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ci: add plumber to watch workflow security
Thibaud-Vdb1d553ff5ee13
diff --git a/.github/workflows/plumber.yml b/.github/workflows/plumber.ymlnew file mode 100644index 000000000..e732eb2cb--- /dev/null+++ b/.github/workflows/plumber.yml@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@+name: plumber++on:+ push:+ branches: [main]+ pull_request:++permissions:+ contents: read++jobs:+ plumber:+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest+ permissions:+ contents: read+ security-events: write+ # Lets the run publish the score for the README badge via OIDC,+ # no secret involved.+ id-token: write+ steps:+ - uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3++ - uses: getplumber/plumber@7970e5df1e7d217de41b2880832b63a6f2152b97 # v0.4.8+ with:+ # Code scanning upload needs security-events write, which PRs+ # from forks do not get. The report stays available as a+ # workflow artifact there.+ upload-sarif: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork != true }}+ # Feeds the score badge in the README. The badge service only+ # keeps the default branch score (verified from the OIDC+ # token), and a failed push never fails the run.+ score-push: truediff --git a/.plumber.yaml b/.plumber.yamlnew file mode 100644index 000000000..29836826e--- /dev/null+++ b/.plumber.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@+# Plumber configuration for this repository.+# Checks the GitHub Actions workflows for supply chain issues:+# unpinned actions, archived dependencies, known CVEs, dangerous+# triggers, secrets handling and more.+#+# Started from `plumber config generate` and scoped to this repo,+# see the inline notes on the few controls that are off.+# Reference: https://github.com/getplumber/plumber++version: "2.0"++github:+ controls:+ # ===========================================+ # Actions must be pinned by commit SHA+ # ===========================================+ # Flags workflow steps whose `uses:` reference is not a 40-character+ # commit SHA. Tag/branch refs (v4, main) are mutable: if the action's+ # maintainer is compromised or retags a release, the caller workflow+ # silently runs new code with its secrets. This is the vector behind+ # the March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files compromise (CVE-2025-30066).+ #+ # The default trustedOwners list exempts first-party (`actions/*`,+ # `github/*`) actions so the initial signal on a fresh repo stays+ # focused on the third-party surface. Pair with Dependabot+ # (`version-update-strategy: sha-and-version`) to keep pins fresh.+ actionsMustBePinnedByCommitSha:+ enabled: true+ # Action-owner prefixes exempt from the pin-by-SHA requirement.+ # Only list owners already inside the workflow's trust boundary.+ trustedOwners:+ - actions+ - github++ # ===========================================+ # Actions must come from authorized sources+ # ===========================================+ # Restrict which `uses:` action sources are allowed. Every third-+ # party action runs with the caller workflow's token and secrets, so+ # limiting actions to vetted owners shrinks the supply-chain surface.+ githubActionMustComeFromAuthorizedSources:+ enabled: true+ # Trust the first-party GitHub-owned actions (actions/*, github/*)+ # that any workflow already executes implicitly. Defaults to true.+ trustGithubOfficialActions: true+ # Trust actions whose owner is the same org/user as the scanned+ # repository — an org's own actions are inside its trust boundary.+ # Defaults to true.+ trustSameOrgActions: true+ # When > 0, also trust any action whose upstream repository has at+ # least this many GitHub stars. Catches rename/re-creation squats+ # where a once-trusted name is re-registered with no history.+ # Requires GitHub API access; 0 disables the star check.+ minimumStars: 0+ # Allowlist of trusted action sources. Each entry is either an+ # exact `owner/repo` or an `owner/*` wildcard for a whole org.+ trustedGithubActions:+ - ncipollo/release-action+ - slackapi/slack-github-action+ - contributor-assistant/github-action+ - mlugg/setup-zig+ - docker/login-action+ - Swatinem/rust-cache+ - dtolnay/rust-toolchain+ - getplumber/plumber++ # ===========================================+ # Container images must not use forbidden tags+ # ===========================================+ # Same control as GitLab; values are GitHub-side. Pinning by digest+ # protects against tag-retag supply-chain attacks. The forbidden tag+ # list catches the common cases of mutable references.+ # Off for now: ghcr.io/lightpanda-io/perf-fmt deliberately tracks+ # :latest and package-debian builds in debian:stable-slim. Worth+ # revisiting if those move to versioned tags or digests.+ containerImageMustNotUseForbiddenTags:+ enabled: false+ tags:+ - latest+ - dev+ - development+ - staging+ - main+ - master+ # When true, ALL images must be pinned by digest (e.g.,+ # alpine@sha256:...). Takes precedence over the forbidden tags+ # list — any image not using an immutable digest reference is+ # flagged.+ containerImagesMustBePinnedByDigest: true++ # ===========================================+ # Pipeline must not use Docker-in-Docker+ # ===========================================+ # Workflows on GitHub-hosted runners that spin up `docker:dind`+ # services have the same privilege-escalation risk as on GitLab.+ # detectInsecureDaemon also flags plaintext DOCKER_HOST and empty+ # DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR values.+ pipelineMustNotUseDockerInDocker:+ enabled: true+ detectInsecureDaemon: true++ # ===========================================+ # Pipeline must not execute unverified scripts+ # ===========================================+ # Same control as GitLab (ISSUE-411). Scans every workflow `run:` step+ # for pipe-to-shell, download-then-exec, redirect-then-exec, and Megalodon-+ # style base64 obfuscation. Maps to OWASP CICD-SEC-3 / CICD-SEC-8.+ pipelineMustNotExecuteUnverifiedScripts:+ enabled: true+ trustedUrls: []+ # - https://internal-artifacts.example.com/*++ # ===========================================+ # Reusable workflows must not inherit secrets+ # ===========================================+ # Detects `jobs.<name>.secrets: inherit` calls. Inherit forwards+ # every secret visible to the caller — repo, organisation,+ # environment — to the reusable workflow regardless of what it+ # actually needs. Use an explicit secrets map instead.+ reusableWorkflowsMustNotInheritSecrets:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Workflow must not export the entire secrets context+ # ===========================================+ # Flags a job that serialises the whole `secrets` context with+ # toJson(secrets) / toJSON(secrets) into a run script, an env+ # binding, or an action `with:` input. The JSON blob carries every+ # repository, organisation and environment secret the job can see;+ # GitHub log redaction masks known secret values, not a JSON string+ # derived from them, so a single echo leaks the lot. Reference each+ # secret by name instead.+ workflowMustNotExportEntireSecretsContext:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Security jobs must not be weakened+ # ===========================================+ # Jobs matching the security-scanner naming patterns must not be+ # neutralised via `continue-on-error: true` (mapped to the same+ # IR field as GitLab's allow_failure: true) or manual-dispatch-only+ # triggers. The pattern set covers the GitHub-native scanners+ # users actually run — `codeql`, `dependency-review`, `trufflehog`,+ # `gitleaks`, `osv-scanner`, plus generic fallbacks like+ # `*scan*`, `*audit*`, `*security*` so SAST jobs named with+ # project-specific prefixes still match.+ securityJobsMustNotBeWeakened:+ enabled: true+ # How patterns are matched+ # ────────────────────────+ # Each pattern is a glob (`*` matches any substring) compared+ # against the job name plumber builds for every job in your+ # workflows. That name is:+ #+ # <workflow filename, .yml/.yaml stripped>/<job id in YAML>+ #+ # Examples:+ # .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml + jobs.analyze+ # -> codeql-analysis/analyze+ # .github/workflows/ci.yml + jobs.lint+ # -> ci/lint+ # .github/workflows/workflow.yml + jobs.my-sast+ # -> workflow/my-sast+ #+ # The namespace exists so two workflow files defining a job+ # with the same id do not collide. Patterns can target whichever+ # part of that name is stable for your repo:+ # "*<token>*" token anywhere in the name (resilient)+ # "<workflow>/*" every job in one workflow file+ # "*/<jobid>" specific job id, any workflow+ # "<workflow>/<jobid>" exact match, no wildcard+ #+ # The defaults below ship wildcard-wrapped because plumber does+ # not know your repo's workflow-file convention. If your jobs+ # follow a known layout you can drop the wildcards for tighter+ # matching.+ securityJobPatterns:+ - "*codeql*"+ - "*dependency-review*"+ - "*trufflehog*"+ - "*gitleaks*"+ - "*osv-scanner*"+ - "*-sast"+ - "*-sast-*"+ - "*-scan"+ - "*scan*"+ - "*-security"+ - "*-security-*"+ - "*-audit"+ - "*-audit-*"+ # Real-world slash-form examples (commented; uncomment / adapt+ # to your repo for a tighter match than the wildcards above).+ # Format reminder: <workflow-filename-without-extension>/<job-id>.+ #+ # - codeql-analysis/analyze # GitHub's default CodeQL template+ # - dependency-review/dependency-review # GitHub's default Dependency Review template+ # - security/gitleaks # gitleaks job in security.yml+ # - security/trufflehog # trufflehog job in security.yml+ # - security/* # every job in security.yml+ # - "*/sast" # any job named "sast", any workflow+ # - ci/semgrep-sast # exact match, no wildcard+ allowFailureMustBeFalse:+ enabled: true+ rulesMustNotBeRedefined:+ enabled: true+ whenMustNotBeManual:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Workflow must not inject user input in scripts+ # ===========================================+ # Catches the canonical script-injection class: `${{ github.event.* }}`+ # / `${{ github.head_ref }}` / `${{ github.actor }}` interpolated+ # directly into a `run:` shell. Attacker-controlled values like PR+ # title or branch name can break out of the intended string and+ # execute arbitrary commands with the job's secrets. Bind through+ # `env:` first, then reference the env var from the shell.+ workflowMustNotInjectUserInputInScripts:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Workflow must not write untrusted content to $GITHUB_ENV / $GITHUB_PATH+ # ===========================================+ # Flags a `run:` step that writes an attacker-controlled expression+ # (${{ github.event.* }} / ${{ github.head_ref }}) into $GITHUB_ENV or+ # $GITHUB_PATH. Both files are sticky: every later step inherits the+ # variable or PATH entry, so an injected NODE_OPTIONS (or a front-loaded+ # PATH directory) hijacks later steps. Critical under pull_request_target /+ # workflow_run. Bind the value through `env:` and reference the shell+ # variable on the redirect line.+ workflowMustNotWriteUntrustedContentToGitHubEnv:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Workflow must not use dangerous triggers+ # ===========================================+ # Flags `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run` triggers, which+ # run with the base repository's secrets while being influenceable+ # by an unprivileged caller. Combined with any user-content+ # checkout this becomes a direct exfiltration path (CVE-2025-30066).+ # Use the standard `pull_request` trigger unless secrets are+ # required.+ workflowMustNotUseDangerousTriggers:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # pull_request_target must not check out PR head+ # ===========================================+ # Flags a workflow triggered by `pull_request_target` that checks+ # out the pull-request head (github.event.pull_request.head.sha or+ # github.head_ref). Base-repo secrets and fork-controlled code then+ # run together, which is the tj-actions / CVE-2025-30066 vector.+ # Keep fork code under a plain `pull_request` trigger instead.+ pullRequestTargetMustNotCheckoutHead:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Workflows must declare permissions+ # ===========================================+ # Workflows without an explicit `permissions:` block fall back to+ # the repo-wide GITHUB_TOKEN default — often `contents: write` or+ # `read-all`. Declaring `permissions: { contents: read }` at the+ # workflow level enforces least-privilege regardless of the repo+ # default.+ # Off for now: adding permissions blocks touches every workflow and+ # deserves its own careful pass, a wrong value silently breaks+ # releases and the CLA bot. Enable after that cleanup.+ workflowsMustDeclarePermissions:+ enabled: false++ # ===========================================+ # Branch must be protected (project governance)+ # ===========================================+ # The first project-governance control on the GitHub path. Every+ # other shipping rule is pipeline-governance (workflow content);+ # this one inspects repository settings via the GitHub branch-+ # protection API. Requires a token with `repo` scope (classic+ # PAT) or "Administration: read" (fine-grained PAT) — content-+ # only read access is NOT enough. Without scope the collector+ # returns an empty branch list and the rule emits no findings,+ # same degraded contract as missing API auth elsewhere.+ # Off in CI: reading branch protection settings needs an admin-read+ # token, the default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot see them.+ branchMustBeProtected:+ enabled: false+ defaultMustBeProtected: true+ namePatterns:+ - main+ - master+ - release/*+ - production+ - dev+ allowForcePush: false+ codeOwnerApprovalRequired: true++ # ============================================================================+ # Workflows must include required actions+ # ============================================================================+ # Asserts that every workflow file under .github/workflows/+ # collectively references a set of required actions or reusable+ # workflows. The GitHub counterpart of+ # pipelineMustIncludeComponent / pipelineMustIncludeTemplate on+ # the GitLab side.+ #+ # GitHub has two ways to "include" something external; the+ # control treats both the same so you do not have to declare+ # which is which:+ #+ # Step-level action:+ # steps:+ # - uses: myorg/sast-scan@v2+ #+ # Job-level reusable workflow call:+ # jobs:+ # security:+ # uses: myorg/policy/.github/workflows/scan.yml@v2+ #+ # Each required entry is an `owner/repo[/path]` string. Matching+ # is ref-agnostic so bumping a pinned SHA does not invalidate+ # the policy. A slash-guard prevents accidental prefix+ # collisions: `myorg/sast-scan` matches+ # `myorg/sast-scan@<anything>` and+ # `myorg/sast-scan/sub@<anything>`, but NOT+ # `myorg/sast-scan-fork@<anything>`.+ #+ # Two ways to define requirements (use one, not both):+ #+ # Option 1, Expression syntax ('required'):+ # A natural boolean expression using AND, OR, and parentheses.+ # AND binds tighter than OR, so "a AND b OR c" means+ # "(a AND b) OR c".+ #+ # required: myorg/sast-scan AND myorg/dependency-review+ # required: (myorg/sast-scan AND myorg/secret-scan) OR myorg/full-security-suite+ #+ # Option 2, Array syntax ('requiredGroups'):+ # A list of groups using "OR of ANDs" logic:+ # - Each inner array = items that must ALL be present (AND)+ # - Outer array = only ONE group needs to be satisfied (OR)+ #+ # requiredGroups:+ # - ["myorg/sast-scan", "myorg/dependency-review"]+ # - ["myorg/full-security-suite"]+ #+ # Disabled by default; opt in once your organization has settled+ # on the action set every repo is expected to wire up.+ workflowMustIncludeRequiredActions:+ enabled: false+ # required: myorg/sast-scan AND myorg/policy/.github/workflows/scan.yml+ requiredGroups: []++ # ===========================================+ # Workflow must not grant write-all permissions+ # ===========================================+ # Flags workflows and jobs whose effective `permissions:` block is the+ # literal `write-all` shortcut. write-all gives GITHUB_TOKEN every+ # scope (contents, packages, deployments, id-token, …) at the same+ # time, so any compromise in the workflow — a malicious dependency,+ # a script-injection bug, a third-party action turning evil — gets+ # to do anything the repo allows: push to main, publish releases,+ # mint OIDC tokens for cloud accounts, mark deployments succeeded.+ #+ # Workflow-level `permissions: write-all` is propagated to every+ # job by the GitHub Actions runner; the rule reads the per-job+ # effective permissions, so a workflow-level grant is caught the+ # same way as a job-level one.+ #+ # Scope: static `permissions:` in committed workflow YAML only.+ # Flags the literal string shortcut `write-all` on a job's effective+ # permissions (workflow-level `write-all` is propagated to every job).+ #+ # Does not flag: `permissions: { contents: write, … }` maps, `read-all`,+ # or missing `permissions:` (see `workflowsMustDeclarePermissions` /+ # ISSUE-801). Does not evaluate `${{ }}` expressions or permissions+ # inside callee reusable-workflow files Plumber did not fetch.+ #+ # Pair with `workflowsMustDeclarePermissions` for the full story.+ workflowMustNotGrantPermissionsWriteAll:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Actions must not use ambiguous tag/branch refs+ # ===========================================+ # Flags `uses: owner/repo@ref` references whose symbolic name resolves+ # upstream as BOTH a tag and a branch (e.g. a tag `v1` kept alongside a+ # long-lived `v1` branch). GitHub Actions resolves tags first, so the+ # workflow runs the tagged commit today — but a tag deletion, rename, or+ # a workflow typo silently switches which revision executes, and the+ # reviewer cannot tell from the YAML alone. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA+ # to remove the ambiguity.+ #+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level+ # `uses: owner/repo@ref`. Requires GitHub API auth: the collector probes+ # both the tag and branch namespaces, and without auth the rule abstains.+ #+ # Fail-safe: the finding fires only on a positive tag+branch double-hit;+ # any probe failure leaves the ref unflagged (no false positive).+ externalRefsMustNotCollide:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Actions must not reference archived repositories+ # ===========================================+ # Flags `uses: owner/repo@ref` references whose upstream repository+ # is archived on GitHub. Archived repos no longer receive+ # maintenance: open vulnerabilities stay open, dependency bumps+ # stop, runtime compatibility regressions accumulate. Pinning by+ # SHA does not save the caller — the last maintainer (or someone+ # who later acquires the namespace) can still push new code under+ # the original repository name.+ #+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level+ # `uses: owner/repo@ref` (not reusable-workflow `jobs.*.uses`, not+ # local `./.github/actions/*`). Requires GitHub API auth; without it+ # the rule abstains (no finding).+ #+ # How it works: `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}` → `archived` flag, one+ # cached lookup per `owner/repo` (all refs share the same result).+ #+ # Does not see: callee reusable-workflow files, deleted/private repos+ # (lookup may fail silently → abstain).+ # Off for now: cla.yml depends on contributor-assistant/github-action,+ # archived upstream in March 2026. It is pinned to a commit in the+ # meantime. Enable once the CLA flow moves to a maintained action.+ actionsMustNotBeArchived:+ enabled: false++ # ===========================================+ # Actions must pin commits that exist upstream+ # ===========================================+ # Flags `uses: owner/repo@<sha>` references pinned to a 40-character+ # commit SHA that the upstream repository confirms does not exist:+ # either a typo (the runner silently falls back to the default+ # branch) or a commit that was removed or never pushed upstream.+ #+ # Scope note: this does NOT detect a fork-network "impostor commit"+ # (one pushed to a fork of the upstream repo). GitHub serves those+ # with HTTP 200 from the parent, so they read as present; the control+ # flags only SHAs the API reports as absent.+ #+ # Fires ONLY when the GitHub API confirms the commit is absent from a+ # repository Plumber can read. A SHA it could not verify+ # (private/missing repo, rate limit, network error) stays silent, so+ # a valid pin is never flagged. Non-SHA refs (tags, branches) are out+ # of scope here; mutable-ref concerns are+ # actionsMustBePinnedByCommitSha's job.+ #+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level+ # `uses: owner/repo@<sha>`. Job-level reusable-workflow refs are not+ # yet covered: the collector does not enrich them with API metadata+ # for ANY metadata control (also affects archived / known-CVE /+ # ref-confusion); extending all four together is tracked upstream.+ # Requires GitHub API auth (`gh` / GH_TOKEN); without it the rule+ # abstains (no finding).+ actionRefsMustExistUpstream:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Actions must not carry known CVEs+ # ===========================================+ # Cross-references every `uses: owner/repo@ref` against the GitHub+ # Advisory Database under the `actions` ecosystem. A positive hit+ # means at least one published advisory targets the action's+ # repository. This is the rule that catches the published-CVE+ # supply-chain class — tj-actions/changed-files (CVE-2025-30066),+ # reviewdog/action-setup (March 2025), unpatched versions of+ # `actions/artifact`.+ #+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level+ # `uses: owner/repo@ref` (not reusable-workflow `jobs.*.uses`, not+ # `./.github/actions/*`, not `docker://`). Requires GitHub API auth+ # (`gh` / GH_TOKEN); without it the rule abstains (no finding).+ #+ # How it works: one Advisory Database query per `owner/repo`+ # (`ecosystem=actions`), cached. When the pinned ref resolves to a+ # semver tag, Plumber filters advisories by `vulnerable_version_range`.+ # A ref that cannot be resolved to a release version — a commit SHA+ # with no matching release tag, or a mutable non-numeric tag such as+ # `rc` / `main` / `latest` — abstains and surfaces a "could not verify"+ # warning rather than matching every advisory for that repo. Upgrade+ # past the fixed-in version and re-pin the SHA to clear the finding.+ #+ # Does not see: org/repo Variables, runtime `$GITHUB_ENV` writes, or+ # actions nested inside composite actions you do not call directly.+ actionsMustNotCarryKnownCVEs:+ enabled: true++ # ===========================================+ # Release workflows must not restore an untrusted cache+ # ===========================================+ # Flags a release/publish job that restores a build cache whose key+ # is not scoped to the release ref. GitHub Actions caches are shared+ # across branches with a permissive fallback, so a PR run on any+ # feature branch can populate the same key a release job later+ # restores, injecting compromised artefacts into the published+ # output (the May 2026 TanStack vector). Weave github.ref_name /+ # github.sha into the cache key, or disable caching on publish paths.+ #+ # The action / script inventories below are configurable: the built-in+ # cache semantics (which setup-* actions cache by default vs on opt-in)+ # stay in code, but WHICH actions publish, WHICH extra actions restore a+ # cache, and WHICH shell commands mean "publish" are org-specific. Extend+ # them for your own tooling instead of waiting for a plumber release.+ releaseWorkflowsMustNotRestoreUntrustedCache:+ enabled: true+ # Actions that publish/release artifacts (a job running one restores+ # into a published build). Add your org's own publish actions.+ publishActions:+ - pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish+ - JS-DevTools/npm-publish+ - gradle/publish-plugin+ - softprops/action-gh-release+ - ncipollo/release-action+ - goreleaser/goreleaser-action+ - crazy-max/ghaction-docker-buildx+ - changesets/action+ # Full inventory of cache-restoring actions AND their per-action+ # semantics (the rego hardcodes none of this). mode:+ # always — restores whenever present (actions/cache, rust-cache)+ # default — restores unless disableInput holds disableValue+ # opt-in — restores only when enableInput names a package manager+ # (enableContains further requires that substring in the+ # value, e.g. build-push-action only caches via GHA when+ # cache-from mentions type=gha)+ # Add your org's own cache actions with the matching mode.+ cacheActions:+ - {action: actions/cache, mode: always}+ - {action: actions/cache/restore, mode: always}+ - {action: Swatinem/rust-cache, mode: always}+ - {action: actions/setup-go, mode: default, disableInput: cache, disableValue: false}+ - {action: gradle/actions/setup-gradle, mode: default, disableInput: cache-disabled, disableValue: true}+ - {action: actions/setup-node, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}+ - {action: actions/setup-python, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}+ - {action: actions/setup-java, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}+ - {action: pnpm/action-setup, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}+ - {action: docker/build-push-action, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache-from, enableContains: type=gha}+ # Shell commands (regex) that mark a job as release intent even under a+ # plain push/tag trigger with no publish action.+ publishScriptPatterns:+ - '(?i)(npm|pnpm|yarn|bun)\s+publish'+ - '(?i)cargo\s+publish'+ - '(?i)twine\s+upload'+ - '(?i)poetry\s+publish'+ - '(?i)gh\s+release\s+create'+ - '(?i)goreleaser\s+release'+ - '(?i)semantic-release'+ - '(?i)gradlew?\b[^\n]*\bpublish'+ - '(?i)\bmvnw?\b[^\n]*\bdeploy\b'+ - '(?i)dotnet\s+nuget\s+push'+ - '(?i)gem\s+push'+ - '(?i)docker\s+push'+ # Verification-only forms that veto a publish-script match on the same+ # run block — they never publish anything.+ publishScriptExcludePatterns:+ - '(?i)--dry-run'+ - '(?i)publishToMavenLocal'+ # Jobs to exempt from this control (glob on `<workflow-file>/<job-id>`).+ # The escape hatch for release jobs you have reviewed and accepted —+ # e.g. a lint job that caches but ships nothing.+ allowedJobs: []+ # - '*/lint'+ # - 'release-docs/*'++ # ===========================================+ # Pipeline must not enable debug trace+ # ===========================================+ # GitHub-side parallel of the GitLab `pipelineMustNotEnableDebugTrace`+ # control. Flags workflows or jobs that set the GitHub Actions+ # debug-trace toggles to a truthy value (`true`, `1`, `yes`).+ #+ # When `ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG=true` or `ACTIONS_RUNNER_DEBUG=true`,+ # the runner prints every environment variable (including masked+ # secrets) and every internal action SDK call into the job log.+ # The masking layer is bypassed for the dump itself, so any+ # secret consumed by the workflow lands in plaintext in the run+ # log and is then visible to anyone with `actions: read` on the+ # repository, plus indefinitely on log artefacts.+ #+ # Scope: static `env:` in committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}`.+ # The collector merges workflow-, job-, and step-level `env:` into+ # each job (step > job > workflow precedence on name collisions).+ #+ # Truthy values: `true`, `1`, `yes` (case-insensitive, trimmed).+ # Variable names: case-insensitive match against `forbiddenVariables`.+ #+ # Also flags: `${{ }}` values on forbidden names in static `env:`+ # (cannot verify off statically), and `run:` lines that write a+ # forbidden name to `$GITHUB_ENV`. All ISSUE-203 findings are critical.+ #+ # Does not see: org/repo/environment Variables with no YAML reference,+ # env inside callee reusable workflows Plumber did not fetch, or GitHub+ # UI "Re-run with debug logging" (not in YAML).+ pipelineMustNotEnableDebugTrace:+ enabled: true+ forbiddenVariables:+ - ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG+ - ACTIONS_RUNNER_DEBUG+diff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 9a880cba3..5a76a7f80 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Not a Chromium fork. Not a WebKit patch. A new browser, written in Zig.[](https://twitter.com/lightpanda_io)[](https://github.com/lightpanda-io/browser)[](https://discord.gg/K63XeymfB5)+[](https://score.getplumber.io/github.com/lightpanda-io/browser)</div><div align="center">