Solution for long term memory for agent coding CLIs and to facilitate handoff between different agent vendors
Rust
feat(sanitize): typed redaction labels [REDACTED:<kind>] (P1)
AkitaOnRailsea011603b019
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex 95ec65d4..e2e8ee90 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0which `install-skills` already writes (#659).### Changed+- The privacy sanitizer now redacts to a **typed marker** — `[REDACTED:<kind>]`+ (e.g. `[REDACTED:github_token]`, `[REDACTED:jwt]`, `[REDACTED:env_secret]`,+ `[REDACTED:custom]` for operator patterns) — instead of a bare `[REDACTED]`,+ so a later reader knows *what kind* of secret was present without it leaking.+ Redaction stays complete and idempotent; the trust boundary is unchanged.+ Note: this changes the durable sanitized string, so pages written before the+ upgrade keep `[REDACTED]` while new writes carry the label (see+ `docs/design-hindsight-borrowings.md` P1).- The managed routing snippet distinguishes a reviewed decision record kept inthe repository (an ADR directory, a Keep the Why `context/` tree) from aharness-local memory store: decisions go into the repo's record under itsdiff --git a/crates/ai-memory-consolidate/src/consolidator.rs b/crates/ai-memory-consolidate/src/consolidator.rsindex 0c6926cf..1559e413 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-consolidate/src/consolidator.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-consolidate/src/consolidator.rs@@ -3193,7 +3193,7 @@ mod tests {.await.expect("page body becomes instructions");assert!(from_page.contains("Prefer the `infra` tag."));- assert!(from_page.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(from_page.contains("[REDACTED:api_key]"));assert!(!from_page.contains("deadbeef"));assert!(from_page.chars().count() <= MAX_PROJECT_INSTRUCTIONS_CHARS,diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rs b/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rsindex 1b17e6ee..739fa15c 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-core/src/sanitize.rs@@ -48,20 +48,20 @@ pub const OBSERVATION_BODY_MAX_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;/// Compile-time list of redaction patterns. Order is intentional:/// more-specific patterns first. False positives are acceptable —/// better to redact a stray hash than to leak a credential.-const BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS: &[&str] = &[+const BUILTIN_PATTERNS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[// Bearer-style tokens.- r#"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-+/=]{16,}"#,+ (r#"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-+/=]{16,}"#, "bearer_token"),// Vendor-prefixed API keys.- r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}",+ (r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}", "api_key"),// Stripe secret *and* restricted keys. `rk_live_` is scoped rather than// full-access, but the scope is operator-chosen and routinely includes// charges/refunds — not meaningfully safer than `sk_live_`.- r"(?:sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}",+ (r"(?:sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}", "stripe_key"),// Every GitHub token prefix, not only personal-access: `gho_` (OAuth —// what `gh auth login` stores on disk), `ghu_` (user-to-server),// `ghs_` (server-to-server / Actions), `ghr_` (refresh).- r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}",- r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}",+ (r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", "github_token"),+ (r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}", "github_token"),// AWS access-key IDs: long-lived (AKIA) and STS temporary (ASIA).//// Anchored to the exact published format — a 4-character prefix plus@@ -72,16 +72,16 @@ const BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS: &[&str] = &[// BEFORE storage and is irreversible: the observation loses the text with// no error and no way to recover it. The word boundaries keep a real key// from being missed when it sits inside punctuation.- r"\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b",+ (r"\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b", "aws_key"),// Naked Google / Gemini API keys.- r"AIza[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{30,}",+ (r"AIza[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{30,}", "google_api_key"),// Google OAuth refresh tokens. Longer-lived than the AIza keys above:// they mint fresh access tokens until explicitly revoked, so a leaked// one outlives the session it came from.- r"1//[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{20,}",+ (r"1//[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{20,}", "google_oauth"),// Meta / Facebook Graph API access tokens (ad accounts, pages,// business management).- r"EAA[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}",+ (r"EAA[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", "meta_token"),// Telegram bot tokens: <bot-id>:<secret>. Grants full control of the bot,// including reading every message it can see. Two branches on purpose:// - `AA…` is the shape every issued token has taken, left open-ended so a@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ const BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS: &[&str] = &[// `<short-sha>:<hex>` pairs.// Thanks to @tahazarif10 for spotting that the documented example fell// outside the original `\d{8,10}:AA…` form.- r"\b\d{6,10}:(?:AA[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{30,}|[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{34,35})\b",+ (+ r"\b\d{6,10}:(?:AA[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{30,}|[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{34,35})\b",+ "telegram_token",+ ),// GoHighLevel Private Integration Tokens. The `pit-` prefix is what the// vendor documents (their MCP guide shows `Bearer pit-your-token`); the// tail is NOT documented anywhere, and every token observed in the wild@@ -101,16 +104,28 @@ const BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS: &[&str] = &[// tail is deliberate: `pit-` is also an English fragment, so// `pit-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{20,}` would redact "pit-stop-strategy-analysis".// These tokens do not expire until manually revoked.- r"pit-[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}",+ (+ r"pit-[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}",+ "ghl_token",+ ),// Slack tokens (bot/user/admin/app-level/refresh).- r"xox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}",- r"xapp-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}",+ (r"xox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}", "slack_token"),+ (r"xapp-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}", "slack_token"),// JWTs (three base64url segments separated by dots).- r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}",+ (+ r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}",+ "jwt",+ ),// PEM private key blocks — multi-line, lazy match.- r"(?s)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",+ (+ r"(?s)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",+ "private_key",+ ),// URL-embedded credentials: scheme://user:pass@host.- r"[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+\-.]*://[^:/\s]+:[^@\s]+@[^\s]+",+ (+ r"[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+\-.]*://[^:/\s]+:[^@\s]+@[^\s]+",+ "url_credentials",+ ),// Auth-bearing HTTP headers carrying an opaque value: AWS SigV4's// `X-Amz-Security-Token`, `X-Api-Key`, GitLab's `Private-Token`, Azure's// `Ocp-Apim-Subscription-Key`. Neither of the rules above reaches these:@@ -129,20 +144,32 @@ const BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS: &[&str] = &[// `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` intact. It is not what// protects an already-redacted value: `[REDACTED]` starts with `[`,// which the value character class excludes outright.- r#"(?i)\b[A-Za-z0-9-]*(?:authentication|authorization|credentials?|password|passwd|apikey|[a-z0-9]*(?:api|auth|access|secret|security|private|session|refresh|client|consumer|subscription|app|bearer)-(?:key|token))\s*:\s*[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,}"#,+ (+ r#"(?i)\b[A-Za-z0-9-]*(?:authentication|authorization|credentials?|password|passwd|apikey|[a-z0-9]*(?:api|auth|access|secret|security|private|session|refresh|client|consumer|subscription|app|bearer)-(?:key|token))\s*:\s*[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,}"#,+ "auth_header",+ ),// Provider-specific env-var assignments (kept explicit for clarity// and so that bare `OPENAI_API_KEY=anything-at-all` still triggers// even without `sk-` shape).- r#"(?i)(ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|OPENAI_API_KEY|OPENROUTER_API_KEY|VOYAGE_API_KEY|MISTRAL_API_KEY|GROQ_API_KEY|HF_TOKEN|HUGGINGFACE_TOKEN|AWS_(SECRET_)?ACCESS_KEY[A-Z_]*|GITHUB_TOKEN|GH_TOKEN|GITLAB_TOKEN|GOOGLE_API_KEY|GEMINI_API_KEY|OLLAMA_API_KEY)\s*[=:]\s*\S+"#,+ (+ r#"(?i)(ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|OPENAI_API_KEY|OPENROUTER_API_KEY|VOYAGE_API_KEY|MISTRAL_API_KEY|GROQ_API_KEY|HF_TOKEN|HUGGINGFACE_TOKEN|AWS_(SECRET_)?ACCESS_KEY[A-Z_]*|GITHUB_TOKEN|GH_TOKEN|GITLAB_TOKEN|GOOGLE_API_KEY|GEMINI_API_KEY|OLLAMA_API_KEY)\s*[=:]\s*\S+"#,+ "env_secret",+ ),// Generic env-var catch-all: any *_KEY / *_TOKEN / *_SECRET /// *_PASSWORD / *_CREDENTIAL[S] / *_PRIVATE_KEY assignment.- r#"(?i)\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|CREDENTIALS|PRIVATE_KEY)\s*[=:]\s*\S+"#,+ (+ r#"(?i)\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|CREDENTIALS|PRIVATE_KEY)\s*[=:]\s*\S+"#,+ "env_secret",+ ),// Filesystem paths that commonly contain credentials.- r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.ssh(?:/[^\s]+)?",- r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.aws(?:/[^\s]+)?",- r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.kube(?:/[^\s]+)?",- r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.config/gcloud(?:/[^\s]+)?",- r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.gnupg(?:/[^\s]+)?",+ (r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.ssh(?:/[^\s]+)?", "credential_path"),+ (r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.aws(?:/[^\s]+)?", "credential_path"),+ (r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.kube(?:/[^\s]+)?", "credential_path"),+ (+ r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.config/gcloud(?:/[^\s]+)?",+ "credential_path",+ ),+ (r"(?:/[^/\s]+)*/\.gnupg(?:/[^\s]+)?", "credential_path"),];/// Stateful sanitizer. Cheap to clone — wraps an `Arc` of compiled@@ -153,7 +180,7 @@ pub struct Sanitizer {}struct SanitizerInner {- patterns: Vec<Regex>,+ patterns: Vec<(Regex, &'static str)>,allowlist: Vec<String>,}@@ -189,13 +216,12 @@ impl Sanitizer {/// Returns [`regex::Error`] when an entry in `extra_patterns` is/// not a valid regex.pub fn new(cfg: &SanitizeConfig) -> Result<Self, regex::Error> {- let mut patterns =- Vec::with_capacity(BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS.len() + cfg.extra_patterns.len());- for p in BUILTIN_PATTERN_STRS {- patterns.push(Regex::new(p)?);+ let mut patterns = Vec::with_capacity(BUILTIN_PATTERNS.len() + cfg.extra_patterns.len());+ for (p, label) in BUILTIN_PATTERNS {+ patterns.push((Regex::new(p)?, *label));}for p in &cfg.extra_patterns {- patterns.push(Regex::new(p)?);+ patterns.push((Regex::new(p)?, "custom"));}Ok(Self {inner: Arc::new(SanitizerInner {@@ -212,13 +238,13 @@ impl Sanitizer {Self::new(&SanitizeConfig::default()).expect("built-in patterns compile")}- /// Scrub a single string. Each match is replaced with `[REDACTED]`- /// unless the matched substring contains an allowlist entry, in- /// which case it is left alone.+ /// Scrub a single string. Each match is replaced with+ /// `[REDACTED:<kind>]` unless the matched substring contains an+ /// allowlist entry, in which case it is left alone.#[must_use]pub fn scrub(&self, input: &str) -> String {let mut out = input.to_string();- for re in &self.inner.patterns {+ for (re, label) in &self.inner.patterns {out = re.replace_all(&out, |caps: ®ex::Captures<'_>| {let m = caps.get(0).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or_default();@@ -226,7 +252,7 @@ impl Sanitizer {m.to_string()} else {debug!(pattern = re.as_str(), "sanitize: redacted match");- "[REDACTED]".to_string()+ format!("[REDACTED:{label}]")}}).into_owned();@@ -367,14 +393,14 @@ mod tests {#[test]fn scrubs_bearer_token() {let out = s().scrub("Authorization: Bearer abcdef0123456789ABCDEF0123456789");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("abcdef0123"));}#[test]fn scrubs_openrouter_key_via_sk_prefix() {let out = s().scrub("key=sk-or-v1-deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("deadbeef"));}@@ -391,7 +417,7 @@ mod tests {// this file. Google's rule only needs `AIza` plus 30, so the shorter// fixture still exercises it.let out = s().scrub("the key AIzaSyFAKEfake0123456789abcdefghijkl is leaked");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("AIzaSy"));}@@ -412,7 +438,7 @@ mod tests {"ghr_FAKEfakeFAKEfakeFAKEfake012345678",] {let out = s().scrub(&format!("token={tok}"));- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"), "not redacted: {tok}");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"), "not redacted: {tok}");assert!(!out.contains("FAKEfake"), "leaked: {tok}");}}@@ -461,7 +487,7 @@ mod tests {"\"ASIAFAKEFAKEFAKEFAKE\",",] {let out = s.scrub(text);- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"), "not redacted: {text}");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"), "not redacted: {text}");assert!(!out.contains("FAKEFAKE"), "leaked: {text}");}}@@ -470,21 +496,21 @@ mod tests {fn scrubs_aws_temporary_session_key_id() {// ASIA… is an STS short-lived key id; AKIA… was already covered.let out = s().scrub("aws_access_key_id ASIAFAKEFAKEFAKEFAKE");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("ASIAFAKE"));}#[test]fn scrubs_stripe_restricted_key() {let out = s().scrub("stripe=rk_live_FAKEfakeFAKE1234");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("FAKEfakeFAKE"));}#[test]fn scrubs_meta_graph_access_token() {let out = s().scrub("fb=EAAFAKEfakeFAKEfake0123456789");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("FAKEfake"));}@@ -495,20 +521,20 @@ mod tests {// the {20,} tail is what stops `EAA…` from matching every base64// blob that happens to contain it.let out = s().scrub("harmless b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAA value");- assert!(!out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(!out.contains("[REDACTED:"));}#[test]fn scrubs_google_oauth_refresh_token() {let out = s().scrub("refresh_token: 1//0gFAKEfakeFAKEfake0123456789");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("FAKEfake"));}#[test]fn scrubs_telegram_bot_token() {let out = s().scrub("TG 123456789:AAFAKEfakeFAKEfakeFAKEfake0123456789 done");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("FAKEfake"));assert!(out.contains("done"), "should not swallow trailing context");}@@ -520,7 +546,7 @@ mod tests {// `AA` prefix — which the original `\d{8,10}:AA…` form could not match.// This is the vendor's placeholder, not a live token.let out = s().scrub("token 123456:ABC-DEF1234ghIkl-zyx57W2v1u123ew11 ok");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("ABC-DEF1234"));assert!(out.contains("ok"), "should not swallow trailing context");}@@ -538,7 +564,7 @@ mod tests {"commit 12345678:deadbeefcafebabe0123456789abcdef",] {let out = s().scrub(benign);- assert!(!out.contains("[REDACTED]"), "false positive on: {benign}");+ assert!(!out.contains("[REDACTED:"), "false positive on: {benign}");}}@@ -548,7 +574,7 @@ mod tests {// pattern accepts both. DEADBEEF/CAFEBABE keeps the fixture// unmistakably synthetic.let out = s().scrub("ghl=pit-DEADBEEF-FACE-4B0B-BEEF-CAFEBABE1234");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("DEADBEEF"));}@@ -557,13 +583,13 @@ mod tests {// Negative control, and the reason the tail is UUID-anchored rather// than permissive: `pit-` is an ordinary English fragment.let out = s().scrub("planning the pit-stop-strategy-analysis for turn 4");- assert!(!out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(!out.contains("[REDACTED:"));}#[test]fn scrubs_slack_bot_token() {let out = s().scrub("slack=xoxb-1234567890-abcdefghij");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("xoxb-1234"));}@@ -571,7 +597,7 @@ mod tests {fn scrubs_pem_private_key_block() {let pem = "before\n-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nb3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAA\n-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nafter";let out = s().scrub(pem);- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("b3BlbnNz"));assert!(out.contains("before"));assert!(out.contains("after"));@@ -580,18 +606,18 @@ mod tests {#[test]fn scrubs_url_embedded_credentials() {let out = s().scrub("connect to postgres://admin:[email protected]/prod");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!out.contains("hunter2"));}#[test]fn scrubs_generic_env_var_assignments() {let out = s().scrub("MY_INTERNAL_API_KEY=aaaaaaaaaaaa");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));let out2 = s().scrub("SOMETHING_SECRET=foo");- assert!(out2.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out2.contains("[REDACTED:"));let out3 = s().scrub("DB_PASSWORD=hunter2");- assert!(out3.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out3.contains("[REDACTED:"));}/// The value character class excludes `[`, so a value already replaced@@ -600,7 +626,7 @@ mod tests {#[test]fn auth_header_pattern_does_not_re_eat_an_earlier_redaction() {let out = s().scrub("X-Api-Key: Bearer FAKEfakeFAKEfake0123456789");- assert_eq!(out, "X-Api-Key: [REDACTED]");+ assert_eq!(out, "X-Api-Key: [REDACTED:bearer_token]");}/// The header name is matched with a flat character class rather than@@ -614,7 +640,7 @@ mod tests {let matching = format!("{long_name}-auth-token: {secret}");let out = s().scrub(&matching);- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"), "adversarial match not redacted");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"), "adversarial match not redacted");assert!(!out.contains(&secret), "leaked under adversarial input");let non_matching = format!("{long_name}-harmless: {secret}");@@ -645,9 +671,9 @@ mod tests {#[test]fn scrubs_cloud_credential_paths() {let out = s().scrub("read /home/user/.aws/credentials");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));let out2 = s().scrub("set KUBECONFIG=/home/user/.kube/config");- assert!(out2.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out2.contains("[REDACTED:"));}/// Opaque auth headers reach capture via tool output echoing curl. The@@ -675,7 +701,7 @@ mod tests {"x-api-key: FAKEfakeFAKEfake0123456789",] {let out = s().scrub(header);- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"), "not redacted: {header}");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"), "not redacted: {header}");assert!(!out.contains("FAKEfake"), "leaked: {header}");}}@@ -711,8 +737,8 @@ mod tests {importance: 5,};let scrubbed = Sanitized::new(raw, &s()).into_inner();- assert!(scrubbed.title.contains("[REDACTED]"));- assert!(scrubbed.body.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(scrubbed.title.contains("[REDACTED:"));+ assert!(scrubbed.body.contains("[REDACTED:"));}#[test]@@ -734,7 +760,7 @@ mod tests {};let scrubbed = Sanitized::new(raw, &s()).into_inner();assert!(scrubbed.body.len() <= OBSERVATION_BODY_MAX_BYTES);- assert!(scrubbed.body.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(scrubbed.body.contains("[REDACTED:"));// Head-tail truncation preserves the tail sentinel so the LLM// consolidator sees both the start and the end of the original body.assert!(scrubbed.body.contains("TAIL_SENTINEL"));@@ -792,7 +818,42 @@ mod tests {};let sn = Sanitizer::new(&cfg).unwrap();let out = sn.scrub("found CANARY-42 here");- assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:"));+ }++ /// Typed labels let a later reader distinguish secret kinds without+ /// reconstructing them from context — the point of P1.+ #[test]+ fn typed_labels_identify_the_secret_kind() {+ let out = s().scrub("token=ghp_FAKEfakeFAKEfakeFAKEfake012345678");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:github_token]"), "got: {out}");++ let out = s().scrub("jwt=eyJFAKEfakeFAKEfake.eyJFAKEfakeFAKEfake.FAKEfakeFAKEfakeFAKEfake");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:jwt]"), "got: {out}");++ let out = s().scrub("OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-leak-1234567890abcdef");+ assert!(out.contains("[REDACTED:env_secret]"), "got: {out}");+ }++ #[test]+ fn extra_pattern_match_is_labeled_custom() {+ let cfg = SanitizeConfig {+ extra_patterns: vec![r"CANARY-[0-9]+".to_string()],+ allowlist: vec![],+ };+ let sn = Sanitizer::new(&cfg).unwrap();+ let out = sn.scrub("found CANARY-42 here");+ assert_eq!(out, "found [REDACTED:custom] here");+ }++ /// The value character class excludes `[`, so an already-labeled marker+ /// cannot be swallowed by a later pattern and lose its kind.+ #[test]+ fn double_scrub_is_idempotent() {+ let once = s().scrub("token=ghp_FAKEfakeFAKEfakeFAKEfake012345678");+ assert!(once.contains("[REDACTED:github_token]"));+ let twice = s().scrub(&once);+ assert_eq!(once, twice);}#[test]diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/assistant_capture.rs b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/assistant_capture.rsindex c0cb1a37..25da028c 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/assistant_capture.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/assistant_capture.rs@@ -337,7 +337,10 @@ mod tests {assert!(out.captured);let excerpt = raw[ASSISTANT_MARKER_KEY]["excerpt"].as_str().unwrap();assert!(!excerpt.contains(&secret), "secret survived: {excerpt}");- assert!(excerpt.contains("[REDACTED]"), "not redacted: {excerpt}");+ assert!(+ excerpt.contains("[REDACTED:aws_key]"),+ "not redacted: {excerpt}"+ );}#[test]diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rsindex ab903c97..1b3d909d 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-hooks/src/router.rs@@ -11756,7 +11756,7 @@ mod tests {assert_eq!(post.body,format!(- "tool_family: non-file\ntool_call_id: call-native-1\noutcome: unknown\n---\n{project}: [REDACTED]"+ "tool_family: non-file\ntool_call_id: call-native-1\noutcome: unknown\n---\n{project}: [REDACTED:custom]"));assert!(@@ -12199,7 +12199,7 @@ mod tests {}));assert!(observations.iter().any(|observation| {observation.kind == ObservationKind::Stop- && observation.body == "completed safely: [REDACTED]"+ && observation.body == "completed safely: [REDACTED:custom]"}));for sentinel in [TOOL_SENTINEL, ASSISTANT_SENTINEL] {assert!(diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/src/server.rs b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/src/server.rsindex a9f533ff..87bd7d1a 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-mcp/src/server.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-mcp/src/server.rs@@ -5988,7 +5988,7 @@ mod tests {"x".repeat(700));let reason = sanitize_feedback_reason(&Sanitizer::builtin(), Some(&raw)).unwrap();- assert!(reason.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(reason.contains("[REDACTED:bearer_token]"));assert!(!reason.contains("abcdef0123456789"));assert!(!reason.contains('\n'));assert!(!reason.contains('\r'));@@ -6085,7 +6085,7 @@ mod tests {let findings = store.reader.open_feedback_findings(ws, proj).await.unwrap();assert_eq!(findings.len(), 1);let reason = findings[0].reason.as_deref().unwrap();- assert!(reason.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(reason.contains("[REDACTED:bearer_token]"));assert!(!reason.contains("abcdef0123456789"));assert!(!reason.contains('\n'));assert!(reason.chars().count() <= MAX_FEEDBACK_REASON_CHARS);@@ -6120,7 +6120,7 @@ mod tests {.expect("stale feedback must appear in memory_lint");assert_eq!(feedback_finding["pages"][0], path.to_string());let lint_message = feedback_finding["message"].as_str().unwrap();- assert!(lint_message.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(lint_message.contains("[REDACTED:bearer_token]"));assert!(!lint_message.contains("abcdef0123456789"));assert!(!lint_message.contains('\n'));diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-store/src/lib.rs b/crates/ai-memory-store/src/lib.rsindex c25621d5..363f6846 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-store/src/lib.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-store/src/lib.rs@@ -3068,7 +3068,10 @@ mod tests {}).unwrap();for col in [&title, &body] {- assert!(col.contains("[REDACTED]"), "expected scrub in: {col}");+ assert!(+ col.contains("[REDACTED:bearer_token]"),+ "expected scrub in: {col}"+ );assert!(!col.contains("abcdef0123"),"secret reached disk unscrubbed: {col}"diff --git a/crates/ai-memory-wiki/src/wiki.rs b/crates/ai-memory-wiki/src/wiki.rsindex 09405593..e5a032b5 100644--- a/crates/ai-memory-wiki/src/wiki.rs+++ b/crates/ai-memory-wiki/src/wiki.rs@@ -3201,7 +3201,7 @@ mod tests {.await;let sidecar = wiki.write_auto_improve_sidecar(ws, proj, id).await.unwrap();let content = std::fs::read_to_string(sidecar).unwrap();- assert!(content.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(content.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!content.contains("sk-ant-leak"));assert!(!content.contains("hunter2"));assert!(!content.contains("ghp_"));@@ -3534,7 +3534,7 @@ mod tests {.await.unwrap().unwrap();- assert!(stored.body.contains("[REDACTED]"));+ assert!(stored.body.contains("[REDACTED:"));assert!(!stored.body.contains("sk-ant-leak"));assert!(std::fs::read_to_string(wiki.abs_path(@@ -3543,7 +3543,7 @@ mod tests {&PagePath::new("notes/mutated.md").unwrap())).unwrap()- .contains("[REDACTED]")+ .contains("[REDACTED:"));}@@ -3930,7 +3930,7 @@ mod tests {// The on-disk page must not contain any of the planted// secrets; each should have been replaced with [REDACTED].assert!(- on_disk.contains("[REDACTED]"),+ on_disk.contains("[REDACTED:"),"expected redaction in: {on_disk}");assert!(@@ -4194,7 +4194,7 @@ mod tests {&PagePath::new("batch/admitted.md").unwrap(),)).unwrap();- assert!(on_disk.contains("[REDACTED]"), "{on_disk}");+ assert!(on_disk.contains("[REDACTED:api_key]"), "{on_disk}");assert!(!on_disk.contains("sk-1234567890abcdef"), "{on_disk}");let hits = store