Open-source Python library for AI browser agents, plus Browser Use Cloud: stealth browsers and a hosted agent API.
Python ai-agentsai-toolsbrowser-agentbrowser-automationbrowser-usecdpcloud-browsercomputer-useheadless-browserllmmcpplaywrightpythonremote-browserstealth-browserweb-automationweb-scraping
fix(security): percent-decode host before IPv4 classification
Saurav Pandab6ef0e28888f
diff --git a/browser_use/browser/watchdogs/security_watchdog.py b/browser_use/browser/watchdogs/security_watchdog.pyindex 22ae50161..55bd7b82d 100644--- a/browser_use/browser/watchdogs/security_watchdog.py+++ b/browser_use/browser/watchdogs/security_watchdog.py@@ -141,17 +141,33 @@ class SecurityWatchdog(BaseWatchdog):Recognizes non-standard IPv4 representations that Chromium resolves but`ipaddress.ip_address()` rejects — decimal (`2130706433`), hex(`0x7f000001`), octal (`0177.0.0.1`), and short forms (`127.1`,- `127.0.1`). Without this canonicalization, `block_ip_addresses=True`- can be bypassed by simply re-encoding the IP in one of these forms.+ `127.0.1`). Also percent-decodes the host first, since Chromium decodes+ `%XX` escapes before applying its IPv4 parser; without that step,+ `http://%30x7f000001/` (decodes to `0x7f000001` → 127.0.0.1) and+ `http://%31%32%37.0.0.1/` (decodes to `127.0.0.1`) would still bypass+ `block_ip_addresses`.+See GHSA-xrfv-gg9f-wwjp / GHSA-g27c-8gp4-28cv."""import ipaddressimport socket+ from urllib.parse import unquote# Strip IPv6 bracket wrapping defensively; urlparse usually strips it,# but a malformed url could leak it through.bare = host.strip('[]')+ # Percent-decode the host before parsing. Browsers decode `%XX` escapes+ # in the host component, so an unencoded check would miss+ # `%30x7f000001` (→ '0x7f000001') and `%31%32%37.0.0.1` (→ '127.0.0.1').+ # `unquote` is forgiving (leaves malformed `%`-sequences as-is) but we+ # still wrap in try/except so any future encoding edge case can never+ # crash the navigation security check.+ try:+ bare = unquote(bare)+ except Exception:+ pass+# Standard dotted-quad IPv4 and full IPv6.try:ipaddress.ip_address(bare)diff --git a/tests/ci/security/test_ip_blocking.py b/tests/ci/security/test_ip_blocking.pyindex 2f408c558..2182306b1 100644--- a/tests/ci/security/test_ip_blocking.py+++ b/tests/ci/security/test_ip_blocking.py@@ -588,3 +588,33 @@ class TestNonStandardIPv4Representations:assert watchdog._is_ip_address('\ud800') is Falseassert watchdog._is_ip_address('caf\udce9.local') is Falseassert watchdog._is_ip_address('\udcff.example.com') is False++ def test_percent_encoded_ipv4_blocked(self):+ """Percent-encoded hostnames that decode to IPs must be blocked.++ Chromium percent-decodes the host before resolving — so+ `http://%30x7f000001/` decodes to `0x7f000001` → `127.0.0.1`, and+ `http://%31%32%37.0.0.1/` decodes to `127.0.0.1`. Without+ percent-decoding inside the classifier, the IP block is bypassed+ whenever the URL contains any `%`-encoded host bytes.+ """+ watchdog = self._watchdog()+ # Mixed encoding: %30 = '0', rest literal → '0x7f000001'+ assert watchdog._is_url_allowed('http://%30x7f000001/') is False+ # Fully encoded canonical form: %31%32%37 = '127'+ assert watchdog._is_url_allowed('http://%31%32%37.0.0.1/') is False+ # Fully encoded decimal form: → '2130706433'+ assert watchdog._is_url_allowed('http://%32%31%33%30%37%30%36%34%33%33/') is False+ # Direct classifier checks for the same decoded forms.+ assert watchdog._is_ip_address('%30x7f000001') is True+ assert watchdog._is_ip_address('%31%32%37.0.0.1') is True+ assert watchdog._is_ip_address('%32%31%33%30%37%30%36%34%33%33') is True++ def test_malformed_percent_encoding_does_not_crash(self):+ """Hostnames with malformed `%` escapes must not crash the classifier."""+ watchdog = self._watchdog()+ # `unquote` leaves bad `%`-sequences as-is; we must still treat the+ # result as a non-IP rather than blowing up.+ assert watchdog._is_ip_address('%') is False+ assert watchdog._is_ip_address('%zz') is False+ assert watchdog._is_ip_address('%2') is False