Bento, the office suite that fits in a file
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docs: invite = keypair delegation chain (secret scheme would let the relay forge)
nyblnet42b921fe7c06
diff --git a/docs/collab-design.md b/docs/collab-design.mdindex 562c7fa8..d96bde09 100644--- a/docs/collab-design.md+++ b/docs/collab-design.md@@ -394,10 +394,16 @@ owner becomes the root of trust.- **Certificates**: the owner signs small statements — `{memberPub, role,expiry}` — "this key may write / comment". Certs are data, not identity: nonames, no PII in the clear.-- **Invites**: a shared copy carries a PRE-SIGNED one-time invite token (owner- signs the hash of an invite secret embedded in that copy). First open: the- joiner's device mints its own keypair and redeems the token → certified at- the copy's role, with the owner OFFLINE. The file stays the invitation.+- **Invites — delegation chain, not secrets**: sharing a copy mints an INVITE+ KEYPAIR; the owner signs `{invPub, role, expiry}` and the copy carries the+ invite's PRIVATE half + that signature. First open: the joiner's device mints+ its own keypair and signs it with the invite key — the chain+ `owner → invite → member` is pure signatures, verifiable by the relay while+ the owner is OFFLINE. (A secret-redemption scheme would hand the secret to+ the relay, letting it certify its own key — the delegation chain never+ exposes private material, so the blind relay still cannot forge writes.)+ The file stays the invitation; revoking the invite key cuts off every copy+ descended from it, revoking a member key cuts off one device.- **Relay change**: verify each mutating frame's signature against ANYcurrently-certified key (cert chain: owner key → member cert → frame sig)instead of the single pinned writer key. Still blind: it sees pubkeys, role