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Privacy-first password manager with built-in email aliasing. Fully encrypted and self-hostable.

Update VaultMessageHandler.ts (#2159)

Leendert de Borstc07c9ea7a9c9
diff --git a/apps/browser-extension/src/entrypoints/background/VaultMessageHandler.ts b/apps/browser-extension/src/entrypoints/background/VaultMessageHandler.ts
index c6775ca53..eb9e59e7b 100644
--- a/apps/browser-extension/src/entrypoints/background/VaultMessageHandler.ts
+++ b/apps/browser-extension/src/entrypoints/background/VaultMessageHandler.ts
@@ -1309,9 +1309,10 @@ export async function handleGetServerRevision(): Promise<number> {
/**
* Adopt a server-side vault key this device does not know about yet.
*
- * A missing local wrapped-VEK cache means one of three things: this user is genuinely still legacy (their next full
- * push performs the KEK/VEK migration), another device migrated while this one held the old password-derived key, or
- * this device never cached the key it registered with.
+ * A missing local wrapped-VEK cache means one of two things: this user is genuinely still legacy (their next full
+ * push performs the KEK/VEK migration), or another device migrated while this one held the old password-derived key.
+ * Every path that adopts a VEK as the session key writes the wrapped-VEK cache first, so a session key that is
+ * already the VEK without a cache is not a reachable state -- it can only come from torn storage, which a re-login fixes.
*
* TODO: this method can be removed once all users have migrated to the KEK/VEK model and we don't support legacy users anymore.
*
@@ -1362,24 +1363,13 @@ async function adoptRemoteVaultKeyIfNeeded(): Promise<boolean> {
cachedVaultBlob = null;
devLog('[VaultSync] Adopted vault key created by another client; session key swapped to the VEK.');
return true;
- } catch {
+ } catch (error) {
/*
- * Unwrap failed, so the session key is not the KEK. The remaining possibility is that it already is the VEK and
- * this device simply never cached the wrapped form (e.g. registered on the KEK/VEK model). Confirm against the
- * local vault before trusting it: if the session key still decrypts the vault, cache the wrapped VEK and carry on.
+ * Unwrap failed, so this device holds key material that is not the KEK the server wrapped the VEK with.
+ * We trigger a re-login to fix the problem.
*/
- try {
- if (encryptedVault) {
- await EncryptionUtility.symmetricDecrypt(encryptedVault, sessionKey);
- }
- } catch (error) {
- devError('[VaultSync] Session key matches neither the KEK nor the VEK, forcing re-login:', error);
- return false;
- }
-
- await storage.setItem(WRAPPED_VEK_STORAGE_KEY, serverWrappedVek);
- devLog('[VaultSync] Session key is already the VEK; cached the wrapped VEK for offline unlock.');
- return true;
+ devError('[VaultSync] Session key matches neither the KEK nor the VEK, forcing re-login:', error);
+ return false;
}
}