Privacy-first password manager with built-in email aliasing. Fully encrypted and self-hostable.
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Leendert de Borst1fc62e236981
diff --git a/apps/mobile-app/android/app/src/main/java/net/aliasvault/app/vaultstore/VaultPin.kt b/apps/mobile-app/android/app/src/main/java/net/aliasvault/app/vaultstore/VaultPin.ktindex a60fd5cdf..7e62e0034 100644--- a/apps/mobile-app/android/app/src/main/java/net/aliasvault/app/vaultstore/VaultPin.kt+++ b/apps/mobile-app/android/app/src/main/java/net/aliasvault/app/vaultstore/VaultPin.kt@@ -47,13 +47,6 @@ sealed class PinUnlockException(message: String) : Exception(message) {* The key wrap and the attempt policy live in the Rust core (crypto/pin.rs); this class only stores them.* Other platform implementations: VaultStore+Pin.swift (iOS), PinUnlockService.ts (browser extension).*- * Security features:- * - 4 failed attempts maximum before requiring full password- * - Salt stored in Android Keystore (makes offline brute-force impossible)- * - Failed attempts counter stored in Keystore (prevents tampering)- * - Encryption key derived using Argon2id (memory-hard, GPU-resistant)- * - Encrypted data automatically deleted after max failed attempts- ** @param context The Android context for accessing SharedPreferences and Keystore*/class VaultPin(diff --git a/core/rust/src/crypto/rsa_oaep.rs b/core/rust/src/crypto/rsa_oaep.rsindex 88b0f7f9a..cbb00ffbe 100644--- a/core/rust/src/crypto/rsa_oaep.rs+++ b/core/rust/src/crypto/rsa_oaep.rs@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ pub fn generate_rsa_key_pair() -> VaultResult<RsaKeyPair> {Ok(RsaKeyPair { public_key: rsa_public_to_jwk(&public, Some(OAEP_PUBLIC))?, private_key: rsa_private_to_jwk(&private, Some(OAEP_PRIVATE))? })}-/// Check that a key pair generated elsewhere (WebCrypto) is a valid private key whose public half matches.+/// Check that the public key belongs to the private key, such as an account public key the server serves.pub fn validate_rsa_key_pair(key_pair: &RsaKeyPair) -> VaultResult<()> {if rsa_private_from_jwk(&key_pair.private_key)?.to_public_key() != oaep_public_from_jwk(&key_pair.public_key)? {return Err(VaultError::General("RSA public key does not belong to the private key".to_string()));@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ fn encrypt(plaintext: &[u8], public_key_jwk: &str, padding: Oaep) -> VaultResultfn decrypt(base64_ciphertext: &str, private_key_jwk: &str, padding: Oaep) -> VaultResult<Vec<u8>> {let private = rsa_private_from_jwk(private_key_jwk)?;let ciphertext = base64_decode(base64_ciphertext)?;- // Blinded: plain `decrypt` runs the exponentiation on the ciphertext as given, which leaks timing an- // attacker who can submit chosen ciphertexts turns into key recovery (RUSTSEC-2023-0071, Marvin attack).+ // Blinded, which reduces but does not remove the timing leak of RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin attack): the rsa crate's+ // big-integer arithmetic is not constant time. Accepted because decryption runs on the client only.private.decrypt_blinded(&mut rand_core06::OsRng, padding, &ciphertext).map_err(|_| VaultError::General("RSA-OAEP decryption failed (wrong key or corrupt data)".to_string()))diff --git a/core/rust/src/vault_codec/compress.rs b/core/rust/src/vault_codec/compress.rsindex 63f6a3feb..178daba8e 100644--- a/core/rust/src/vault_codec/compress.rs+++ b/core/rust/src/vault_codec/compress.rs@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ pub fn gzip(bytes: &[u8]) -> VaultResult<Vec<u8>> {/// Cap on a decompressed payload, so a gzip bomb in a shared manifest cannot exhaust memory. Derived from the/// server's default `MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB` (100 MB per vault write, compressed): 5x that leaves room for highly-/// compressible JSON while staying well below what a wasm32 client can hold.+/// compressible JSON.pub const MAX_DECOMPRESSED_PAYLOAD_BYTES: u64 = 512 * 1024 * 1024;/// Decompress gzipped bytes into a UTF-8 string, refusing output above [`MAX_DECOMPRESSED_PAYLOAD_BYTES`].diff --git a/core/rust/src/vault_codec/manifest.rs b/core/rust/src/vault_codec/manifest.rsindex 1ba51ac43..240f81676 100644--- a/core/rust/src/vault_codec/manifest.rs+++ b/core/rust/src/vault_codec/manifest.rs@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@ pub struct Manifest {pub canonicalized_at: String,/// The server-side id of the manifest this snapshot belongs to.pub manifest_id: String,- /// Display name of the manifest, carried inside the encrypted payload so the server never sees it.- #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]- pub name: Option<String>,/// Tables mapped to arrays of row objects. Blob columns replaced with `{ "__blobRef", "__blobKind" }`.#[serde(default)]pub tables: HashMap<String, Vec<CodecRecord>>,@@ -87,9 +84,6 @@ pub struct ManifestSpec {pub manifest_id: String,/// Per-manifest salt for this manifest's blob hashing.pub manifest_salt: String,- /// Display name written into the manifest. See [`Manifest::name`].- #[serde(default)]- pub name: Option<String>,}/// One manifest produced by canonicalize: the manifest blob and the blob map hashed with its own salt.diff --git a/scripts/dependencies/audit-allowlist.json b/scripts/dependencies/audit-allowlist.jsonindex de2611840..d6fcfa3b8 100644--- a/scripts/dependencies/audit-allowlist.json+++ b/scripts/dependencies/audit-allowlist.json@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@{"id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0071","package": "rsa",- "reason": "The Marvin timing attack is primarily relevant when an attacker can observe decryption timing, such as over a network. Since decryption is performed client-side only and uses decrypt_blinded, this provides a sufficient mitigation."+ "reason": "No patched release exists. The Marvin timing attack needs an attacker who can observe many decryption timings, such as over a network. RSA decryption runs client-side only, and decrypt_blinded reduces (but does not remove) the leak. Recheck when rsa 0.10 is stable."},{"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0374",