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Privacy-first password manager with built-in email aliasing. Fully encrypted and self-hostable.

Update whitepaper autofill behaviour docs

Leendert de Borste48797e5952f
diff --git a/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx b/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx
index a3d0e2fe6..c309165bc 100644
--- a/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx
+++ b/docs/docs/security-whitepaper.mdx
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ The last column names the mechanism and the section that describes it.
|---|---|---|---|
| **Malicious or compromised server** (operator, insider, intruder, leaked database or backups) | Reads and modifies everything the server stores; controls every API response; serves any public key, setting or version it likes | Read vault or stored email contents; learn the master password or any key; forge or alter vault contents undetected; move data between vaults, fields or users; make a client derive a key below the client-enforced minimum | Client-held key hierarchy ([4](#4-key-derivation-and-key-hierarchy)); AES-256-GCM bound to its slot ([4.1](#41-key-hierarchy), [6](#6-vault-operations)); other users' keys accepted only against their out-of-band provided account fingerprint, grants opened only when signed by the account itself ([10.3](#103-account-fingerprints-and-key-certifications)); client-side Argon2id minimum ([4](#4-key-derivation-and-key-hierarchy)); known limitations: rollback ([13.2](#limitation-rollback)), email on arrival ([2.2](#22-trust-assumptions)) |
| **Network attacker** (on-path, rogue access point, mis-issued certificate) | Reads and modifies traffic between client and server | Learn the password or any key; read vault contents; impersonate the server to a client during login | SRP with mutual proof ([5](#5-authentication-process)); vault data encrypted before transmission ([6](#6-vault-operations)); TLS |
-| **Malicious website** visited while the extension is installed | Runs scripts in its own page, sends messages to the content script, calls the WebAuthn API | Obtain credentials or passkey signatures for another site; trigger autofill for another origin; read extension storage | Autofill suggestions matched on the registrable domain; one item released per user pick, only to the frame it was picked in; content-script isolation; WebAuthn origin and relying-party checks ([8](#8-passkey-authentication)) |
+| **Malicious website** visited while the extension is installed | Runs scripts in its own page, sends messages to the content script, calls the WebAuthn API | Obtain credentials or passkey signatures for another site; trigger autofill for another origin; read extension storage | Items with a website URL are only suggested on that URL's registrable domain; items without any URL may be suggested when a word of their name appears in the registrable domain; one item released per user pick, only to the frame it was picked in; content-script isolation; WebAuthn origin and relying-party checks ([8](#8-passkey-authentication)) |
| **Another AliasVault user**, including current and former shared-vault members | Holds their own account, grants they were given, and copies of data they synced | Open a vault they were not invited to; read another user's personal vault; keep receiving a shared vault's mail after removal | One VEK per vault, grants only to invited accounts, per-vault authorization on the server for vaults and their email ([10](#10-vault-sharing)) |
| **Holder of a stolen session token** | Calls the API as the user until the token expires or its session is revoked | Decrypt anything; send an alias's future email to another vault; approve a Login with Mobile request | Tokens never decrypt; access tokens live 10 minutes; refresh tokens are stored hashed and rotated on use ([5.3](#53-session-tokens)); Login with Mobile approvals are signed and refused from a revoked session ([9.2](#92-login-flow)); alias moves are signed ([7.1](#71-key-generation-and-storage)) |
| **Holder of a copy of the encrypted data** (server database, device storage, backup, export file) | Unlimited offline computation | Decrypt without the master password or export password | Argon2id with a client-enforced minimum ([4](#4-key-derivation-and-key-hierarchy), [12](#12-vault-exports)); known limitation: the opt-in extension PIN can be guessed offline from a copy of the extension storage ([13.3](#limitation-pin-unlock)) |