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Login identity provider metadata

AuthenticationInfo — the anonymous message the login page already fetches — grows a hand-written list of the providers that page renders, and GetAuthenticationRestriction is renamed GetAuthenticationInfo to match what it now returns. ListIdentityProviders becomes an ordinary IAM method behind a new bb.identityProviders.list permission, so LDAP host, bind DN, base DN and user filter stop being readable without a credential. Closes T12 in v1-api-audit-2026-08.md / BYT-10156, which carries the line-level citations.

Background

ListIdentityProviders is anonymous and takes a caller-supplied parent. Three journeys call it, and all three receive the same admin record — every provider field except client_secret and bind_password, the complete LDAP config included.

Journey Reachable by Needs
Login page anyone which providers exist, what to call them, where to send the browser
SSO admin console bb.identityProviders.get the whole record
General settings every Workspace Member whether any provider exists

Problem

  • Anonymous callers read the directory topology. Self-hosted needs no guessing — GetWorkspace is anonymous too and returns the singleton workspace ID — and self-hosted is where LDAP is configured. The login page never needed any of it: it reads an authorization endpoint, a client ID and scopes, and the LDAP bind happens server-side.
  • Redaction is a denylist. Two SECURITY: blanks stand between the admin record and an anonymous caller. Every field added to the config is public the day it ships unless someone remembers to blank it — the failure mode #21184 removed from GetActuatorInfo.
  • The third journey is why it is still anonymous. An IAM gate on today's method would break General settings, whose route asks only for bb.settings.getWorkspaceProfile and bb.policies.get — both held by workspaceMember, the role every user receives on joining a workspace.

Goals

  • G1 An anonymous caller learns only what the login page renders.
  • G2 Provider configuration is readable only with bb.identityProviders.get.
  • G3 A field added to the admin record stays private until someone publishes it on purpose.
  • G4 No journey loses access on upgrade — including custom roles that already reached the SSO console.
  • G5 One anonymous request serves the pre-login page, and the server resolves workspace versus global providers.

Non-goals

  • Hiding that a workspace has SSO. The login page renders "Continue with Okta" to anonymous visitors. Provider existence, type and branding are public by construction here and everywhere surveyed; only the configuration behind them is not.
  • The workspace-existence oracle on GetAuthenticationRestriction, accepted in T12. An unknown workspace is refused before any provider is read, so the list adds no signal.
  • Changing LDAP sign-in, or who may open General settings.

Design

The pre-login list rides on AuthenticationInfo

// A provider as the login page sees it. Not a view of IdentityProvider:
// every field here is published by hand.
message LoginIdentityProvider {
  string name = 1; // idps/{idp}
  IdentityProviderType type = 2;
  string title = 3;
  // Set for OAUTH2 and OIDC, absent for LDAP.
  AuthorizationRequest authorization_request = 4;
}

// What the browser needs to start the redirect, and nothing else.
message AuthorizationRequest {
  // The OAuth2 auth_url, or the authorization endpoint from the OIDC
  // issuer's discovery document.
  string endpoint = 1;
  string client_id = 2;
  repeated string scopes = 3;
}

AuthenticationInfo gains repeated LoginIdentityProvider identity_providers. That is exactly what the browser puts in an authorization URL or on a button label; an LDAP entry carries name, type and title, and the message has nowhere to put a host.

A separate message rather than a mask over IdentityProvider is what makes G3 structural: a new LDAP attribute or OIDC field reaches no one until someone writes a line for it here.

The server returns the named workspace's providers, falling back to the global ones when it has none — the fallback the client codes today, at the cost of a second anonymous round trip.

ListIdentityProviders becomes an admin method

Drop the anonymous option and require bb.identityProviders.list under auth_method = IAM. The permission is new: bb.identityProviders.get reads one provider, and a collection read is its own verb. Workspace admin gains it in code; custom roles that already carry .get — the same roles that could already reach the SSO console — gain it in a data migration, so no existing grant silently stops working (G4).

parent stays. Identity providers are workspace children and AIP-132 names the parent, which is also how every other workspace-scoped list here reads. What made parent dangerous was the anonymous method behind it, not the field: the gate is what stops a caller reading another workspace. The permission is checked against the credential's workspace, so the handler refuses a parent naming any other workspace rather than quietly serving the caller's own — a request the check never authorized.

Dropping the anonymous option is breaking.

The method is named for what it returns

GetAuthenticationRestriction now returns restrictions and providers, so it becomes GetAuthenticationInfo, matching its long-standing AuthenticationInfo response and the /v1/auth/info path. It stays anonymous and workspace-named.

General settings reads the bit, not the list

The disallow-password-signin checkbox is an affordance only: UpdateSetting already refuses the write when no provider exists, and the checkbox is disabled anyway without bb.settings.setWorkspaceProfile. So the page takes the length of AuthenticationInfo.identity_providers — no permission a signed-in user lacks, and nothing newly disclosed. It is also the truer signal: the guard means "an SSO login path exists", which is what the login list enumerates rather than what the IdP table holds. The fetch is gated on self-hosted to match the toggle it feeds; today it runs in SaaS too, where the setting cannot be changed.

Alternatives

  • Redact IdentityProvider by caller. Smallest diff, closes it today, leaves the denylist standing for the next field (fails G3).
  • A view enum or field mask on the one method (AIP-157). Two shapes behind one name, where the anonymous shape is the default a mistake widens (fails G3).
  • A second anonymous RPC. The same content under a better name, at the cost of another unauthenticated endpoint and another round trip (fails G5).
  • Grant bb.identityProviders.get to workspaceMember. Makes today's method gateable by handing every member the LDAP config (fails G2).
  • Reuse bb.identityProviders.get for the list. Adds no permission and needs no backfill, but collapses "read one provider" and "enumerate the collection" into one grant, which no other resource here does.
  • Drop parent and take the workspace from the token, as #21184 did to GetActuatorInfo's name. Safe, but it removes the parent from a child collection for a danger the IAM gate already answers, and leaves the list shaped unlike every other workspace-scoped list.
  • bool sso_configured on the workspace profile read. Serves General settings with a permission members already hold, but builds a second path to a bit AuthenticationInfo carries and that is anonymous either way.

Reference

Every product fronting an SSO login page draws the line in the same place: a public document holding exactly what a client needs to begin the flow, and a gated API holding the configuration. Surveyed 2026-09-02.

Element Same as
Public metadata document, contents fixed by a spec OIDC Discovery /.well-known/openid-configuration, RFC 8414
A public API for untrusted front-ends, separate from the configuration API Auth0 Authentication API vs. Management API
Provider configuration behind an admin role or scoped token Keycloak manage-identity-providers, Okta /api/v1/idps, Grafana SSO Settings under RBAC
Secrets withheld even from authorized readers Grafana returns clientSecret as *********
Directory bind configuration never client-facing LDAP and AD binds are server-side in all of the above

Sources: OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 · RFC 8414 · Auth0 Management API · Keycloak Admin REST API · Okta Identity Providers API · Grafana SSO Settings API.