๐ก๏ธ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) โ Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.
JavaScript adversarial-aiclaude-codecursorelectron-securityllm-securitymcpmcp-serverobfuscationreverse-engineeringwebassembly
chore(release): bla-agents v2.1.0
qybaihedb54442770db
diff --git a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.mdindex b199990..db68405 100644--- a/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md+++ b/.agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: >Agents). Prefer this skill as the guide; call existing MCP tools / CLI โ do not inventnew MCP tools. Default verb: bla_harden. Refuse crack/RE of third-party software.metadata:- version: "2.0.0"+ version: "2.1.0"---# BLA: Blind LLM Agents@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ model misjudgment on proprietary logic, or **one-click / ไธ้ฎๅ ๅบ** a build.Defensive only: protect **their own** artifacts. Refuse crack, RE, bypass PoCs, orattack playbooks against software they do not own.-**bla-agents 2.0.0** (2026-11-03): packaging-gates unified lint, R1โR12 refuse/recipe/honesty layers below, WASM arity/export-order defaults, MCP write-safety + run evidence. Relative to 1.x: bankrupt harden refuses more footguns by default; Skill recipes (SHA-256 KDF, commitment outside XOR, random pad3/rounds, unlock body scatter) stay guide-only โ no fake refuse lints.+**bla-agents 2.1.0** (2026-11-05): post-2.0 absorptions โ seeded polymorphism + `bla_polymorph_report`, string XOR encrypt + plaintext-secret lint, interleaved integrity coverage + entry self-digest, CrackMe v8 Aegis / public-SEAL hygiene, MCP version pin, `audit --fail-under`, opt-in ed25519 attestation. 2.0 refuse/recipe/honesty layers unchanged; still no fake refuse lints for full WASM RE + online/SMT.**Principles (red-blue R1โR12 โ MCP/Skill 2.0):**diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex e905de7..f180dd6 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -6,10 +6,30 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]+## [2.1.0] โ 2026-11-05++Minor release after 2.0.0: competitor-research absorptions that stay honest (seeded+polymorphism / string XOR pass / interleaved integrity + real entry self-digest),+CrackMe v8 Aegis + public-SEAL hygiene, and community MCP/CLI/test/signing polish.+No npm publish in this cut โ GitHub tag + Release only.+### Added-- **Self-seal entry self-digest (CrackMe v8 red team 2026-11-05):** the self-seal measure now embeds a canonical SHA-256 of the entry file (all digest literals zeroed) finalized at the protector's write chokepoint, so editing or appending to the entry itself hard-fails with `integrity check failed` instead of only shifting the opaque digest. Un-finalized snippets soft-skip (never brick). `hardenProject` reports `integrityCoverageSelfVerified`; when the on-disk entry does not verify, `integrity-coverage.json` drops `host#site*` โ host self edges (honest refuse) rather than claiming paper coverage.-- **seal-commitment lint:** new warnings `public-materialization-seed` and `public-key-digest-oracle` (CrackMe v8 red-team exposures) surface via `bla lint` / `bla_lint`. Warning only โ not bankrupt refuse.-- **CrackMe v8 Aegis:** product entitlement challenge rebuilt with bla-agents **2.0** (`bankrupt` + `--self-seal`, no `--allow-*`). Absorbs red/blue R1โR12 recipes (SHA-256(key) mask KDF, commitment outside XOR, seed-derived rounds/pad3, arity-2 / export-order / unlock body-index hygiene). Meridian v7 remains a historical snapshot (cleartext private; not re-hardened).+- **Seeded polymorphism + drift report (#84):** HMAC-SHA256 `deriveSeedLabel` for independent PRNG substreams; bundler chunk seeds derived from the harden seed; MCP `bla_polymorph_report` objectively quantifies cross-build structural drift (same seed โ reproducible; different seed โ measurable divergence). Skill: re-randomize every release; functional equivalence stays REA-proven.+- **String/constant XOR encrypt pass (#85):** MCP `bla_encrypt_strings` + `bla_lint_plaintext_secrets` / gate `plaintext-secret`. Seed-derived XOR only (no JS AES โ stays clear of the house `lint-js-aes-unwrap` refuse). Sensitive panel/license literals must not remain cleartext.+- **Interleaved integrity coverage (#86):** schema `bla-integrity-coverage/v1`, MCP `bla_lint_integrity_coverage` / gate `integrity-coverage`. Multi-check coverage matrix refuses paper-only plans (full cover / anti-single-point / hash completeness / weak connectivity).+- **Self-seal entry self-digest (#87, CrackMe v8 red team 2026-11-05):** embeds a canonical SHA-256 of the entry (digest literals zeroed) finalized at the protector write chokepoint โ editing/appending the entry hard-fails with `integrity check failed`. Un-finalized snippets soft-skip (never brick). `hardenProject` reports `integrityCoverageSelfVerified`; when on-disk entry does not verify, `integrity-coverage.json` drops host self-edges (honest refuse) rather than claiming paper coverage. Skill: real-not-paper self-coverage.+- **Opt-in ed25519 defense attestation (#88, rebase of #81):** sign defense attestation manifests when a key is supplied; verify path for signed manifests.+- **`bla audit --fail-under` (#79):** exit non-zero when exposure score is at or above the given threshold (CI-friendly gate).+- **Core unit coverage (#80):** detector, prng, identifiers, sarif, llm-directives, reporter, python.+- **CrackMe v8 Aegis (#82):** product entitlement challenge rebuilt with bla-agents **2.0** (`bankrupt` + `--self-seal`, no `--allow-*`). Absorbs red/blue R1โR12 recipes (SHA-256(key) mask KDF, commitment outside XOR, seed-derived rounds/pad3, arity-2 / export-order / unlock body-index hygiene). Meridian v7 remains a historical snapshot (cleartext private; not re-hardened).+- **seal-commitment lint warnings (#83):** `public-materialization-seed` and `public-key-digest-oracle` surface via `bla lint` / `bla_lint`. Warning only โ not bankrupt refuse. CrackMe v8 SEAL v2 keeps harden seed private and drops published `keySha256`.++### Fixed+- **MCP registration pin (#78):** `bla setup` pins MCP package registration to the running BLA version instead of `@latest`, so agent configs cannot silently float onto a mismatched release.++### Changed+- Skill guide **v2.1.0** documents polymorph / plaintext-secret / integrity-coverage / entry self-digest principles alongside the 2.0 refuse/recipe/honesty layers.+## [2.0.0] โ 2026-11-03diff --git a/STATE.md b/STATE.mdindex 6a2c664..53f4344 100644--- a/STATE.md+++ b/STATE.md@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@# BLA state of the project-**Version:** 2.0.0 (`package.json` โ `src/identity.ts`, verified by build; see `CHANGELOG.md`)+**Version:** 2.1.0 (`package.json` โ `src/identity.ts`, verified by build; see `CHANGELOG.md`)**Status:** CI matrix runs typecheck, build, tests and the benchmark on ubuntu / macos / windows with Node 24. Windows checkouts keep `challenge/**` LF via `.gitattributes` so the CrackMe seals verify.**Publishing:** tag-only releases (`git tag bla-agents-<version>`); see `CHANGELOG.md` and GitHub Releases.diff --git a/challenge/v6/SEAL.json b/challenge/v6/SEAL.jsonindex 1d38f31..01ecf75 100644--- a/challenge/v6/SEAL.json+++ b/challenge/v6/SEAL.json@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@{"schema": "bla-crackme-v6-seal/v2","mode": "release",- "blaVersion": "2.0.0",+ "blaVersion": "2.1.0","recipe": "npm run crackme:build (hardenProject == `bla harden <dir> --intensity bankrupt --seed <seed>`)","seed": "bla-crackme-v6-harden-native-2026-11","intensity": "bankrupt",diff --git a/challenge/v7/SEAL.json b/challenge/v7/SEAL.jsonindex 57769d4..534701a 100644--- a/challenge/v7/SEAL.json+++ b/challenge/v7/SEAL.json@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@"schema": "bla-crackme-v7-seal/v1","mode": "release","product": "Meridian",- "blaVersion": "2.0.0",+ "blaVersion": "2.1.0","hardenSeedLabel": "bound-at-build-into-opaque-predicates","intensity": "bankrupt","llmDirectives": false,diff --git a/challenge/v8/SEAL.json b/challenge/v8/SEAL.jsonindex a6cc4a6..00d3645 100644--- a/challenge/v8/SEAL.json+++ b/challenge/v8/SEAL.json@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@"schema": "bla-crackme-v8-seal/v2","mode": "release","product": "Aegis",- "blaVersion": "2.0.0",+ "blaVersion": "2.1.0","recipe": "npm run crackme:v8:build (hardenProject == `bla harden <dir> --intensity bankrupt --seed <private> --self-seal`); harden/schedule seed is private (derived from release secrets) and NOT published","label": "bla-crackme-v8-aegis-2026-11","intensity": "bankrupt",diff --git a/docs/releases/v2.1.0.md b/docs/releases/v2.1.0.mdnew file mode 100644index 0000000..aec939a--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/releases/v2.1.0.md@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@+# bla-agents v2.1.0 โ post-2.0 hardening + honesty absorptions++**Date:** 2026-11-05 (Asia/Singapore)++## Headline++Minor cut after 2.0.0. Absorbs competitor research that stays provable, closes CrackMe v8+public-SEAL exposures, and lands community MCP/CLI/test/signing polish.++- **Seeded polymorphism + `bla_polymorph_report`** (#84) โ HMAC-SHA256 substreams, objective cross-build drift+- **`bla_encrypt_strings` + plaintext-secret lint** (#85) โ seed XOR only (no JS AES)+- **Interleaved integrity coverage** (#86) + **entry self-digest** (#87) โ real coverage, not paper+- **CrackMe v8 Aegis** (#82) + public-SEAL hygiene (#83)+- MCP pin to running version (#78), `bla audit --fail-under` (#79), core tests (#80), opt-in ed25519 attestation (#88)++Skill **v2.1.0**. Honesty residual unchanged: full WASM RE + online/SMT โ still no fake refuse lint.+Acoda-style model-bait / fake vulns intentionally **not** absorbed.++## Relative to 2.0.0++| Area | 2.0.0 | 2.1.0 |+|------|-------|-------|+| Build polymorphism | seed used ad-hoc | HMAC-derived substreams + `bla_polymorph_report` |+| Cleartext literals | house AES lint only | XOR encrypt pass + `plaintext-secret` gate |+| Self-seal | sibling + env fingerprint | + interleaved coverage matrix + entry self-digest |+| Public SEAL | could leak seed / key digest | warn lint + CrackMe v8 private seed |+| Setup / audit / attest | `@latest` MCP; soft audit exit | pinned version; `--fail-under`; opt-in ed25519 |++## Gates++- `npm run build` โ required green+- `npm test` โ required green+- Tags: `bla-agents-2.1.0` (and `v2.1.0` alias)++## Publish checklist++```bash+gh auth status+git checkout main && git pull+git tag -a bla-agents-2.1.0 -m "bla-agents v2.1.0"+git tag -a v2.1.0 -m "bla-agents v2.1.0"+git push origin bla-agents-2.1.0 v2.1.0+gh release create bla-agents-2.1.0 --title "bla-agents v2.1.0" --notes-file docs/releases/v2.1.0.md+# npm publish only when npm credentials are configured โ NOT done for this cut+```++## Red line++Unsigned APKs only. Defensive tooling โ refuse crack/RE of third-party software.diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.jsonindex c1e71ff..31dd25e 100644--- a/package-lock.json+++ b/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "bla-agents",- "version": "2.0.0",+ "version": "2.1.0","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "bla-agents",- "version": "2.0.0",+ "version": "2.1.0","license": "MIT","dependencies": {"@babel/generator": "^7.26.0",diff --git a/package.json b/package.jsonindex 2d33d29..6beea7c 100644--- a/package.json+++ b/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "bla-agents",- "version": "2.0.0",+ "version": "2.1.0","description": "BLA (Blind LLM Agents) โ Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, WebAssembly, SQLite, AI Models, and Android DEX/IL2CPP against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA.","keywords": ["reverse-engineering-defense",diff --git a/src/identity.ts b/src/identity.tsindex 3219141..624f4e7 100644--- a/src/identity.ts+++ b/src/identity.ts@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ export const BLA_IDENTITY = Object.freeze({packageAlias: "bla-shield",cliBinary: "bla",cliAlias: "bla-agents",- version: "2.0.0",+ version: "2.1.0",slogan: "Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate. Make Reverse Engineering Bankrupt Again.",counterpart: {name: "REA",diff --git a/tests/skill-guide-contents.test.ts b/tests/skill-guide-contents.test.tsindex ada3a6d..542989d 100644--- a/tests/skill-guide-contents.test.ts+++ b/tests/skill-guide-contents.test.ts@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const skillPath = path.join(skillDir, "SKILL.md");describe("blind-llm-agents skill guide contents", () => {it("ships v1.5+/2.0 short decision guide with write-safety, lint-lanes, and run evidence", () => {const text = fs.readFileSync(skillPath, "utf8");- expect(text).toMatch(/metadata:\s*\n\s*version:\s*"(?:1\.5\.\d+|2\.0\.\d+)"/);+ expect(text).toMatch(/metadata:\s*\n\s*version:\s*"(?:1\.5\.\d+|2\.\d+\.\d+)"/);expect(text).toContain("bla_harden");expect(text).toContain("npx bla-agents@latest harden .");expect(text).toContain("weave_decoys");