🛡️ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) — Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.
JavaScript adversarial-aiclaude-codecursorelectron-securityllm-securitymcpmcp-serverobfuscationreverse-engineeringwebassembly
fix(engine): bound auditor directory walk against hostile trees (#61)
Dery Ferdika1bdee0ac5c4a
diff --git a/src/core/types.ts b/src/core/types.tsindex 765756b..51bb5b0 100644--- a/src/core/types.ts+++ b/src/core/types.ts@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ export interface AuditReport {readonly agentEstimates: readonly AgentCostEstimate[];readonly headlineWarning: string;readonly recommendedCommand: string;+ /** Entries skipped while walking a directory tree (depth/entry/file-size bounds). */+ readonly walkSkipped?: { directories: number; files: number; bytes: number };}export interface ProtectionOptions {diff --git a/src/engine/auditor.ts b/src/engine/auditor.tsindex 7d7c9d2..061158a 100644--- a/src/engine/auditor.ts+++ b/src/engine/auditor.ts@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@import { createHash } from "node:crypto";-import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "node:fs";+import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync, type Stats } from "node:fs";import { basename, extname, join, resolve } from "node:path";import { parse } from "@babel/parser";import _traverse from "@babel/traverse";@@ -349,16 +349,50 @@ export function auditTarget(targetPath: string): AuditReport {};const exposedItems: ExposedSymbolOrModule[] = [];const vulnerableVectors = new Set<ReaAttackVectorId>();+ let skippedDirectories = 0;+ let skippedFiles = 0;+ let skippedBytes = 0;if (format === "directory") {const filesToScan: string[] = [];const nonJsFilesToScan: string[] = [];- const walkDir = (dir: string): void => {+ // Mirror the bounded-read design of release-exposure.ts so a hostile or+ // gigantic tree cannot hang or OOM the default defend/audit pipeline.+ const MAX_DIR_DEPTH = 16;+ const MAX_DIR_ENTRIES = 10_000;+ const MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;+ const walkDir = (dir: string, depth = 0): void => {+ if (depth > MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {+ skippedDirectories++;+ return;+ }+ let entriesSeen = 0;for (const entry of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {+ entriesSeen++;+ if (entriesSeen > MAX_DIR_ENTRIES) {+ skippedDirectories++;+ break;+ }if (entry.name === "node_modules" || entry.name === ".git") continue;const full = join(dir, entry.name);- if (entry.isDirectory()) walkDir(full);- else if ([".js", ".ts", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".jsx", ".tsx"].includes(extname(entry.name).toLowerCase())) {+ if (entry.isDirectory()) {+ walkDir(full, depth + 1);+ continue;+ }+ let stat: Stats;+ try {+ stat = statSync(full);+ } catch {+ skippedFiles++;+ continue;+ }+ if (stat.size > MAX_FILE_BYTES) {+ skippedFiles++;+ skippedBytes += stat.size;+ continue;+ }+ const ext = extname(entry.name).toLowerCase();+ if ([".js", ".ts", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".jsx", ".tsx"].includes(ext)) {filesToScan.push(full);} else {const cf = detectArtifactFormat(full);@@ -1167,19 +1201,24 @@ export function auditTarget(targetPath: string): AuditReport {? `SHIELD ACTIVE: ${basename(absPath)} triggers ${sim.triggeredResourceLimits.length} REA resource limits and forces ~${primaryEstimate.estimatedInputTokens.toLocaleString()} tokens ($${primaryEstimate.estimatedCostUsd.toFixed(2)}) of agent tarpit exhaustion.`: `DANGER: Module "${primaryModule}" in ${basename(absPath)} is exposed to REA (${exposureScore}/100 exposure). Estimated Claude Code time: ${primaryEstimate.estimatedWallClockSeconds}s, cost: $${primaryEstimate.estimatedCostUsd.toFixed(2)} to reconstruct. Run "${recommendedCommand}" to inject AI Tarpit & Semantic Shield.`;- return {- targetPath: absPath,- detectedFormat: format,- sha256,- byteSize,- timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),- exposureScore,- protectionStatus,- reaSimulation: sim,- exposedItems,- vulnerableReaVectors: [...vulnerableVectors],- agentEstimates,- headlineWarning,- recommendedCommand,- };+ return {+ targetPath: absPath,+ detectedFormat: format,+ sha256,+ byteSize,+ timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),+ exposureScore,+ protectionStatus,+ reaSimulation: sim,+ exposedItems,+ vulnerableReaVectors: [...vulnerableVectors],+ agentEstimates,+ headlineWarning,+ recommendedCommand,+ ...(skippedDirectories > 0 || skippedFiles > 0+ ? {+ walkSkipped: { directories: skippedDirectories, files: skippedFiles, bytes: skippedBytes },+ }+ : {}),+ };}diff --git a/src/ui/reporter.ts b/src/ui/reporter.tsindex 41945b4..20dc788 100644--- a/src/ui/reporter.ts+++ b/src/ui/reporter.ts@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ export function formatAuditReport(report: AuditReport): string {`${ANSI.bold}Triggered Limits:${ANSI.reset} ${ANSI.green}${report.reaSimulation.triggeredResourceLimits.join(", ")}${ANSI.reset}`,);}+ if (report.walkSkipped && (report.walkSkipped.files > 0 || report.walkSkipped.directories > 0)) {+ lines.push(+ `${ANSI.bold}Walk Skipped:${ANSI.reset} ${ANSI.yellow}${report.walkSkipped.files} file(s) over size cap + ${report.walkSkipped.directories} directory subtree(s) over depth/entry cap (results are partial)${ANSI.reset}`,+ );+ }lines.push(`${ANSI.bold}Obligation Graph:${ANSI.reset} ${report.reaSimulation.obligationLedgerNodes} nodes (${report.reaSimulation.decoyFunctionsDetectedAsReal} decoy tarpit nodes, ${report.reaSimulation.architecturalChaffPayloads} chaff manifests)`,