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docs: offboarding review is a two-filter scan — creator plus member (codex review)
Danny001c8ad1cbc4
diff --git a/docs/design/saved-queries-model.md b/docs/design/saved-queries-model.mdindex 4509267fd4..c4e2c4407e 100644--- a/docs/design/saved-queries-model.md+++ b/docs/design/saved-queries-model.md@@ -280,21 +280,23 @@ discovery and run gates instead.**Offboarding.** Removing a user from a project ends discovery and runimmediately (workspace-wide roles aside — those reach every project by-design). Explicitly granted content access — and the creator's access-to their own queries — persists until revoked, and the revocation surface-is explicit: bindings are enumerable via `ListSavedQueries` with a-`member` filter that, given a `user:` principal, **expands the target's-group memberships server-side** — the same `principals(u)` expansion the-read path uses — so the review lists rows granted directly *and* via any-of the user's groups (a `group:` principal matches that group's rows).-Direct grants are strippable via `SetIamPolicy` by the creator or an-admin; group-held access is revoked at the group (leave or edit it), not-per-query — a group grant's audience is deliberately the live group.-Content reads are audited; an admin can delete a departed creator's-queries, and workspace deactivation ends everything. This is precisely-BigQuery's behavior. The audit's Problem-1 complaint was never retention-itself but *implicit* retention — flag-derived access with no grant to-see, audit, or revoke.+design). Explicitly granted content access — and the creator's access to+their own queries — persists until revoked, and the revocation surface is+explicit: an offboarding review is **two `ListSavedQueries` filters** over+the target. `creator == target` lists the rows they own — no binding+exists for these, so no member filter can find them (remediation: an+admin deletes them, or deliberately leaves the departed user their own+drafts). `member == target`, given a `user:` principal, **expands the+target's group memberships server-side** — the same `principals(u)`+expansion the read path uses — listing rows granted directly *and* via+any of the user's groups (a `group:` principal matches that group's+rows); direct grants strip via `SetIamPolicy`, while group-held access is+revoked at the group (leave or edit it), not per-query — a group grant's+audience is deliberately the live group. Content reads are audited, and+workspace deactivation ends everything. This is precisely BigQuery's+behavior. The audit's Problem-1 complaint was never retention itself but+*implicit* retention — flag-derived access with no grant to see, audit,+or revoke.**Share-with-project is a snapshot.** There is deliberately no derived"everyone in the project" principal (see Alternatives); the share dialog's