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Bento, the office suite that fits in a file

slides sanitize rig: pin the escaped-url / image-set css egress families (#581)

nyblnetdbb8989dd7f1
diff --git a/scripts/test-sanitize.ts b/scripts/test-sanitize.ts
index ee735d5b..af495be7 100644
--- a/scripts/test-sanitize.ts
+++ b/scripts/test-sanitize.ts
@@ -199,6 +199,38 @@ for (const at of ['@media screen{.p{fill:red}}', '@supports (fill:red){.p{fill:r
ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p::before{content:"a@b"}') === '.p::before{content:"a@b"}',
'an @ that does not start a token is not an at-rule')
+// The escaped-url and image-set families #519's follow-up closed. url( written
+// with escapes is decoded and cut by the text pass, so it can be judged here in
+// node.
+for (const spelling of ['\\75 rl', 'u\\72 l', '\\75\\72\\6c', '\\000075rl']) {
+ ok(sanitizeSvgCss(`.p{background-image:${spelling}(https://evil.example/x)}`).includes('background-image:none'),
+ `an escaped url() spelling — ${spelling}( — is rewritten to none by the text pass`)
+}
+ok(sanitizeSvgCss('@supports (color:red){.p{background-image:\\75 rl(https://evil.example/x)}}').includes('none'),
+ 'and inside @supports it is cut the same way')
+ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{fill:url(#g)}') === '.p{fill:url(#g)}', 'url(#…) is left exactly alone')
+ok(sanitizeSvgCss('.p{background-image:url()}').includes('data:image/'),
+ 'and a data:image url is kept — the ban is on the network, not on pictures')
+ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:\\75 rl(https://evil.example/x)', 'style') === false,
+ 'the style="" gate refuses an escaped url()')
+ok(svgUrlRefsAllowed('fill:url(#g)', 'style') === true, 'and keeps url(#…) in a style attribute')
+
+// …and the image-set spellings the browser section measures, judged here too:
+// written straight after a property colon they used to slip the text pass and
+// rely on the CSSOM check alone. The text pass now refuses them on its own, so
+// even with no CSSOM (this node run) nothing that can fetch survives.
+for (const css of [
+ '.p{background-image:image-set("https://evil.example/a" 1x)}',
+ '.p{background-image:-webkit-image-set("https://evil.example/b" 1x)}',
+ '.p{background-image:image-se\\74 ("https://evil.example/c" 1x)}',
+ '.p{cursor:image-set("https://evil.example/d" 1x), auto}',
+ '@media all{.p{background-image:image-set("https://evil.example/e" 1x)}}',
+]) {
+ const out = sanitizeSvgCss(css)
+ ok(!/image-set\(/i.test(out) && out.includes('bento-refused('),
+ `image-set straight after a colon is refused by the text pass alone: ${css.slice(0, 44)}…`)
+}
+
// A call written straight after a colon is a SELECTOR only if its name is a
// pseudo-class/-element function; any other is a value, judged by the function
// allowlist like a call anywhere else. The text pass used to spare every
@@ -317,7 +349,7 @@ const CHROME = [
* it. Written without backticks or `${` so it can live in a template literal.
*/
const probeSource = (renderPath: string, modelPath: string, pastePath: string) => `
-import { renderSlide, sanitizeHtml } from ${JSON.stringify(renderPath)}
+import { renderSlide, sanitizeHtml, sanitizeSvgCss, svgUrlRefsAllowed } from ${JSON.stringify(renderPath)}
import { newDoc } from ${JSON.stringify(modelPath)}
import { clipboardToHtml } from ${JSON.stringify(pastePath)}
@@ -523,6 +555,89 @@ if (location.pathname === '/meta.html') {
(sheet.querySelector('style')?.textContent ?? '').includes('@keyframes bp-spin') &&
(sheet.querySelector('style')?.textContent ?? '').includes('@media (min-width:1px)'))
+ // --- 4c. the css egress families the escaped-url / image-set fix closed ----
+ //
+ // sanitizeSvgCss is a two-layer filter: a text pass, then — where there is a
+ // browser — the browser's own parse (cssomFindsFetch) as the last word. Each
+ // layer stops these families on its own now: section 1 pins the text pass in
+ // node (including image-set written straight after a property colon, which
+ // the text pass used to spare and leave to the CSSOM check alone), and this
+ // block proves the end result in a real engine — sanitizeSvgCss run HERE,
+ // its output injected into a live <style>, while a local server logs
+ // whether anything reached out. A regression in either layer alone is caught
+ // by the other half of the rig.
+ //
+ // Every negative below is non-vacuous: the raw positive controls FETCH in
+ // this engine (url(), and image-set in both spellings — measured), so a zero
+ // on a sanitised row means the sanitiser stopped it, not that the engine
+ // never asks. A backslash is String.fromCharCode(92), never written
+ // literally — this code is inside probeSource's template literal, where a
+ // lone backslash collapses before the probe runs (see the @import rows).
+ const BS = String.fromCharCode(92)
+ const eBox = (seg: string): HTMLElement => {
+ const b = document.createElement('div'); b.id = 'eg-' + seg
+ b.style.width = '40px'; b.style.height = '40px'; b.style.display = 'block'
+ document.body.appendChild(b); return b
+ }
+ const eForce = (b: HTMLElement) => { void b.offsetHeight; b.getBoundingClientRect() }
+ // sanitiser OUTPUT injected live — exactly the text render.ts hands the
+ // document for an svg <style> or the model's css field. BOX → the box's id.
+ const egress = (seg: string, sheet: string) => {
+ const b = eBox(seg); const s = document.createElement('style')
+ s.textContent = sanitizeSvgCss(sheet.split('BOX').join('#' + b.id))
+ document.head.appendChild(s); eForce(b)
+ }
+ // positive control: the SAME shape, NOT sanitised — it must reach the server.
+ const egressRaw = (seg: string, sheet: string) => {
+ const b = eBox(seg); const s = document.createElement('style')
+ s.textContent = sheet.split('BOX').join('#' + b.id)
+ document.head.appendChild(s); eForce(b)
+ }
+ egressRaw('pos-url', 'BOX{background-image:url("' + O + '/eg-pos-url")}')
+ egressRaw('pos-imgset', 'BOX{background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-pos-imgset" 1x)}')
+ egress('neg', 'BOX{background-image:url("' + O + '/eg-neg")}')
+ egress('esc-u', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/eg-esc-u")}')
+ egress('esc-r', 'BOX{background-image:u' + BS + '72 l("' + O + '/eg-esc-r")}')
+ egress('esc-all', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + '75' + BS + '72' + BS + '6c("' + O + '/eg-esc-all")}')
+ egress('esc-hex', 'BOX{background-image:' + BS + '000075rl("' + O + '/eg-esc-hex")}')
+ egress('imgset', 'BOX{background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-imgset" 1x)}')
+ egress('wk-imgset', 'BOX{background-image:-webkit-image-set("' + O + '/eg-wk-imgset" 1x)}')
+ egress('imgset-escfn', 'BOX{background-image:image-se' + BS + '74 ("' + O + '/eg-imgset-escfn" 1x)}')
+ egress('cursor', 'BOX{cursor:image-set("' + O + '/eg-cursor" 1x), auto}')
+ egress('at-media', '@media all{BOX{background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-at-media" 1x)}}')
+ egress('at-supports', '@supports (color:red){BOX{background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/eg-at-supports")}}')
+ // the allowed shapes still draw: url(#…) and a data:image survive the filter.
+ check('css-egress — url(#grad) survives the css filter untouched',
+ sanitizeSvgCss('#x{fill:url(#grad)}').indexOf('url(#grad)') >= 0)
+ check('css-egress — a data:image background survives the css filter',
+ sanitizeSvgCss('#x{background-image:url()}').indexOf('data:image/') >= 0)
+ // style="" is a declaration block: svgUrlRefsAllowed with the element.style
+ // oracle. In a browser the oracle re-parses and REFUSES image-set and the
+ // escaped url; the harmless declarations are kept.
+ check('css-egress — style="" image-set is refused',
+ svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:image-set("' + O + '/x" 1x)', 'style') === false)
+ check('css-egress — style="" an escaped url is refused',
+ svgUrlRefsAllowed('background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/x")', 'style') === false)
+ check('css-egress — style="" fill:red is kept', svgUrlRefsAllowed('fill:red', 'style') === true)
+ check('css-egress — style="" url(#grad) is kept', svgUrlRefsAllowed('fill:url(#g)', 'style') === true)
+ // belt: if the gate ever WRONGLY allowed one, WRITING it would fetch. The raw
+ // control proves a style="" background reaches the server in this engine.
+ {
+ const raw = eBox('attr-pos'); raw.style.cssText = 'background-image:url("' + O + '/eg-attr-pos")'; eForce(raw)
+ const gated = (seg: string, decl: string) => {
+ const b = eBox(seg); if (svgUrlRefsAllowed(decl, 'style')) b.style.cssText = decl; eForce(b)
+ }
+ gated('attr-imgset', 'background-image:image-set("' + O + '/eg-attr-imgset" 1x)')
+ gated('attr-esc', 'background-image:' + BS + '75 rl("' + O + '/eg-attr-esc")')
+ }
+ // markup spellings: an escaped url in a fill attribute and in the svg <style>.
+ // draw() is the full render path; the allowed paint-server and <image>
+ // fetches asserted elsewhere are the matching positive controls.
+ draw('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10">' +
+ '<rect width="10" height="10" fill="' + BS + '75 rl(' + O + '/eg-m-fill)"/></svg>')
+ draw('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10"><sty' + 'le>' +
+ 'rect{fill:' + BS + '75 rl(' + O + '/eg-m-style)}</sty' + 'le><rect width="10" height="10"/></svg>')
+
// --- 5. SMIL retargeting ---------------------------------------------------
const smil = draw('<svg><rect id="sm" width="10" height="10">' +
'<set attributeName="onclick" to="window.__pwn(51)"/>' +
@@ -806,6 +921,33 @@ async function runBrowserSection(chrome: string) {
ok(hits.includes('/remote.png'), 'an <image href="http(s)://…"> still loads — that one is allowed on purpose')
ok(hits.includes('/xlink-remote.png'), 'and so does the xlink:href spelling of it — the policy is not a ban on pictures')
ok(hits.includes('/embed-view.png'), '9 — an embed view is held to the svg policy, no stricter: its <image> loads too')
+
+ // 4c — the escaped-url / image-set css egress families (the #519 follow-up).
+ // Positive controls first: they prove the request path is live, so the zeros
+ // that follow are a boundary and not an artefact of the engine.
+ ok(hits.includes('/eg-pos-url'), '4c — a raw url() background fetches here (the css request path is live)')
+ ok(hits.includes('/eg-pos-imgset'), '4c — a raw image-set() background fetches here too (positive control)')
+ ok(hits.includes('/eg-attr-pos'), '4c — a raw style="" url() background fetches here (style-attr path is live)')
+ const cssEgress: Array<[string, string]> = [
+ ['neg', 'a plain external url()'],
+ ['esc-u', 'an escaped u — the \\75 rl( spelling of url('],
+ ['esc-r', 'an escaped r — the u\\72 l( spelling'],
+ ['esc-all', 'a fully escaped \\75\\72\\6c( spelling'],
+ ['esc-hex', 'the six-digit \\000075rl( spelling'],
+ ['imgset', 'image-set() straight after the colon (the CSSOM-pass case)'],
+ ['wk-imgset', '-webkit-image-set()'],
+ ['imgset-escfn', "image-set() with the function name itself escaped"],
+ ['cursor', 'image-set() carried on cursor'],
+ ['at-media', 'image-set() nested in @media'],
+ ['at-supports', 'an escaped url() nested in @supports'],
+ ['attr-imgset', 'image-set() in a style="" attribute'],
+ ['attr-esc', 'an escaped url() in a style="" attribute'],
+ ['m-fill', 'an escaped url() in a fill="" attribute'],
+ ['m-style', 'an escaped url() in the svg <style>'],
+ ]
+ for (const [seg, what] of cssEgress) {
+ ok(!hits.includes('/eg-' + seg), '4c — sanitised, no fetch: ' + what)
+ }
} finally {
server.close()
fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true })