π‘οΈ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) β Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.
CrackMe v8 β Aegis Design
Status: successor to CrackMe v7 Meridian. Built with bla-agents 2.0 after red/blue rounds 1β12; the published tree is
hardenProject()output.
Product framing
Aegis is a small entitlement unlock:
| Command | Behavior |
|---|---|
node license.cjs <16-char-key> |
Unlock certificate / FLAG on success; uniform DENIED otherwise |
There is no in-browser panel derive. panel.html is operator UI only.
Why not re-harden Meridian v7
Meridian cleartext + gen.mjs live in a maintainer-private store (only
hardened + SEAL are in git). Round-1 already recorded that an honest 2.0
re-harden of v7 is impossible without that store. Aegis is the public
graduation of the standing red/blue entitlement design instead.
Recipes absorbed from R1βR12
| Round | Lesson | Aegis response |
|---|---|---|
| R1 | Stable WASM ABI + independent 1-byte lanes | No wasmPreserveExports / no lane tables; bankrupt rename default |
| R2βR4 | Reversible seals, JS AES unwrap, panel oracles, soft self-seal | One-way SHA-256 seal; no AES unwrap; no panel derive; --self-seal |
| R5βR6 | Hydrate dump / XOR-mask sidecar | Unlock stays in WASM; no mask sidecar |
| R7βR9 | Seal.revision XOR-KP + weak mask KDF + structure KP | SHA-256(key) mask KDF; commitment outside XOR; seed-derived rounds+pad3 |
| v8 red | Public SEAL seed β schedule KP; public keySha256 β offline key oracle |
Harden/schedule seed private (derived from release secrets), SEAL v2 publishes only label + flagSha256; bla_lint warns public-materialization-seed / public-key-digest-oracle |
| R10βR12 | Arity-2 alias stack / export-order / body idx 0 | Prefer arity-2 aliases; export-order shuffle; unlock body-index scatter |
| P2 | Full WASM RE + SMT | Honest residual β not refused as a packaging lint |
Architecture
challenge/v8/hardened/
license.cjs β hardened host gate (arity + FLAG + certificateSha256)
panel.html β hardened operator UI (no token derive)
core.wasm.gz β unlock-in-WASM (gzipped; ~7 MB raw)
seal.json β runtime one-way seal (revision + certificateSha256)
challenge/v8/SEAL.json β public digests / knobs only
Unlock (happy path)
- Host loads hardened
core.wasm, finds arity-2 exports (order/name-independent). - Invokes candidates; accepts UTF-8 matching
FLAG{β¦}. - Requires
SHA-256(result) === seal.certificateSha256. - Inside WASM:
mask = SHA-256(key[16]), unmask packsalt||rounds||pad3||entropyPad[32]||clen||cipher, compare clear commitment segment toSHA-256(ARX_state), decrypt certificate.
Wrong key / honeypot canary / missing sibling β uniform deny (honeypots never call WASM unlock).
Honest scope
Solvable by a determined reverse engineer who recovers the in-WASM unlock (SHA-256 KDF + ARX + commitment layout) and searches the key space β not by packaging footguns that R1βR12 closed. Gates do not claim white-box secrecy against full WASM RE / online SMT.
Maintainer recipe
npm run build
CRACKME_V8_KEY='β¦' CRACKME_V8_FLAG='FLAG{β¦}' npm run crackme:v8:build
npm run crackme:v8:seal
# fixture-only CI path (no release secrets):
npm run crackme:v8:build -- --fixture