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macOS computer use Phase 1 implementation notes
This note records implementation and acceptance facts without changing the
approved behavior tables in
desktop-computer-use.md. Evidence is from the
isolated lane owned by Agent Session ses9qeb46suvv.
First installed artifact
The first installed artifact was built from
89a0634a0454f67df58067f5f49097d23efb20b3 and held byte-for-byte fixed at:
- app:
/Users/max/Applications/Avibe CUA Acceptance.app - bundle identifier:
bot.avibe.desktop.cua.acceptance - outer cdhash:
1a0d31caf13f8d82789a9bece36022ca682a4cf5 - nested driver cdhash:
7939ebd23e7c44f54533c377a77216dd4764bfda - installed tree-manifest SHA-256:
bd55dd471beaf1d76dac4ba57a1d4358e86508cc5e69d88e880b934ee369e5ef
It was launched against an isolated Runtime on 127.0.0.1:15177. The
acceptance bundle's app-data directory, daemon socket, Runtime home, backend
configuration, and CLI homes were separate from the owner's installed Avibe
and default ~/.avibe state.
Acceptance incidents and corrections
Missing Workbench assets
The first isolated Runtime launch served /ready and desktop APIs but returned
404 JSON for /, /workbench, and /index.html. That shape was rejected:
an installed desktop artifact must show the actual Workbench. The isolated UI
bundle was built and installed into the test Runtime, after which the page and
its JavaScript and CSS assets returned 200. The product acceptance checks the
page and its assets, not only the API.
Activation burst
The first investigation incorrectly attributed the generation increase to repeated acceptance-probe activations. The saved commands contain no 18- or 14-action loop. Preserved WindowServer, RunningBoard, LaunchServices, AppKit, and driver-exit logs instead establish a product feedback loop:
- a real host activation authorized the stale-preflight fallback;
- the raw driver under
Contents/MacOSresolved the outer app bundle id and registered as a regular foreground process before setting its accessory policy; - the host deactivated when the driver became frontmost;
- the missing-grant driver exited and LaunchServices restored the host;
NSApplicationDidBecomeActivetreated that synthetic return as a new retry and spawned the next driver.
The first burst produced 18 drivers and the second produced 14. Every driver in the first burst received a frontmost assertion. The representative first cycle was host active at 12:17:36.004, driver 52754 first log at .025, driver frontmost at .223, host inactive at .230, driver exit at .275-.279, host restored and active at .289, and driver 52756 starting at .302.
The exact early probe and timestamps remain under:
/tmp/avibe-cua-phase1-acceptance-ses9qeb46suvv-be8e909/evidence-20261007/
The full ordered loop evidence is under:
/tmp/avibe-computer-use-phase1-sesbn6xrdnd8p/activation-loop/
The accepted fix has two parts. The driver moves unchanged to the raw,
plist-less nested-tool location Contents/Helpers/cua-driver, so it no longer
resolves the outer regular-app bundle before AppKit initialization. The shell
treats activation as a silent preflight observation only. A false preflight
cannot spawn any child; only an explicit toggle or a proven grant transition
can. The prior five-second activation throttle is removed because it limited
the loop without fixing its cause.
Screen Recording registration failure
Two fixed candidates failed to appear automatically in System Settings → Privacy & Security → Screen & System Audio Recording.
The 89a0634a acceptance artifact called
CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess and captureImageInRect, but the permission
path was not dispatched to the AppKit main thread and ignored the asynchronous
capture result. The owner manually dragged that app into the pane so the
vertical-slice investigation could continue. That was an owner-assisted
workaround and is not acceptance of the product request path.
Candidate 2 was built from
7ddb10741411b290469e39d6a7922a987755405b and held byte-for-byte fixed at:
- app:
/Users/max/Applications/Avibe CUA Candidate 2.app - bundle identifier:
bot.avibe.desktop.cua.candidate2 - outer cdhash:
5180ece1bc73874b19e5378eec73600c845360ed - installed tree-manifest SHA-256:
843b0aa5bef45d89319bb370f972b79524ae408535913a3beda61420ad24c1a5
Candidate 2 moved Accessibility, CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess, and the
capture probe onto the AppKit main thread and recorded the asynchronous
result. The capture callback reported an image, but the Settings row was still
absent. Unified logs show that TCC received the explicit non-preflight request
from the correct shell PID and bundle, returned authValue=0 /
authReason=5, and took DB Action:None. The following
captureImageInRect path only produced preflight checks and no persisted
ScreenCapture row. An image callback therefore does not establish either a
grant or registration.
The historical Phase 0 comparison used the same AX request followed by
CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess. Its persistent serve-only mode also failed to
register. The run that next entered ordinary SCShareableContent enumeration
and a filter-based capture did create the denied TCC record that exposed the
grant path. This is the smallest observed behavioral difference.
The next candidate therefore replaces captureImageInRect with ordinary
SCShareableContent enumeration followed by a display-filtered capture. Both
the source rectangle in the selected display's logical coordinate system and
the output are explicitly 1 x 1. Enumeration and capture share one 5 s
deadline; a denied enumeration ends with its concrete NSError, and a late
enumeration callback cannot start capture. The image is discarded, and no
window or application enumeration is logged or retained. This remains a
testable hypothesis until a new bundle identity appears in Settings before any
manual add or grant.
Candidate 3 was built from
d0127adc8ae299e220180c70cdeeb84d56b4f6dc and held byte-for-byte fixed at:
- app:
/Users/max/Applications/Avibe CUA Candidate 3.app - bundle identifier:
bot.avibe.desktop.cua.candidate3 - outer cdhash:
5b15f25bb08bb138699d147becdffddbe9ba9242 - installed tree-manifest SHA-256:
9c35406431e1a80abb2344b7e2dc6797cf7b6ec8c92d146180446c8e38a4adad
Its first intended toggle did not run: a System Events process reference
selected by unix id was later re-resolved by the common process name and read
the owner app. Native PID-bound AX inspection proved Candidate 3 had both
Computer Use menu items, and the failed aliased lookup performed no menu
action. A later direct AX action verified PID, bundle id, path, menu role,
title, enabled state, and element owner immediately before the press.
Candidate 3 then made both the shell CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess request and
the ordinary SCK request. TCC attributed both to the correct shell, but logged
that ScreenCapture prompting was not allowed and persisted no row. System
Settings reopened fresh still showed Candidate 3 absent.
That third failure ended in-process probe variants. The approved implementation
adds exactly one shell-owned child capture on explicit toggle-on while the
grant is missing. It runs the pinned driver as direct embedded MCP, calls one
real get_desktop_state capture with a one-pixel output cap, discards the
result, and exits under one deadline. It is not the persistent daemon, never
retries, never changes D out of needs_permission, and is canceled on
toggle-off or quit.
Candidate 3 also exposed the activation feedback loop because the raw driver
was packaged in the outer app's Contents/MacOS. LaunchServices CHECKIN logs
gave each driver the outer Candidate bundle id and foreground status. A
Foundation metadata probe showed that identical bytes under
Contents/Helpers resolve with no bundle identifier, while nested-code
signing and codesign --verify --deep --strict succeed there. The next fixed
candidate combines this layout change with the shell activation change; it
must prove helper identity, no helper foreground assertion, no respawn loop,
outer-app TCC responsibility, automatic Settings registration, and a visible
agent cursor during a later authorized action.
Candidate 4 was built from
e0e3034ae9314c9312226872c1e47d8fcc4638d6, installed under the unique
bot.avibe.desktop.cua.candidate4 identity, and started once through the
isolated lane command only to obtain its PID and verify origin. It was stopped
before any toggle, permission request, child capture, TCC record, or D write.
A source review then found the remaining permission-level feedback path:
after a daemon reported missing_grant, the five-second tick could see a stale
shell all-granted preflight and spawn again indefinitely. Candidate 4 is
therefore pre-fix evidence only and is not permission-acceptance evidence.
The lifecycle now consumes automatic spawn eligibility whenever startup health
or a ready heartbeat reports missing_grant. Repeated all-granted tick or
activation observations remain in needs_permission; only a newly observed
shell missing → granted edge or an explicit off/on can start another daemon.
This completes the feedback-loop repair without a timer, throttle, or retry
budget side effect.
Candidate 5 automatic registration result
Candidate 5 was built from 4ea184f98033c1bb9bc761441599f569618372e2 and held
byte-for-byte fixed throughout the permission attempt:
- app:
/Users/max/Applications/Avibe CUA Candidate 5.app - bundle identifier:
bot.avibe.desktop.cua.candidate5 - outer cdhash:
b58c51f7eabae717640cb2732784eb19dea1dd37 - helper cdhash:
794bd1e41b44e7f483c2b22587f11aa48da5a6c3 - installed tree-manifest SHA-256:
f90671bd8f9b204350a737ff4059abd23373df098af6cb55a4421e2b89d98937
After the source handoff confirmed that the owner was present and the console
was unlocked, the lane performed exactly one direct PID-bound AXPress at
2026-10-07 18:56:01 UTC+8. The fixed shell was PID 66045, the isolated
Runtime was on port 15177, and the pre-action status was
{"status":"off","reason":"never_enabled"}. No consent click, manual add, or
grant was performed.
The explicit toggle started exactly one bounded registration child:
- PID
15202, PPID66045 /Users/max/Applications/Avibe CUA Candidate 5.app/Contents/Helpers/cua-drivermcp --direct --embedded --no-overlay --host-bundle-id bot.avibe.desktop.cua.candidate5
During a 44.62 second observation spanning multiple five-second ticks, the
child count was one, the persistent daemon count was zero, and no respawn
occurred. D stayed at needs_permission with reason screen_recording and
generation 0; the status API stayed
{"status":"needs_permission","reason":"screen_recording"}. The bounded child
recorded a ScreenCaptureKit rejection (-3801). That result is not evidence
that a person clicked a denial control.
The retained TCC stream provides the complete responsibility boundary for this
attempt. At 2026-10-07 18:56:01.801330 UTC+8, TCC handled
kTCCServiceScreenCapture for subject
bot.avibe.desktop.cua.candidate5 with responsible PID 66045 and the
Candidate 5 shell path. At 18:56:01.801579, TCC notified the same target and
responsible PID. The WindowServer attribution names the accessor as
cua-driver PID 15202 at the fixed Contents/Helpers path. TCC then logged
Service kTCCServiceScreenCapture does not allow prompting; returning denied.
The helper therefore no longer checks in under the host bundle identity, while
the host remains the responsible app.
The source reopened System Settings → Privacy & Security → Screen & System
Audio Recording without input at about 2026-10-07 19:05 UTC+8. The
Candidate 5 row was absent. The screenshot is
/tmp/avibe-computer-use-phase1-sesbn6xrdnd8p/source-c5/screen-recording-list-1905.png.
Candidate 5 automatic Screen Recording registration therefore failed even
with the corrected helper layout, direct child responsibility chain, stable
permission lifecycle, and no recorded driver foreground assertion. The owner
accepted the guided manual +/drag recovery as the Phase 1 product path at
2026-10-07 19:22 UTC+8. Automatic registration remains a known limitation
and is deferred for separate investigation when Developer ID signing exists;
it is not automatic-registration success.
One unannounced state change must remain separate from the lane action: at
2026-10-07 18:56:14.57, TCC recorded Accessibility as
Allowed (System Set) for Candidate 5. The request came from the
System Settings SecurityPrivacyExtension.appex PID 15214, not from the
lane's AXPress or registration child. The owner later confirmed that they
accepted the Accessibility prompt and completed the Settings action. This is
positive evidence for the Accessibility prompt-to-Settings path, but it is not
Screen Recording evidence.
This result closes the live evidence for the activation and focus fixes and records the remaining macOS registration limitation. The guided manual addition path is accepted Phase 1 product guidance and remains distinct from automatic registration.
Primary diagnostics:
screen-registration-diagnostics.log, SHA-2560d929f482959283eb74b7cfe98f0f2a6d40a69ee3b4daeb93f5bb2b5d689a973capture-call-full.log, SHA-25663eacc4a4ab2048653104b15dcb636ebc239f32ebec58e6f00e36fff74b6935ecandidate2-tcc-history.log, SHA-256723a65110073da6a9b9e7c749c8215c974dd572eccc3f826cb07adf29c027e2ephase0-historical-ExampleAgentHarness.swift, SHA-256fb7e7662bee1cc65647e6d85bd69f1b4c8feebc93eab367881a7d9cebca18e30
macOS Quit & Reopen and test isolation
macOS Quit & Reopen relaunched the fixed artifact without the lane's launch
environment. That shell adopted the owner's older Runtime on port 5123 and
correctly entered needs_runtime/runtime_unavailable; it did not start a driver.
The lane stopped only that recorded shell PID and relaunched the same unchanged
artifact with the isolated origin and executable overrides. Before resuming
GUI work, the lane verified that the replacement shell connected only to
15177, D was ready, the driver was its child, and the owner's Runtime
process start times and /ready health were unchanged.
All later acceptance relaunches must use the recorded isolated command and verify the actual Runtime origin before any GUI action. This is a test-harness boundary and does not add a product setting.
First real Claude tool-chain slice
The fixed 89a0634a artifact completed this path:
native toggle → shell daemon → D ready → Avibe computer MCP server → Claude Code → disposable background app
Claude Code 2.1.282 used claude-sonnet-5, isolated HOME/XDG/Claude
directories, --strict-mcp-config, and one avibe_computer server exposing
exactly 28 tools. It observed a dedicated app window, set
切片通过-2026 through an AX element token, pressed the app's save control,
observed the window again, read back Saved 1 times: 切片通过-2026, and ended
the named session. The target app wrote:
{"save_count":1,"text":"切片通过-2026"}
Both observations delivered one PNG image block. The stable Avibe server folded
the upstream structuredContent into a trailing text block and preserved the
image block; it did not preserve a structuredContent field. The first click
attempt omitted pid and was rejected by the upstream schema before any GUI
side effect. The corrected click saved once.
Primary evidence:
claude-vertical-slice-summary.json, SHA-25615c168461c572500fb4c3ad76d80ae8b6fef1eea917f055de312a93b06279883claude-stream.jsonl, SHA-2564fcaa037382a91a61e7826f4a9424d733fc0e3b04499fa5b5b147880a1dc9484target-result.json, SHA-25664c7f5b4866f991e62994dbd9bc6c4cc77cee4a4928dccc61462c9e7d81735c5
This is mechanism evidence with explicit limits:
- Screen Recording came from the manual-add workaround.
- The artifact predates the activation-loop fix and observable main-thread permission probe.
--strict-mcp-configisolated the direct CLI probe. It does not prove the RuntimeSessionHandlerinjection path or preservation of native user MCP configuration.- The app may not have been idle. Before/after frontmost-app and pointer samples were unchanged, but they do not prove idle focus, pointer, or visible cursor behavior.
- The tool actions were AX
set_valueand AX press, not pixel-coordinate input. - The run used a probe prompt. Final acceptance must use the product's injected prompt and treat tool errors by observing again before retrying.
Remaining native acceptance
Candidate 5 failed the automatic Screen Recording registration attempt. The
owner accepted the guided manual +/drag path for Phase 1, so no further
permission candidate is required for that limitation. The failed
automatic-registration evidence remains separate from the live evidence that
passed:
- the shell and helper have a stable parent/child relationship;
- the helper no longer acquires the outer app identity or foreground status;
- the activation and permission-level feedback loops do not respawn a child;
- missing permission settles at
needs_permissionwithout error or retry churn; and - the TCC request is attributed to the outer Candidate 5 shell while the helper is the capture accessor.
After the owner grants the unchanged fixed artifact through the guided path, the remaining native evidence still needs the persistent serve path, visible cursor overlay, idle focus and pointer checks, parent-liveness cleanup, and the normal isolated Runtime Claude session with native user MCP configuration preserved. A direct no-overlay registration child does not satisfy those later checks.