๐ก๏ธ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) โ Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.
JavaScript adversarial-aiclaude-codecursorelectron-securityllm-securitymcpmcp-serverobfuscationreverse-engineeringwebassembly
docs: round-4 writeback โ AES unwrap + panel oracle gates (skill v1.5.7)
qybaiheb4aad2544dee
diff --git a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.mdindex 61e2522..3acd09e 100644--- a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md+++ b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ model misjudgment on proprietary logic, or **one-click / ไธ้ฎๅ ๅบ** a build.Defensive only: protect **their own** artifacts. Refuse crack, RE, bypass PoCs, orattack playbooks against software they do not own.-**Principles (red-blue round-1+2+3+4):** do not ship a stable public WASM ABI without an explicit `wasm_preserve_exports` list; do not leave JS-side independent lane tables โ prefer whole-key chained mixing (`bla_lint_lanes` / harden refuse). **Do not** place plaintext seal/catalog JSON (`revision`, salts, certificate ciphertext) beside hardened outputs. Public compare targets must be **one-way** (SHA-256/HMAC/etc.); reversible ARX/Feistel digests as public `revision` are a key-recovery footgun (round-2 break โ **closed in round-3** when seal is digests-only). Enforce with `bla_lint_seal` / `bla lint-seal`; bankrupt harden **refuses** unless `allow_plaintext_seal` / `--allow-plaintext-seal`. Round-3 residual **gates**: `bla_lint_wasm_params` / `bla lint-wasm-params` โ bankrupt refuses clear `R2SEAL`/`R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`-class carriers unless `allow_wasm_clear_params`; `bla_lint_panel_derive` โ maximum/bankrupt **rewrites** `__vaultPanelDerive_*` to `_blaPd_*` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`; bankrupt harden sets `selfSealRecommended` for multi-artifact trees (never auto for single-file) โ prefer **`self_seal`**. Round-4: AES-CTR sealed WASM param blobs (no clear PARM magic) still leak when the **JS wrap key** is passed to `crypto.createDecipheriv` โ treat wrap keys as RE-reachable under Node instrumentation; prefer unwrap inside WASM / white-box, avoid fixed hdr beacons when feasible. `self_seal` now embeds **expected sibling SHA-256 hard-fail** when siblings already exist on disk at protect time (harden processes JS last); opaque-seed entanglement alone does **not** gate entitlement control flow. Panel-local `deriveLocal` + plaintext `panelTokenSha256` remain an offline oracle surface โ rename/scrub and avoid shipping digests beside UI when possible.+**Principles (red-blue round-1+2+3+4):** do not ship a stable public WASM ABI without an explicit `wasm_preserve_exports` list; do not leave JS-side independent lane tables โ prefer whole-key chained mixing (`bla_lint_lanes` / harden refuse). **Do not** place plaintext seal/catalog JSON (`revision`, salts, certificate ciphertext) beside hardened outputs. Public compare targets must be **one-way** (SHA-256/HMAC/etc.); reversible ARX/Feistel digests as public `revision` are a key-recovery footgun (round-2 break โ **closed in round-3** when seal is digests-only). Enforce with `bla_lint_seal` / `bla lint-seal`; bankrupt harden **refuses** unless `allow_plaintext_seal` / `--allow-plaintext-seal`. Round-3 residual **gates**: `bla_lint_wasm_params` / `bla lint-wasm-params` โ bankrupt refuses clear `R2SEAL`/`R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`-class carriers unless `allow_wasm_clear_params`; `bla_lint_panel_derive` โ maximum/bankrupt **rewrites** `__vaultPanelDerive_*` to `_blaPd_*` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`; bankrupt harden sets `selfSealRecommended` for multi-artifact trees (never auto for single-file) โ prefer **`self_seal`**. Round-4 gates: `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` / `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap` โ bankrupt **refuses** JS wrap-key + `create*iv` + fixed sealed hdr (e.g. `d17ea004`) unless `allow_js_aes_unwrap` (gate only โ **not** white-box AES; prefer in-WASM unwrap). `bla_lint_panel_derive` flags `deriveLocal` (rewritten to `_blaPdLocal_*`) and **refuses** `deriveLocal` + plaintext `panelTokenSha256` offline-oracle packaging unless `allow_panel_offline_oracle` (rename is not a crypto fix โ scrub digests / avoid derive UI). `self_seal` embeds **expected sibling SHA-256 hard-fail** when siblings exist at protect time (harden processes JS last); opaque-seed entanglement alone does **not** gate entitlement control flow.## Prerequisites (once)diff --git a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-javascript.md b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-javascript.mdindex 1ca97db..c3a8d98 100644--- a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-javascript.md+++ b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-javascript.md@@ -55,3 +55,14 @@ Round-3 confirmed: SHA-256 (or HMAC) public `revision` **stops** seal-only ARX i- `bla_lint_panel_derive` / `bla lint-panel-derive` flags stable `__vaultPanelDerive_*`; maximum/bankrupt protect rewrites to `_blaPd_*` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`.- Multi-artifact trees: bankrupt harden reports `selfSealRecommended` โ pass `self_seal: true` (auto sibling bind on harden). Single-file stays opt-in only.++## Round-4 residual gates (AES wrap + panel oracle)++AES-CTR sealed WASM param blobs without clear `PARM` magic still leak when **JS** holds a recoverable wrap key and calls `createDecipheriv` / `createCipheriv` against a fixed hdr beacon (e.g. `d17ea004`). This is **not** white-box AES.++| Gate | Surface | Default |+| :--- | :--- | :--- |+| `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` / `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap` | wrap-key + create*iv + fixed hdr | bankrupt **refuse** unless `allow_js_aes_unwrap` / `--allow-js-aes-unwrap` |+| `bla_lint_panel_derive` | `deriveLocal` rewrite + `panelTokenSha256` oracle | rewrite `_blaPdLocal_*`; bankrupt **refuse** oracle combo unless `allow_panel_offline_oracle` |++Prefer unwrap inside WASM; scrub plaintext panel token digests; do not ship a callable derive UI beside seal digests. Self-seal sibling SHA-256 hard-fail is separate and already on when siblings exist at protect time.diff --git a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-wasm.md b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-wasm.mdindex 19fe01c..fcba9d6 100644--- a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-wasm.md+++ b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-wasm.md@@ -29,3 +29,7 @@ Export rename closes the public `mix`/`seal` hook surface. It does **not** hide- Run `bla_lint_wasm_params` / `bla lint-wasm-params` before shipping. Bankrupt harden refuses clear param/cipher magics unless `allow_wasm_clear_params`.- This is a **detection gate**, not data-section encryption.++## Sealed blobs still need JS honesty (red-blue round-4)++Encrypting WASM data (no clear `R3PARM`) closes the ASCII-carrier lint. If the **JS loader** still does `Buffer.from(WRAP_KEY_HEX, "hex")` + `createDecipheriv` against a fixed hdr, Node instrumentation recovers params. Run `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` on the loader; bankrupt refuses that footgun. BLA does **not** claim white-box AES.diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex b40830e..20e7974 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]### Added+- **Red/Blue round-4 ยท Writeback โ JS AES unwrap lint + panel offline-oracle gate:** CLI `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap` / MCP `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` detect hex/base64 wrap-key material + `createDecipheriv`/`createCipheriv` + fixed sealed hdr (e.g. `d17ea004`). Bankrupt harden/protect **refuse** unless `allowJsAesUnwrap` / `--allow-js-aes-unwrap` / `allow_js_aes_unwrap`. Gate only โ **not** white-box AES. `bla_lint_panel_derive` / CLI also flag stable `deriveLocal` (maximum/bankrupt rewrite to `_blaPdLocal_*`) and `deriveLocal` + plaintext `panelTokenSha256` offline-oracle packaging (same-file or sibling `seal.json`); bankrupt **refuses** the oracle combo unless `allowPanelOfflineOracle` / `--allow-panel-offline-oracle` / `allow_panel_offline_oracle`. Skill **v1.5.7**. Self-seal sibling SHA-256 hard-fail remains from `c2ec868`.- **Red/Blue round-3 ยท Writeback residual โ WASM param lint + panel rewrite + self_seal recommend:** CLI `bla lint-wasm-params` / MCP `bla_lint_wasm_params` detect clear `R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`/`R2SEAL`-class ASCII carriers with adjacent binary blobs; bankrupt harden/protect **refuse** unless `allowWasmClearParamCarriers` / `--allow-wasm-clear-params` / `allow_wasm_clear_params`. CLI `bla lint-panel-derive` / MCP `bla_lint_panel_derive` flag stable `__vaultPanelDerive_*` (and classic FNV primes as warning); maximum/bankrupt protect **rewrites** to seed-stable `_blaPd_*` unless `allowStablePanelDeriveAbi` / `--allow-stable-panel-derive` / `allow_stable_panel_derive`. Bankrupt harden sets `selfSealRecommended` for multi-artifact JS/WASM/HTML trees without auto-enabling single-file; `--self-seal` on harden auto-binds sibling paths. Audit surfaces the same WASM/panel findings. Skill **v1.5.6**. Full WASM data-section encryption remains a follow-up.- **Red/Blue round-3 ยท Red writeback (skill):** one-way SHA-256 seals **close** the round-2 ARX-invert break; skill **v1.5.5** + format appendices document residual packaging โ WASM `R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`-class clear param/cipher carriers, stable `__vaultPanelDerive_*` / FNV literals, and prefer `self_seal` for multi-artifact entitlement trees. No emergency P0.- **Red/Blue round-2 ยท Writeback P1 โ seal-commitment lint + bankrupt refuse:** CLI `bla lint-seal` / MCP `bla_lint_seal` detect plaintext seal sidecars and reversible public commitments (round-2 `seal.json` + ARX `revision` break). Bankrupt harden/protect refuse unless `allowPlaintextSeal` / `--allow-plaintext-seal` / `allow_plaintext_seal`. One-way SHA-256 seals pass. Skill v1.5.4 points at the new tool/switch.diff --git a/docs/cli-and-mcp.md b/docs/cli-and-mcp.mdindex 0980268..a3a6500 100644--- a/docs/cli-and-mcp.md+++ b/docs/cli-and-mcp.md@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ For coding agents, the **[`blind-llm-agents` skill](../.agents/skills/blind-llm-- `bla_lint_lanes`: Read-only lane-independence footgun lint (`path`) โ same engine as CLI `bla lint-lanes`.- `bla_lint_seal`: Read-only seal-commitment lint (`path`) โ plaintext / reversible seal sidecars; same engine as CLI `bla lint-seal`.- `bla_lint_wasm_params`: Read-only WASM clear param/cipher carrier lint (`path`) โ `R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`/`R2SEAL`-class; same engine as CLI `bla lint-wasm-params`.-- `bla_lint_panel_derive`: Read-only panel-derive ABI lint (`path`) โ stable `__vaultPanelDerive_*` / classic FNV; same engine as CLI `bla lint-panel-derive`.+- `bla_lint_panel_derive`: Read-only panel-derive ABI lint (`path`) โ stable `__vaultPanelDerive_*` / `deriveLocal` / `panelTokenSha256` oracle; same engine as CLI `bla lint-panel-derive`.+- `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap`: Read-only JS AES wrap-key unwrap lint (`path`) โ wrap-key + create*iv + fixed hdr; same engine as CLI `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap`. Gate only โ not white-box AES.- `bla_run_lookup`: Read-only harden-run correlation (`summary_path`, optional `run_id`). Summaries are **unsigned**; missing/mismatched id is an error.- `bla_rea_drift`: Thin wrapper over `npm run verify:rea` / `scripts/verify-rea-constants.mjs`. Absent sibling REA โ `status: unverified` (not red-team evidence).- `bla_redteam_report`: Read (or `execute:true` re-run) `docs/redteam/empirical-rea-validation.json`. On-disk read โ `status: available` (not a live REA verdict); `execute:true` โ `pass`/`fail`; missing report / unready REA โ `status: unverified`.