` fallback hook commands now use PowerShell `-EncodedCommand`instead of embedding `$env:` setup inside a nested quoted command. Thisprevents outer Windows hook runners such as Antigravity CLI from expandingdiff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 286984c5..7052f400 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -377,6 +377,11 @@ one matching entry.### Install Notes+- **SELinux:** on enforcing Linux hosts, the Docker wrapper automatically adds+ `--security-opt label=disable` only to short-lived helper commands that write+ bind-mounted host files. It does not alter the long-lived server container+ or relabel `$HOME`; do not add `:z`/`:Z` to the whole home bind. See+ [`docs/install.md`](docs/install.md#selinux-enforcing-hosts).- **Windows:** use the Linux path inside WSL2, or the native Windows wrapperfrom PowerShell/cmd. Local supported profiles default to host-native commands:Claude Code may use its supported `ai-memory.exe` exec form, while otherdiff --git a/bin/ai-memory b/bin/ai-memoryindex 65b0b1a1..796a4c5f 100755--- a/bin/ai-memory+++ b/bin/ai-memory@@ -417,19 +417,34 @@ esac# write to a host bind mount: other commands only touch the /data named# volume, which isn't host-visible and doesn't have this problem, so leave# their UID mapping alone.+DOCKER_SECURITY_OPTIONS=$("${DOCKER}" info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}' 2>/dev/null || true)ROOTLESS_DOCKER=0-if "${DOCKER}" info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'name=rootless'; then+if printf '%s\n' "${DOCKER_SECURITY_OPTIONS}" | grep -q 'name=rootless'; thenROOTLESS_DOCKER=1fiif [ "${WRITES_HOST_FILES}" -eq 1 ] && [ "${ROOTLESS_DOCKER}" -eq 1 ]; thenUSER_ARGS=(-u 0:0)fi+SELINUX_ARGS=()case "$(uname -s 2>/dev/null || true)" inLinux)if [ -z "${AI_MEMORY_SERVER_URL:-}" ]; thenNETWORK_ARGS=(--network host)fi+ # SELinux blocks the helper's container label from writing normal home+ # labels even when its uid/gid match the host user. Relabeling the entire+ # $HOME bind with :z/:Z is unsafe, so relax label confinement only for the+ # short-lived, trusted helper commands that actually write host files.+ SELINUX_MODE=$(getenforce 2>/dev/null || true)+ if [ -z "${SELINUX_MODE}" ] && [ -r /sys/fs/selinux/enforce ]; then+ SELINUX_MODE=$(cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce 2>/dev/null || true)+ fi+ if [ "${WRITES_HOST_FILES}" -eq 1 ] \+ && { [ "${SELINUX_MODE}" = "Enforcing" ] || [ "${SELINUX_MODE}" = "enforcing" ] || [ "${SELINUX_MODE}" = "1" ]; } \+ && printf '%s\n' "${DOCKER_SECURITY_OPTIONS}" | grep -q 'name=selinux'; then+ SELINUX_ARGS=(--security-opt label=disable)+ fi;;Darwin)# macOS has no Docker host networking, so a thin-client command reaches@@ -494,6 +509,7 @@ fi# and falls back to the cwd basename only if it's unset.exec "${DOCKER}" run --rm ${TTY_ARGS[@]+"${TTY_ARGS[@]}"} \${NETWORK_ARGS[@]+"${NETWORK_ARGS[@]}"} \+ ${SELINUX_ARGS[@]+"${SELINUX_ARGS[@]}"} \-v "${HOME}:${HOME}" \-v "${PWD}:/work" \-w /work \diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rs b/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rsindex 41eac98c..78738a26 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-cli/tests/packaging.rs@@ -288,7 +288,13 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_and_claude_config(docker_info_stdout: &str,claude_config_dir: &str,) -> String {- run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args, docker_info_stdout, None, Some(claude_config_dir))+ run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(+ args,+ docker_info_stdout,+ None,+ Some(claude_config_dir),+ None,+ )}// The wrapper also shells out to `id -u` / `id -g` when choosing its default@@ -304,7 +310,22 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_and_uname(docker_info_stdout: &str,uname_stdout: Option<&str>,) -> String {- run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args, docker_info_stdout, uname_stdout, None)+ run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(args, docker_info_stdout, uname_stdout, None, None)+}++#[cfg(unix)]+fn run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(+ args: &[&str],+ docker_info_stdout: &str,+ selinux_mode: &str,+) -> String {+ run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(+ args,+ docker_info_stdout,+ Some("Linux"),+ None,+ Some(selinux_mode),+ )}#[cfg(unix)]@@ -313,12 +334,14 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(docker_info_stdout: &str,uname_stdout: Option<&str>,claude_config_dir: Option<&str>,+ selinux_mode: Option<&str>,) -> String {let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();let docker_args = tmp.path().join("docker-args.txt");let docker = tmp.path().join("docker");let uname = tmp.path().join("uname");let id = tmp.path().join("id");+ let getenforce = tmp.path().join("getenforce");std::fs::write(&docker,format!(@@ -348,6 +371,14 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(esac\n",).unwrap();+ std::fs::write(+ &getenforce,+ format!(+ "#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf '{}\\n'\n",+ selinux_mode.unwrap_or("Disabled")+ ),+ )+ .unwrap();#[cfg(unix)]{use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;@@ -356,6 +387,7 @@ fn run_wrapper_with_fake_docker_env(std::fs::set_permissions(&uname, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();}std::fs::set_permissions(&id, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();+ std::fs::set_permissions(&getenforce, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();}// Always prepend the fake-binary dir to PATH: `id` is shadowed@@ -489,6 +521,56 @@ fn rootful_docker_keeps_host_uid_for_host_config_commands() {);}+#[cfg(unix)]+#[test]+fn selinux_enforcing_disables_labels_only_for_host_file_commands() {+ let selinux_info = "[name=seccomp,profile=default name=selinux name=cgroupns]";++ for subcommand in [+ "install-mcp",+ "install-hooks",+ "setup-agent",+ "install-instructions",+ "install-skills",+ "uninstall",+ "backup",+ ] {+ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(&[subcommand], selinux_info, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ args.contains("--security-opt\nlabel=disable"),+ "{subcommand} writes bind-mounted host files and needs the scoped \+ SELinux exception; got {args}"+ );+ }++ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(&["status"], selinux_info, "Enforcing");+ assert!(+ !args.contains("label=disable"),+ "thin-client commands must retain SELinux label confinement; got {args}"+ );+}++#[cfg(unix)]+#[test]+fn selinux_label_exception_requires_enforcement_and_daemon_support() {+ let selinux_info = "[name=seccomp,profile=default name=selinux name=cgroupns]";+ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(&["install-mcp"], selinux_info, "Permissive");+ assert!(+ !args.contains("label=disable"),+ "permissive hosts do not need a label exception; got {args}"+ );++ let args = run_wrapper_with_fake_selinux(+ &["install-mcp"],+ "[name=seccomp,profile=default name=cgroupns]",+ "Enforcing",+ );+ assert!(+ !args.contains("label=disable"),+ "a daemon without SELinux support must not receive SELinux options; got {args}"+ );+}+#[test]fn macos_docs_use_valid_install_commands_and_release_body_points_to_them() {let docs = read_repo("docs/macos.md");diff --git a/docs/install.md b/docs/install.mdindex 06411fd1..f1d0db63 100644--- a/docs/install.md+++ b/docs/install.md@@ -1379,6 +1379,24 @@ that helper back to the host's `127.0.0.1:49374`, so `ai-memory status`,`ai-memory search`, and `ai-memory bootstrap` work with the same defaultURL as the generated agent config.+#### SELinux-enforcing hosts++On SELinux-enforcing Linux systems such as Fedora, RHEL, and openSUSE, normal+home-directory labels can prevent the helper container from writing agent+config even when its UID and GID match the host user. The wrapper checks both+the host enforcement mode and Docker's advertised security options. For the+short-lived helper commands that write host files (`install-*`, `setup-agent`,+`uninstall`, and `backup`), it adds `--security-opt label=disable`; thin-client+commands remain confined. This relaxes SELinux label confinement only for that+trusted helper invocation. It does not modify the long-lived ai-memory server,+which uses a Docker-managed named volume.++Do not add `:z` or `:Z` to the wrapper's whole `$HOME` bind. Docker's+[bind-mount documentation](https://docs.docker.com/engine/storage/bind-mounts/#configure-the-selinux-label)+warns that relabeling system directories such as `/home` can make the host+inoperable. Docker documents `label=disable` in the+[`docker run` security options](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/container/run/#security-opt).+`ai-memory run` is the exception: the current wrapper intercepts it and starts acached checksum-verified native client on the host, where harness executablesand session stores exist. It preserves an explicit remote