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docs: offboarding member filter expands group memberships (codex review)
Danny868f296f2f4a
diff --git a/docs/design/saved-queries-model.md b/docs/design/saved-queries-model.mdindex 7e5b404985..4509267fd4 100644--- a/docs/design/saved-queries-model.md+++ b/docs/design/saved-queries-model.md@@ -282,13 +282,19 @@ discovery and run gates instead.immediately (workspace-wide roles aside — those reach every project bydesign). Explicitly granted content access — and the creator's accessto their own queries — persists until revoked, and the revocation surface-is explicit: bindings are enumerable (`ListSavedQueries`, filter by-`member` or `creator`), strippable via `SetIamPolicy` by the creator or an-admin, and content reads are audited; an admin can delete a departed-creator's queries, and workspace deactivation ends everything. This is-precisely BigQuery's behavior. The audit's Problem-1 complaint was never-retention itself but *implicit* retention — flag-derived access with no-grant to see, audit, or revoke.+is explicit: bindings are enumerable via `ListSavedQueries` with a+`member` filter that, given a `user:` principal, **expands the target's+group memberships server-side** — the same `principals(u)` expansion the+read path uses — so the review lists rows granted directly *and* via any+of the user's groups (a `group:` principal matches that group's rows).+Direct grants are strippable via `SetIamPolicy` by the creator or an+admin; group-held access is revoked at the group (leave or edit it), not+per-query — a group grant's audience is deliberately the live group.+Content reads are audited; an admin can delete a departed creator's+queries, and workspace deactivation ends everything. This is precisely+BigQuery's behavior. The audit's Problem-1 complaint was never retention+itself but *implicit* retention — flag-derived access with no grant to+see, audit, or revoke.**Share-with-project is a snapshot.** There is deliberately no derived"everyone in the project" principal (see Alternatives); the share dialog's