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Andee lives on your phone or Mac and uses any app like you do—no integrations, no root, any model; memory and passwords never leave your device | Andee 住进你的手机或 Mac,像你一样操作任何 App——无需集成、无需 Root、支持任意模型,记忆和密码绝不离开设备。

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Security Policy

This project runs as an accessibility service that can read the screen, perform gestures, and act on the user's behalf across every app. That makes it a high-value target, and it means "the app can read my screen" is the intended function rather than a bug. Please read the threat model below before reporting.

This file is about vulnerabilities. User liability lives elsewhere. What the software is permitted to do, where your data goes, and who bears the consequences are in DISCLAIMER.md and docs/acceptable-use.md.

The distinction matters at triage: "it can be steered into doing this" is a security finding and belongs here. "It did the thing it was built to do and it cost me money" is the documented, expected behaviour of an automation tool — it is covered in the disclaimer, and it is not a vulnerability.

Nothing in this file is a promise that any particular action is prevented. Where it describes a limitation, read it as a fact about the software, not as a commitment to guard against it.

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

https://github.com/kuafuai/andee/security/advisories/new

That link is the only reporting channel, on purpose: it is private, it is attached to the repository, and it does not depend on anyone watching a mailbox. There is deliberately no email address to write to — an unmonitored one reads as a second channel while behaving like a dead end.

Please do not open a public issue, discussion, or pull request for a security problem — that discloses it before there is a fix.

Include as much of the following as you can safely share:

  • What the issue is, and which component or file it lives in
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Which Android version and ROM you saw it on (ROM-specific behaviour is a common source of findings in this project — see below)
  • Whether the accessibility service was enabled, and whether the app was in hub or local brain mode
  • Potential impact, and any suggested fix

This is a small project without a dedicated security team; response is best-effort rather than SLA-backed, and no timeframe is promised. Where we can, we will acknowledge your report, coordinate on a fix and a disclosure date, and credit you in the release notes unless you ask us not to.

Threat model

In scope — this is what the app is for. With the accessibility service enabled and the user's consent, the app can:

  • read the text and structure of whatever is on screen, including other apps
  • dispatch taps, swipes, long-presses, and text input
  • take screenshots
  • read notifications, SMS, call logs, contacts, and calendar entries
  • hold credentials in an on-device vault and type them into fields without the model ever seeing them

Each of those is an explicit product capability the user turns on. A report that amounts to "the app can do the thing it says it does" is not a vulnerability.

In scope — a real bug. Examples of things this project does consider vulnerabilities:

  • a route that lets an attacker drive the device without the user's consent, other than the interfaces documented under Known security limitations below — those are acknowledged, not findings
  • vault contents leaking to the model, to the network, or to another app
  • a permission being exercised without the user having granted it for that call
  • the app writing credentials or screen content somewhere they outlive the feature that needed them
  • a way for untrusted on-screen content to reach the user's saved credentials (prompt injection more generally is treated as a known limitation — see §3, which also states what it does not cover)

Known security limitations

Read these before deploying on a device you care about. They are design boundaries of the current version, not undisclosed bugs.

1. The device-side WebSocket server is unauthenticated and binds to all interfaces

BodyWsServer (app/src/main/java/net/kuafuai/andee/net/BodyWsServer.kt) is started by ScreenBodyService and listens on 0.0.0.0:9008. onOpen() accepts every incoming connection as a driver without any credential check.

Impact: any host that can reach the device's IP address can connect, with no credential, and drive it as fully as the app itself can — including reading what is on screen and using the credentials the user has saved on the device. Assume that means full control of the device, and of anything the user is logged into on it.

When you are exposed: whenever the accessibility service is enabled and the device shares a network with other hosts you do not control — café, hotel, airport, conference, or a shared corporate LAN.

Mitigations available today:

  • keep the device on a network you trust, or one where the port is firewalled
  • drive the device over adb forward instead of the LAN, and keep the server unreachable from the network
  • treat a device with this service enabled as a device you would not leave unattended on an untrusted network

The real fix is to require authentication on every connection, and to make the bind address and port configurable with loopback-only as the default. That work is tracked as an open issue; contributions are welcome. Until it lands, this limitation stands.

2. The body ↔ hub link is unauthenticated and plaintext

BodyWsClient registers with the hub using a plain register frame carrying device_id, device_name and the tool schemas. There is no token or signature, and hub_url is a user-supplied ws:// endpoint with no TLS enforcement.

Impact: on a hostile network, an attacker who can intercept or reach that link can observe tool calls and screen content in transit, and can present themselves as the hub to issue commands.

Mitigation: only point hub_url at a host you control, on a network you trust. Running in local brain mode avoids the link entirely — the model is called over HTTPS by the app itself, and no inbound command channel exists.

3. Prompt injection from screen content

The agent reads whatever is on screen — web pages, chat messages, incoming SMS — and that text enters the model's context. Content crafted to look like instructions ("ignore previous instructions and…") can attempt to steer the agent. This is an inherent property of an agent that perceives untrusted content; it is not specific to this implementation.

Current posture: there is no sandbox, and the checks on risky actions are instructions to the model rather than enforcement. The model is told to ask before anything irreversible — paying, sending, deleting — and it usually does. That is a rule it follows, not a lock that stops it. A narrow set of actions carries a mechanical refusal, but that is the exception rather than the pattern.

Assume the device can be driven to do anything its permissions, and the user's own logged-in state, allow — including moving money — with no prompt appearing. If it is steered into doing something you did not intend, the consequence is yours: see DISCLAIMER.md and docs/acceptable-use.md.

If you find an injection that reaches something this file says is protected, that is a vulnerability — report it.

4. The vault is not bound to device unlock

Vault (app/src/main/java/net/kuafuai/andee/config/Vault.kt) encrypts entries with AES/GCM using a key generated in the Android KeyStore. The key is not created with setUserAuthenticationRequired, so it does not require biometric or device-credential authentication to use.

What the vault does protect: the model never receives secret values (get_vault omits them; only fill_secret exists, which types the value on the device), the UI masks them, and the ciphertext is not useful off the device because the key does not leave the KeyStore.

What it does not protect: a person who can unlock the device can reach the entries through the app. Treat the vault as protection against extraction and model exposure, not against someone holding your unlocked device.

5. Nothing is backed up

android:allowBackup="false", and both res/xml/backup_rules.xml and res/xml/data_extraction_rules.xml exclude every domain. Both are needed: on Android 12+ allowBackup="false" stops cloud backup but leaves device-to-device transfer permitted, so the rules files close that half.

The reasoning is that this app has no non-sensitive data. Its dataset is two plaintext API keys, the vault, the notebook, meeting transcripts, and — in grounding mode — screenshots of the user's screen. The vault's ciphertext would be unreadable after a restore anyway (the KeyStore key does not travel, and the code says so explicitly: "vault: decrypt failed — entries are unreadable on this install"), but an undecryptable blob arriving on a new device is downside without an upside.

Supported versions

Only the latest release and the tip of the default branch receive security fixes. There is no back-porting to older builds.

Disclosure

Please keep the details private until a fix or mitigation is available. We will try to agree a disclosure date with you and, where practical, publish an advisory crediting the reporter.

Fixes may ship in a normal release. Users are encouraged to track the default branch or the latest release rather than running an old build.