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What happens when a browser opens an HTTPS site for the first time? {#first-visit}

The browser resolves the hostname, opens TCP, then runs a one-round-trip TLS 1.3 handshake. It agrees fresh encryption keys and checks the server's identity before any request is sent.

  • The browser sends its key share inside ClientHello, so one round trip is enough.
  • After ServerHello everything is encrypted, including the server's certificate.
  • CertificateVerify proves the server holds the certificate's private key.
  • Keys come from ephemeral shares, so a later leak of the private key cannot decrypt this session.

@answer scope="TLS 1.3 over TCP · first visit to a host · no proxy, no resumption" @meta locale=en @source rfc8446 title="RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3" url=https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446

What crosses the wire before the first request? {#wire}

@sequence id=tls-visit title="First HTTPS visit: DNS to first response" | actor browser | Browser | frontend | | actor dns | DNS resolver | external | | actor server | Web server | backend | | phase | Name lookup | | browser | dns | DNS query: example.com | | dns | browser | IP address | return | | phase | TCP handshake · 1 RTT | | browser | server | SYN | | server | browser | SYN + ACK | return | | browser | server | ACK | | phase | TLS 1.3 handshake · 1 RTT | | browser | server | ClientHello: suites, SNI, key share | | server | browser | ServerHello: chosen suite, key share | return | | server | browser | Certificate + CertificateVerify + Finished, encrypted | return | | browser | server | Finished | emphasis | | phase | Encrypted HTTP | | browser | server | GET / | | server | browser | 200 OK + page | return |

@steps id=visit-steps | resolve | DNS resolver | Turns the hostname into an IP before the connection can start. | tls-visit | dns | | hello | Browser | Opens TCP and sends ClientHello with TLS 1.3, cipher suites, the hostname and an ephemeral key share. | tls-visit | browser | | prove | Web server | Sends its key share, then certificate and Finished under encryption; checks the client's Finished. | tls-visit | server |

@callout id=quic level=note title="What about HTTP/3?" | With QUIC, the TCP steps disappear: QUIC runs the same TLS 1.3 handshake inside the transport, still in one round trip.

How does the browser know this is the real site? {#trust}

Check What the browser verifies
Chain The certificate chains to a root CA in the browser's trust store.
Hostname The site's name appears in the certificate's subject alternative name (SAN) list.
Validity Today sits inside the certificate's not-before and not-after dates.
Ownership CertificateVerify signs the handshake transcript; only the private-key holder could produce it.
Revocation Stapled OCSP or CRLs, checked best-effort; many browsers accept an unreachable check. {caution:Weak}

Where do the session keys come from? {#keys}

@facts id=key-facts | Key shares | Each side sends an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share, usually X25519. | | Shared secret | Each side combines its private share with the peer's public share. | | Key schedule | HKDF expands the secret plus the transcript into handshake, then traffic keys. | | Forward secrecy | Shares are discarded after use, so later key theft cannot decrypt this session. | | Client Finished | Confirms both sides hold the same keys; the request can now ride on them. |

What changes on the next visit? {#revisit}

Aspect First visit Resumed visit
Server proof Full certificate and signature check Pre-shared key from a NewSessionTicket
Round trips to first byte DNS + TCP + 1 RTT of TLS TCP, then data can ride with ClientHello {good:0-RTT}
Early data risk None; the request waits for Finished 0-RTT data can be replayed, so servers limit what it may do {caution:Replayable}