🛡️ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) — Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.
JavaScript adversarial-aiclaude-codecursorelectron-securityllm-securitymcpmcp-serverobfuscationreverse-engineeringwebassembly
test(protector): add output path safety tests for directory recursion and symlink aliases
qybaihecec358e60d60
diff --git a/tests/output-path-safety.test.ts b/tests/output-path-safety.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 0000000..a5126f3--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/output-path-safety.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@+import {+ linkSync,+ mkdirSync,+ mkdtempSync,+ readFileSync,+ rmSync,+ symlinkSync,+ writeFileSync,+} from "node:fs";+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";+import { join } from "node:path";+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";+import { protectTarget } from "../src/engine/protector.js";++const tempDirs: string[] = [];++function makeTempDir(): string {+ const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-output-safety-"));+ tempDirs.push(dir);+ return dir;+}++afterEach(() => {+ for (const dir of tempDirs.splice(0)) {+ rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++describe("protectTarget output path safety", () => {+ it("rejects directory outputs inside the input directory, in-place directories, and existing directories", () => {+ const root = makeTempDir();+ const inputDir = join(root, "app");+ const existingDir = join(root, "existing");+ mkdirSync(inputDir);+ mkdirSync(existingDir);+ writeFileSync(join(inputDir, "index.js"), "export const answer = 42;\n");+ writeFileSync(join(existingDir, "keep.txt"), "keep\n");++ expect(() =>+ protectTarget({+ inputPath: inputDir,+ outputPath: join(inputDir, "nested", "out"),+ }),+ ).toThrow(/outside the input directory/);+ expect(() =>+ protectTarget({ inputPath: inputDir, inPlace: true }),+ ).toThrow(/in-place directory protection is not supported/);+ expect(() =>+ protectTarget({ inputPath: inputDir, outputPath: existingDir }),+ ).toThrow(/existing outputs are not overwritten/);+ expect(readFileSync(join(existingDir, "keep.txt"), "utf8")).toBe("keep\n");+ });++ it("rejects symlinked directory outputs that resolve inside the input directory", () => {+ const root = makeTempDir();+ const inputDir = join(root, "app");+ const insideDir = join(inputDir, "inside");+ const aliasParent = join(root, "alias");+ mkdirSync(insideDir, { recursive: true });+ writeFileSync(join(inputDir, "index.js"), "export const answer = 42;\n");+ symlinkSync(insideDir, aliasParent, "dir");++ expect(() =>+ protectTarget({+ inputPath: inputDir,+ outputPath: join(aliasParent, "out"),+ }),+ ).toThrow(/outside the input directory/);+ });++ it("rejects overwriting the input file through direct, symlink, or hardlink aliases unless inPlace is true", () => {+ const root = makeTempDir();+ const inputFile = join(root, "bundle.js");+ const symlinkFile = join(root, "bundle.symlink.js");+ const hardlinkFile = join(root, "bundle.hardlink.js");+ const original = "export function calc(x) { return x + 1; }\n";+ writeFileSync(inputFile, original);+ symlinkSync(inputFile, symlinkFile);+ linkSync(inputFile, hardlinkFile);++ for (const outputPath of [inputFile, symlinkFile, hardlinkFile]) {+ expect(() => protectTarget({ inputPath: inputFile, outputPath })).toThrow(+ /explicitly enable inPlace/,+ );+ expect(readFileSync(inputFile, "utf8")).toBe(original);+ }++ protectTarget({+ inputPath: inputFile,+ outputPath: symlinkFile,+ inPlace: true,+ });+ expect(readFileSync(inputFile, "utf8")).not.toBe(original);+ });+});