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Add trusted_proxies env var to control nginx x-forwarded-for behaviour (#1982)

Leendert de Borstc9eaf2d807d8
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index 6fadc7017..ee53e2914 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -119,3 +119,13 @@ MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB=100
# Requests from non-allowlisted IPs are silently routed to the client app and will
# result in a 404 error.
ADMIN_IP_ALLOWLIST=
+
+# Trusted upstream proxies that AliasVault's reverse proxy will accept the
+# X-Forwarded-For header from when determining the real client IP. Options:
+# - Empty = trust all RFC1918 ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16).
+# - A comma-separated list of CIDRs/IPs (e.g. "10.0.1.5,192.168.1.0/24") to
+# trust only those upstream proxies. Recommended when running behind a
+# specific reverse proxy (HAProxy, Traefik, Cloudflare, etc.) so X-Forwarded-For
+# from any other source is ignored.
+# - "none" = trust no upstream proxies; logs always show the direct peer IP.
+TRUSTED_PROXIES=
diff --git a/apps/server/entrypoint.sh b/apps/server/entrypoint.sh
index 9d5d56214..24153373e 100644
--- a/apps/server/entrypoint.sh
+++ b/apps/server/entrypoint.sh
@@ -73,6 +73,51 @@ build_admin_ip_geo_rules() {
ADMIN_IP_GEO_RULES_VALUE=$(build_admin_ip_geo_rules)
sed -i "s|__ADMIN_IP_GEO_RULES__|${ADMIN_IP_GEO_RULES_VALUE}|g" /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
+# Build the set_real_ip_from directives from TRUSTED_PROXIES. These tell nginx
+# which upstream proxies it should accept the X-Forwarded-For header from when
+# determining the real client IP. Empty -> RFC1918 (backwards-compatible
+# default). "none" -> no directives (raw $remote_addr is always used). Otherwise
+# treated as a comma-separated list of CIDRs/IPs; invalid tokens are skipped
+# with a warning so a typo can't crash-loop nginx, and if no valid tokens
+# remain we emit no directives (equivalent to "none").
+build_trusted_proxies_directives() {
+ local raw="${TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}"
+ case "$(printf '%s' "$raw" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')" in
+ "")
+ printf '%s' "set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8; set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12; set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;"
+ ;;
+ none)
+ printf '%s' ""
+ ;;
+ *)
+ local out=""
+ local valid=0
+ local IFS=','
+ for cidr in $raw; do
+ cidr=$(printf '%s' "$cidr" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+ [ -z "$cidr" ] && continue
+ if is_valid_cidr "$cidr"; then
+ if [ -z "$out" ]; then
+ out="set_real_ip_from $cidr;"
+ else
+ out="$out set_real_ip_from $cidr;"
+ fi
+ valid=$((valid + 1))
+ else
+ printf 'warning: TRUSTED_PROXIES: ignoring invalid CIDR/IP %s\n' "$cidr" >&2
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ "$valid" -eq 0 ]; then
+ printf 'warning: TRUSTED_PROXIES has no valid entries; X-Forwarded-For will be ignored from all upstreams\n' >&2
+ fi
+ printf '%s' "$out"
+ ;;
+ esac
+}
+
+TRUSTED_PROXIES_VALUE=$(build_trusted_proxies_directives)
+sed -i "s|__TRUSTED_PROXIES__|${TRUSTED_PROXIES_VALUE}|g" /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
+
# Function to check if certificate needs regeneration
needs_cert_regeneration() {
# If cert doesn't exist, need to generate
diff --git a/apps/server/nginx-443.conf b/apps/server/nginx-443.conf
index 7aa4c3d78..4c036dcc0 100644
--- a/apps/server/nginx-443.conf
+++ b/apps/server/nginx-443.conf
@@ -22,10 +22,9 @@ http {
}
# Preserve any existing X-Forwarded-* headers, this is relevant if AliasVault
- # is running behind another reverse proxy.
- set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8;
- set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12;
- set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;
+ # is running behind another reverse proxy. The set_real_ip_from directives
+ # are rendered by entrypoint.sh from TRUSTED_PROXIES (default: RFC1918).
+ __TRUSTED_PROXIES__
real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
real_ip_recursive on;
diff --git a/apps/server/nginx-80-443.conf b/apps/server/nginx-80-443.conf
index 3a963637b..b1713ede9 100644
--- a/apps/server/nginx-80-443.conf
+++ b/apps/server/nginx-80-443.conf
@@ -22,10 +22,9 @@ http {
}
# Preserve any existing X-Forwarded-* headers, this is relevant if AliasVault
- # is running behind another reverse proxy.
- set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8;
- set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12;
- set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;
+ # is running behind another reverse proxy. The set_real_ip_from directives
+ # are rendered by entrypoint.sh from TRUSTED_PROXIES (default: RFC1918).
+ __TRUSTED_PROXIES__
real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
real_ip_recursive on;
diff --git a/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-443.conf b/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-443.conf
index 876b7e53f..bb5ebee06 100644
--- a/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-443.conf
+++ b/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-443.conf
@@ -20,10 +20,9 @@ http {
}
# Preserve any existing X-Forwarded-* headers, this is relevant if AliasVault
- # is running behind another reverse proxy.
- set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8;
- set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12;
- set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;
+ # is running behind another reverse proxy. The set_real_ip_from directives
+ # are rendered by the nginx s6 script from TRUSTED_PROXIES (default: RFC1918).
+ __TRUSTED_PROXIES__
real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
real_ip_recursive on;
diff --git a/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-80-443.conf b/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-80-443.conf
index 9dc27acaf..ff709623c 100644
--- a/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-80-443.conf
+++ b/dockerfiles/all-in-one/config/nginx-80-443.conf
@@ -21,10 +21,9 @@ http {
}
# Preserve any existing X-Forwarded-* headers, this is relevant if AliasVault
- # is running behind another reverse proxy.
- set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8;
- set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12;
- set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;
+ # is running behind another reverse proxy. The set_real_ip_from directives
+ # are rendered by the nginx s6 script from TRUSTED_PROXIES (default: RFC1918).
+ __TRUSTED_PROXIES__
real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
real_ip_recursive on;
diff --git a/dockerfiles/all-in-one/s6-scripts/nginx/run b/dockerfiles/all-in-one/s6-scripts/nginx/run
index 616b09cfa..514d84a15 100644
--- a/dockerfiles/all-in-one/s6-scripts/nginx/run
+++ b/dockerfiles/all-in-one/s6-scripts/nginx/run
@@ -83,6 +83,51 @@ build_admin_ip_geo_rules() {
ADMIN_IP_GEO_RULES_VALUE=$(build_admin_ip_geo_rules)
sed -i "s|__ADMIN_IP_GEO_RULES__|${ADMIN_IP_GEO_RULES_VALUE}|g" /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
+# Build the set_real_ip_from directives from TRUSTED_PROXIES. These tell nginx
+# which upstream proxies it should accept the X-Forwarded-For header from when
+# determining the real client IP. Empty -> RFC1918 (backwards-compatible
+# default). "none" -> no directives (raw $remote_addr is always used). Otherwise
+# treated as a comma-separated list of CIDRs/IPs; invalid tokens are skipped
+# with a warning so a typo can't crash-loop nginx, and if no valid tokens
+# remain we emit no directives (equivalent to "none").
+build_trusted_proxies_directives() {
+ local raw="${TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}"
+ case "$(printf '%s' "$raw" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')" in
+ "")
+ printf '%s' "set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8; set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12; set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;"
+ ;;
+ none)
+ printf '%s' ""
+ ;;
+ *)
+ local out=""
+ local valid=0
+ local IFS=','
+ for cidr in $raw; do
+ cidr=$(printf '%s' "$cidr" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+ [ -z "$cidr" ] && continue
+ if is_valid_cidr "$cidr"; then
+ if [ -z "$out" ]; then
+ out="set_real_ip_from $cidr;"
+ else
+ out="$out set_real_ip_from $cidr;"
+ fi
+ valid=$((valid + 1))
+ else
+ printf 'warning: TRUSTED_PROXIES: ignoring invalid CIDR/IP %s\n' "$cidr" >&2
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ "$valid" -eq 0 ]; then
+ printf 'warning: TRUSTED_PROXIES has no valid entries; X-Forwarded-For will be ignored from all upstreams\n' >&2
+ fi
+ printf '%s' "$out"
+ ;;
+ esac
+}
+
+TRUSTED_PROXIES_VALUE=$(build_trusted_proxies_directives)
+sed -i "s|__TRUSTED_PROXIES__|${TRUSTED_PROXIES_VALUE}|g" /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
+
echo "Starting Nginx reverse proxy..."
# Set nginx error log level based on verbosity
diff --git a/docs/installation/docker-compose/advanced/trusted-proxies.md b/docs/installation/docker-compose/advanced/trusted-proxies.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..35638d4a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/installation/docker-compose/advanced/trusted-proxies.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+layout: default
+title: Trusted proxies
+parent: Advanced
+grand_parent: Docker Compose
+nav_order: 6
+---
+
+# Trusted proxies
+
+When AliasVault sits behind another reverse proxy (HAProxy, Traefik, Cloudflare, an upstream nginx, etc.), the built-in nginx reads the real client IP from the `X-Forwarded-For` header so that audit logs and the IP allowlist see the actual client rather than the upstream proxy.
+
+To prevent header spoofing, nginx only honors `X-Forwarded-For` when the request comes from an explicitly trusted upstream. The `TRUSTED_PROXIES` environment variable controls that list.
+
+## How it works
+
+For every incoming request, nginx checks the direct peer's IP against `TRUSTED_PROXIES`:
+
+- If the peer IP matches a trusted entry, nginx replaces `$remote_addr` with the value from `X-Forwarded-For`.
+- If it doesn't match, the header is ignored and the direct peer IP is used.
+
+`real_ip_recursive` is enabled, so when a chain of trusted proxies is configured nginx walks the `X-Forwarded-For` list right-to-left until it finds the first untrusted address.
+
+## Options
+
+Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` in the `environment:` section of your `docker-compose.yml` to one of:
+
+| Value | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| _empty_ (default) | Trust all RFC1918 ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`). |
+| Comma-separated list of CIDRs/IPs | Trust only the listed proxies. **Recommended** when you know your upstream proxy address(es). |
+| `none` | Trust no upstream proxies. `X-Forwarded-For` is always ignored and the direct peer IP is logged. |
+
+### Examples
+
+```yaml
+# ...
+ environment:
+ # Trust only a specific HAProxy at 10.0.1.5 and a /24 of internal proxies:
+ TRUSTED_PROXIES: "10.0.1.5,192.168.10.0/24"
+# ...
+```
+
+```yaml
+# ...
+ environment:
+ # Disable X-Forwarded-For handling entirely:
+ TRUSTED_PROXIES: "none"
+# ...
+```
+
+## Apply the change
+
+After updating `docker-compose.yml`, the container must be recreated for the new environment value to take effect:
+
+```bash
+docker compose down
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+## Why narrow this down
+
+The default of all RFC1918 ranges is convenient. Most setups place AliasVault and its upstream proxy in the same private network. But it does mean that **any** request originating from a private IP can spoof `X-Forwarded-For` and appear in the logs as a different client. If you have other workloads on the same private network, set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your specific upstream proxy address(es) so only that proxy is trusted to set the header.
diff --git a/docs/installation/script/advanced/admin-access.md b/docs/installation/script/advanced/admin-access.md
index 86662dade..d7e369e96 100644
--- a/docs/installation/script/advanced/admin-access.md
+++ b/docs/installation/script/advanced/admin-access.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ By default the admin panel at `/admin` is reachable from the public internet, al
- Sign-in requires the admin password you set during installation (and optional 2FA).
- The admin account is protected against brute force: after 10 failed sign-in attempts the account is locked for 30 minutes.
-If you'd still rather not expose `/admin` to the open internet — for example if your AliasVault server is only meant to be reached from a home network or VPN — you can restrict it by client IP at the reverse-proxy layer.
+If you'd still rather not expose `/admin` to the open internet, for example if your AliasVault server is only meant to be reached from a home network or VPN, you can restrict it by client IP at the reverse-proxy layer using the `ADMIN_IP_ALLOWLIST` environment variable.
## How it works
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Requests from allowlisted IPs reach the admin panel as normal.
## Configure
-Run the install script — it walks you through the options, validates your input, and offers to restart the containers for you:
+Run the install script which walks you through the options, validates your input, and offers to restart the containers for you:
```bash
$ ./install.sh configure-admin-access
diff --git a/docs/installation/script/advanced/trusted-proxies.md b/docs/installation/script/advanced/trusted-proxies.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3fd380b96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/installation/script/advanced/trusted-proxies.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+layout: default
+title: Trusted proxies
+parent: Advanced
+grand_parent: Install Script
+nav_order: 6
+---
+
+# Trusted proxies
+
+When AliasVault sits behind another reverse proxy (HAProxy, Traefik, Cloudflare, an upstream nginx, etc.), the built-in nginx reads the real client IP from the `X-Forwarded-For` header so that audit logs and the IP allowlist see the actual client rather than the upstream proxy.
+
+To prevent header spoofing, nginx only honors `X-Forwarded-For` when the request comes from an explicitly trusted upstream. The `TRUSTED_PROXIES` environment variable controls that list.
+
+## How it works
+
+For every incoming request, nginx checks the direct peer's IP against `TRUSTED_PROXIES`:
+
+- If the peer IP matches a trusted entry, nginx replaces `$remote_addr` with the value from `X-Forwarded-For`.
+- If it doesn't match, the header is ignored and the direct peer IP is used.
+
+`real_ip_recursive` is enabled, so when a chain of trusted proxies is configured nginx walks the `X-Forwarded-For` list right-to-left until it finds the first untrusted address.
+
+## Configure
+
+Run the install script which walks you through the options, validates your input, and offers to restart the containers for you:
+
+```bash
+$ ./install.sh configure-trusted-proxies
+```
+
+You'll be prompted to choose one of:
+
+| Option | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| Default | Trust all RFC1918 ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`). |
+| Custom CIDRs/IPs | Trust only the listed proxies (recommended when you know your upstream proxy address). |
+| None | Trust no upstream proxies. `X-Forwarded-For` is always ignored and the direct peer IP is logged. |
+
+## Why narrow this down
+
+The default of all RFC1918 ranges is convenient. Most setups place AliasVault and its upstream proxy in the same private network. But it does mean that **any** request originating from a private IP can spoof `X-Forwarded-For` and appear in the logs as a different client. If you have other workloads on the same private network, set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your specific upstream proxy address(es) so only that proxy is trusted to set the header.
diff --git a/install.sh b/install.sh
index b90dd255e..9f4229c4e 100755
--- a/install.sh
+++ b/install.sh
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ show_usage() {
printf " configure-registration Configure new account registration (enable or disable)\n"
printf " configure-ip-logging Configure IP address logging (enable or disable)\n"
printf " configure-admin-access Configure /admin IP allowlist (restrict admin access by client IP)\n"
+ printf " configure-trusted-proxies Configure trusted upstream proxies for X-Forwarded-For\n"
printf " reset-admin-password Reset admin password\n"
printf " uninstall Uninstall AliasVault\n"
printf "\n"
@@ -95,6 +96,30 @@ print_logo() {
}
# Function to parse command line arguments
+# Canonical command list (primary forms only, no aliases). Used by
+# suggest_commands to render "Did you mean..." prefix matches when the user
+# enters an unknown command. Keep sorted so suggestions appear in stable order.
+KNOWN_COMMANDS="build configure-admin-access configure-dev-db configure-email configure-hostname configure-ip-logging configure-registration configure-ssl configure-trusted-proxies db-export db-import install migrate-db reset-admin-password restart start stop uninstall update update-installer"
+
+# Print "Did you mean ..." suggestions for any known command that has the user's
+# input as a prefix. Returns 0 if at least one match was found, 1 otherwise.
+suggest_commands() {
+ local input="$1"
+ local found=0
+ for cmd in $KNOWN_COMMANDS; do
+ case "$cmd" in
+ "$input"*)
+ if [ "$found" -eq 0 ]; then
+ printf "${YELLOW}Did you mean:${NC}\n"
+ found=1
+ fi
+ printf " %s\n" "$cmd"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ done
+ [ "$found" -eq 1 ]
+}
+
parse_args() {
COMMAND=""
VERBOSE=false
@@ -169,6 +194,10 @@ parse_args() {
COMMAND="configure-admin-access"
shift
;;
+ configure-trusted-proxies|trusted-proxies)
+ COMMAND="configure-trusted-proxies"
+ shift
+ ;;
start|s)
COMMAND="start"
shift
@@ -220,8 +249,11 @@ parse_args() {
exit 0
;;
*)
- echo "Unknown option: $1"
- show_usage
+ printf "${RED}Unknown command: %s${NC}\n" "$1"
+ if suggest_commands "$1"; then
+ printf "\n"
+ fi
+ printf "Run '%s --help' to see all available commands.\n" "$0"
exit 1
;;
esac
@@ -978,6 +1010,9 @@ main() {
"configure-admin-access")
handle_admin_access_configuration
;;
+ "configure-trusted-proxies")
+ handle_trusted_proxies_configuration
+ ;;
"start")
handle_start
;;
@@ -3434,6 +3469,123 @@ handle_admin_access_configuration() {
fi
}
+# Function to handle trusted upstream proxies configuration
+handle_trusted_proxies_configuration() {
+ printf "${YELLOW}+++ Trusted Proxies Configuration +++${NC}\n"
+ printf "\n"
+
+ # Check if AliasVault is installed
+ if [ ! -f "docker-compose.yml" ]; then
+ printf "${RED}Error: AliasVault must be installed first.${NC}\n"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+
+ CURRENT_SETTING=$(grep "^TRUSTED_PROXIES=" "$ENV_FILE" | cut -d '=' -f2-)
+
+ printf "${CYAN}About Trusted Proxies:${NC}\n"
+ printf "When AliasVault sits behind another reverse proxy (HAProxy, Traefik, Cloudflare, etc.),\n"
+ printf "the built-in nginx reads the real client IP from the X-Forwarded-For header. To prevent\n"
+ printf "spoofing, this header is only honored when the request comes from a trusted upstream.\n"
+ printf "\n"
+ printf "${CYAN}Current Configuration:${NC}\n"
+ if [ -z "$CURRENT_SETTING" ]; then
+ printf "Trusted Proxies: ${GREEN}All RFC1918${NC} (default: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)\n"
+ elif [ "$CURRENT_SETTING" = "none" ]; then
+ printf "Trusted Proxies: ${CYAN}none${NC} (X-Forwarded-For is ignored)\n"
+ else
+ printf "Trusted Proxies: ${CYAN}${CURRENT_SETTING}${NC}\n"
+ fi
+ printf "\n"
+ printf "${CYAN}Options:${NC}\n"
+ printf "1) Default — trust all RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)\n"
+ printf "2) Custom — comma-separated CIDRs/IPs (e.g. 10.0.1.5,192.168.1.0/24) — recommended\n"
+ printf "3) None — trust no upstream proxies, log the direct peer IP only\n"
+ printf "4) Cancel\n"
+ printf "\n"
+
+ read -p "Select an option [1-4]: " trusted_option
+
+ NEW_VALUE=""
+ case $trusted_option in
+ 1)
+ NEW_VALUE=""
+ ;;
+ 2)
+ while true; do
+ read -p "Enter comma-separated CIDRs/IPs: " CUSTOM_LIST
+ if [ -z "$CUSTOM_LIST" ]; then
+ printf "${YELLOW}> List cannot be empty. Use option 1 to restore default or option 3 to trust none.${NC}\n"
+ continue
+ fi
+
+ INVALID=""
+ CLEANED=""
+ OLD_IFS="$IFS"
+ IFS=','
+ for token in $CUSTOM_LIST; do
+ token=$(printf '%s' "$token" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+ [ -z "$token" ] && continue
+ if is_valid_cidr "$token"; then
+ if [ -z "$CLEANED" ]; then
+ CLEANED="$token"
+ else
+ CLEANED="$CLEANED,$token"
+ fi
+ else
+ if [ -z "$INVALID" ]; then
+ INVALID="$token"
+ else
+ INVALID="$INVALID, $token"
+ fi
+ fi
+ done
+ IFS="$OLD_IFS"
+
+ if [ -n "$INVALID" ]; then
+ printf "${YELLOW}> Invalid entries: ${INVALID}${NC}\n"
+ printf "${YELLOW}> Each entry must be an IPv4/IPv6 address with an optional /mask. Try again.${NC}\n"
+ continue
+ fi
+
+ NEW_VALUE="$CLEANED"
+ break
+ done
+ ;;
+ 3)
+ NEW_VALUE="none"
+ ;;
+ 4)
+ printf "${YELLOW}Trusted proxies configuration cancelled.${NC}\n"
+ return 0
+ ;;
+ *)
+ printf "${RED}Invalid option selected.${NC}\n"
+ return 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ update_env_var "TRUSTED_PROXIES" "$NEW_VALUE"
+
+ printf "\n${YELLOW}Warning: Docker containers need to be restarted to apply these changes.${NC}\n"
+ read -p "Restart now? (y/n): " restart_confirm
+
+ if [ "$restart_confirm" != "y" ] && [ "$restart_confirm" != "Y" ]; then
+ printf "${YELLOW}Please restart manually to apply the changes.${NC}\n"
+ exit 0
+ fi
+
+ handle_restart
+
+ printf "\n"
+ if [ -z "$NEW_VALUE" ]; then
+ print_success_box "Trusted proxies reset to default (all RFC1918 ranges)."
+ elif [ "$NEW_VALUE" = "none" ]; then
+ print_success_box "Trusted proxies disabled — X-Forwarded-For will be ignored."
+ else
+ print_success_box "Trusted proxies set to: ${NEW_VALUE}"
+ fi
+}
+
check_and_populate_env() {
printf "${CYAN}ℹ Checking .env values...${NC} ${GREEN}✓${NC}\n"
@@ -3517,6 +3669,12 @@ check_and_populate_env() {
update_env_var "ADMIN_IP_ALLOWLIST" ""
printf " Set ADMIN_IP_ALLOWLIST\n"
fi
+
+ # TRUSTED_PROXIES
+ if ! grep -q "^TRUSTED_PROXIES=" "$ENV_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
+ update_env_var "TRUSTED_PROXIES" ""
+ printf " Set TRUSTED_PROXIES\n"
+ fi
}
main "$@"