Bento, the office suite that fits in a file
TypeScript mit-licenseofficeoffice-365office-suiteoffice-toolsoffice365open-sourcepowerpointself-hostedsingle-page-appslidesslideshareslideshowslideshow-galleryslideshow-makerslideshows
Docs: record the blob-offload decision and changelog entry
nyblnet9c4b3e11ee38
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex 8a8edc89..bf974c68 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -11,6 +11,22 @@ pre-1.0.## [Unreleased]+- **Photos and video now work in live collaboration.** This finishes what+ 1.0.9 could only warn you about: previously anything past about half a+ megabyte was simply too big to send to your collaborators. Now a large image+ is uploaded once, encrypted, and everyone else pulls it down in the+ background — so you can drop a full-resolution photo into a shared deck the+ same way you would in a deck you're editing alone. A 3MB photo used to+ produce a message the relay refused outright; it now travels as a reference+ of about a hundred bytes.++ As always the server never sees the picture: it is encrypted before it+ leaves your machine, and the relay stores bytes it cannot read. Collaborators+ on the same computer don't involve the relay at all. Small images are still+ carried inside the document exactly as before, so nothing changes for+ ordinary decks, and a self-hosted relay without blob storage keeps working —+ it just falls back to the old inline-only behaviour.+## [1.0.9] — 2026-07-25- **Fix: large text could silently kill live collaboration.** A text box ofdiff --git a/docs/DECISIONS.md b/docs/DECISIONS.mdindex ce061870..440f20e2 100644--- a/docs/DECISIONS.md+++ b/docs/DECISIONS.md@@ -181,3 +181,31 @@ One HTML file = document + viewer + editor, working offline from file://.The splice contract on `#bento-doc` is frozen forever (shipped updatersdepend on it). Everything else is negotiable; this isn't. Seedocs/PLATFORM.md §1–2.++## 2026-07-25 — Large assets travel out-of-band; the relay stays blind++Assets over 64KB (`BLOB_INLINE_MAX`) no longer ride inside CRDT ops. They are+encrypted client-side, uploaded once to the relay's R2 bucket, and referenced+from the document by a content-addressed key; peers fetch and decrypt on+receipt. This was forced by measurement, not preference: Durable Object storage+values cap at ~2MB, so the previous inline path produced frames the relay+accepted-then-dropped, and the client re-sent forever. Details and threat model+in `docs/blob-offload.md`.++Three properties are load-bearing and must not be traded away:++- **The relay cannot read a blob.** It pipes ciphertext without buffering. The+ key is `HMAC(roomKey, sha256(plaintext))`, so identical bytes dedupe *within*+ a room and are unlinkable *across* rooms — a plain content hash would have+ let the relay confirm two rooms hold the same file.+- **R2 is optional.** Absent binding = `/b/` answers 501, clients inline small+ assets and same-origin tabs still resolve from the local cache. A+ self-hoster without a bucket degrades; they are not broken. This follows+ from the relay being dumb infrastructure (see the vault entry).+- **Failures are visible, never silent-but-wrong.** An unresolved blob leaves+ the asset absent and renders empty rather than blank-looking-fine. The whole+ change set exists because the old failure mode was invisible.++Operational consequence: the relay must be deployed **before** a client that+depends on the blob endpoints — the standing rule for this split, same as the+keepalive and access-verification changes.