Database governance built for humans and agents — controlling changes and access across every major database.
Go cicddata-governancedata-maskingdata-securitydatabase-accessdatabase-governancedevopsdevsecopsflywaygitopsliquibasemongodbmysqloraclepostgresqlschema-migrationssecuritysql-clientsqlservertidb
package audit
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
spb "google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc/status"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb"
storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"
)
// TestLogAuditToStdoutFormat is a contract test for the structured JSON fields
// emitted to stdout when audit log stdout is enabled. Operators run commands
// like `docker logs <container> | grep '"log_type":"audit"'` — changes to
// these keys or their values are breaking for downstream log pipelines.
func TestLogAuditToStdoutFormat(t *testing.T) {
a := require.New(t)
// Redirect slog default to a JSON handler writing into a buffer so the
// test can inspect the exact structured payload.
prev := slog.Default()
t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) })
var buf bytes.Buffer
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelInfo,
})))
p := &storepb.AuditLog{
Parent: "workspaces/ws-abc",
Method: "/bytebase.v1.AuthService/Login",
Resource: "[email protected]",
Severity: storepb.AuditLog_INFO,
User: "users/[email protected]",
Request: `{"email":"[email protected]","web":true}`,
Response: `{"user":{"name":"users/[email protected]","email":"[email protected]"}}`,
Status: &spb.Status{Code: 0, Message: ""},
Latency: durationpb.New(123_000_000), // 123ms
RequestMetadata: &storepb.RequestMetadata{
CallerIp: "10.0.1.50",
CallerSuppliedUserAgent: "TestAgent/1.0",
},
}
LogAuditToStdout(context.Background(), p)
// Every line the handler wrote is an independent JSON object.
lines := bytes.Split(bytes.TrimSpace(buf.Bytes()), []byte{'\n'})
a.Len(lines, 1, "LogAuditToStdout must emit exactly one JSON record")
var got map[string]any
a.NoError(json.Unmarshal(lines[0], &got),
"stdout record must be valid JSON: %s", string(lines[0]))
// Keys the customer explicitly greps for — these form our public contract.
// If any of these assertions need to change, it's a breaking change for
// everyone consuming audit stdout logs.
a.Equal("audit", got["log_type"], `log_type=="audit" is how operators filter audit lines from application logs`)
a.Equal("workspaces/ws-abc", got["parent"])
a.Equal("/bytebase.v1.AuthService/Login", got["method"])
a.Equal("[email protected]", got["resource"])
a.Equal("users/[email protected]", got["user"])
a.Equal("INFO", got["severity"])
a.Equal("10.0.1.50", got["client_ip"])
a.Equal("TestAgent/1.0", got["user_agent"])
a.Equal(float64(123), got["latency_ms"], "latency must be exposed in milliseconds")
a.Equal(`{"email":"[email protected]","web":true}`, got["request"],
"request payload must be emitted verbatim (already redacted upstream)")
a.Equal(`{"user":{"name":"users/[email protected]","email":"[email protected]"}}`, got["response"])
// Status code 0 (OK) should be reported explicitly so downstream pipelines
// can distinguish successful from failed calls.
a.Equal(float64(0), got["status_code"])
// slog standard fields — keep them stable too.
a.Equal("INFO", got["level"])
a.Equal("/bytebase.v1.AuthService/Login", got["msg"],
"slog msg is set to the method so operators can read the log without parsing")
// Error status round-trip: a failed call must emit status_code and status_message.
buf.Reset()
p2 := &storepb.AuditLog{
Parent: "workspaces/ws-abc",
Method: "/bytebase.v1.AuthService/Login",
Severity: storepb.AuditLog_INFO,
Status: &spb.Status{Code: 16, Message: "invalid email or password"}, // UNAUTHENTICATED
Latency: durationpb.New(5_000_000),
}
LogAuditToStdout(context.Background(), p2)
var failed map[string]any
a.NoError(json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(buf.Bytes()), &failed))
a.Equal(float64(16), failed["status_code"], "failed call must carry status_code")
a.Equal("invalid email or password", failed["status_message"],
"failed call must carry status_message")
// MCP-delegated calls carry their provenance in stdout too, so operators
// tailing container logs can trace an agent session without the API.
a.NotContains(got, "mcp_correlation_id",
"non-MCP rows must not emit MCP keys")
buf.Reset()
p3 := &storepb.AuditLog{
Parent: "workspaces/ws-abc",
Method: "/bytebase.v1.SQLService/Query",
Severity: storepb.AuditLog_INFO,
McpDelegation: &storepb.MCPDelegation{
Scope: "mcp:read-only",
Resource: "https://bb.example.com/mcp",
ClientId: "client-A",
CorrelationId: "corr-42",
},
}
LogAuditToStdout(context.Background(), p3)
var delegated map[string]any
a.NoError(json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(buf.Bytes()), &delegated))
a.Equal(true, delegated["mcp"], `mcp==true is how operators filter MCP-originated rows`)
a.Equal("corr-42", delegated["mcp_correlation_id"],
"the session correlation ID is the key operators pivot on")
a.Equal("mcp:read-only", delegated["mcp_scope"])
a.Equal("https://bb.example.com/mcp", delegated["mcp_resource"])
a.Equal("client-A", delegated["mcp_client_id"])
}
// recordingWriter captures the row RecordOutOfBandAudit inserts.
type recordingWriter struct {
rows []*storepb.AuditLog
}
func (w *recordingWriter) CreateAuditLog(_ context.Context, _ string, row *storepb.AuditLog) error {
w.rows = append(w.rows, row)
return nil
}
// TestRecordOutOfBandAuditStampsWarning pins that a door outside the connect
// chains cannot file a refusal the compliance reader's severity filter misses.
// The /mcp connection and OAuth consent doors both refuse on the same ceiling
// verdict the per-request gate does, and the gate's refusal is WARNING.
func TestRecordOutOfBandAuditStampsWarning(t *testing.T) {
a := require.New(t)
prev := slog.Default()
t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) })
var buf bytes.Buffer
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, nil)))
writer := &recordingWriter{}
row := &storepb.AuditLog{
Parent: "workspaces/ws-abc",
Method: AuditMethodMCPSessionAuthorize,
User: "users/[email protected]",
Status: &spb.Status{Code: 7, Message: "MCP access is turned off"},
}
RecordOutOfBandAudit(context.Background(), writer, true, "ws-abc", row)
a.Len(writer.rows, 1)
a.Equal(storepb.AuditLog_WARNING, writer.rows[0].Severity, "a refusal is stored as a warning")
var line map[string]any
a.NoError(json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(buf.Bytes()), &line))
a.Equal(storepb.AuditLog_WARNING.String(), line["severity"],
"the stream carries the same severity as the row")
}