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๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) โ€” Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.

Red/Blue round-8 ยท Blue

qybaihe286319cc92d8
diff --git a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md
index 8f5ae62..4e72083 100644
--- a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md
+++ b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md
@@ -7,14 +7,14 @@ description: >
Agents). Prefer this skill as the guide; call existing MCP tools / CLI โ€” do not invent
new MCP tools. Default verb: bla_harden. Refuse crack/RE of third-party software.
metadata:
- version: "1.5.12"
+ version: "1.5.13"
---
# BLA: Blind LLM Agents
**This skill is the primary one-click harden GUIDE.** MCP (`bla` server) and the
`bla-agents` CLI are the **execution layer**. Prefer teaching/calling existing tools
-(`bla_harden`, `bla_defend`, `bla_weave_plan`, `bla_lint_lanes`, `bla_lint_seal`, `bla_lint_wasm_params`, `bla_lint_panel_derive`, `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap`, `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump`, `bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar`, โ€ฆ) over inventing new
+(`bla_harden`, `bla_defend`, `bla_weave_plan`, `bla_lint_lanes`, `bla_lint_seal`, `bla_lint_wasm_params`, `bla_lint_panel_derive`, `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap`, `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump`, `bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar`, `bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext`, โ€ฆ) over inventing new
MCP surfaces.
Use BLA whenever the user asks to harden a project against AI reverse-engineering
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ model misjudgment on proprietary logic, or **one-click / ไธ€้”ฎๅŠ ๅ›บ** a build.
Defensive only: protect **their own** artifacts. Refuse crack, RE, bypass PoCs, or
attack playbooks against software they do not own.
-**Principles (red-blue round-1+2+3+4+5+6+7+7b):** do not ship a stable public WASM ABI without an explicit `wasm_preserve_exports` list; do not leave JS-side independent lane tables โ€” prefer whole-key chained mixing (`bla_lint_lanes` / harden refuse). **Do not** place plaintext seal/catalog JSON (`revision`, salts, certificate ciphertext) beside hardened outputs. Public compare targets must be **one-way** (SHA-256/HMAC/etc.); reversible ARX/Feistel digests as public `revision` are a key-recovery footgun (round-2 break โ€” **closed in round-3** when seal is digests-only). Enforce with `bla_lint_seal` / `bla lint-seal`; bankrupt harden **refuses** unless `allow_plaintext_seal` / `--allow-plaintext-seal`. Round-3 residual **gates**: `bla_lint_wasm_params` / `bla lint-wasm-params` โ€” bankrupt refuses clear `R2SEAL`/`R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`-class carriers unless `allow_wasm_clear_params`; `bla_lint_panel_derive` โ€” maximum/bankrupt **rewrites** `__vaultPanelDerive_*` to `_blaPd_*` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`; bankrupt harden sets `selfSealRecommended` for multi-artifact trees (never auto for single-file) โ€” prefer **`self_seal`**. Round-4 gates: `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` / `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap` โ€” bankrupt **refuses** JS wrap-key + `create*iv` + fixed sealed hdr (e.g. `d17ea004`) unless `allow_js_aes_unwrap` (gate only โ€” **not** white-box AES; prefer in-WASM unwrap). `bla_lint_panel_derive` flags `deriveLocal` (rewritten to `_blaPdLocal_*`) and **refuses** `deriveLocal` + plaintext `panelTokenSha256` offline-oracle packaging unless `allow_panel_offline_oracle` (rename is not a crypto fix โ€” scrub digests / avoid derive UI). `self_seal` embeds **expected sibling SHA-256 hard-fail** when siblings exist at protect time (harden processes JS last); opaque-seed entanglement alone does **not** gate entitlement control flow. Round-5 gates: `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` / `bla lint-js-wasm-hydrate-dump` โ€” bankrupt **refuses** JS that copies salt/rounds/cipher from `WebAssembly.Memory` after hydrate/instantiate unless `allow_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` (host memory dump needs **no** Node `create*iv`; export rename alone does not close this โ€” prefer keep ARX+certify **inside** WASM so params never re-enter JS). Round-6 product pattern: export `unlock(keyPtr,keyLen)->outLen` (or equivalent) so ARX+compare+decrypt stay in WASM; JS only writes key bytes and reads the result โ€” do **not** call hydrate then decode salt/rounds/cipher in JS (closes the round-5 host memory-dump residual under bankrupt defaults). Honesty: WASM reverse-engineering of the unlock body remains a theoretical surface; gates do not claim white-box secrecy. Round-6 **break residual**: do **not** store a plaintext XOR mask adjacent to a masked entitlement pack (`salt||rounds||expected-words||cipher`) in WASM data โ€” static unmask needs no key; combined with invertible ARX expected-state compare this recovers the prize (`bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar` / `bla lint-wasm-xor-mask-sidecar`; bankrupt refuses unless `allow_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar`). Prefer key-dependent unmask and **one-way** commitments inside WASM (not reversible expected words). Round-7 product pattern: keep unlock-in-WASM; derive the XOR mask from the key inside `unlock` (do **not** embed a plaintext mask beside the blob); store a SHA-256 commitment of the ARX state for compare (not invertible expected words). Round-7 **break residual**: do **not** place public `seal.revision` (or other public digests) as plaintext under a repeating XOR mask in WASM data โ€” `revision` XOR `masked[8..40)` recovers the mask with no key; combined with an algebraically weak key-dependent mask KDF this recovers the prize (`bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext` / `bla lint-wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext`; bankrupt refuses unless `allow_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext`). Prefer a one-way mask KDF (e.g. SHA-256(key||i)) and keep public digests **out** of the masked plaintext prefix (or bind revision differently). Honesty: full WASM reverse-engineering of unlock can still recover algorithms; gates close packaging footguns, not white-box secrecy.
+**Principles (red-blue round-1+2+3+4+5+6+7+7b+8):** do not ship a stable public WASM ABI without an explicit `wasm_preserve_exports` list; do not leave JS-side independent lane tables โ€” prefer whole-key chained mixing (`bla_lint_lanes` / harden refuse). **Do not** place plaintext seal/catalog JSON (`revision`, salts, certificate ciphertext) beside hardened outputs. Public compare targets must be **one-way** (SHA-256/HMAC/etc.); reversible ARX/Feistel digests as public `revision` are a key-recovery footgun (round-2 break โ€” **closed in round-3** when seal is digests-only). Enforce with `bla_lint_seal` / `bla lint-seal`; bankrupt harden **refuses** unless `allow_plaintext_seal` / `--allow-plaintext-seal`. Round-3 residual **gates**: `bla_lint_wasm_params` / `bla lint-wasm-params` โ€” bankrupt refuses clear `R2SEAL`/`R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`-class carriers unless `allow_wasm_clear_params`; `bla_lint_panel_derive` โ€” maximum/bankrupt **rewrites** `__vaultPanelDerive_*` to `_blaPd_*` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`; bankrupt harden sets `selfSealRecommended` for multi-artifact trees (never auto for single-file) โ€” prefer **`self_seal`**. Round-4 gates: `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` / `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap` โ€” bankrupt **refuses** JS wrap-key + `create*iv` + fixed sealed hdr (e.g. `d17ea004`) unless `allow_js_aes_unwrap` (gate only โ€” **not** white-box AES; prefer in-WASM unwrap). `bla_lint_panel_derive` flags `deriveLocal` (rewritten to `_blaPdLocal_*`) and **refuses** `deriveLocal` + plaintext `panelTokenSha256` offline-oracle packaging unless `allow_panel_offline_oracle` (rename is not a crypto fix โ€” scrub digests / avoid derive UI). `self_seal` embeds **expected sibling SHA-256 hard-fail** when siblings exist at protect time (harden processes JS last); opaque-seed entanglement alone does **not** gate entitlement control flow. Round-5 gates: `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` / `bla lint-js-wasm-hydrate-dump` โ€” bankrupt **refuses** JS that copies salt/rounds/cipher from `WebAssembly.Memory` after hydrate/instantiate unless `allow_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` (host memory dump needs **no** Node `create*iv`; export rename alone does not close this โ€” prefer keep ARX+certify **inside** WASM so params never re-enter JS). Round-6 product pattern: export `unlock(keyPtr,keyLen)->outLen` (or equivalent) so ARX+compare+decrypt stay in WASM; JS only writes key bytes and reads the result โ€” do **not** call hydrate then decode salt/rounds/cipher in JS (closes the round-5 host memory-dump residual under bankrupt defaults). Honesty: WASM reverse-engineering of the unlock body remains a theoretical surface; gates do not claim white-box secrecy. Round-6 **break residual**: do **not** store a plaintext XOR mask adjacent to a masked entitlement pack (`salt||rounds||expected-words||cipher`) in WASM data โ€” static unmask needs no key; combined with invertible ARX expected-state compare this recovers the prize (`bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar` / `bla lint-wasm-xor-mask-sidecar`; bankrupt refuses unless `allow_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar`). Prefer key-dependent unmask and **one-way** commitments inside WASM (not reversible expected words). Round-7 product pattern: keep unlock-in-WASM; derive the XOR mask from the key inside `unlock` (do **not** embed a plaintext mask beside the blob); store a SHA-256 commitment of the ARX state for compare (not invertible expected words). Round-7 **break residual**: do **not** place public `seal.revision` (or other public digests) as plaintext under a repeating XOR mask in WASM data โ€” `revision` XOR `masked[8..40)` recovers the mask with no key; combined with an algebraically weak key-dependent mask KDF this recovers the prize (`bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext` / `bla lint-wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext`; bankrupt refuses unless `allow_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext`). Prefer a one-way mask KDF (e.g. SHA-256(key||i)) and keep public digests **out** of the masked plaintext prefix (or bind revision differently). Round-8 product pattern: derive the XOR mask with a **one-way** KDF such as `SHA-256(key[16])` (never an algebraically invertible byte mix); put an entropy/random pad โ€” **not** `seal.revision` โ€” in the masked pack prefix; keep the SHA-256 ARX commitment in a **separate clear data segment** (or otherwise outside the XOR-masked layout) so public digests cannot serve as XOR known-plaintext. Honesty: full WASM reverse-engineering of unlock can still recover algorithms; gates close packaging footguns, not white-box secrecy.
## Prerequisites (once)
diff --git a/tests/wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext-lint.test.ts b/tests/wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext-lint.test.ts
index 4d6ec6f..156a387 100644
--- a/tests/wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext-lint.test.ts
+++ b/tests/wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext-lint.test.ts
@@ -32,4 +32,15 @@ describe("wasm-seal-xor-known-plaintext-lint", () => {
it("looksLike helper rejects empty buffer", () => {
expect(looksLikeSealRevisionKnownPlaintextPack(Buffer.alloc(10), Buffer.alloc(32)).ok).toBe(false);
});
+
+ it("round-8 entropy pad under XOR (commit elsewhere) does not refuse", () => {
+ // Product pattern: masked prefix holds entropy โ‰  seal.revision; commitment is not under XOR.
+ const { wasm, seal } = buildTestWasmWithSealXorKnownPlaintext({ mismatchCommit: true });
+ const report = lintWasmSealXorKnownPlaintextBuffer(wasm, {
+ path: "r8-style.wasm",
+ sealRaw: JSON.stringify(seal),
+ });
+ expect(report.shouldRefuseBankrupt).toBe(false);
+ expect(report.findings).toHaveLength(0);
+ });
});