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feat: add rate limiting for authentication attempts (#17983)
boojack5d9c16a76482
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/audit.go b/backend/api/v1/audit.goindex d790626c42..81066e6c31 100644--- a/backend/api/v1/audit.go+++ b/backend/api/v1/audit.go@@ -18,10 +18,13 @@ import (spb "google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc/status""google.golang.org/grpc/codes"+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/api/auth""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/log"+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/config"storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"v1pb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1"+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1/v1connect""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/store")@@ -30,15 +33,19 @@ var (maskedString string)-// ACLInterceptor is the v1 ACL interceptor for gRPC server.+// AuditInterceptor is the v1 audit interceptor for gRPC server.type AuditInterceptor struct {- store *store.Store+ store *store.Store+ secret string+ profile *config.Profile}-// NewAuditInterceptor returns a new v1 API ACL interceptor.-func NewAuditInterceptor(store *store.Store) *AuditInterceptor {+// NewAuditInterceptor returns a new v1 API audit interceptor.+func NewAuditInterceptor(store *store.Store, secret string, profile *config.Profile) *AuditInterceptor {return &AuditInterceptor{- store: store,+ store: store,+ secret: secret,+ profile: profile,}}@@ -59,7 +66,7 @@ func (in *AuditInterceptor) WrapUnary(next connect.UnaryFunc) connect.UnaryFuncif !common.IsNil(response) {respMsg = response.Any()}- if err := createAuditLogConnect(ctx, req.Any(), respMsg, req.Spec().Procedure, in.store, serviceData, rerr, req.Header(), req.Peer().Addr, latency); err != nil {+ if err := createAuditLogConnect(ctx, req.Any(), respMsg, req.Spec().Procedure, in.store, in.secret, in.profile, serviceData, rerr, req.Header(), req.Peer().Addr, latency); err != nil {slog.Warn("audit interceptor: failed to create audit log", log.BBError(err), slog.String("method", req.Spec().Procedure))}}@@ -120,14 +127,14 @@ func (c *auditConnectStreamingConn) Send(resp any) error {// Create audit log for each message pairif c.curRequest != nil {latency := time.Since(c.startTime)- if auditErr := createAuditLogConnect(c.ctx, c.curRequest, resp, c.method, c.interceptor.store, nil, nil, c.RequestHeader(), c.Peer().Addr, latency); auditErr != nil {+ if auditErr := createAuditLogConnect(c.ctx, c.curRequest, resp, c.method, c.interceptor.store, c.interceptor.secret, c.interceptor.profile, nil, nil, c.RequestHeader(), c.Peer().Addr, latency); auditErr != nil {return auditErr}}return nil}-func createAuditLogConnect(ctx context.Context, request, response any, method string, storage *store.Store, serviceData *anypb.Any, rerr error, headers http.Header, peerAddr string, latency time.Duration) error {+func createAuditLogConnect(ctx context.Context, request, response any, method string, storage *store.Store, secret string, profile *config.Profile, serviceData *anypb.Any, rerr error, headers http.Header, peerAddr string, latency time.Duration) error {requestString, err := getRequestString(request)if err != nil {return errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get request string")@@ -141,6 +148,7 @@ func createAuditLogConnect(ctx context.Context, request, response any, method stif u, ok := GetUserFromContext(ctx); ok {user = common.FormatUserUID(u.ID)} else {+ // Try to get user from successful login response.if loginResponse, ok := response.(*v1pb.LoginResponse); ok {user = loginResponse.GetUser().GetName()}@@ -169,10 +177,26 @@ func createAuditLogConnect(ctx context.Context, request, response any, method stcreateAuditLogCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx)for _, parent := range parents {+ resource := getRequestResource(request)+ // For login requests, if resource is empty, try to get email from user context or MFA temp token.+ // This handles MFA phase where request doesn't have email field.+ if resource == "" && method == v1connect.AuthServiceLoginProcedure {+ if u, ok := GetUserFromContext(ctx); ok {+ resource = u.Email+ } else if loginRequest, ok := request.(*v1pb.LoginRequest); ok && loginRequest.MfaTempToken != nil {+ // Extract user from MFA temp token and fetch email from database.+ if userID, err := auth.GetUserIDFromMFATempToken(*loginRequest.MfaTempToken, profile.Mode, secret); err == nil {+ if u, err := storage.GetUserByID(createAuditLogCtx, userID); err == nil && u != nil {+ resource = u.Email+ }+ }+ }+ }+p := &storepb.AuditLog{Parent: parent,Method: method,- Resource: getRequestResource(request),+ Resource: resource,Severity: storepb.AuditLog_INFO,User: user,Request: requestString,diff --git a/backend/api/v1/auth_service.go b/backend/api/v1/auth_service.goindex 50bf0936db..c413647eee 100644--- a/backend/api/v1/auth_service.go+++ b/backend/api/v1/auth_service.go@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import ("github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/api/auth""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/log"+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/qb""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/config""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/iam""github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/state"@@ -35,8 +36,32 @@ import ("github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/store")+const (+ // mfaTempTokenDuration is the duration for MFA temporary tokens.+ // Following industry standards (Okta: 5 minutes, Auth0: 10 minutes, AWS Cognito: 3 minutes).+ // A short duration reduces the attack window for TOTP brute-force attempts.+ mfaTempTokenDuration = 5 * time.Minute++ // Login rate limiting configuration.+ // Password phase: 10 failed attempts within 10 minutes.+ passwordMaxFailedAttempts = 10 //nolint:unused // Will be used for password rate limiting+ passwordLockoutWindow = 10 * time.Minute //nolint:unused // Will be used for password rate limiting++ // MFA phase: 5 failed attempts within 5 minutes.+ mfaMaxFailedAttempts = 5+ mfaLockoutWindow = 5 * time.Minute++ // Error messages for authentication failures.+ // These constants are used both for error responses and for querying audit logs during rate limiting.+ errMsgInvalidCredentials = "invalid email or password"+ errMsgInvalidMFACode = "invalid MFA code"+ errMsgInvalidRecoveryCode = "invalid recovery code"+ errMsgTooManyPassword = "too many failed login attempts, please try again later" //nolint:unused // Will be used for password rate limiting+ errMsgTooManyMFA = "too many failed MFA attempts, please try again later"+)+var (- invalidUserOrPasswordError = connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated, errors.Errorf("the email or password is not valid"))+ invalidCredentialsError = connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated, errors.Errorf(errMsgInvalidCredentials)))// AuthService implements the auth service.@@ -98,7 +123,12 @@ func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, req *connect.Request[v1pb.Loginreturn nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeInternal, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to find user, error"))}if user == nil {- return nil, invalidUserOrPasswordError+ return nil, invalidCredentialsError+ }++ // Check if user is locked out due to too many failed MFA attempts.+ if err := s.checkMFALockout(ctx, user.Email); err != nil {+ return nil, err}if request.OtpCode != nil {@@ -145,7 +175,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, req *connect.Request[v1pb.LoginuserMFAEnabled := loginUser.MFAConfig != nil && loginUser.MFAConfig.OtpSecret != ""// We only allow MFA login (2-step) when the feature is enabled and user has enabled MFA.if s.licenseService.IsFeatureEnabled(v1pb.PlanFeature_FEATURE_TWO_FA) == nil && !mfaSecondLogin && userMFAEnabled {- mfaTempToken, err := auth.GenerateMFATempToken(loginUser.Name, loginUser.ID, s.profile.Mode, s.secret, tokenDuration)+ mfaTempToken, err := auth.GenerateMFATempToken(loginUser.Name, loginUser.ID, s.profile.Mode, s.secret, mfaTempTokenDuration)if err != nil {return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeInternal, errors.Errorf("failed to generate MFA temp token"))}@@ -269,17 +299,22 @@ func (s *AuthService) Logout(ctx context.Context, req *connect.Request[v1pb.Logo}func (s *AuthService) getAndVerifyUser(ctx context.Context, request *v1pb.LoginRequest) (*store.UserMessage, error) {+ // Check if user is locked out due to too many failed password attempts.+ if err := s.checkPasswordLockout(ctx, request.Email); err != nil {+ return nil, err+ }+user, err := s.store.GetUserByEmail(ctx, request.Email)if err != nil {return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeInternal, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get user by email %q", request.Email))}if user == nil {- return nil, invalidUserOrPasswordError+ return nil, invalidCredentialsError}// Compare the stored hashed password, with the hashed version of the password that was received.if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(user.PasswordHash), []byte(request.Password)); err != nil {// If the two passwords don't match, return a 401 status.- return nil, invalidUserOrPasswordError+ return nil, invalidCredentialsError}return user, nil}@@ -471,9 +506,82 @@ func (s *AuthService) userCountGuard(ctx context.Context) error {return nil}+// countRecentLoginFailures counts the number of failed login attempts for a given email+// within the specified time window, matching any of the provided error messages.+func (s *AuthService) countRecentLoginFailures(ctx context.Context, email string, window time.Duration, errMessages ...string) (int, error) {+ if len(errMessages) == 0 {+ return 0, errors.New("at least one error message is required")+ }++ windowStart := time.Now().Add(-window)++ // Build filter query for login failures.+ filterQ := qb.Q().Space("TRUE")+ filterQ.And("payload->>'method' = ?", "/bytebase.v1.AuthService/Login")+ filterQ.And("payload->>'resource' = ?", email)+ filterQ.And("(payload->'status'->>'code')::int != 0")++ // Build OR condition for error messages.+ if len(errMessages) == 1 {+ filterQ.And("payload->'status'->>'message' = ?", errMessages[0])+ } else {+ // For multiple messages, build: (msg = ? OR msg = ? OR ...)+ orConditions := qb.Q()+ for i, msg := range errMessages {+ if i == 0 {+ orConditions.Space("payload->'status'->>'message' = ?", msg)+ } else {+ orConditions.Or("payload->'status'->>'message' = ?", msg)+ }+ }+ filterQ.And("(?)", orConditions)+ }++ filterQ.And("created_at >= ?", windowStart)++ logs, err := s.store.SearchAuditLogs(ctx, &store.AuditLogFind{+ FilterQ: filterQ,+ })+ if err != nil {+ return 0, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to search audit logs for login failures")+ }++ return len(logs), nil+}++// checkPasswordLockout checks if the user has exceeded the password failure rate limit.+// Returns an error if the user is locked out due to too many failed password attempts.+func (s *AuthService) checkPasswordLockout(ctx context.Context, email string) error {+ count, err := s.countRecentLoginFailures(ctx, email, passwordLockoutWindow, errMsgInvalidCredentials)+ if err != nil {+ return connect.NewError(connect.CodeInternal, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to count recent password failures"))+ }++ if count >= passwordMaxFailedAttempts {+ return connect.NewError(connect.CodeResourceExhausted, errors.Errorf(errMsgTooManyPassword))+ }++ return nil+}++// checkMFALockout checks if the user has exceeded the MFA failure rate limit.+// Returns an error if the user is locked out due to too many failed MFA attempts.+func (s *AuthService) checkMFALockout(ctx context.Context, email string) error {+ count, err := s.countRecentLoginFailures(ctx, email, mfaLockoutWindow, errMsgInvalidMFACode, errMsgInvalidRecoveryCode)+ if err != nil {+ return connect.NewError(connect.CodeInternal, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to count recent MFA failures"))+ }++ if count >= mfaMaxFailedAttempts {+ return connect.NewError(connect.CodeResourceExhausted, errors.Errorf(errMsgTooManyMFA))+ }++ return nil+}+func challengeMFACode(user *store.UserMessage, mfaCode string) error {if !validateWithCodeAndSecret(mfaCode, user.MFAConfig.OtpSecret) {- return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated, errors.Errorf("invalid MFA code"))+ return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated, errors.Errorf(errMsgInvalidMFACode))}return nil}@@ -495,7 +603,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) challengeRecoveryCode(ctx context.Context, user *store.Usereturn nil}}- return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated, errors.Errorf("invalid recovery code"))+ return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated, errors.Errorf(errMsgInvalidRecoveryCode))}// validateWithCodeAndSecret validates the given code against the given secret.diff --git a/backend/server/grpc_routes.go b/backend/server/grpc_routes.goindex 21ec958b51..ccd95ce2de 100644--- a/backend/server/grpc_routes.go+++ b/backend/server/grpc_routes.go@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func configureGrpcRouters(apiv1.NewDebugInterceptor(metricReporter),auth.New(stores, secret, licenseService, stateCfg, profile),apiv1.NewACLInterceptor(stores, secret, iamManager, profile),- apiv1.NewAuditInterceptor(stores),+ apiv1.NewAuditInterceptor(stores, secret, profile),),connect.WithRecover(onPanic),)