Skip to content

Lightpanda: the headless browser designed for AI and automation

ci: add plumber to watch workflow security

Thibaud-Vdb1d553ff5ee13
diff --git a/.github/workflows/plumber.yml b/.github/workflows/plumber.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e732eb2cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/plumber.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+name: plumber
+
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [main]
+ pull_request:
+
+permissions:
+ contents: read
+
+jobs:
+ plumber:
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ permissions:
+ contents: read
+ security-events: write
+ # Lets the run publish the score for the README badge via OIDC,
+ # no secret involved.
+ id-token: write
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
+
+ - uses: getplumber/plumber@7970e5df1e7d217de41b2880832b63a6f2152b97 # v0.4.8
+ with:
+ # Code scanning upload needs security-events write, which PRs
+ # from forks do not get. The report stays available as a
+ # workflow artifact there.
+ upload-sarif: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork != true }}
+ # Feeds the score badge in the README. The badge service only
+ # keeps the default branch score (verified from the OIDC
+ # token), and a failed push never fails the run.
+ score-push: true
diff --git a/.plumber.yaml b/.plumber.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..29836826e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.plumber.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
+# Plumber configuration for this repository.
+# Checks the GitHub Actions workflows for supply chain issues:
+# unpinned actions, archived dependencies, known CVEs, dangerous
+# triggers, secrets handling and more.
+#
+# Started from `plumber config generate` and scoped to this repo,
+# see the inline notes on the few controls that are off.
+# Reference: https://github.com/getplumber/plumber
+
+version: "2.0"
+
+github:
+ controls:
+ # ===========================================
+ # Actions must be pinned by commit SHA
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags workflow steps whose `uses:` reference is not a 40-character
+ # commit SHA. Tag/branch refs (v4, main) are mutable: if the action's
+ # maintainer is compromised or retags a release, the caller workflow
+ # silently runs new code with its secrets. This is the vector behind
+ # the March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files compromise (CVE-2025-30066).
+ #
+ # The default trustedOwners list exempts first-party (`actions/*`,
+ # `github/*`) actions so the initial signal on a fresh repo stays
+ # focused on the third-party surface. Pair with Dependabot
+ # (`version-update-strategy: sha-and-version`) to keep pins fresh.
+ actionsMustBePinnedByCommitSha:
+ enabled: true
+ # Action-owner prefixes exempt from the pin-by-SHA requirement.
+ # Only list owners already inside the workflow's trust boundary.
+ trustedOwners:
+ - actions
+ - github
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Actions must come from authorized sources
+ # ===========================================
+ # Restrict which `uses:` action sources are allowed. Every third-
+ # party action runs with the caller workflow's token and secrets, so
+ # limiting actions to vetted owners shrinks the supply-chain surface.
+ githubActionMustComeFromAuthorizedSources:
+ enabled: true
+ # Trust the first-party GitHub-owned actions (actions/*, github/*)
+ # that any workflow already executes implicitly. Defaults to true.
+ trustGithubOfficialActions: true
+ # Trust actions whose owner is the same org/user as the scanned
+ # repository — an org's own actions are inside its trust boundary.
+ # Defaults to true.
+ trustSameOrgActions: true
+ # When > 0, also trust any action whose upstream repository has at
+ # least this many GitHub stars. Catches rename/re-creation squats
+ # where a once-trusted name is re-registered with no history.
+ # Requires GitHub API access; 0 disables the star check.
+ minimumStars: 0
+ # Allowlist of trusted action sources. Each entry is either an
+ # exact `owner/repo` or an `owner/*` wildcard for a whole org.
+ trustedGithubActions:
+ - ncipollo/release-action
+ - slackapi/slack-github-action
+ - contributor-assistant/github-action
+ - mlugg/setup-zig
+ - docker/login-action
+ - Swatinem/rust-cache
+ - dtolnay/rust-toolchain
+ - getplumber/plumber
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Container images must not use forbidden tags
+ # ===========================================
+ # Same control as GitLab; values are GitHub-side. Pinning by digest
+ # protects against tag-retag supply-chain attacks. The forbidden tag
+ # list catches the common cases of mutable references.
+ # Off for now: ghcr.io/lightpanda-io/perf-fmt deliberately tracks
+ # :latest and package-debian builds in debian:stable-slim. Worth
+ # revisiting if those move to versioned tags or digests.
+ containerImageMustNotUseForbiddenTags:
+ enabled: false
+ tags:
+ - latest
+ - dev
+ - development
+ - staging
+ - main
+ - master
+ # When true, ALL images must be pinned by digest (e.g.,
+ # alpine@sha256:...). Takes precedence over the forbidden tags
+ # list — any image not using an immutable digest reference is
+ # flagged.
+ containerImagesMustBePinnedByDigest: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Pipeline must not use Docker-in-Docker
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflows on GitHub-hosted runners that spin up `docker:dind`
+ # services have the same privilege-escalation risk as on GitLab.
+ # detectInsecureDaemon also flags plaintext DOCKER_HOST and empty
+ # DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR values.
+ pipelineMustNotUseDockerInDocker:
+ enabled: true
+ detectInsecureDaemon: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Pipeline must not execute unverified scripts
+ # ===========================================
+ # Same control as GitLab (ISSUE-411). Scans every workflow `run:` step
+ # for pipe-to-shell, download-then-exec, redirect-then-exec, and Megalodon-
+ # style base64 obfuscation. Maps to OWASP CICD-SEC-3 / CICD-SEC-8.
+ pipelineMustNotExecuteUnverifiedScripts:
+ enabled: true
+ trustedUrls: []
+ # - https://internal-artifacts.example.com/*
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Reusable workflows must not inherit secrets
+ # ===========================================
+ # Detects `jobs.<name>.secrets: inherit` calls. Inherit forwards
+ # every secret visible to the caller — repo, organisation,
+ # environment — to the reusable workflow regardless of what it
+ # actually needs. Use an explicit secrets map instead.
+ reusableWorkflowsMustNotInheritSecrets:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflow must not export the entire secrets context
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags a job that serialises the whole `secrets` context with
+ # toJson(secrets) / toJSON(secrets) into a run script, an env
+ # binding, or an action `with:` input. The JSON blob carries every
+ # repository, organisation and environment secret the job can see;
+ # GitHub log redaction masks known secret values, not a JSON string
+ # derived from them, so a single echo leaks the lot. Reference each
+ # secret by name instead.
+ workflowMustNotExportEntireSecretsContext:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Security jobs must not be weakened
+ # ===========================================
+ # Jobs matching the security-scanner naming patterns must not be
+ # neutralised via `continue-on-error: true` (mapped to the same
+ # IR field as GitLab's allow_failure: true) or manual-dispatch-only
+ # triggers. The pattern set covers the GitHub-native scanners
+ # users actually run — `codeql`, `dependency-review`, `trufflehog`,
+ # `gitleaks`, `osv-scanner`, plus generic fallbacks like
+ # `*scan*`, `*audit*`, `*security*` so SAST jobs named with
+ # project-specific prefixes still match.
+ securityJobsMustNotBeWeakened:
+ enabled: true
+ # How patterns are matched
+ # ────────────────────────
+ # Each pattern is a glob (`*` matches any substring) compared
+ # against the job name plumber builds for every job in your
+ # workflows. That name is:
+ #
+ # <workflow filename, .yml/.yaml stripped>/<job id in YAML>
+ #
+ # Examples:
+ # .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml + jobs.analyze
+ # -> codeql-analysis/analyze
+ # .github/workflows/ci.yml + jobs.lint
+ # -> ci/lint
+ # .github/workflows/workflow.yml + jobs.my-sast
+ # -> workflow/my-sast
+ #
+ # The namespace exists so two workflow files defining a job
+ # with the same id do not collide. Patterns can target whichever
+ # part of that name is stable for your repo:
+ # "*<token>*" token anywhere in the name (resilient)
+ # "<workflow>/*" every job in one workflow file
+ # "*/<jobid>" specific job id, any workflow
+ # "<workflow>/<jobid>" exact match, no wildcard
+ #
+ # The defaults below ship wildcard-wrapped because plumber does
+ # not know your repo's workflow-file convention. If your jobs
+ # follow a known layout you can drop the wildcards for tighter
+ # matching.
+ securityJobPatterns:
+ - "*codeql*"
+ - "*dependency-review*"
+ - "*trufflehog*"
+ - "*gitleaks*"
+ - "*osv-scanner*"
+ - "*-sast"
+ - "*-sast-*"
+ - "*-scan"
+ - "*scan*"
+ - "*-security"
+ - "*-security-*"
+ - "*-audit"
+ - "*-audit-*"
+ # Real-world slash-form examples (commented; uncomment / adapt
+ # to your repo for a tighter match than the wildcards above).
+ # Format reminder: <workflow-filename-without-extension>/<job-id>.
+ #
+ # - codeql-analysis/analyze # GitHub's default CodeQL template
+ # - dependency-review/dependency-review # GitHub's default Dependency Review template
+ # - security/gitleaks # gitleaks job in security.yml
+ # - security/trufflehog # trufflehog job in security.yml
+ # - security/* # every job in security.yml
+ # - "*/sast" # any job named "sast", any workflow
+ # - ci/semgrep-sast # exact match, no wildcard
+ allowFailureMustBeFalse:
+ enabled: true
+ rulesMustNotBeRedefined:
+ enabled: true
+ whenMustNotBeManual:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflow must not inject user input in scripts
+ # ===========================================
+ # Catches the canonical script-injection class: `${{ github.event.* }}`
+ # / `${{ github.head_ref }}` / `${{ github.actor }}` interpolated
+ # directly into a `run:` shell. Attacker-controlled values like PR
+ # title or branch name can break out of the intended string and
+ # execute arbitrary commands with the job's secrets. Bind through
+ # `env:` first, then reference the env var from the shell.
+ workflowMustNotInjectUserInputInScripts:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflow must not write untrusted content to $GITHUB_ENV / $GITHUB_PATH
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags a `run:` step that writes an attacker-controlled expression
+ # (${{ github.event.* }} / ${{ github.head_ref }}) into $GITHUB_ENV or
+ # $GITHUB_PATH. Both files are sticky: every later step inherits the
+ # variable or PATH entry, so an injected NODE_OPTIONS (or a front-loaded
+ # PATH directory) hijacks later steps. Critical under pull_request_target /
+ # workflow_run. Bind the value through `env:` and reference the shell
+ # variable on the redirect line.
+ workflowMustNotWriteUntrustedContentToGitHubEnv:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflow must not use dangerous triggers
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run` triggers, which
+ # run with the base repository's secrets while being influenceable
+ # by an unprivileged caller. Combined with any user-content
+ # checkout this becomes a direct exfiltration path (CVE-2025-30066).
+ # Use the standard `pull_request` trigger unless secrets are
+ # required.
+ workflowMustNotUseDangerousTriggers:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # pull_request_target must not check out PR head
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags a workflow triggered by `pull_request_target` that checks
+ # out the pull-request head (github.event.pull_request.head.sha or
+ # github.head_ref). Base-repo secrets and fork-controlled code then
+ # run together, which is the tj-actions / CVE-2025-30066 vector.
+ # Keep fork code under a plain `pull_request` trigger instead.
+ pullRequestTargetMustNotCheckoutHead:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflows must declare permissions
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflows without an explicit `permissions:` block fall back to
+ # the repo-wide GITHUB_TOKEN default — often `contents: write` or
+ # `read-all`. Declaring `permissions: { contents: read }` at the
+ # workflow level enforces least-privilege regardless of the repo
+ # default.
+ # Off for now: adding permissions blocks touches every workflow and
+ # deserves its own careful pass, a wrong value silently breaks
+ # releases and the CLA bot. Enable after that cleanup.
+ workflowsMustDeclarePermissions:
+ enabled: false
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Branch must be protected (project governance)
+ # ===========================================
+ # The first project-governance control on the GitHub path. Every
+ # other shipping rule is pipeline-governance (workflow content);
+ # this one inspects repository settings via the GitHub branch-
+ # protection API. Requires a token with `repo` scope (classic
+ # PAT) or "Administration: read" (fine-grained PAT) — content-
+ # only read access is NOT enough. Without scope the collector
+ # returns an empty branch list and the rule emits no findings,
+ # same degraded contract as missing API auth elsewhere.
+ # Off in CI: reading branch protection settings needs an admin-read
+ # token, the default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot see them.
+ branchMustBeProtected:
+ enabled: false
+ defaultMustBeProtected: true
+ namePatterns:
+ - main
+ - master
+ - release/*
+ - production
+ - dev
+ allowForcePush: false
+ codeOwnerApprovalRequired: true
+
+ # ============================================================================
+ # Workflows must include required actions
+ # ============================================================================
+ # Asserts that every workflow file under .github/workflows/
+ # collectively references a set of required actions or reusable
+ # workflows. The GitHub counterpart of
+ # pipelineMustIncludeComponent / pipelineMustIncludeTemplate on
+ # the GitLab side.
+ #
+ # GitHub has two ways to "include" something external; the
+ # control treats both the same so you do not have to declare
+ # which is which:
+ #
+ # Step-level action:
+ # steps:
+ # - uses: myorg/sast-scan@v2
+ #
+ # Job-level reusable workflow call:
+ # jobs:
+ # security:
+ # uses: myorg/policy/.github/workflows/scan.yml@v2
+ #
+ # Each required entry is an `owner/repo[/path]` string. Matching
+ # is ref-agnostic so bumping a pinned SHA does not invalidate
+ # the policy. A slash-guard prevents accidental prefix
+ # collisions: `myorg/sast-scan` matches
+ # `myorg/sast-scan@<anything>` and
+ # `myorg/sast-scan/sub@<anything>`, but NOT
+ # `myorg/sast-scan-fork@<anything>`.
+ #
+ # Two ways to define requirements (use one, not both):
+ #
+ # Option 1, Expression syntax ('required'):
+ # A natural boolean expression using AND, OR, and parentheses.
+ # AND binds tighter than OR, so "a AND b OR c" means
+ # "(a AND b) OR c".
+ #
+ # required: myorg/sast-scan AND myorg/dependency-review
+ # required: (myorg/sast-scan AND myorg/secret-scan) OR myorg/full-security-suite
+ #
+ # Option 2, Array syntax ('requiredGroups'):
+ # A list of groups using "OR of ANDs" logic:
+ # - Each inner array = items that must ALL be present (AND)
+ # - Outer array = only ONE group needs to be satisfied (OR)
+ #
+ # requiredGroups:
+ # - ["myorg/sast-scan", "myorg/dependency-review"]
+ # - ["myorg/full-security-suite"]
+ #
+ # Disabled by default; opt in once your organization has settled
+ # on the action set every repo is expected to wire up.
+ workflowMustIncludeRequiredActions:
+ enabled: false
+ # required: myorg/sast-scan AND myorg/policy/.github/workflows/scan.yml
+ requiredGroups: []
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Workflow must not grant write-all permissions
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags workflows and jobs whose effective `permissions:` block is the
+ # literal `write-all` shortcut. write-all gives GITHUB_TOKEN every
+ # scope (contents, packages, deployments, id-token, …) at the same
+ # time, so any compromise in the workflow — a malicious dependency,
+ # a script-injection bug, a third-party action turning evil — gets
+ # to do anything the repo allows: push to main, publish releases,
+ # mint OIDC tokens for cloud accounts, mark deployments succeeded.
+ #
+ # Workflow-level `permissions: write-all` is propagated to every
+ # job by the GitHub Actions runner; the rule reads the per-job
+ # effective permissions, so a workflow-level grant is caught the
+ # same way as a job-level one.
+ #
+ # Scope: static `permissions:` in committed workflow YAML only.
+ # Flags the literal string shortcut `write-all` on a job's effective
+ # permissions (workflow-level `write-all` is propagated to every job).
+ #
+ # Does not flag: `permissions: { contents: write, … }` maps, `read-all`,
+ # or missing `permissions:` (see `workflowsMustDeclarePermissions` /
+ # ISSUE-801). Does not evaluate `${{ }}` expressions or permissions
+ # inside callee reusable-workflow files Plumber did not fetch.
+ #
+ # Pair with `workflowsMustDeclarePermissions` for the full story.
+ workflowMustNotGrantPermissionsWriteAll:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Actions must not use ambiguous tag/branch refs
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags `uses: owner/repo@ref` references whose symbolic name resolves
+ # upstream as BOTH a tag and a branch (e.g. a tag `v1` kept alongside a
+ # long-lived `v1` branch). GitHub Actions resolves tags first, so the
+ # workflow runs the tagged commit today — but a tag deletion, rename, or
+ # a workflow typo silently switches which revision executes, and the
+ # reviewer cannot tell from the YAML alone. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA
+ # to remove the ambiguity.
+ #
+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level
+ # `uses: owner/repo@ref`. Requires GitHub API auth: the collector probes
+ # both the tag and branch namespaces, and without auth the rule abstains.
+ #
+ # Fail-safe: the finding fires only on a positive tag+branch double-hit;
+ # any probe failure leaves the ref unflagged (no false positive).
+ externalRefsMustNotCollide:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Actions must not reference archived repositories
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags `uses: owner/repo@ref` references whose upstream repository
+ # is archived on GitHub. Archived repos no longer receive
+ # maintenance: open vulnerabilities stay open, dependency bumps
+ # stop, runtime compatibility regressions accumulate. Pinning by
+ # SHA does not save the caller — the last maintainer (or someone
+ # who later acquires the namespace) can still push new code under
+ # the original repository name.
+ #
+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level
+ # `uses: owner/repo@ref` (not reusable-workflow `jobs.*.uses`, not
+ # local `./.github/actions/*`). Requires GitHub API auth; without it
+ # the rule abstains (no finding).
+ #
+ # How it works: `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}` → `archived` flag, one
+ # cached lookup per `owner/repo` (all refs share the same result).
+ #
+ # Does not see: callee reusable-workflow files, deleted/private repos
+ # (lookup may fail silently → abstain).
+ # Off for now: cla.yml depends on contributor-assistant/github-action,
+ # archived upstream in March 2026. It is pinned to a commit in the
+ # meantime. Enable once the CLA flow moves to a maintained action.
+ actionsMustNotBeArchived:
+ enabled: false
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Actions must pin commits that exist upstream
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags `uses: owner/repo@<sha>` references pinned to a 40-character
+ # commit SHA that the upstream repository confirms does not exist:
+ # either a typo (the runner silently falls back to the default
+ # branch) or a commit that was removed or never pushed upstream.
+ #
+ # Scope note: this does NOT detect a fork-network "impostor commit"
+ # (one pushed to a fork of the upstream repo). GitHub serves those
+ # with HTTP 200 from the parent, so they read as present; the control
+ # flags only SHAs the API reports as absent.
+ #
+ # Fires ONLY when the GitHub API confirms the commit is absent from a
+ # repository Plumber can read. A SHA it could not verify
+ # (private/missing repo, rate limit, network error) stays silent, so
+ # a valid pin is never flagged. Non-SHA refs (tags, branches) are out
+ # of scope here; mutable-ref concerns are
+ # actionsMustBePinnedByCommitSha's job.
+ #
+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level
+ # `uses: owner/repo@<sha>`. Job-level reusable-workflow refs are not
+ # yet covered: the collector does not enrich them with API metadata
+ # for ANY metadata control (also affects archived / known-CVE /
+ # ref-confusion); extending all four together is tracked upstream.
+ # Requires GitHub API auth (`gh` / GH_TOKEN); without it the rule
+ # abstains (no finding).
+ actionRefsMustExistUpstream:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Actions must not carry known CVEs
+ # ===========================================
+ # Cross-references every `uses: owner/repo@ref` against the GitHub
+ # Advisory Database under the `actions` ecosystem. A positive hit
+ # means at least one published advisory targets the action's
+ # repository. This is the rule that catches the published-CVE
+ # supply-chain class — tj-actions/changed-files (CVE-2025-30066),
+ # reviewdog/action-setup (March 2025), unpatched versions of
+ # `actions/artifact`.
+ #
+ # Scope: committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}` only; step-level
+ # `uses: owner/repo@ref` (not reusable-workflow `jobs.*.uses`, not
+ # `./.github/actions/*`, not `docker://`). Requires GitHub API auth
+ # (`gh` / GH_TOKEN); without it the rule abstains (no finding).
+ #
+ # How it works: one Advisory Database query per `owner/repo`
+ # (`ecosystem=actions`), cached. When the pinned ref resolves to a
+ # semver tag, Plumber filters advisories by `vulnerable_version_range`.
+ # A ref that cannot be resolved to a release version — a commit SHA
+ # with no matching release tag, or a mutable non-numeric tag such as
+ # `rc` / `main` / `latest` — abstains and surfaces a "could not verify"
+ # warning rather than matching every advisory for that repo. Upgrade
+ # past the fixed-in version and re-pin the SHA to clear the finding.
+ #
+ # Does not see: org/repo Variables, runtime `$GITHUB_ENV` writes, or
+ # actions nested inside composite actions you do not call directly.
+ actionsMustNotCarryKnownCVEs:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Release workflows must not restore an untrusted cache
+ # ===========================================
+ # Flags a release/publish job that restores a build cache whose key
+ # is not scoped to the release ref. GitHub Actions caches are shared
+ # across branches with a permissive fallback, so a PR run on any
+ # feature branch can populate the same key a release job later
+ # restores, injecting compromised artefacts into the published
+ # output (the May 2026 TanStack vector). Weave github.ref_name /
+ # github.sha into the cache key, or disable caching on publish paths.
+ #
+ # The action / script inventories below are configurable: the built-in
+ # cache semantics (which setup-* actions cache by default vs on opt-in)
+ # stay in code, but WHICH actions publish, WHICH extra actions restore a
+ # cache, and WHICH shell commands mean "publish" are org-specific. Extend
+ # them for your own tooling instead of waiting for a plumber release.
+ releaseWorkflowsMustNotRestoreUntrustedCache:
+ enabled: true
+ # Actions that publish/release artifacts (a job running one restores
+ # into a published build). Add your org's own publish actions.
+ publishActions:
+ - pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish
+ - JS-DevTools/npm-publish
+ - gradle/publish-plugin
+ - softprops/action-gh-release
+ - ncipollo/release-action
+ - goreleaser/goreleaser-action
+ - crazy-max/ghaction-docker-buildx
+ - changesets/action
+ # Full inventory of cache-restoring actions AND their per-action
+ # semantics (the rego hardcodes none of this). mode:
+ # always — restores whenever present (actions/cache, rust-cache)
+ # default — restores unless disableInput holds disableValue
+ # opt-in — restores only when enableInput names a package manager
+ # (enableContains further requires that substring in the
+ # value, e.g. build-push-action only caches via GHA when
+ # cache-from mentions type=gha)
+ # Add your org's own cache actions with the matching mode.
+ cacheActions:
+ - {action: actions/cache, mode: always}
+ - {action: actions/cache/restore, mode: always}
+ - {action: Swatinem/rust-cache, mode: always}
+ - {action: actions/setup-go, mode: default, disableInput: cache, disableValue: false}
+ - {action: gradle/actions/setup-gradle, mode: default, disableInput: cache-disabled, disableValue: true}
+ - {action: actions/setup-node, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}
+ - {action: actions/setup-python, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}
+ - {action: actions/setup-java, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}
+ - {action: pnpm/action-setup, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache}
+ - {action: docker/build-push-action, mode: opt-in, enableInput: cache-from, enableContains: type=gha}
+ # Shell commands (regex) that mark a job as release intent even under a
+ # plain push/tag trigger with no publish action.
+ publishScriptPatterns:
+ - '(?i)(npm|pnpm|yarn|bun)\s+publish'
+ - '(?i)cargo\s+publish'
+ - '(?i)twine\s+upload'
+ - '(?i)poetry\s+publish'
+ - '(?i)gh\s+release\s+create'
+ - '(?i)goreleaser\s+release'
+ - '(?i)semantic-release'
+ - '(?i)gradlew?\b[^\n]*\bpublish'
+ - '(?i)\bmvnw?\b[^\n]*\bdeploy\b'
+ - '(?i)dotnet\s+nuget\s+push'
+ - '(?i)gem\s+push'
+ - '(?i)docker\s+push'
+ # Verification-only forms that veto a publish-script match on the same
+ # run block — they never publish anything.
+ publishScriptExcludePatterns:
+ - '(?i)--dry-run'
+ - '(?i)publishToMavenLocal'
+ # Jobs to exempt from this control (glob on `<workflow-file>/<job-id>`).
+ # The escape hatch for release jobs you have reviewed and accepted —
+ # e.g. a lint job that caches but ships nothing.
+ allowedJobs: []
+ # - '*/lint'
+ # - 'release-docs/*'
+
+ # ===========================================
+ # Pipeline must not enable debug trace
+ # ===========================================
+ # GitHub-side parallel of the GitLab `pipelineMustNotEnableDebugTrace`
+ # control. Flags workflows or jobs that set the GitHub Actions
+ # debug-trace toggles to a truthy value (`true`, `1`, `yes`).
+ #
+ # When `ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG=true` or `ACTIONS_RUNNER_DEBUG=true`,
+ # the runner prints every environment variable (including masked
+ # secrets) and every internal action SDK call into the job log.
+ # The masking layer is bypassed for the dump itself, so any
+ # secret consumed by the workflow lands in plaintext in the run
+ # log and is then visible to anyone with `actions: read` on the
+ # repository, plus indefinitely on log artefacts.
+ #
+ # Scope: static `env:` in committed `.github/workflows/*.{yml,yaml}`.
+ # The collector merges workflow-, job-, and step-level `env:` into
+ # each job (step > job > workflow precedence on name collisions).
+ #
+ # Truthy values: `true`, `1`, `yes` (case-insensitive, trimmed).
+ # Variable names: case-insensitive match against `forbiddenVariables`.
+ #
+ # Also flags: `${{ }}` values on forbidden names in static `env:`
+ # (cannot verify off statically), and `run:` lines that write a
+ # forbidden name to `$GITHUB_ENV`. All ISSUE-203 findings are critical.
+ #
+ # Does not see: org/repo/environment Variables with no YAML reference,
+ # env inside callee reusable workflows Plumber did not fetch, or GitHub
+ # UI "Re-run with debug logging" (not in YAML).
+ pipelineMustNotEnableDebugTrace:
+ enabled: true
+ forbiddenVariables:
+ - ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG
+ - ACTIONS_RUNNER_DEBUG
+
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 9a880cba3..5a76a7f80 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Not a Chromium fork. Not a WebKit patch. A new browser, written in Zig.
[![Twitter Follow](https://img.shields.io/twitter/follow/lightpanda_io)](https://twitter.com/lightpanda_io)
[![GitHub stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/lightpanda-io/browser)](https://github.com/lightpanda-io/browser)
[![Discord](https://img.shields.io/discord/1391984864894521354?style=flat-square&label=discord)](https://discord.gg/K63XeymfB5)
+[![Plumber Score](https://score.getplumber.io/github.com/lightpanda-io/browser.svg)](https://score.getplumber.io/github.com/lightpanda-io/browser)
</div>
<div align="center">