Open-source agentic AI Search Execution Platform. Track AI visibility, find opportunities, and let agents turn signals into prioritized actions and drafted fixes across ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Google AI Overviews, Google AI Mode, Perplexity, Grok, and Microsoft Copilot.
TypeScript aeoai-agentai-searchanswer-engine-optimizationbrand-monitoringchatgptclaudecopilotdockergeminigeogoogle-ai-overviewsgrokmcpnextjsopen-sourceperplexityseosupabasetypescript
fix(security): enable RLS on exposed tables (#250)
Gökhan Geyikda817c239fbf
diff --git a/supabase/migrations/00016_enable_rls_exposed_tables.sql b/supabase/migrations/00016_enable_rls_exposed_tables.sqlnew file mode 100644index 000000000..e709aeb2c--- /dev/null+++ b/supabase/migrations/00016_enable_rls_exposed_tables.sql@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@+-- 00016_enable_rls_exposed_tables.sql+--+-- Close a direct-REST data exposure: four tables have shipped since 00001 with+-- Row Level Security DISABLED and GRANT ALL to the `authenticated` role and no+-- policies. With RLS off, anyone holding the public anon key can read or write+-- EVERY organization's rows in these tables straight through PostgREST,+-- bypassing the application entirely:+--+-- public.competitors, public.topics, public.prompt_volumes, public.jobs+--+-- Why enabling RLS here is safe (verified against the current code + schema):+--+-- * All server-side / worker access goes through the service_role key+-- (server/src/config/supabase.js, web/src/lib/supabase/admin.ts), which+-- bypasses RLS regardless of policies — unaffected.+--+-- * No SQL function references any of these four tables, so no SECURITY+-- INVOKER RPC can be starved by enabling RLS (confirmed: zero matches in+-- pg_get_functiondef across all public functions).+--+-- * jobs and prompt_volumes are NEVER read through the cookie-based+-- authenticated client — only via service_role (Express job manager, and+-- web/src/lib/mcp/data.ts which uses supabaseAdmin). So enabling RLS with+-- NO policy denies the authenticated/anon REST surface outright while the+-- service_role path keeps working.+--+-- * competitors and topics ARE read and written by Server Actions through the+-- authenticated client (web/src/lib/actions/competitor.ts, topic.ts,+-- citations.ts, prompt.ts, tracking.ts). They get org-membership-scoped+-- policies that mirror the existing "content_opportunities: member select"+-- pattern (brand_id -> brands -> profiles -> auth.uid()).+--+-- Policy scope: member-level (any member of the owning org) for all of+-- SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE. This preserves today's in-org behavior — with+-- RLS off, any authenticated org member could already CRUD these rows — while+-- blocking the cross-org access that was previously possible. Tightening writes+-- to admin/manager (as brands/content_opportunities do) is a separate decision.++-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+-- Server-only tables: enable RLS, no policy (service_role bypasses).+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ALTER TABLE public.jobs ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;+ALTER TABLE public.prompt_volumes ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;++-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+-- competitors: org-membership-scoped policies (brand_id -> brands -> profiles).+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ALTER TABLE public.competitors ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;++CREATE POLICY "competitors: member select" ON public.competitors+ FOR SELECT USING (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++CREATE POLICY "competitors: member insert" ON public.competitors+ FOR INSERT WITH CHECK (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++CREATE POLICY "competitors: member update" ON public.competitors+ FOR UPDATE USING (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ )+ WITH CHECK (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++CREATE POLICY "competitors: member delete" ON public.competitors+ FOR DELETE USING (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+-- topics: org-membership-scoped policies (brand_id -> brands -> profiles).+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ALTER TABLE public.topics ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;++CREATE POLICY "topics: member select" ON public.topics+ FOR SELECT USING (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++CREATE POLICY "topics: member insert" ON public.topics+ FOR INSERT WITH CHECK (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++CREATE POLICY "topics: member update" ON public.topics+ FOR UPDATE USING (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ )+ WITH CHECK (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );++CREATE POLICY "topics: member delete" ON public.topics+ FOR DELETE USING (+ brand_id IN (+ SELECT b.id+ FROM public.brands b+ JOIN public.profiles p ON p.organization_id = b.organization_id+ WHERE p.id = auth.uid()+ )+ );