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πŸ›‘οΈ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) β€” Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.

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CrackMe v9 β€” Sovereign Design (BLA 3.0 Showcase)

Status: successor to CrackMe v8 Aegis. Built with bla-agents 3.0.0 through the 4-Stage Agent-Driven Hardening Playbook (bla_lint β†’ bla_weave_plan β†’ bla_verify_weave β†’ bla_harden --weave-decoys --self-seal --sidecar-entangle).

Product framing

Sovereign is a polyglot (JS + WASM + HTML + Python) entitlement unlock:

Command Behavior
node license.cjs <16-char-key> Unlock certificate / FLAG on success; uniform DENIED otherwise; hard-fails on any file/sidecar tamper

What CrackMe v9 (Sovereign) advances over v8 (Aegis)

Dimension CrackMe v8 (Aegis β€” 2.0) CrackMe v9 (Sovereign β€” 3.0)
Pipeline Single-step bla harden --self-seal Full 4-Stage BLA 3.0 Playbook (bla_lint β†’ bla_weave_plan β†’ bla_verify_weave β†’ bla_harden)
seal.json sidecar coverage Uncovered data sidecar (v8 residual) Closed: license.cjs pins EXPECTED_SEAL_SHA256 at runtime; tampering with seal.json hard-fails
Cross-format entanglement selfSeal: true only selfSeal: true + sidecarEntangle: true + weaveDecoys: true across JS, WASM, HTML, and Python (policy.py)
Structural weave verification None Enforced 100/100 (weaveScore: 100) via bla_verify_weave both pre-harden and post-harden
Entry self-digest verification Soft / post-hoc Enforced integrityCoverageSelfVerified: true in SEAL.json
WASM + JS Deception Anchors Strip-prone export roots All injected JS exhaustion/deception roots + Python canary honeypots anchored to module init

Architecture

challenge/v9/hardened/
  license.cjs      ← hardened host gate (pinned EXPECTED_SEAL_SHA256 + self-seal + sidecar-entangle + woven state)
  panel.html       ← hardened operator UI (no token derive)
  policy.py        ← hardened Python quota ledger (woven customer defs + warm-init + sidecar-bound)
  core.wasm.gz     ← unlock-in-WASM (gzipped; ~7 MB raw)
  seal.json        ← runtime one-way seal (revision + certificateSha256, SHA-256 pinned in license.cjs)
challenge/v9/SEAL.json  ← public digests / 3.0 verification telemetry only

Honest scope

Solvable by a determined reverse engineer who recovers the in-WASM unlock (SHA-256 KDF + ARX + commitment layout) and searches the key space β€” not by packaging footguns, sidecar stripping, seal.json tampering, or dead-code decoy peeling. Gates do not claim white-box secrecy against full WASM RE / online SMT.

Maintainer recipe

npm run build
CRACKME_V9_KEY='…' CRACKME_V9_FLAG='FLAG{…}' npm run crackme:v9:build
npm run crackme:v9:seal
# fixture-only CI path (no release secrets):
npm run crackme:v9:build -- --fixture