Open-source Python library for AI browser agents, plus Browser Use Cloud: stealth browsers and a hosted agent API.
Python ai-agentsai-toolsbrowser-agentbrowser-automationbrowser-usecdpcloud-browsercomputer-useheadless-browserllmmcpplaywrightpythonremote-browserstealth-browserweb-automationweb-scraping
Fix: Filter sensitive data from state messages
Cursor Agent8ba95aefa855
diff --git a/browser_use/agent/message_manager/service.py b/browser_use/agent/message_manager/service.pyindex 7e7af5591..d79903e70 100644--- a/browser_use/agent/message_manager/service.py+++ b/browser_use/agent/message_manager/service.py@@ -422,17 +422,22 @@ class MessageManager:def _set_message_with_type(self, message: BaseMessage, message_type: Literal['system', 'state']) -> None:"""Replace a specific state message slot with a new message"""- # Don't filter system and state messages - they should contain placeholder tags or normal conversation+ # System messages don't need filtering - they only contain instructions/placeholders+ # State messages need filtering - they include agent_history_description which contains+ # action results with real sensitive values (after placeholder replacement during execution)if message_type == 'system':self.state.history.system_message = messageelif message_type == 'state':+ if self.sensitive_data:+ message = self._filter_sensitive_data(message)self.state.history.state_message = messageelse:raise ValueError(f'Invalid state message type: {message_type}')def _add_context_message(self, message: BaseMessage) -> None:"""Add a contextual message specific to this step (e.g., validation errors, retry instructions, timeout warnings)"""- # Don't filter context messages - they should contain normal conversation or error messages+ # Context messages typically contain error messages and validation info, not action results+ # with sensitive data, so filtering is not needed hereself.state.history.context_messages.append(message)@time_execution_sync('--filter_sensitive_data')diff --git a/tests/ci/security/test_sensitive_data.py b/tests/ci/security/test_sensitive_data.pyindex d9cadbc97..a55ddc41c 100644--- a/tests/ci/security/test_sensitive_data.py+++ b/tests/ci/security/test_sensitive_data.py@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ import pytestfrom pydantic import BaseModel, Fieldfrom browser_use.agent.message_manager.service import MessageManager-from browser_use.agent.views import MessageManagerState+from browser_use.agent.views import ActionResult, AgentOutput, AgentStepInfo, MessageManagerState+from browser_use.browser.views import BrowserStateSummary+from browser_use.dom.views import SerializedDOMStatefrom browser_use.filesystem.file_system import FileSystemfrom browser_use.llm import SystemMessage, UserMessagefrom browser_use.llm.messages import ContentPartTextParam@@ -269,3 +271,168 @@ def test_is_new_tab_page():assert is_new_tab_page('http://google.com') is Falseassert is_new_tab_page('') is Falseassert is_new_tab_page('chrome://settings') is False+++def test_sensitive_data_filtered_from_action_results():+ """+ Test that sensitive data in action results is filtered before being sent to the LLM.++ This tests the full flow:+ 1. Agent outputs actions with <secret>password</secret> placeholder+ 2. Placeholder gets replaced with real value 'secret_pass123' during action execution+ 3. Action result contains: "Typed 'secret_pass123' into password field"+ 4. When state messages are created, the real value should be replaced back to placeholder+ 5. The LLM should never see the real password value+ """+ import os+ import tempfile+ import uuid++ base_tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()+ file_system_path = os.path.join(base_tmp, str(uuid.uuid4()))++ sensitive_data: dict[str, str | dict[str, str]] = {'username': 'admin_user', 'password': 'secret_pass123'}++ message_manager = MessageManager(+ task='Login to the website',+ system_message=SystemMessage(content='You are a browser automation agent'),+ state=MessageManagerState(),+ file_system=FileSystem(file_system_path),+ sensitive_data=sensitive_data,+ )++ # Create browser state+ dom_state = SerializedDOMState(_root=None, selector_map={})+ browser_state = BrowserStateSummary(+ dom_state=dom_state,+ url='https://example.com/login',+ title='Login Page',+ tabs=[],+ )++ # Simulate action result containing sensitive data after placeholder replacement+ # This represents what happens after typing a password into a form field+ action_results = [+ ActionResult(+ long_term_memory="Successfully typed 'secret_pass123' into the password field",+ error=None,+ )+ ]++ # Create model output for step 1+ model_output = AgentOutput(+ evaluation_previous_goal='Navigated to login page',+ memory='On login page, need to enter credentials',+ next_goal='Submit login form',+ action=[],+ )++ step_info = AgentStepInfo(step_number=1, max_steps=10)++ # Create state messages - this should filter sensitive data+ message_manager.create_state_messages(+ browser_state_summary=browser_state,+ model_output=model_output,+ result=action_results,+ step_info=step_info,+ use_vision=False,+ )++ # Get messages that would be sent to LLM+ messages = message_manager.get_messages()++ # Extract all text content from messages+ all_text = []+ for msg in messages:+ if isinstance(msg.content, str):+ all_text.append(msg.content)+ elif isinstance(msg.content, list):+ for part in msg.content:+ if isinstance(part, ContentPartTextParam):+ all_text.append(part.text)++ combined_text = '\n'.join(all_text)++ # Verify the bug is fixed: plaintext password should NOT appear in messages+ assert 'secret_pass123' not in combined_text, (+ 'Sensitive data leaked! Real password value found in LLM messages. '+ 'The _filter_sensitive_data method should replace it with <secret>password</secret>'+ )++ # Verify the filtered placeholder IS present (proves filtering happened)+ assert '<secret>password</secret>' in combined_text, (+ 'Filtering did not work correctly. Expected <secret>password</secret> placeholder in messages.'+ )+++def test_sensitive_data_filtered_with_domain_specific_format():+ """Test that domain-specific sensitive data format is also filtered from action results."""+ import os+ import tempfile+ import uuid++ base_tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()+ file_system_path = os.path.join(base_tmp, str(uuid.uuid4()))++ # Use domain-specific format+ sensitive_data: dict[str, str | dict[str, str]] = {+ 'example.com': {'api_key': 'sk-secret-api-key-12345'},+ }++ message_manager = MessageManager(+ task='Use the API',+ system_message=SystemMessage(content='You are a browser automation agent'),+ state=MessageManagerState(),+ file_system=FileSystem(file_system_path),+ sensitive_data=sensitive_data,+ )++ dom_state = SerializedDOMState(_root=None, selector_map={})+ browser_state = BrowserStateSummary(+ dom_state=dom_state,+ url='https://example.com/api',+ title='API Page',+ tabs=[],+ )++ # Action result with API key that should be filtered+ action_results = [+ ActionResult(+ long_term_memory="Set API key to 'sk-secret-api-key-12345' in the input field",+ error=None,+ )+ ]++ model_output = AgentOutput(+ evaluation_previous_goal='Opened API settings',+ memory='Need to configure API key',+ next_goal='Save settings',+ action=[],+ )++ step_info = AgentStepInfo(step_number=1, max_steps=10)++ message_manager.create_state_messages(+ browser_state_summary=browser_state,+ model_output=model_output,+ result=action_results,+ step_info=step_info,+ use_vision=False,+ )++ messages = message_manager.get_messages()++ all_text = []+ for msg in messages:+ if isinstance(msg.content, str):+ all_text.append(msg.content)+ elif isinstance(msg.content, list):+ for part in msg.content:+ if isinstance(part, ContentPartTextParam):+ all_text.append(part.text)++ combined_text = '\n'.join(all_text)++ # API key should be filtered out+ assert 'sk-secret-api-key-12345' not in combined_text, 'API key leaked into LLM messages!'+ assert '<secret>api_key</secret>' in combined_text, 'API key placeholder not found in messages'