Skip to content

Modern Docker Management, Designed for Everyone

chore: cleanup old file

Kyle Mendell3a9d4de3a070
diff --git a/.vscode/PLAN.md b/.vscode/PLAN.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f32c49dc2..000000000
--- a/.vscode/PLAN.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-Plan: Enforce per-environment permissions on the remote-environment proxy
-TL;DR — Fix an authorization bypass where any authenticated user can perform write actions on remote/edge environments regardless of their role. The manager's EnvironmentMiddleware proxies /api/environments/{id}/... to agents after checking only authentication; the agent runs with SudoPermissionSet(), so no permission is ever enforced. Fix: enforce the caller's per-environment permission in the proxy before forwarding, using each operation's required permission as a single source of truth (attached to huma.Operation.Metadata). Local env ("0") is already correctly enforced and stays unchanged.
-
-Phase 1 — Make each operation's permission introspectable (single source of truth)
-Add a shared registration helper in role.go (or a sibling file), e.g. RegisterEnvScoped(api, op, perm, handler), that stores perm in op.Metadata[MetaRequiredPermission], attaches RequirePermission(api, perm), and calls huma.Register. The required perm argument makes it impossible to register without one.
-Migrate the env-scoped (/environments/{id}/...) handler registrations to the helper — containers, images, image_updates, volumes, networks, ports, system, swarm, projects, dashboard, vulnerabilities (mechanical: drop the Middlewares: line, pass perm as an arg). All of these use a single RequirePermission today; none under /environments/{id}/ uses RequireGlobalAdmin.
-Expose a shared slice of the 6 proxied WS routes + their permissions from handler.go:243 (project logs, container logs/stats/terminal, swarm service logs, system stats) so both route registration and the matcher use one source.
-Phase 2 — Build the authorization matcher
-After SetupAPI in api.go:138, build a (method, env-suffix-path-template) → permission matcher by walking api.OpenAPI().Paths reading Metadata[MetaRequiredPermission], plus the WS slice from step 3. Normalize Huma {x} and Echo :x params to one wildcard form; static segments win over wildcards (so /containers/counts ≠ /containers/{containerId}).
-Phase 3 — Enforce in the proxy
-Give the proxy the caller's PermissionSet: change AuthValidator in environment_middleware.go:52 to return (\*authz.PermissionSet, bool), and update router_bootstrap.go:90 to resolve it via the existing RoleService.ResolvePermissions / ResolveApiKeyPermissions (env/agent-bootstrap tokens → SudoPermissionSet()). Reuse, no duplication.
-In EnvironmentMiddleware.Handle, right after auth-validation and before any proxy branch (covers edge-tunnel + HTTP + WS): look up the required permission for (method, suffix); if the caller isn't Sudo and !ps.Allows(perm, remoteEnvID) → 403 (matching the file's existing JSON error shape). No mapping found → default-deny 403.
-Wire the matcher through NewEnvProxyMiddlewareWithParam[AndRegistry] and the bootstrap call.
-Phase 4 — Tests & verification
-Unit tests: matcher static-vs-{param} precedence; remote write denied for read-only role; remote read allowed; agent/env token still allowed; local path untouched; WS terminal denied without containers:exec.
-Guard test: every /environments/{id}/... Huma op carries permission metadata (also catches any unprotected env-scoped endpoint).
-Run cd backend && go test ./api/... ./internal/services/... ./internal/middleware/... ./internal/bootstrap/... ./pkg/authz/....
-Manual: run the issue's repro against a remote env → expect 403; confirm an allowed role works and local is unaffected.
-Relevant files
-
-environment_middleware.go:95 — authz check in Handle; AuthValidator signature; constructor takes the matcher.
-router_bootstrap.go:90 — resolve PermissionSet; build/pass matcher.
-api.go:138 — build matcher from api.OpenAPI() metadata.
-role.go:19 — RegisterEnvScoped helper + MetaRequiredPermission key.
-handler.go:243 — shared WS route→permission slice.
-backend/api/handlers/{containers,images,image_updates,volumes,networks,ports,system,swarm,projects,dashboard,vulnerabilities}.go — migrate env-scoped registrations.
-Decisions (confirmed)
-
-Single source of truth via operation metadata + shared helper (Approach A).
-Covers all env-scoped resources, not just containers.
-Unmapped env-scoped path to a remote env → default-deny (403).
-Scope boundaries
-
-Excluded: local env enforcement (already correct), org-level endpoints (not proxied), management paths under /environments/{id}/ already handled locally (isManagementPathInternal), and the frontend (backend enforcement is authoritative; UI gating is out of scope here).
-Audit item during implementation: confirm no buildables/playwright/direct-Echo routes sit under /environments/{id}/ that default-deny would wrongly block (initial grep found none).
-Want me to proceed with this plan, or adjust anything (e.g., migrate all Huma registrations to the helper for uniformity vs. only the env-scoped ones)?