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fix(cli): confine writes through dangling symlinks (#6513)

Joey7cd3516d68ac
diff --git a/.changeset/cli-spec-assert-within-dangling-symlinks.md b/.changeset/cli-spec-assert-within-dangling-symlinks.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63da701a52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/cli-spec-assert-within-dangling-symlinks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+'@astryxdesign/cli': patch
+---
+
+[fix] Commands that write files no longer follow a dangling symlink out of the project: when the target, or a directory on the way to it, links to a missing path outside the project root, the command now fails with `ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL` instead of creating the file there. A symlink escape reported by `integration add` now carries `ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL` too, instead of an unregistered `PATH_TRAVERSAL` code.
+
+@josephfarina
diff --git a/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.mjs b/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.mjs
index aab9d07015..d5b7277d95 100644
--- a/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.mjs
+++ b/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.mjs
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
import * as path from 'node:path';
import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import {ERROR_CODES} from '../response/error-codes.mjs';
/**
* Error thrown by path-safety guards. Carries a stable `code`
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ export class PathSafetyError extends Error {
*
* - Absolute paths (e.g. `/tmp/x`) — re-rooted by `path.join` is silent;
* better to fail loudly. Pass `{allowAbsolute: true}` to opt in.
- * - Paths that escape via `..` segments.
+ * - Paths that escape via `..` segments or a symlink, dangling or not.
*
* Returns the resolved absolute path on success.
*
@@ -50,7 +51,8 @@ export class PathSafetyError extends Error {
* @param {string} [options.label='path'] - Human-readable name of the arg
* being checked (used in error messages, e.g. 'output directory').
* @returns {string} Absolute resolved path inside `rootDir`.
- * @throws {PathSafetyError}
+ * @throws {PathSafetyError} An escape carries the registered
+ * `ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL`, so it reaches an envelope correctly even uncaught.
*/
export function assertWithin(targetPath, rootDir, options = {}) {
const {allowAbsolute = false, label = 'path'} = options;
@@ -83,42 +85,70 @@ export function assertWithin(targetPath, rootDir, options = {}) {
throw new PathSafetyError(
`Invalid ${label} "${targetPath}": resolves outside the project root ` +
`(${absRoot}). Path traversal is not allowed.`,
- 'PATH_TRAVERSAL',
+ ERROR_CODES.ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL,
);
}
// path.resolve is purely lexical — it does NOT follow symlinks, so a symlink
// INSIDE the root that points outside would pass the check above while the
- // real write lands outside root. Canonicalize the deepest EXISTING ancestor
- // (the target itself usually doesn't exist yet) and re-check against the
- // realpath'd root. This closes the symlink-escape hole for every command that
- // writes through this guard.
+ // real write lands outside root. Canonicalize both paths through every
+ // symlink, dangling ones included (a write through a dangling link creates
+ // its target), and re-check.
try {
- const realRoot = fs.realpathSync(absRoot);
- let existing = resolved;
- while (!fs.existsSync(existing)) {
- const parent = path.dirname(existing);
- if (parent === existing) break;
- existing = parent;
- }
- const realExisting = fs.realpathSync(existing);
+ const realRoot = canonicalPath(absRoot);
+ const realTarget = canonicalPath(resolved);
const realRootWithSep = realRoot.endsWith(path.sep) ? realRoot : realRoot + path.sep;
- if (realExisting !== realRoot && !realExisting.startsWith(realRootWithSep)) {
+ if (realTarget !== realRoot && !realTarget.startsWith(realRootWithSep)) {
throw new PathSafetyError(
`Invalid ${label} "${targetPath}": resolves outside the project root ` +
`(${absRoot}) via a symlink. Path traversal is not allowed.`,
- 'PATH_TRAVERSAL',
+ ERROR_CODES.ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL,
);
}
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof PathSafetyError) throw err;
- // realpath can fail if the root doesn't exist (ENOENT) or on a race; fall
- // back to the lexical result already validated above rather than crash.
+ // A symlink loop, a permission error, or a race; fall back to the lexical
+ // result already validated above rather than crash.
}
return resolved;
}
+/** Linux's MAXSYMLINKS; a longer chain is treated as a loop. */
+const MAX_SYMLINK_HOPS = 40;
+
+/**
+ * `target` with every symlink resolved, including a dangling one, which
+ * `fs.realpathSync` refuses. Components below the deepest existing entry are
+ * appended as given.
+ *
+ * @param {string} target absolute path
+ * @param {number} [hops] symlinks followed so far
+ * @returns {string}
+ * @throws when the chain exceeds {@link MAX_SYMLINK_HOPS} or `lstat` fails
+ * for a reason other than a missing entry
+ */
+function canonicalPath(target, hops = 0) {
+ if (hops > MAX_SYMLINK_HOPS) throw new Error(`Too many symlinks: ${target}`);
+ let stat;
+ try {
+ stat = fs.lstatSync(target);
+ } catch (err) {
+ const code = /** @type {NodeJS.ErrnoException} */ (err).code;
+ if (code !== 'ENOENT' && code !== 'ENOTDIR') throw err;
+ const parent = path.dirname(target);
+ if (parent === target) return target;
+ return path.join(canonicalPath(parent, hops), path.basename(target));
+ }
+ try {
+ return fs.realpathSync(target);
+ } catch (err) {
+ if (!stat.isSymbolicLink()) throw err;
+ }
+ const link = fs.readlinkSync(target);
+ return canonicalPath(path.resolve(fs.realpathSync(path.dirname(target)), link), hops + 1);
+}
+
/**
* Validate a "name" argument (e.g. theme name, component name) that will
* be embedded in a generated filename. Rejects names containing path
diff --git a/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.test.mjs b/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.test.mjs
index 445a7c0f7c..f1822e1b8b 100644
--- a/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/cli/foundation/fs/path-safety.test.mjs
@@ -19,6 +19,19 @@ afterEach(() => {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, {recursive: true, force: true});
});
+/**
+ * The code a guard rejected with, or 'accepted'.
+ * @param {() => unknown} fn
+ */
+function rejectionCode(fn) {
+ try {
+ fn();
+ } catch (err) {
+ return err instanceof PathSafetyError ? err.code : err;
+ }
+ return 'accepted';
+}
+
describe('assertWithin', () => {
it('accepts a relative path that stays inside root', () => {
const result = assertWithin('subdir/file.txt', tmpDir);
@@ -38,6 +51,14 @@ describe('assertWithin', () => {
expect(() => assertWithin('a/b/../../../c', tmpDir)).toThrow(PathSafetyError);
});
+ it('reports an escape with the registered ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL code', () => {
+ // An uncaught guard error reaches the JSON envelope with this code as-is.
+ expect(rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('../escaped', tmpDir))).toBe('ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL');
+ expect(
+ rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('/etc/passwd', tmpDir, {allowAbsolute: true})),
+ ).toBe('ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL');
+ });
+
it('rejects absolute paths by default', () => {
expect(() => assertWithin('/tmp/elsewhere', tmpDir)).toThrow(/absolute paths are not allowed/i);
});
@@ -160,6 +181,7 @@ describe('assertWithin — symlink escape (realpath guard)', () => {
// path.resolve is lexical and would pass this; the realpath check must catch it.
expect(() => assertWithin('link/evil.txt', root)).toThrow(PathSafetyError);
expect(() => assertWithin('link/evil.txt', root)).toThrow(/outside|symlink|traversal/i);
+ expect(rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('link/evil.txt', root))).toBe('ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL');
});
it('still accepts a legit non-existent nested path inside root', () => {
@@ -169,4 +191,32 @@ describe('assertWithin — symlink escape (realpath guard)', () => {
it('rejects a NUL byte in the path', () => {
expect(() => assertWithin('a\u0000b', root)).toThrow(PathSafetyError);
});
+
+ it('rejects a dangling symlink whose target is outside root', () => {
+ // A write through the link would create the missing target outside root.
+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, 'created.txt'), path.join(root, 'leaf'));
+ expect(rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('leaf', root))).toBe('ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL');
+ });
+
+ it('rejects a path through a dangling directory symlink that points outside root', () => {
+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, 'missing-dir'), path.join(root, 'dir'));
+ expect(rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('dir/evil.txt', root))).toBe('ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL');
+ });
+
+ it('follows a chain of links that ends in a dangling target outside root', () => {
+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outside, 'missing.txt'), path.join(root, 'second'));
+ fs.symlinkSync('second', path.join(root, 'first'));
+ expect(rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('first', root))).toBe('ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL');
+ });
+
+ it('accepts a dangling symlink whose target stays inside root', () => {
+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join('sub', 'new.txt'), path.join(root, 'leaf'));
+ expect(assertWithin('leaf', root)).toBe(path.join(root, 'leaf'));
+ });
+
+ it('terminates on a symlink loop', () => {
+ fs.symlinkSync('loop', path.join(root, 'loop'));
+ const result = rejectionCode(() => assertWithin('loop', root));
+ expect(['accepted', 'ERR_PATH_TRAVERSAL']).toContain(result);
+ });
});