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Privacy-first password manager with built-in email aliasing. Fully encrypted and self-hostable.

Update docs

Leendert de Borste12629be720b
diff --git a/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx b/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx
index 4122bba8c..732834803 100644
--- a/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx
+++ b/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx
@@ -429,14 +429,14 @@ Access to a shared vault is called a *grant*: a copy of the vault's VEK encrypte
### 10.3. Account fingerprints and key certifications
Every account has an account fingerprint, shown in the apps under Settings: the fingerprint of its account signing public key, 20 decimal digits in groups of four, taken from the SHA-256 of the key under a fixed label (`aliasvault/v1/signing-key-fingerprint`). The fingerprint is the same on every client, is not secret, and changes only when the signing key is replaced by a key rotation ([4.2](#42-key-rotation)). A user's own fingerprint is derived from their signing private key, decrypted with the Account Key, so it does not depend on the public key the server reports for the account.
-The fingerprint is the one input the server does not control. It is used in both directions, once per person:
+The fingerprint is the one input the server does not control, so it has to be exchanged outside AliasVault: in person, by phone or over a channel the two people already trust. It is used in both directions, once per person:
- The inviter types the invitee's fingerprint to invite them. The server finds the account by the fingerprint and returns its signing key; the client refuses the key unless its fingerprint is the typed fingerprint.
- The invitee types the inviter's fingerprint to accept. The client checks the inviter's signing key the same way.
Each check ends in a *key certification*: an Ed25519 signature by the checking account over a message that names the certifier, the certified account and the certified signing key (label `aliasvault/v1/sig/key-certification`). The certifications are stored on the server and served back with the groups' rosters, with the list of people the user verified, and with invitations. A client trusts a certification only after verifying it under its own signing public key, derived from its private key, so the server can withhold a certification but cannot forge one. Without a valid certification the client refuses to hand out or accept a vault key and asks for the other person's fingerprint; it never accepts a served key on its own.
-The certified key anchors everything that follows: the account public key a vault key is encrypted to must be signed by it, and the invitation and grant signatures are checked under it. Later shared vaults between the same two people need no further fingerprint. A key rotation ([4.2](#42-key-rotation)) signs the rotating account's own certifications again with its new signing key, in the same transaction; the certifications others made of the old key no longer match, so the next invitation between them asks for the new fingerprint. Leaving or being removed from a shared vault keeps the certifications, so sharing again later needs no fingerprint.
+The certified key anchors everything that follows: the account public key a vault key is encrypted to must be signed by it, and the invitation and grant signatures are checked under it. Later shared vaults between the same two people need no further fingerprint. Trust is set up between the admin and each member only: members do not certify each other, as only the admin hands out vault keys. A key rotation ([4.2](#42-key-rotation)) signs the rotating account's own certifications again with its new signing key, in the same transaction; the certifications others made of the old key no longer match, so the next invitation between them asks for the new fingerprint. Leaving or being removed from a shared vault keeps the certifications, so sharing again later needs no fingerprint.
Finding a signing key with a given 20-digit fingerprint takes on the order of 10<sup>20</sup> key generations.