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Bento, the office suite that fits in a file

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#!/usr/bin/env node
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// Copyright (c) 2026 The Bento authors
// Untrusted-document rig: what a deck may put into the reader's DOM.
//
//   slides/node_modules/.bin/esbuild scripts/test-sanitize.ts --bundle \
//     --platform=node --format=esm --outfile="$TMPDIR/test-sanitize.mjs" \
//     && node "$TMPDIR/test-sanitize.mjs"
//
// (Bundled, not run directly: render.ts imports './model' extensionless, the
// same reason the spaces undo rig is bundled in CI. Source paths below are
// therefore resolved from the REPO ROOT — import.meta.url would point at the
// bundle.)
//
// WHAT THIS PROVES. Every deck is untrusted input: mailed, downloaded, pasted,
// or delivered as a collab op into a file already open. Script running in this
// page is not a defaced slide — it holds `doc.collab.key`, the owner/writer
// private keys, the plaintext IndexedDB autosave store and the File System
// Access handle ⌘S writes through. It is the document AND the file on disk.
//
// Three places used to hand author data straight to the DOM:
//
//   1. AN `svg` ELEMENT'S MARKUP, assigned with innerHTML. Measured in Chrome
//      141 (2026-08-09): a deck whose svg element carried `<svg onload="…">`
//      ran it — from a DETACHED div, before anything was inserted anywhere.
//      The `svgAsImage` sibling path (a data-URI <img>) was inert all along,
//      which is why only the live path changed.
//   2. TABLE CELL COLOURS, PADDINGS AND ALIGNMENTS, interpolated into a `style`
//      attribute unescaped. Same measurement: a cell whose `bg` read
//      `red" onmouseover="steal()` produced a `<td>` with a real `onmouseover`
//      attribute — on the canvas, in present, in print and in every thumbnail.
//   3. `canvas.startTextEdit`, which swaps the RESOLVED text for the model's
//      raw html so the author edits `{{page:2}}` rather than "06". It assigned
//      `model.html` unsanitized, so double-clicking a text box was enough.
//
// WHY THE SVG SECTION LOOKS LIKE THIS. The first fix for (1) was a DENYLIST —
// five tags, `on*`, three url attributes — and this rig pinned it with source
// regexes over the call sites. A verifier then measured script still executing
// through the real renderSlide → renderElement → sanitizeSvg path in six ways,
// and every one of them passed all forty checks, because a source regex knows
// the sanitizer is CALLED and nothing about what it PERMITS. So:
//
//   * the policy is now an allowlist, and the allowlist itself is exercised
//     here in node, where it is pure data (SVG_TAGS, svgAttrAllowed,
//     svgHrefAllowed, svgUrlRefsAllowed, sanitizeSvgCss);
//   * the WALK is exercised in a real browser, against the real renderSlide,
//     with payloads that either run or do not. `--headless=new --dump-dom`
//     over a throwaway http server on 127.0.0.1, so a "did this deck phone
//     home" claim is answered by a request log and not by reading the code.
//
// The browser half needs Chrome. Where there is none it says so loudly and
// skips; the node half still fails on every one of the six bypasses, because
// every one of them is a question about the policy.

import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
import fs from 'node:fs'
import http from 'node:http'
import os from 'node:os'
import path from 'node:path'
import {
  renderTableHtml,
  sanitizeHtml,
  sanitizeSvgCss,
  svgAttrAllowed,
  svgHrefAllowed,
  svgUrlRefsAllowed,
  SVG_TAGS,
} from '../slides/src/render.ts'
import { defaultTable, newDoc } from '../slides/src/model.ts'

let failures = 0
let checks = 0
function ok(cond: boolean, msg: string) {
  checks++
  if (!cond) {
    failures++
    console.error(`  ✗ ${msg}`)
  } else {
    console.log(`  ✓ ${msg}`)
  }
}

const repoFile = (rel: string): string => {
  const file = path.resolve(rel)
  if (!fs.existsSync(file)) throw new Error(`run this rig from the repo root — ${rel} not found`)
  return file
}

// --- 1. the svg policy -------------------------------------------------------
//
// Pure data and pure functions, so the decisions can be inspected here while
// the walk that applies them is measured in a browser below. Both directions
// matter equally: a sanitizer that drops `url(#…)` refs renders every
// gradient-filled diagram blank, which is the failure that gets a sanitizer
// deleted again.

console.log('\nsvg tag allowlist')

ok(['svg', 'g', 'path', 'rect', 'circle', 'defs', 'pattern', 'lineargradient', 'radialgradient', 'stop',
  'clippath', 'mask', 'marker', 'filter', 'feturbulence', 'fecolormatrix', 'fegaussianblur',
  'text', 'tspan', 'use', 'image', 'style', 'animate'].every((t) => SVG_TAGS.has(t)),
  'the svg vocabulary the starter deck draws with is permitted')

for (const tag of ['script', 'foreignobject', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'form', 'button', 'input',
  'meta', 'base', 'link', 'template', 'frame', 'frameset', 'audio', 'video', 'math']) {
  ok(!SVG_TAGS.has(tag), `<${tag}> is not permitted`)
}

console.log('\nsvg attribute allowlist')

ok(['id', 'class', 'd', 'viewbox', 'fill', 'stroke-width', 'transform', 'patternunits', 'stddeviation',
  'basefrequency', 'gradienttransform', 'preserveaspectratio', 'stop-color', 'clip-path', 'href',
  'xlink:href', 'attributename'].every(svgAttrAllowed),
  'the attributes real artwork carries are permitted, in the html parser’s casing too')
ok(svgAttrAllowed('viewBox') && svgAttrAllowed('attributeName') && svgAttrAllowed('stdDeviation'),
  'and matching is case-insensitive, which is how the parser’s foreign-content fixups line up')
ok(svgAttrAllowed('aria-label') && svgAttrAllowed('role'), 'aria-* and role are permitted')
ok(svgAttrAllowed('data-part'), 'a diagram’s own data-* CSS hook is permitted')

for (const attr of ['action', 'formaction', 'http-equiv', 'srcdoc', 'onclick', 'onload', 'onerror',
  'onbegin', 'formtarget', 'ping', 'rel', 'src', 'data-el-id', 'data-flip-id']) {
  ok(!svgAttrAllowed(attr), `${attr} is not permitted`)
}
// data-bento is reserved as a PREFIX. The shell's own marks are the full names:
// kernel serializeBody DELETES every [data-bento-transient] node from the clone
// it saves, and save.ts removes [data-bento-preview] unconditionally. Reserving
// the bare string would have left an author element answering either query.
for (const attr of ['data-bento', 'data-bento-transient', 'data-bento-preview', 'data-bento-state']) {
  ok(!svgAttrAllowed(attr), `${attr} is reserved to the shell, not lent to a diagram`)
}

console.log('\nsvg href policy')

ok(svgHrefAllowed('#grad-1'), 'a same-document fragment is kept — gradients and markers paint through url(#…)')
ok(svgHrefAllowed('https://example.com/a.png'), 'https is kept for an <image>')
ok(svgHrefAllowed('HTTP://EXAMPLE.COM/a.png'), 'scheme matching is case-insensitive')
ok(svgHrefAllowed(''), 'a data:image is kept — the browser loads it script-disabled')
ok(svgHrefAllowed('https://example.com/x', 'a'), 'and an <a> may point at the web — the reader clicks it')

ok(!svgHrefAllowed('javascript:alert(1)'), 'javascript: is refused')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)'), 'so is the mixed-case spelling')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('  javascript:alert(1)'), 'leading whitespace does not smuggle it past')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('java\tscript:alert(1)'), 'nor does a tab inside the scheme, which browsers ignore')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('java\u0000script:alert(1)'), 'nor a NUL')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('data:text/html,<svg onload=alert(1)>'), 'a data: that is not an image is refused')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('//evil.example/x.svg'), 'protocol-relative is refused — it is a fetch out of a self-contained file')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('sprites.svg#icon'), 'and so is the plain relative form, for the same reason')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed(''), 'an empty href is not a url')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('https://evil.example/x.svg#s', 'use'),
  'a <use> may not instance a subtree out of another document, however ordinary the scheme')
ok(!svgHrefAllowed('https://evil.example/x.svg#g', 'lineargradient'),
  'nor may a gradient inherit from one')

console.log('\nurl() targets')

ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('url(#bp-dots-i)'), 'fill="url(#…)" survives — it is the whole pattern/gradient idiom')
ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('none') && svgUrlRefsAllowed('#F7A600'), 'a value with no url() at all is untouched')
ok(!svgUrlRefsAllowed('url(https://evil.example/paint.svg#g)'), 'an external paint server is refused')
ok(!svgUrlRefsAllowed("url('//evil.example/x')"), 'quoted and protocol-relative is still refused')
ok(!svgUrlRefsAllowed('url( \u0000https://evil.example/x )'), 'padding and control characters do not hide it')

console.log('\nsvg css')

ok(!/@import/i.test(sanitizeSvgCss('@import url("https://evil.example/t.css");\n.p{fill:red}')),
  '@import is removed — a live fetch out of a self-contained file, and a read receipt for a mailed deck')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('@import "x.css";\n.p{fill:red}').includes('.p{fill:red}'),
  'the rest of the sheet survives: dropping it would cost the artwork')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill:url(#g)}') === '.p{fill:url(#g)}', 'url(#…) inside the sheet is untouched')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{background:url(https://evil.example/b.png)}').includes('background:none'),
  'an external url() becomes none — valid everywhere url() is legal, so the sheet still parses')
ok(!sanitizeSvgCss('@font-face{src:url(https://evil.example/f.woff2)}').includes('evil.example'),
  'and a webfont fetch goes the same way')

// The at-rule half is an ALLOWLIST because cutting `@import` by name did not
// work. Measured against the allowlist-tags build on 2026-08-09, Chrome 141:
// `@\69mport "http://…";` inside an svg <style> FETCHED — the probe server
// logged the request — because a CSS at-keyword is an ident and an ident takes
// escapes. The bare-string form has no `url(` in it either, so the url() rewrite
// above never saw it.
const escaped = sanitizeSvgCss('@\\69mport "https://evil.example/t.css";\n.p{fill:red}')
ok(!/@\\?[\\\w]*import/i.test(escaped) && escaped.includes('@bento-refused'),
  'an at-keyword written with a CSS escape is refused — @\\69mport is @import')
ok(escaped.includes('.p{fill:red}'), 'and the sheet around it still parses')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('@im\\port url(x);').includes('@bento-refused'), 'so is @im\\port')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('@\\49MPORT "x";').includes('@bento-refused'), 'and @\\49MPORT')
ok(!sanitizeSvgCss('@import "https://evil.example/t.css";').includes('evil.example')
  || sanitizeSvgCss('@import "https://evil.example/t.css";').startsWith('@bento-refused'),
  'the bare-STRING import is refused too — the url() rewrite cannot see that one')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('@import "https://evil.example/t.css"\n.p{fill:red}').includes('@bento-refused'),
  'and so is the form with no semicolon, which the old regex required')
ok(!sanitizeSvgCss('@document url-prefix();.p{fill:red}').includes('@document'),
  'an at-rule nobody asked for is refused by default, which is the point of a list')

for (const at of ['@media screen{.p{fill:red}}', '@supports (fill:red){.p{fill:red}}',
  '@keyframes spin{to{transform:rotate(1turn)}}', '@-webkit-keyframes spin{to{opacity:0}}',
  '@font-face{font-family:X;src:local("X")}', '@layer base{.p{fill:red}}']) {
  ok(sanitizeSvgCss(at) === at, `${at.slice(0, at.indexOf(' ') > 0 ? at.indexOf(' ') : at.indexOf('{'))} is kept — motion and layout are what a diagram's sheet is for`)
}
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p::before{content:"a@b"}') === '.p::before{content:"a@b"}',
  'an @ that does not start a token is not an at-rule')

// The escaped-url and image-set families #519's follow-up closed. url( written
// with escapes is decoded and cut by the text pass, so it can be judged here in
// node.
for (const spelling of ['\\75 rl', 'u\\72 l', '\\75\\72\\6c', '\\000075rl']) {
  ok(sanitizeSvgCss(`.p{background-image:${spelling}(https://evil.example/x)}`).includes('background-image:none'),
    `an escaped url() spelling — ${spelling}( — is rewritten to none by the text pass`)
}
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('@supports (color:red){.p{background-image:\\75 rl(https://evil.example/x)}}').includes('none'),
  'and inside @supports it is cut the same way')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill:url(#g)}') === '.p{fill:url(#g)}', 'url(#…) is left exactly alone')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{background-image:url()}').includes('data:image/'),
  'and a data:image url is kept — the ban is on the network, not on pictures')
ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:\\75 rl(https://evil.example/x)', 'style') === false,
  'the style="" gate refuses an escaped url()')
ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('fill:url(#g)', 'style') === true, 'and keeps url(#…) in a style attribute')

// Three more spellings. An IDENTITY escape of a non-hex character: CSS reads
// `u\rl(` as plain `url(` (the backslash just quotes the r), so it is decoded
// like the hex forms and the fetch is cut to none.
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{background-image:u\\rl(https://evil.example/x)}').includes('background-image:none'),
  'an identity-escaped url() spelling — u\\rl( — is decoded and rewritten to none')
ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:u\\rl(https://evil.example/x)', 'style') === false,
  'and the style="" gate refuses it')
// A comment between the letters: CSS ends a token at a comment, so u/**/rl( is
// the ident `u` and then a call to `rl(` — not url( at all (the browser section
// measures that the raw form fetches nothing). `rl` is off the function
// allowlist, so it is refused by name all the same.
{
  const out = sanitizeSvgCss('.p{background-image:u/**/rl(https://evil.example/x)}')
  ok(out.includes('bento-refused(') && !/rl\(https/i.test(out), `a comment-split u/**/rl( is refused by name (${out})`)
}
ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:u/**/rl(https://evil.example/x)', 'style') === false,
  'and the style="" gate refuses it')
// behavior: (old IE's .htc binding) fetches through a url() — which is cut like
// any other, so nothing it names is ever requested; a bare value names nothing.
for (const prop of ['behavior', '-ms-behavior']) {
  ok(sanitizeSvgCss(`.p{${prop}:url(https://evil.example/x.htc)}`) === `.p{${prop}:none}`,
    `${prop}: with an external url() keeps no url — rewritten to none`)
  ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed(`${prop}:url(https://evil.example/x.htc)`, 'style') === false,
    `and the style="" gate refuses ${prop}: with a url()`)
}

// …and the image-set spellings the browser section measures, judged here too:
// written straight after a property colon they used to slip the text pass and
// rely on the CSSOM check alone. The text pass now refuses them on its own, so
// even with no CSSOM (this node run) nothing that can fetch survives.
for (const css of [
  '.p{background-image:image-set("https://evil.example/a" 1x)}',
  '.p{background-image:-webkit-image-set("https://evil.example/b" 1x)}',
  '.p{background-image:image-se\\74 ("https://evil.example/c" 1x)}',
  '.p{cursor:image-set("https://evil.example/d" 1x), auto}',
  '@media all{.p{background-image:image-set("https://evil.example/e" 1x)}}',
]) {
  const out = sanitizeSvgCss(css)
  ok(!/image-set\(/i.test(out) && out.includes('bento-refused('),
    `image-set straight after a colon is refused by the text pass alone: ${css.slice(0, 44)}…`)
}

// A call written straight after a colon is a SELECTOR only if its name is a
// pseudo-class/-element function; any other is a value, judged by the function
// allowlist like a call anywhere else. The text pass used to spare every
// colon-preceded call, leaving `prop:fn(` (no space) to the CSSOM check alone.
// `bento-probe` stands in for any function off the allowlist.
for (const sel of ['.a:not(.b){fill:red}', '.a:nth-child(2n+1):is(.b,.c){fill:red}', '.a:where(.b):has(.c){fill:red}',
  '.a::part(x){fill:red}', '::view-transition-group(x){opacity:1}', '.a:lang(ja):dir(rtl){fill:red}']) {
  ok(sanitizeSvgCss(sel) === sel, `selector functions after a colon are kept: ${sel.slice(0, sel.indexOf('{'))}`)
}
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill:rgb(1,2,3);width:calc(1px + 2px)}') === '.p{fill:rgb(1,2,3);width:calc(1px + 2px)}',
  'allowed value functions straight after a colon are kept')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill:bento-probe(1)}').includes('fill:bento-refused('),
  'an off-list function straight after a property colon is refused by the text pass')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill: bento-probe(1)}').includes('bento-refused('),
  '…as it already was with a space')
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill:not(1)}') === '.p{fill:not(1)}',
  'a pseudo name used as a value is spared (it can fetch nothing, and CSS drops it as invalid)')

// --- 2. the table, end to end ------------------------------------------------
//
// renderTableHtml is a string builder with no DOM in it, so the real output can
// be inspected here. Every value below is what a received deck can contain: the
// model's `string` and `number` are types, not promises.

console.log('\ntable style attribute')

const doc = newDoc()
const hostile = defaultTable()
hostile.rows[1].cells[0] = { html: 'ok', bg: 'red" onmouseover="steal()', color: '#0F0' }
hostile.rows[1].cells[1] = { html: 'two', align: 'right;background:url(https://evil.example/p)' as never }
hostile.rows[1].cells[2] = { html: 'three', color: 'expression(alert(1))' }
hostile.style.cellPadY = '0;position:fixed;inset:0' as never
hostile.style.borderColor = 'x" onclick="steal()'
hostile.style.fontFamily = 'Inter;}</sty' + 'le><b>x'
const out = renderTableHtml(hostile, doc)

/** One cell's opening tag — everything a parser reads before the first ">". */
const cellTag = (r: number, c: number) => {
  const at = out.indexOf(`<td data-r="${r}" data-c="${c}"`)
  return at < 0 ? '' : out.slice(at, out.indexOf('>', at) + 1)
}

ok(!/\son[a-z]+\s*=/i.test(out), 'no event-handler attribute is minted anywhere in the table')
ok(!out.includes('onmouseover="steal()') && !out.includes('onclick="steal()'),
  'the two handler payloads are gone, not merely renamed')
ok(!out.includes('evil.example'), 'an alignment carrying a url() cannot reach the stylesheet')
ok(!/expression\(/i.test(out), 'nor can expression()')
ok(!out.includes('position:fixed'), 'a padding that is not a number cannot add declarations')
ok(cellTag(1, 0).includes('background:transparent'), 'the rejected colour falls back rather than being "cleaned"')
ok(cellTag(1, 1).includes('text-align:left'), 'the rejected alignment falls back to the format default')
ok(out.includes('font-family:inherit'), 'and the rejected font stack falls back too')
// The structural version of the same claim, and the one that fails loudly on
// the old output: a `=` cannot occur inside a validated style value, so three
// of them is exactly data-r, data-c and style. The old cell had four.
ok((cellTag(1, 0).match(/=/g) ?? []).length === 3, 'the cell tag still carries three attributes and no fourth')

console.log('\ntable, unremarkable content')

const plain = defaultTable()
plain.rows[1].cells[0] = { html: 'Revenue', align: 'right', color: '#1E2A3A', bg: 'rgba(30,42,58,0.05)', bold: true }
const good = renderTableHtml(plain, doc)
ok(good.includes('text-align:right'), 'a real alignment survives')
ok(good.includes('color:#1E2A3A'), 'a hex colour survives')
ok(good.includes('background:rgba(30,42,58,0.05)'), 'an rgba() colour survives — the zebra stripe is one')
ok(good.includes(`font-family:${doc.theme.fontFamily.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')}`), "the deck's font stack survives")
ok(good.includes('font-size:18px') && good.includes('padding:11px 16px'), 'so do the numeric style fields')
ok(good.includes('>Revenue<'), 'and the cell text is still there')

const cjk = defaultTable()
cjk.style.fontFamily = 'ヒラギノ角ゴ ProN, sans-serif'
ok(renderTableHtml(cjk, doc).includes('ヒラギノ角ゴ'),
  'a non-ASCII font family survives — a character allowlist would have eaten it')

// --- 3. the raw-html swap ----------------------------------------------------
//
// startTextEdit shows the model's raw html so the author edits the TOKEN and
// not the computed value. Sanitizing there is only free if the two things the
// swap exists for are not markup — and they are not, which is the point.

console.log('\ntokens survive the sanitizer')

const RAW = '{{page:2}} of {{pages}} — $E=mc^2$ and $$\\frac{a}{b}$$'
ok(sanitizeHtml(RAW).includes('{{page:2}}'), 'a zero-padded page field round-trips')
ok(sanitizeHtml(RAW).includes('$E=mc^2$'), 'inline TeX source round-trips')
ok(sanitizeHtml(RAW).includes('$$\\frac{a}{b}$$'), 'display TeX source round-trips')

// --- 4. the walk, in a browser ----------------------------------------------
//
// Everything above is a decision. This is the machinery, and the machinery is
// where the bypasses lived: a policy is only as good as the walk that reaches
// every node. So the payloads below go through the REAL renderSlide into a
// REAL document, and the ones that are supposed to run are given every chance
// to — inserted, clicked, submitted — while a local server logs whether the
// page reached for anything.
//
// The `MUST NOT execute` cases each have a number: they are the six the
// verifier measured against the denylist build (2026-08-09, Chrome 141). 1, 2
// and 3 ran or navigated for real there; 4 fetched; 5 and 6 survived the walk
// intact and were refused only by Blink's own restraint, which is not a
// security boundary.

const CHROME = [
  process.env.BENTO_CHROME,
  '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome',
  '/Applications/Chromium.app/Contents/MacOS/Chromium',
  '/usr/bin/google-chrome',
  '/usr/bin/google-chrome-stable',
  '/usr/bin/chromium',
  '/usr/bin/chromium-browser',
].find((p): p is string => !!p && fs.existsSync(p))
  ?? (spawnSync('which', ['google-chrome']).status === 0 ? 'google-chrome' : undefined)

/**
 * The page that does the work. Bundled by esbuild against the repo's own
 * render.ts, so this is the shipping code path and not a re-implementation of
 * it. Written without backticks or `${` so it can live in a template literal.
 */
const probeSource = (renderPath: string, modelPath: string, pastePath: string) => `
import { renderSlide, sanitizeHtml, sanitizeSvgCss, svgUrlRefsAllowed } from ${JSON.stringify(renderPath)}
import { newDoc } from ${JSON.stringify(modelPath)}
import { clipboardToHtml } from ${JSON.stringify(pastePath)}

const O = location.origin
const pwned: number[] = []
;(window as any).__pwn = (n: number) => { pwned.push(n) }

const results: Array<[string, boolean]> = []
const check = (name: string, pass: boolean) => { results.push([name, pass]) }

/** The shipping path: model → renderSlide → renderElement → sanitizeSvg. */
function draw(markup: string, css?: string): HTMLElement {
  const doc = newDoc()
  const slide = doc.slides[0]
  slide.elements = [{
    id: 'sv1', type: 'svg', x: 0, y: 0, w: 200, h: 200,
    rotation: 0, opacity: 1, markup, ...(css ? { css } : {}),
  } as any]
  const surface = renderSlide(slide, doc)
  document.body.appendChild(surface)
  return surface
}

/** The same path for an embed element's view. */
function drawEmbed(view: string): HTMLElement {
  const doc = newDoc()
  const slide = doc.slides[0]
  slide.elements = [{
    id: 'em1', type: 'embed', x: 0, y: 0, w: 200, h: 200,
    rotation: 0, opacity: 1, app: 'web', view,
  } as any]
  const surface = renderSlide(slide, doc)
  document.body.appendChild(surface)
  return surface
}

if (location.pathname === '/meta.html') {
  // Finding 2, the live half: if the meta survives the walk, Chrome navigates
  // this document to /pwned.html and the dumped DOM is somebody else's page.
  draw('<svg><rect width="10" height="10"/><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=/pwned.html"></svg>')
  draw('<div>x</div><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=/pwned.html">')
} else {
  try {
    const baseBefore = document.baseURI

    // Several payloads below open with a throwaway <div>, and it is not padding:
    // a LEADING <link>, <meta>, <base> or <template> is hoisted into <head> by
    // DOMParser, and the walk only ever sees parsed.body. Tested at the front of
    // the string, every one of them passes against a sanitizer that does nothing
    // — measured on the denylist build, which "passed" three of these until the
    // div went in. One line of body content is what puts them in the walk's way.

    // --- 1. form-driven javascript: (action / formaction / input type=image) ---
    const shot = draw(
      '<form action="javascript:window.__pwn(11)"><button type="submit">go</button></form>' +
      '<form><button type="submit" formaction="javascript:window.__pwn(12)">go</button></form>' +
      '<form action="javascript:window.__pwn(13)">' +
      '<input type="image" src=""></form>'
    )
    check('1 — no <form>, <button> or <input> survives the walk',
      shot.querySelectorAll('form, button, input').length === 0)

    // --- 2. meta refresh (structure here, navigation in the second run) --------
    const metas = draw('<svg><rect width="10" height="10"/><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=/pwned.html"></svg>' +
      '<div>x</div><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=/pwned.html">')
    check('2 — no <meta> survives the walk', metas.querySelectorAll('meta').length === 0)

    // --- 3. base href ----------------------------------------------------------
    const based = draw('<div>x</div><base href="' + O + '/evil/"><svg><rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>')
    check('3 — no <base> survives the walk', based.querySelectorAll('base').length === 0)
    check('3 — relative urls still resolve against this document', document.baseURI === baseBefore)

    // --- 3b. links in text ---------------------------------------------------
    // <a href> is allowed now (issue #421) — with a web URL only, and no
    // other attribute. The three shapes that would matter: a javascript:
    // href, an event handler on an allowed anchor, and a target that would
    // let the page reach this window. All decided at click time in present.ts;
    // none stored.
    const linked = sanitizeHtml('<a href="https://bento.page/" onclick="window.__pwn(31)" target="_top" rel="opener">ok</a>' +
      '<a href="javascript:window.__pwn(32)">bad</a><a href="data:text/html,x">bad2</a><a>plain</a>')
    const box = document.createElement('div'); box.innerHTML = linked
    const anchors = Array.from(box.querySelectorAll('a'))
    check('3b — a web link keeps exactly its href and nothing else',
      anchors.length === 1 && anchors[0].getAttribute('href') === 'https://bento.page/' && anchors[0].attributes.length === 1)
    check('3b — javascript:/data:/attribute-less anchors are unwrapped to their text',
      box.textContent === 'okbadbad2plain' && !linked.includes('javascript:') && !linked.includes('data:'))
    // NOT clicked: a click on the surviving https anchor navigates the probe
    // away and it reports nothing (the same trap the click loop below avoids).
    // The handler cannot survive without the attribute, which is asserted.
    check('3b — no handler attribute survives on the surviving anchor', !linked.includes('onclick') && !linked.includes('__pwn(31)'))

    // --- 3c. nested markup is walked like top-level markup -----------------
    // An allowed tag inside a tag the walk does not know, at any depth, is
    // held to the same rule as one at the top level; a refused anchor's
    // contents likewise. Control: the same child under an allowed parent.
    const nested = sanitizeHtml(
      '<section><b onclick="window.__pwn(41)">a</b></section>' +
      '<foo><span style="position:fixed;inset:0">b</span></foo>' +
      '<div><foo><bar><i onmouseover="window.__pwn(42)">c</i></bar></foo></div>' +
      '<a href="javascript:window.__pwn(43)"><b onclick="window.__pwn(44)">d</b></a>' +
      '<div><b onclick="window.__pwn(45)">e</b></div>')
    const nbox = document.createElement('div'); nbox.innerHTML = nested
    check('3c — nested markup is walked like top-level markup: no attribute survives at any depth',
      !nbox.querySelector('[onclick],[onmouseover],[style]') && nbox.textContent === 'abcde')
    document.body.appendChild(nbox)
    for (const el of Array.from(nbox.querySelectorAll('b, i, span'))) {
      el.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }))
      el.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true }))
    }
    check('3c — and clicking or hovering the lifted elements runs nothing', ![41, 42, 44, 45].some((n) => pwned.includes(n)))

    // --- 3d. the clipboard's html flavour, pasted into a live text box --------
    // Discussion #503: a paste now prefers text/html. It goes through the SAME
    // sanitizer (editor/paste.ts clipboardToHtml), so the hostile corpus above,
    // arriving as a ClipboardEvent into a contentEditable box, comes out with
    // no handler, no script, no style, and nothing runs when the pasted nodes
    // are clicked or hovered. Chrome's copy quirks are handled first: meta and
    // style elements go, and a <b style="font-weight:normal"> (Chrome's way
    // of saying NOT bold inside a bold run) is unwrapped rather than becoming
    // a real <b> once its attribute is stripped.
    const box3d = document.createElement('div')
    box3d.contentEditable = 'true'
    document.body.appendChild(box3d)
    box3d.focus()
    const hostile = '<meta charset="utf-8"><style>b{color:red}</style>' +
      '<b onclick="window.__pwn(51)" style="font-weight:700">bold</b> ' +
      '<b style="font-weight:normal">notbold</b> ' +
      '<i onmouseover="window.__pwn(52)">it</i>' +
      '<script>window.__pwn(53)</scr' + 'ipt>' +
      '<a href="javascript:window.__pwn(54)">j</a><a href="https://bento.page/" target="_top" onclick="window.__pwn(55)">ok</a>' +
      '<section><u onclick="window.__pwn(56)">deep</u></section>' +
      '<img src=x onerror="window.__pwn(57)">' +
      '<span style="position:fixed;inset:0;background:url(' + O + '/beacon.png)">s</span>' +
      // every shape a browser starts LOADING the moment a node joins a live
      // document, each pointing at this rig's own server, with the handlers
      // such a load would fire — the paste helper must let none of them run
      // or fetch, because nothing it touches may ever join the live document
      '<img src="' + O + '/paste-img.gif" onload="window.__pwn(61)">' +
      '<img srcset="' + O + '/paste-srcset.gif 1x" src="' + O + '/paste-src2.gif">' +
      '<picture><source srcset="' + O + '/paste-source.gif"><img src="' + O + '/paste-pic.gif"></picture>' +
      '<video poster="' + O + '/paste-poster.gif" src="' + O + '/paste-video.mp4" onerror="window.__pwn(62)"></video>' +
      '<audio src="' + O + '/paste-audio.mp3" onerror="window.__pwn(63)"></audio>' +
      '<input type="image" src="' + O + '/paste-input.gif" onload="window.__pwn(64)">' +
      '<noscript><img src="' + O + '/paste-noscript.gif"></noscript>' +
      '<iframe src="' + O + '/paste-frame.html"></iframe>' +
      '<object data="' + O + '/paste-object.svg"></object>' +
      '<ul><li>one</li><li>two</li></ul>'
    const dt3d = new DataTransfer()
    dt3d.setData('text/html', hostile)
    dt3d.setData('text/plain', 'plain fallback')
    const inserted = clipboardToHtml(dt3d)
    document.execCommand('insertHTML', false, inserted)
    const kept = box3d.innerHTML
    check('3d — the html flavour is used (bold, italic, underline and the list survive the paste)',
      /<b>bold<\\/b>/.test(kept) && /<i>it<\\/i>/.test(kept) && /<u>deep<\\/u>/.test(kept) && /<ul><li>one<\\/li><li>two<\\/li><\\/ul>/.test(kept))
    check('3d — Chrome\\'s "not bold" <b> is unwrapped, not promoted to bold', !/<b>notbold<\\/b>/.test(kept) && /notbold/.test(kept))
    check('3d — no handler, script, style, img or meta survives the paste',
      !box3d.querySelector('[onclick],[onmouseover],[onerror],[style],script,img,meta,style,link') && !kept.includes('__pwn') && !kept.includes('javascript:'))
    const a3d = Array.from(box3d.querySelectorAll('a'))
    check('3d — only the web link keeps its href, with no other attribute',
      a3d.length === 1 && a3d[0].getAttribute('href') === 'https://bento.page/' && a3d[0].attributes.length === 1)
    for (const el of Array.from(box3d.querySelectorAll('b, i, u, span, li'))) {
      el.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }))
      el.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true }))
    }
    check('3d — clicking or hovering the pasted nodes runs nothing', ![51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57].some((n) => pwned.includes(n)))
    check('3d — no media element of any kind survives the paste', !box3d.querySelector('img,picture,source,video,audio,input,noscript,iframe,object'))
    // the load handlers fire asynchronously: asserted again after the settle
    // at the end (see "3d — the paste started no load" below), and the
    // server's hit list is checked on the node side
    const dtPlain = new DataTransfer()
    dtPlain.setData('text/plain', 'just text')
    check('3d — a clipboard with no html flavour hands over to the plain path', clipboardToHtml(dtPlain) === '')
    const dtEmpty = new DataTransfer()
    dtEmpty.setData('text/html', '<meta charset="utf-8"><style>x{}</style><script>window.__pwn(58)</scr' + 'ipt>')
    check('3d — html that is nothing but junk hands over to the plain path too', clipboardToHtml(dtEmpty) === '' && !pwned.includes(58))

    // --- 4. network out of a self-contained file -------------------------------
    draw('<div>x</div><link rel="stylesheet" href="' + O + '/tracker.css">' +
      '<svg><style>@import url("' + O + '/imported.css");.q{fill:red}</sty' + 'le>' +
      '<rect class="q" width="10" height="10" fill="url(' + O + '/paint.svg#g)"/></svg>')
    draw('<svg><rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>', '@import url("' + O + '/model-css.css");.z{fill:red}')

    // 4, the spellings that beat a regex written around the word "import".
    // Both of these FETCHED against the build that cut @import by name
    // (2026-08-09, Chrome 141): an at-keyword is an ident, and an ident takes
    // escapes; and the string form carries no url( for the url() rewrite to
    // find. This is why CSS at-rules are an allowlist now.
    draw('<svg><style>@\\\\69mport "' + O + '/esc-import.css";.q{fill:red}</sty' + 'le>' +
      '<rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>')
    draw('<svg><style>@import "' + O + '/str-import.css";.q{fill:red}</sty' + 'le>' +
      '<rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>')
    // no semicolon where the parser wants one, and a <style> in HTML context
    // rather than inside the svg — same sheet, same policy, different route in.
    draw('<svg><style>@import "' + O + '/nosemi-import.css"\\n.q{fill:red}</sty' + 'le></svg>')
    draw('<div>x</div><style>@\\\\69mport "' + O + '/html-style.css";</style>')

    // and the sheet a real diagram writes still animates
    const sheet = draw('<svg><style>@keyframes bp-spin{to{transform:rotate(1turn)}}' +
      '@media (min-width:1px){.q{fill:url(#g)}}</sty' + 'le>' +
      '<rect class="q" width="10" height="10"/></svg>')
    check('a diagram keeps @keyframes and @media — the allowlist is not a ban on CSS',
      (sheet.querySelector('style')?.textContent ?? '').includes('@keyframes bp-spin') &&
      (sheet.querySelector('style')?.textContent ?? '').includes('@media (min-width:1px)'))

    // --- 4c. the css egress families the escaped-url / image-set fix closed ----
    //
    // sanitizeSvgCss is a two-layer filter: a text pass, then — where there is a
    // browser — the browser's own parse (cssomFindsFetch) as the last word. Each
    // layer stops these families on its own now: section 1 pins the text pass in
    // node (including image-set written straight after a property colon, which
    // the text pass used to spare and leave to the CSSOM check alone), and this
    // block proves the end result in a real engine — sanitizeSvgCss run HERE,
    // its output injected into a live <style>, while a local server logs
    // whether anything reached out. A regression in either layer alone is caught
    // by the other half of the rig.
    //
    // Every negative below is non-vacuous: the raw positive controls FETCH in
    // this engine (url(), and image-set in both spellings — measured), so a zero
    // on a sanitised row means the sanitiser stopped it, not that the engine
    // never asks. A backslash is String.fromCharCode(92), never written
    // literally — this code is inside probeSource's template literal, where a
    // lone backslash collapses before the probe runs (see the @import rows).
    const BS = String.fromCharCode(92)
    const eBox = (seg: string): HTMLElement => {
      const b = document.createElement('div'); b.id = 'eg-' + seg
      b.style.width = '40px'; b.style.height = '40px'; b.style.display = 'block'
      document.body.appendChild(b); return b
    }
    const eForce = (b: HTMLElement) => { void b.offsetHeight; b.getBoundingClientRect() }
    // sanitiser OUTPUT injected live — exactly the text render.ts hands the
    // document for an svg <style> or the model's css field. BOX → the box's id.
    const egress = (seg: string, sheet: string) => {
      const b = eBox(seg); const s = document.createElement('style')
      s.textContent = sanitizeSvgCss(sheet.split('BOX').join('#' + b.id))
      document.head.appendChild(s); eForce(b)
    }
    // positive control: the SAME shape, NOT sanitised — it must reach the server.
    const egressRaw = (seg: string, sheet: string) => {
      const b = eBox(seg); const s = document.createElement('style')
      s.textContent = sheet.split('BOX').join('#' + b.id)
      document.head.appendChild(s); eForce(b)
    }
    egressRaw('pos-url', 'BOX{background-image:url("' + O + '/eg-pos-url")}')
    egressRaw('pos-imgset', 'BOX{background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-pos-imgset" 1x)}')
    egress('neg', 'BOX{background-image:url("' + O + '/eg-neg")}')
    egress('esc-u', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/eg-esc-u")}')
    egress('esc-r', 'BOX{background-image:u' + BS + '72 l("' + O + '/eg-esc-r")}')
    egress('esc-all', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + '75' + BS + '72' + BS + '6c("' + O + '/eg-esc-all")}')
    egress('esc-hex', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + '000075rl("' + O + '/eg-esc-hex")}')
    egress('imgset', 'BOX{background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-imgset" 1x)}')
    egress('wk-imgset', 'BOX{background-image:-webkit-image-set("' + O + '/eg-wk-imgset" 1x)}')
    egress('imgset-escfn', 'BOX{background-image:image-se' + BS + '74 ("' + O + '/eg-imgset-escfn" 1x)}')
    egress('cursor', 'BOX{cursor:image-set("' + O + '/eg-cursor" 1x), auto}')
    egress('at-media', '@media all{BOX{background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-at-media" 1x)}}')
    egress('at-supports', '@supports (color:red){BOX{background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/eg-at-supports")}}')
    // regression pins (security §36a): identity escapes, a comment-split name,
    // behavior:, an escaped @import. Each spelling is ALSO injected raw, so the
    // zero on its sanitised row is a boundary: a refused function leaves the
    // address text in place, so only the request log can tell neutralised from
    // fetching. Where the raw spelling itself fetches nothing in this engine
    // (the comment split, behavior:), the hit list says so and that row's
    // control is the plain url() above.
    const pin = (seg: string, sheet: string) => { egressRaw('raw-' + seg, sheet.split('SEG').join('raw-' + seg)); egress(seg, sheet.split('SEG').join(seg)) }
    pin('id-esc', 'BOX{background-image:u' + BS + 'rl("' + O + '/eg-SEG")}')
    pin('id-esc-all', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + 'u' + BS + 'r' + BS + 'l("' + O + '/eg-SEG")}')
    pin('id-esc-upper', 'BOX{background-image:U' + BS + 'RL("' + O + '/eg-SEG")}')
    pin('comment-split', 'BOX{background-image:u/**/rl("' + O + '/eg-SEG")}')
    pin('behavior', 'BOX{behavior:url("' + O + '/eg-SEG")}')
    pin('imgset-id-esc', 'BOX{background-image:image-se' + BS + 't("' + O + '/eg-SEG" 1x)}')
    pin('import-id-esc', '@im' + BS + 'port "' + O + '/eg-SEG";BOX{fill:red}')
    // the allowed shapes still draw: url(#…) and a data:image survive the filter.
    check('css-egress — url(#grad) survives the css filter untouched',
      sanitizeSvgCss('#x{fill:url(#grad)}').indexOf('url(#grad)') >= 0)
    check('css-egress — a data:image background survives the css filter',
      sanitizeSvgCss('#x{background-image:url()}').indexOf('data:image/') >= 0)
    // style="" is a declaration block: svgUrlRefsAllowed with the element.style
    // oracle. In a browser the oracle re-parses and REFUSES image-set and the
    // escaped url; the harmless declarations are kept.
    check('css-egress — style="" image-set is refused',
      svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:image-set("' + O + '/x" 1x)', 'style') === false)
    check('css-egress — style="" an escaped url is refused',
      svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/x")', 'style') === false)
    check('css-egress — style="" fill:red is kept', svgUrlRefsAllowed('fill:red', 'style') === true)
    check('css-egress — style="" url(#grad) is kept', svgUrlRefsAllowed('fill:url(#g)', 'style') === true)
    // belt: if the gate ever WRONGLY allowed one, WRITING it would fetch. The raw
    // control proves a style="" background reaches the server in this engine.
    {
      const raw = eBox('attr-pos'); raw.style.cssText = 'background-image:url("' + O + '/eg-attr-pos")'; eForce(raw)
      const gated = (seg: string, decl: string) => {
        const b = eBox(seg); if (svgUrlRefsAllowed(decl, 'style')) b.style.cssText = decl; eForce(b)
      }
      gated('attr-imgset', 'background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-attr-imgset" 1x)')
      gated('attr-esc', 'background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/eg-attr-esc")')
      gated('attr-id-esc', 'background-image:u' + BS + 'rl("' + O + '/eg-attr-id-esc")')
      gated('attr-comment-split', 'background-image:u/**/rl("' + O + '/eg-attr-comment-split")')
      gated('attr-behavior', 'behavior:url("' + O + '/eg-attr-behavior")')
    }
    // markup spellings: an escaped url in a fill attribute and in the svg <style>.
    // draw() is the full render path; the allowed paint-server and <image>
    // fetches asserted elsewhere are the matching positive controls.
    draw('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10">' +
      '<rect width="10" height="10" fill="' + BS + '75 rl(' + O + '/eg-m-fill)"/></svg>')
    draw('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10"><sty' + 'le>' +
      'rect{fill:' + BS + '75 rl(' + O + '/eg-m-style)}</sty' + 'le><rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>')

    // --- 5. SMIL retargeting ---------------------------------------------------
    const smil = draw('<svg><rect id="sm" width="10" height="10">' +
      '<set attributeName="onclick" to="window.__pwn(51)"/>' +
      '<animate attributeName="href" to="javascript:window.__pwn(52)" dur="1s" fill="freeze"/>' +
      '</rect></svg>')
    check('5 — an animation that would write an on* handler is gone',
      smil.querySelectorAll('set, animate').length === 0)
    check('5 — and nothing in the subtree carries an onclick',
      !Array.from(smil.querySelectorAll('*')).some((e) => e.hasAttribute('onclick')))

    // --- 6. template ------------------------------------------------------------
    const tpl = draw('<div>x</div><template><img src="x" onerror="window.__pwn(61)"><svg onload="window.__pwn(62)"></svg></template>')
    check('6 — no <template> survives, so nothing hides in .content',
      tpl.querySelectorAll('template').length === 0 && !tpl.innerHTML.includes('__pwn'))

    // --- 7. the xlink spelling of everything above -----------------------------
    //
    // href and xlink:href are the same attribute to a browser, and a policy
    // that only knows the short name is a policy with a second door in it.
    const xl = draw('<svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">' +
      '<a id="xa" xlink:href="javascript:window.__pwn(81)"><rect width="10" height="10"/></a>' +
      '<image id="xi" xlink:href="' + O + '/xlink-remote.png" width="10" height="10"/>' +
      '<use id="xu" xlink:href="' + O + '/xlink.svg#s"/>' +
      '<rect id="xr" width="10" height="10"><animate attributeName="xlink:href" to="javascript:window.__pwn(82)" dur="1s"/></rect>' +
      '</svg>')
    check('7 — a javascript: xlink:href loses its href just as a plain one does',
      !!xl.querySelector('#xa') && !xl.querySelector('#xa')!.hasAttribute('xlink:href'))
    check('7 — a <use> reaching out of the document by xlink:href is dropped whole',
      !xl.querySelector('#xu'))
    check('7 — an animation retargeting xlink:href is gone',
      xl.querySelectorAll('animate').length === 0)

    // --- 8. the html integration points --------------------------------------
    //
    // <desc>, <title> and <foreignObject> are where the parser LEAVES foreign
    // content and resumes html rules, so a <script> written inside one is a real
    // html script element and not svg text. The walk has to recurse into them.
    const desc = draw('<svg><desc><scr' + 'ipt>window.__pwn(91)</scr' + 'ipt>' +
      '<img src="' + O + '/desc-img.png" onerror="window.__pwn(92)"></desc>' +
      '<title><img src="' + O + '/title-img.png"></title><rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>')
    check('8 — nothing survives inside <desc> or <title>, where html parsing resumes',
      desc.querySelectorAll('script, img').length === 0 && !!desc.querySelector('rect'))

    // --- 9. an svg carried as a data: image ------------------------------------
    //
    // data:image/ is allowed on an <image> href on purpose. An svg loaded THAT
    // way is script-disabled by the browser, and this is the check that says so
    // rather than assuming it.
    draw('<svg><image width="99" height="99" href="data:image/svg+xml,' +
      encodeURIComponent('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="99" height="99" onload="top.__pwn(101)">' +
        '<rect width="9" height="9" fill="red"/></svg>') + '"/></svg>')

    // --- 0. the case round one did fix, still fixed ----------------------------
    const classic = draw('<svg onload="window.__pwn(1)"><rect id="clicky" width="10" height="10" onclick="window.__pwn(2)"/>' +
      '<scr' + 'ipt>window.__pwn(3)</scr' + 'ipt>' +
      '<foreignObject><img src="x" onerror="window.__pwn(4)"></foreignObject></svg>')
    check('0 — script and foreignObject are gone and no on* handler is left',
      classic.querySelectorAll('script, foreignObject').length === 0 &&
      !Array.from(classic.querySelectorAll('*')).some((e) =>
        Array.from(e.attributes).some((a) => a.name.toLowerCase().startsWith('on'))))

    // --- refs -------------------------------------------------------------------
    const refs = draw('<svg><a id="ok" href="https://example.com/x">t</a>' +
      '<a id="bad" href="javascript:window.__pwn(71)">t</a>' +
      '<image id="img" href="' + O + '/remote.png" width="10" height="10"/>' +
      '<image id="jsimg" href="javascript:window.__pwn(72)" width="10" height="10"/>' +
      '<use id="localuse" href="#ok"/><use id="remoteuse" href="' + O + '/x.svg#s"/></svg>')
    check('an <a> to the web is kept', refs.querySelector('#ok')!.getAttribute('href') === 'https://example.com/x')
    check('a javascript: <a> loses its href but keeps its place in the layout',
      !!refs.querySelector('#bad') && !refs.querySelector('#bad')!.hasAttribute('href'))
    check('an http <image> is kept', !!refs.querySelector('#img'))
    check('a javascript: <image> loses its href', !refs.querySelector('#jsimg')!.hasAttribute('href'))
    check('a same-document <use> is kept', !!refs.querySelector('#localuse'))
    check('a <use> pointing out of this document is dropped whole', !refs.querySelector('#remoteuse'))

    // --- the artwork that has to keep drawing ----------------------------------
    const art = draw('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 1280 720" preserveAspectRatio="none">' +
      '<defs><pattern id="bp-dots-i" width="28" height="28" patternUnits="userSpaceOnUse">' +
      '<circle cx="1.5" cy="1.5" r="1.4" fill="#FFFFFF" opacity="0.07"/></pattern>' +
      '<radialGradient id="bp-ga-am"><stop offset="0" stop-color="#FFEED6" stop-opacity="0.15"/></radialGradient>' +
      '<filter id="bp-grain"><feTurbulence type="fractalNoise" baseFrequency="0.9" numOctaves="2" stitchTiles="stitch"/>' +
      '<feColorMatrix type="matrix" values="0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0.045 0"/></filter></defs>' +
      '<sty' + 'le>.dot{fill:url(#bp-ga-am)}</sty' + 'le>' +
      '<rect width="1280" height="720" fill="url(#bp-dots-i)" filter="url(#bp-grain)"/></svg>')
    check('a pattern keeps its id — url(#…) resolves document-globally',
      !!art.querySelector('pattern#bp-dots-i') && !!art.querySelector('radialGradient#bp-ga-am'))
    check('and the rect still points at it', art.querySelector('rect')!.getAttribute('fill') === 'url(#bp-dots-i)')
    check('feTurbulence keeps baseFrequency and feColorMatrix keeps values',
      art.querySelector('feTurbulence')!.getAttribute('baseFrequency') === '0.9' &&
      !!art.querySelector('feColorMatrix')!.getAttribute('values'))
    check('viewBox and preserveAspectRatio survive the parser round-trip',
      art.querySelector('svg')!.getAttribute('viewBox') === '0 0 1280 720')
    // The <style> INSIDE the markup is kept because removing it breaks real
    // decks, and its content is filtered by sanitizeSvgCss. This check asserts
    // only that the RULES SURVIVE — deliberately NOT whether they are scoped,
    // because that is changing underneath it: on main the markup sheet is
    // unscoped (scopeCss's one call site takes el.css, not the markup), and
    // PR #402 scopes it. Claiming either state here would make this rig a
    // hostage to that PR's merge order.
    //
    // Hence the whitespace squash, which is the whole reason this is not a plain
    // includes(): scopeCss emits the scope, a space, the selector, then a space
    // before the brace — so scoping rewrites '.dot{fill:...}' as
    // '[data-el-id="..."] .dot {fill:...}' and a literal substring test fails on
    // ONE INSERTED SPACE while the rules are perfectly intact. Measured both
    // ways. The two checks below cover the scoping question properly, on el.css,
    // which is the field scopeCss actually guards.
    //
    // NOTE, and this cost a build: everything here is inside probeSource's
    // template literal. A backtick or a dollar-brace in a COMMENT is still code
    // to the parser and ends the template early.
    // NOTE the DOUBLED backslash: this line lives inside probeSource's template
    // literal, where a single backslash-s is an escape that collapses to a bare
    // 's' — the regex became /s+/g and stripped the letter s out of the markup
    // (the element id 'sv1' came back as 'v1', which is how it was caught).
    const squash = (css) => css.replace(/\\s+/g, '')
    check('the svg <style> inside the markup is kept, with its rules intact',
      squash(art.querySelector('style')?.textContent ?? '').includes(squash('.dot{fill:url(#bp-ga-am)}')))

    const scoped = draw('<svg viewBox="0 0 20 20"><rect id="sc" width="10" height="10"/></svg>',
      '.z{fill:red}@keyframes k{to{opacity:0}}')
    const elSheet = scoped.querySelector('svg > style')?.textContent ?? ''
    check('el.css IS scoped to the element — this is what keeps one diagram out of another',
      elSheet.includes('[data-el-id="sv1"] .z') && elSheet.trim().indexOf('.z') !== 0)
    check('and @keyframes stays top-level — a prefixed keyframes name resolves to nothing',
      elSheet.includes('@keyframes k') && !elSheet.includes('[data-el-id="sv1"] @keyframes'))

    const sloppy = draw('<svg viewBox="0 0 20 20"><rect width="10" height="10"><circle cx="5" cy="5" r="2"/></svg>')
    check('an unclosed tag still draws — text/html, not the fatal xml parser',
      !!sloppy.querySelector('svg') && !!sloppy.querySelector('circle'))

    // The embed element's view is the same kind of author markup
    // and goes through the same walk. Its whole purpose is to carry markup
    // someone else produced, which makes it the most attractive place in the
    // format to hide a script. (No backticks in this comment: it lives inside
    // probeSource's template literal.)
    const embedded = drawEmbed('<svg viewBox="0 0 20 20"><rect id="ev" width="10" height="10"/>' +
      '<scr' + 'ipt>window.__pwn(91)</scr' + 'ipt><rect onload="window.__pwn(92)" width="1" height="1"/>' +
      '<image href="' + O + '/embed-view.png" width="1" height="1"/></svg>')
    check('9 — an embed view drops its <script> and on* handler and keeps the picture',
      embedded.querySelectorAll('script').length === 0 && !embedded.querySelector('[onload]') &&
      !!embedded.querySelector('.bento-el-embed svg rect#ev'))

    // Give every payload its chance: insertion alone is not the only trigger.
    // Measured on the pre-sanitizer build, where the difference showed: a
    // form-driven javascript: needs the submit button CLICKED, and an
    // onclick on a rect needs a click dispatched at the rect. Only the
    // javascript: anchors are clicked — clicking an ordinary one navigates the
    // probe away and it reports nothing at all.
    for (const el of Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('button, input'))) (el as HTMLElement).click()
    for (const f of Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('form'))) {
      try { (f as HTMLFormElement).requestSubmit() } catch { /* no submitter */ }
    }
    for (const a of Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('a'))) {
      const href = (a.getAttribute('href') ?? a.getAttribute('xlink:href') ?? '').toLowerCase()
      if (href.startsWith('javascript:')) (a as HTMLElement).click()
    }
    // Never inside an <a>: a click that bubbles to the ALLOWED
    // https://example.com anchor navigates, and a probe that navigated reports
    // nothing at all (measured — the dump held the rendered slides and no
    // results block).
    for (const el of Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('#clicky, [onclick], [onmouseover]'))) {
      if (!el.closest('a')) el.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }))
    }

  } catch (err) {
    // A probe that dies half way through would otherwise report only the
    // checks it reached, all of them passing.
    check('the probe ran to the end (it threw: ' + String(err) + ')', false)
  }

  setTimeout(async () => {
    // a fence: one request of our own, answered in order after any load the
    // paste might have started, so the node side's hit list is complete
    try { await fetch(O + '/paste-fence', { cache: 'no-store' }) } catch {}
    check('3d — after the settle, no load or error handler from the paste ran', ![61, 62, 63, 64].some((n) => pwned.includes(n)))
    check('nothing executed: ' + (pwned.length ? pwned.join(',') : 'clean'), pwned.length === 0)
    const pre = document.createElement('pre')
    pre.id = 'bento-results'
    // btoa is Latin-1 only and every check name here has an em dash in it:
    // encode to utf-8 bytes first or this throws and the rig reports nothing.
    const utf8 = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(results))
    pre.textContent = 'BENTO-RESULTS:' + btoa(String.fromCharCode(...utf8)) + ':END'
    document.body.appendChild(pre)
  }, 400)
}
`

async function runBrowserSection(chrome: string) {
  const tmp = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'bento-sanitize-'))
  const entry = path.join(tmp, 'probe.ts')
  fs.writeFileSync(entry, probeSource(repoFile('slides/src/render.ts'), repoFile('slides/src/model.ts'), repoFile('slides/src/editor/paste.ts')))
  execFileSync(repoFile('slides/node_modules/.bin/esbuild'), [
    entry, '--bundle', '--format=esm', '--outfile=' + path.join(tmp, 'probe.js'),
  ], { stdio: 'pipe' })
  const bundle = fs.readFileSync(path.join(tmp, 'probe.js'), 'utf8')

  // Written by concatenation: never a literal script-close in a source file
  // (AGENTS.md #1). This one is not spliced into a deck, but the habit is the
  // rule.
  // The trailing <img> is a LOAD GATE, and it is load-bearing: the new headless
  // ignores --virtual-time-budget, so `--dump-dom` fires at the load event and
  // a probe that reports from a timer reports nothing at all (measured — the
  // dump held every rendered slide and no results block). The server answers
  // /slow.gif late, load waits for it, and the probe's timer lands first.
  const page = (marker: string) =>
    '<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>bento sanitize probe</title>' +
    '<body>' + marker +
    '<scr' + 'ipt type="module" src="/probe.js"></scr' + 'ipt>' +
    '<img src="/slow.gif" width="1" height="1" alt=""></body>'

  const hits: string[] = []
  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
    const url = (req.url ?? '/').split('?')[0]
    hits.push(url)
    if (url === '/probe.js') { res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/javascript' }); res.end(bundle); return }
    if (url === '/probe.html') { res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }); res.end(page('BENTO-PROBE')); return }
    if (url === '/meta.html') { res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }); res.end(page('BENTO-STAYED')); return }
    if (url === '/pwned.html') { res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }); res.end('<!doctype html>BENTO-NAVIGATED'); return }
    if (url.endsWith('.css')) { res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/css' }); res.end('.tracked{fill:red}'); return }
    const gif = () => {
      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'image/gif' })
      res.end(Buffer.from('R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP///ywAAAAAAQABAAACAUwAOw==', 'base64'))
    }
    if (url === '/slow.gif') { setTimeout(gif, 1500); return }
    gif()
  })
  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve))
  const port = (server.address() as { port: number }).port

  // spawn, never spawnSync: the server above lives in THIS process, so a
  // synchronous child blocks the event loop that has to answer Chrome's
  // request for /probe.js — measured as a hang, not as a failure.
  const load = (route: string) => new Promise<string>((resolve) => {
    const child = spawn(chrome, [
      '--headless=new', '--disable-gpu', '--no-sandbox', '--no-first-run',
      '--no-default-browser-check', '--disable-background-networking',
      '--disable-component-update', '--disable-sync', '--disable-default-apps',
      '--user-data-dir=' + path.join(tmp, 'profile'),
      '--virtual-time-budget=4000', '--dump-dom',
      `http://127.0.0.1:${port}${route}`,
    ], { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] })
    let dom = ''
    child.stdout.on('data', (b: Buffer) => { dom += b.toString('utf8') })
    const done = setTimeout(() => child.kill('SIGKILL'), 45_000)
    child.on('close', () => { clearTimeout(done); resolve(dom) })
  })

  try {
    const dom = await load('/probe.html')
    const blob = /BENTO-RESULTS:([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+):END/.exec(dom)
    if (!blob) {
      const dumped = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'bento-sanitize-dump.html')
      fs.writeFileSync(dumped, dom)
      ok(false, `the browser probe reported results (it did not — dumped DOM in ${dumped})`)
    } else {
      for (const [name, pass] of JSON.parse(Buffer.from(blob[1], 'base64').toString('utf8')) as Array<[string, boolean]>) {
        ok(pass, name)
      }
    }

    // Finding 2's live half. A page that navigated is somebody else's page.
    const metaDom = await load('/meta.html')
    ok(!metaDom.includes('BENTO-NAVIGATED') && metaDom.includes('BENTO-STAYED'),
      '2 — a meta refresh in a deck does not navigate the reader off the document')

    ok(!hits.includes('/tracker.css'), '4 — a <link rel=stylesheet> in a deck never fetches')
    ok(!hits.includes('/imported.css'), '4 — nor does @import inside the svg <style>')
    ok(!hits.includes('/model-css.css'), "4 — nor @import in the model's own css field")
    ok(!hits.includes('/paint.svg'), '4 — nor an external paint server in fill="url(…)"')
    ok(!hits.includes('/esc-import.css'), '4 — nor @\\69mport, which fetched until at-rules became an allowlist')
    ok(!hits.includes('/str-import.css'), '4 — nor the bare-string @import, which carries no url() to rewrite')
    ok(!hits.includes('/nosemi-import.css'), '4 — nor the form with no semicolon')
    ok(!hits.includes('/html-style.css'), '4 — nor a <style> that reached the body in html context')
    ok(!hits.includes('/desc-img.png') && !hits.includes('/title-img.png'),
      '8 — nothing inside <desc> or <title> fetches either')
    ok(!hits.includes('/xlink.svg'), '7 — nor an xlink:href <use> pointing out of the document')
    ok(hits.includes('/paste-fence'), '3d — the fence request arrived (the hit list is complete)')
    const pasteLoads = hits.filter((h) => h.startsWith('/paste-') && h !== '/paste-fence')
    ok(pasteLoads.length === 0, '3d — the paste helper started no load: img, srcset, picture/source, video poster/src, audio, input type=image, noscript img, iframe, object' + (pasteLoads.length ? ' — FETCHED ' + pasteLoads.join(' ') : ''))
    ok(hits.includes('/remote.png'), 'an <image href="http(s)://…"> still loads — that one is allowed on purpose')
    ok(hits.includes('/xlink-remote.png'), 'and so does the xlink:href spelling of it — the policy is not a ban on pictures')
    ok(hits.includes('/embed-view.png'), '9 — an embed view is held to the svg policy, no stricter: its <image> loads too')

    // 4c — the escaped-url / image-set css egress families (the #519 follow-up).
    // Positive controls first: they prove the request path is live, so the zeros
    // that follow are a boundary and not an artefact of the engine.
    ok(hits.includes('/eg-pos-url'), '4c — a raw url() background fetches here (the css request path is live)')
    ok(hits.includes('/eg-pos-imgset'), '4c — a raw image-set() background fetches here too (positive control)')
    ok(hits.includes('/eg-attr-pos'), '4c — a raw style="" url() background fetches here (style-attr path is live)')
    const cssEgress: Array<[string, string]> = [
      ['neg', 'a plain external url()'],
      ['esc-u', 'an escaped u — the \\75 rl( spelling of url('],
      ['esc-r', 'an escaped r — the u\\72 l( spelling'],
      ['esc-all', 'a fully escaped \\75\\72\\6c( spelling'],
      ['esc-hex', 'the six-digit \\000075rl( spelling'],
      ['imgset', 'image-set() straight after the colon (the CSSOM-pass case)'],
      ['wk-imgset', '-webkit-image-set()'],
      ['imgset-escfn', "image-set() with the function name itself escaped"],
      ['cursor', 'image-set() carried on cursor'],
      ['at-media', 'image-set() nested in @media'],
      ['at-supports', 'an escaped url() nested in @supports'],
      ['attr-imgset', 'image-set() in a style="" attribute'],
      ['attr-esc', 'an escaped url() in a style="" attribute'],
      ['m-fill', 'an escaped url() in a fill="" attribute'],
      ['m-style', 'an escaped url() in the svg <style>'],
    ]
    for (const [seg, what] of cssEgress) {
      ok(!hits.includes('/eg-' + seg), '4c — sanitised, no fetch: ' + what)
    }
    // the regression pins: the raw spelling first (does THIS engine fetch it?),
    // then the sanitised one, which must not. `fetches` records what was
    // measured for the raw form; a spelling that fetches raw makes its own zero
    // meaningful, one that does not leans on the plain-url() control above.
    const pins: Array<[string, string, boolean]> = [
      ['id-esc', 'an identity-escaped u\\rl( (CSS reads plain url()', true],
      ['id-esc-all', 'a fully identity-escaped \\u\\r\\l(', true],
      ['id-esc-upper', 'an upper-case U\\RL(', true],
      ['comment-split', 'a comment-split u/**/rl( (two tokens, not url()', false],
      ['behavior', 'behavior:url() (an .htc binding; Chrome has no behavior)', false],
      ['imgset-id-esc', 'image-set() with an identity escape in its name', true],
      ['import-id-esc', '@im\\port (an identity-escaped @import)', true],
    ]
    for (const [seg, what, fetches] of pins) {
      const raw = hits.includes('/eg-raw-' + seg)
      ok(raw === fetches, `4c pin — raw, unsanitised, ${fetches ? 'DOES fetch' : 'fetches nothing in this engine'}: ${what}`)
      ok(!hits.includes('/eg-' + seg), '4c pin — sanitised, no fetch: ' + what)
    }
    for (const seg of ['attr-id-esc', 'attr-comment-split', 'attr-behavior']) {
      ok(!hits.includes('/eg-' + seg), '4c pin — style="" gate, no fetch: ' + seg.slice(5))
    }
  } finally {
    server.close()
    fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true })
  }
}

console.log('\nthe walk, in a browser')
if (!CHROME) {
  console.log('  ⚠ SKIPPED — no Chrome found. Set BENTO_CHROME to a binary to run this section;')
  console.log('    it is the only half that can prove a payload does not RUN.')
} else {
  await runBrowserSection(CHROME)
}

console.log(`\n${checks - failures}/${checks} checks passed`)
if (failures) process.exit(1)