Privacy-first password manager with built-in email aliasing. Fully encrypted and self-hostable.
/**
* Storage keys the client core reads and writes through the host's {@link IKeyValueStore}. Host apps extend this
* set with their own keys; the names here are shared so that every platform stores the same state under the same key.
*/
import { ALL_VAULT_MUTATION_SCOPES, type VaultMutationScope } from '../sync/VaultMutationScope';
import type { StorageKey } from '../platform/KeyValueStore';
export type { StorageKey } from '../platform/KeyValueStore';
export const StorageKeys = {
/*
* -- Auth and server connection --
*/
/** JWT access token for the API. */
ACCESS_TOKEN: 'local:accessToken',
/** JWT refresh token for the API. */
REFRESH_TOKEN: 'local:refreshToken',
/** Username of the logged in user. */
USERNAME: 'local:username',
/** Base URL of the API the client talks to. */
API_URL: 'local:apiUrl',
/** Base URL of the web client, used for deep links. */
CLIENT_URL: 'local:clientUrl',
/** Random id of this install, which per-device vault rows (item usage statistics) are keyed by. */
DEVICE_ID: 'local:deviceId',
/** Version reported by the server on the last status call. */
SERVER_VERSION: 'local:serverVersion',
/** The capabilities that are enabled for this account passed from the server. */
CAPABILITIES: 'local:capabilities',
/** The number of open invitations to shared folders addressed to this account, from the last status call. */
PENDING_SHARING_INVITATIONS: 'local:pendingSharingInvitations',
/*
* -- Vault data (local cache) --
*/
/** The encrypted vault blob. */
ENCRYPTED_VAULT: 'local:encryptedVault',
/** Public email domains supported by the server. */
PUBLIC_EMAIL_DOMAINS: 'local:publicEmailDomains',
/** Private email domains supported by the server. */
PRIVATE_EMAIL_DOMAINS: 'local:privateEmailDomains',
/** Private email domains that are hidden from the domain picker. */
HIDDEN_PRIVATE_EMAIL_DOMAINS: 'local:hiddenPrivateEmailDomains',
/** Argon2 parameters used to derive the unlock key from the master password (the storage key string name is historical). */
UNLOCK_KEY_DERIVATION_PARAMS: 'local:encryptionKeyDerivationParams',
/** The VEK encrypted with the Account Key, as returned by the server. */
ENCRYPTED_VEK: 'local:encryptedVek',
/** The Account Key encrypted with the KEK derived from the password, as returned by the server. */
ENCRYPTED_ACCOUNT_KEY: 'local:encryptedAccountKey',
/** The account public key, used for encrypting shared-manifest VEK grants. */
ACCOUNT_PUBLIC_KEY: 'local:accountPublicKey',
/** The account private key encrypted with the Account Key. */
ENCRYPTED_ACCOUNT_PRIVATE_KEY: 'local:encryptedAccountPrivateKey',
/** The account signing public key (Ed25519, base64). */
SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY: 'local:signingPublicKey',
/** The account signing private key encrypted with the Account Key. */
ENCRYPTED_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: 'local:encryptedSigningPrivateKey',
/*
* -- Sync state --
*/
/** True when the local vault has changes that are not pushed to the server yet. */
IS_DIRTY: 'local:isDirty',
/** Monotonic counter used to detect mutations that happened during an in-flight sync. */
MUTATION_SEQUENCE: 'local:mutationSequence',
/** True when the client operates against the local vault only. */
IS_OFFLINE_MODE: 'local:isOfflineMode',
/** The last failed sync attempt, as the translation key and error code the UI renders from. */
LAST_SYNC_ERROR: 'local:lastSyncError',
/** The client's last known server revision per manifest. */
SERVER_MANIFEST_REVISIONS: 'local:serverManifestRevisions',
/** The client's last known revision per data bucket. */
VAULT_BUCKET_REVISIONS: 'local:vaultBucketRevisions',
/** The personal manifest's blob-hashing salt, cached from the last pull. */
VAULT_MANIFEST_SALT: 'local:vaultManifestSalt',
/**
* The server-side id of the user's personal manifest, learned from GET /v2/Vault. Fallback source for
* canonicalize when the vault DB does not record it yet (legacy migration push).
*/
VAULT_PERSONAL_MANIFEST_ID: 'local:vaultPersonalManifestId',
/** Content fingerprints of the last pushed manifests and buckets, used for changed-only writes. */
VAULT_CONTENT_FINGERPRINTS: 'local:vaultContentFingerprints',
/** Local cache of encrypted blobs (hash to base64 AES-GCM ciphertext). Never stores plaintext at rest. */
VAULT_BLOB_CIPHER_CACHE: 'local:vaultBlobCipherCache',
/** Blob hashes the server has stored (refreshed on every pull/push). */
VAULT_SERVER_BLOB_HASHES: 'local:vaultServerBlobHashes',
/** Shared-manifest key records (wrapped VEK grants). */
SHARED_MANIFESTS: 'local:sharedManifests',
/*
* -- Session state (cleared when the vault locks) --
*/
/**
* The Account Key of the session, from which the vault encryption key and account private key are opened on demand (see VaultKeyService).
* Session-only: it must never persist to disk. An additional unlock method (PIN) protects this same key.
* The `unlockKey` in the storage key string is historical; the value is the Account Key.
*/
ACCOUNT_KEY: 'session:unlockKey',
/** The sync hold record (reason + when it was taken) while an operation no sync may race runs; see VaultSyncHold. */
VAULT_SYNC_HOLD: 'session:vaultSyncHold',
} as const satisfies Record<string, StorageKey>;
/**
* Storage key holding the dirty flag for a single mutation scope.
* @param scope - the mutation scope
*/
export const dirtyScopeStorageKey = (scope: VaultMutationScope): `local:${string}` => `local:dirtyScope:${scope}`;
/** Keys that hold auth tokens, ephemeral error state and account-scoped server state. Cleared on any logout. */
export const AUTH_STORAGE_KEYS: readonly StorageKey[] = [
StorageKeys.ACCESS_TOKEN,
StorageKeys.REFRESH_TOKEN,
StorageKeys.LAST_SYNC_ERROR,
StorageKeys.CAPABILITIES,
StorageKeys.PENDING_SHARING_INVITATIONS,
];
/** Keys that must not survive a vault lock: the Account Key. Hosts add anything they derive from decrypted data. */
export const VAULT_LOCK_STORAGE_KEYS: readonly StorageKey[] = [
StorageKeys.ACCOUNT_KEY,
];
/**
* Every key holding vault data or state derived from it, including the per-scope dirty flags. Cleared on ANY logout,
* forced or user-initiated. Hosts append their own vault-derived keys.
*/
export const vaultDataStorageKeys = (): StorageKey[] => [
StorageKeys.ENCRYPTED_VAULT,
StorageKeys.PUBLIC_EMAIL_DOMAINS,
StorageKeys.PRIVATE_EMAIL_DOMAINS,
StorageKeys.HIDDEN_PRIVATE_EMAIL_DOMAINS,
StorageKeys.SERVER_MANIFEST_REVISIONS,
StorageKeys.VAULT_BUCKET_REVISIONS,
StorageKeys.VAULT_MANIFEST_SALT,
StorageKeys.VAULT_PERSONAL_MANIFEST_ID,
StorageKeys.SHARED_MANIFESTS,
StorageKeys.VAULT_CONTENT_FINGERPRINTS,
StorageKeys.VAULT_BLOB_CIPHER_CACHE,
StorageKeys.VAULT_SERVER_BLOB_HASHES,
StorageKeys.IS_DIRTY,
StorageKeys.MUTATION_SEQUENCE,
StorageKeys.IS_OFFLINE_MODE,
StorageKeys.UNLOCK_KEY_DERIVATION_PARAMS,
StorageKeys.ENCRYPTED_VEK,
StorageKeys.ENCRYPTED_ACCOUNT_KEY,
StorageKeys.ACCOUNT_PUBLIC_KEY,
StorageKeys.ENCRYPTED_ACCOUNT_PRIVATE_KEY,
StorageKeys.SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY,
StorageKeys.ENCRYPTED_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY,
...ALL_VAULT_MUTATION_SCOPES.map(scope => dirtyScopeStorageKey(scope)),
];