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feat(mcp): say when no other person can approve an access request, and stop pointing agents at dead ends (#21649)

Vincent Huangc8e0b1fbcea9
diff --git a/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling.go b/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling.go
index 8048287bac..023606e466 100644
--- a/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling.go
+++ b/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling.go
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ func ClassifyMCPCeiling(settings *storepb.MCPSetting, err error) MCPCeilingVerdi
}
}
+// MCPCeilingLocation is where an admin changes the ceiling; every refusal names it.
+const MCPCeilingLocation = "Integration > MCP > Access policy"
+
// Refusal is what a door tells the caller it is refusing: what is wrong with
// this workspace's ceiling, and what an admin does about it. Empty for
// MCPCeilingServes, which refuses nothing.
@@ -74,13 +77,13 @@ func (v MCPCeilingVerdict) Refusal() string {
switch v {
case MCPCeilingDisabled:
return "a workspace admin has turned MCP access off for this workspace. " +
- "Ask them to raise the MCP ceiling in the workspace settings"
+ "Ask them to raise the MCP ceiling under " + MCPCeilingLocation
case MCPCeilingUnserved:
return "this workspace's stored MCP capability ceiling is not one this build serves. " +
- "Ask a workspace admin to set the MCP ceiling to a supported value in the workspace settings"
+ "Ask a workspace admin to set the MCP ceiling to a supported value under " + MCPCeilingLocation
case MCPCeilingUnavailable:
return "this workspace's MCP capability ceiling could not be read. " +
- "Retry shortly; if it persists, ask a workspace admin to check the workspace settings"
+ "Retry shortly; if it persists, ask a workspace admin to check " + MCPCeilingLocation
default:
return ""
}
diff --git a/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling_test.go b/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling_test.go
index 9ec690ae9f..cebb93ec93 100644
--- a/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/auth/mcp_ceiling_test.go
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func TestEveryVerdictThatRefusesHasWording(t *testing.T) {
// Every refusal names the remedy, not only the fault. A denial an
// operator cannot act on is the failure this series exists to fix.
- require.Contains(t, refusal, "workspace settings", "%v must name where the fix is", v)
+ require.Contains(t, refusal, MCPCeilingLocation, "%v must name where the fix is", v)
}
require.Empty(t, MCPCeilingServes.Refusal(), "serving refuses nothing")
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/connection_audit_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/connection_audit_test.go
index 57aefa9ab9..10a9c4f77e 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/connection_audit_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/connection_audit_test.go
@@ -296,19 +296,3 @@ func mcpToken(t *testing.T, secret string, opts tokenOptions) string {
require.NoError(t, err)
return tokenStr
}
-
-// TestCeilingRefusalsAreRecognizedAsPolicy runs the real IsPolicyRefusal over
-// the ceiling refusals that can reach a tool, rather than restating its phrase
-// list somewhere it would drift.
-//
-// Only this verdict reaches it. A 403 is what the predicate is consulted for,
-// and the per-request gate answers CodePermissionDenied for it; an
-// outage answers CodeUnavailable, and DISABLED is refused at this door before
-// any tool call and by the serving table at the per-request one. A refusal it
-// stops recognizing gets "request a project role" appended — advice that cannot
-// lift a workspace setting.
-func TestCeilingRefusalsAreRecognizedAsPolicy(t *testing.T) {
- verdict := auth.MCPCeilingUnserved
- require.True(t, IsPolicyRefusal(verdict.Refusal()),
- "%v reaches a tool as a 403 and must carry its own way out", verdict)
-}
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/gen/openapi.yaml b/backend/api/mcp/gen/openapi.yaml
index 9237ac7175..6254382c97 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/gen/openapi.yaml
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/gen/openapi.yaml
@@ -9285,8 +9285,9 @@ components:
type: string
title: creator
description: |-
- The creator of the access grant.
+ The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it.
Format: users/{email}
+ readOnly: true
status:
allOf:
- $ref: '#/components/schemas/bytebase.v1.AccessGrant.Status'
@@ -9348,7 +9349,6 @@ components:
description: The container name to execute the query against, used for CosmosDB only.
title: AccessGrant
required:
- - creator
- targets
bytebase.v1.AccessGrant.Status:
type: string
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/server.go b/backend/api/mcp/server.go
index 6089ce75c8..055a7f3539 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/server.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/server.go
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/log"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/audit"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/config"
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/review"
storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/store"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/utils"
@@ -43,6 +44,10 @@ type Server struct {
revokedAccessTokens sync.Map // map[string]struct{}
+ // findUnapprovableStep needs the concrete store, which serverStore hides,
+ // so NewServer binds it and tests replace it.
+ findUnapprovableStep func(ctx context.Context, workspace, issueName string) (*review.UnapprovableStep, error)
+
// planCheckPollBudgetOverride lets tests shorten the plan-check poll budget.
// Zero means use the default (planCheckPollBudget).
planCheckPollBudgetOverride time.Duration
@@ -72,7 +77,14 @@ func NewServer(stores *store.Store, profile *config.Profile, secret string, inte
if stores == nil {
return nil, errors.New("store is required")
}
- return newServerWithStore(stores, profile, secret, internalAPI)
+ s, err := newServerWithStore(stores, profile, secret, internalAPI)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ s.findUnapprovableStep = func(ctx context.Context, workspace, issueName string) (*review.UnapprovableStep, error) {
+ return review.FindUnapprovableStep(ctx, stores, workspace, issueName)
+ }
+ return s, nil
}
func newServerWithStore(stores serverStore, profile *config.Profile, secret string, internalAPI http.Handler) (*Server, error) {
@@ -141,6 +153,7 @@ func newServerWithStore(stores serverStore, profile *config.Profile, secret stri
// principal.
mcpServer.AddReceivingMiddleware(negotiateLegacyProtocol)
mcpServer.AddReceivingMiddleware(liveRequestMetadata)
+ mcpServer.AddReceivingMiddleware(nameSignedInAccount)
// Pin each session to the identity it was opened with. The SDK captures
// TokenInfo.UserID when a session is created and rejects later requests
@@ -193,6 +206,22 @@ func negotiateLegacyProtocol(next mcp.MethodHandler) mcp.MethodHandler {
}
}
+// nameSignedInAccount opens the initialize instructions with the session's
+// Bytebase account: clients also show the model other accounts, such as their
+// own sign-in. It goes first, so a client that cuts long instructions keeps it.
+func nameSignedInAccount(next mcp.MethodHandler) mcp.MethodHandler {
+ return func(ctx context.Context, method string, req mcp.Request) (mcp.Result, error) {
+ result, err := next(ctx, method, req)
+ // The SDK refuses a second initialize on a session with a nil result,
+ // and a panic here would end the process.
+ if initialized, ok := result.(*mcp.InitializeResult); ok && initialized != nil {
+ account := fmt.Sprintf(`This session acts as the Bytebase account %s: every tool call runs with its permissions, and "you" in tool results means it. The user may have other accounts with other emails, such as the client's own sign-in.`, getUserEmail(ctx))
+ initialized.Instructions = strings.TrimSpace(account + "\n\n" + initialized.Instructions)
+ }
+ return result, err
+ }
+}
+
// refuseSessionlessProtocol rejects requests announcing that revision or newer.
//
// The SDK refuses it for every method but server/discover, and answers discover
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/server_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/server_test.go
index 70b693a92b..8ef0351f80 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/server_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/server_test.go
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package mcp
import (
+ "context"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
@@ -594,3 +595,42 @@ func tokenForWorkspace(t *testing.T, secret, workspaceID string) string {
require.NoError(t, err)
return tokenStr
}
+
+func TestInitializeNamesTheSignedInAccount(t *testing.T) {
+ endpoint, _, _ := newProbeServer(t)
+ token := mintMCPToken(t, "[email protected]", "client-A", "ws-test", "mcp:read-write", time.Hour)
+
+ session := connectLegacy(t, endpoint, token, nil)
+ require.Equal(t, `This session acts as the Bytebase account [email protected]: every tool call runs with its permissions, `+
+ `and "you" in tool results means it. The user may have other accounts with other emails, such as the client's own sign-in.`,
+ session.InitializeResult().Instructions)
+}
+
+// A second initialize on an open session is refused by the SDK with no result,
+// which the instructions middleware must pass through untouched.
+func TestDuplicateInitializeIsRefusedAndTheServerKeepsServing(t *testing.T) {
+ endpoint, _, _ := newProbeServer(t)
+ token := mintMCPToken(t, "[email protected]", "client-A", "ws-test", "mcp:read-write", time.Hour)
+ session := connectLegacy(t, endpoint, token, nil)
+
+ body := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":99,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"dup","version":"0"}}}`
+ req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, endpoint, strings.NewReader(body))
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+ req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+ req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream")
+ req.Header.Set("Mcp-Session-Id", session.ID())
+ req.Header.Set("Mcp-Protocol-Version", session.InitializeResult().ProtocolVersion)
+ resp, err := (&http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}).Do(req)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ defer resp.Body.Close()
+ reply, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.Contains(t, string(reply), `"error"`)
+ require.Contains(t, string(reply), "duplicate", "the SDK refuses the second initialize")
+
+ ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+ defer cancel()
+ _, err = session.ListTools(ctx, nil)
+ require.NoError(t, err, "the session must keep serving after the refused initialize")
+}
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request.go
index d5058ca311..ca64b78216 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request.go
@@ -4,10 +4,13 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
+ "log/slog"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/log"
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/review"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1/v1connect"
)
@@ -95,9 +98,41 @@ func (s *Server) handleRequestAccessGrant(ctx context.Context, _ *mcp.CallToolRe
DurationHours: input.DurationHours,
Link: link,
}
+ approval, next := "A person approves it in Bytebase before it takes effect.", useAfterApproval(input.Export)
+ if step := s.unapprovableStep(ctx, grant.Issue); step != nil {
+ approval, next = describeUnapprovableStep(step), wayAroundUnapprovableStep(input.Unmask)
+ }
return &mcp.CallToolResult{Content: []mcp.Content{&mcp.TextContent{Text: fmt.Sprintf(
- "Requested %s: %s for %s from approval. A person approves it in Bytebase before it takes effect.\nIssue: %s\n%s",
- grant.Name, describeRequestedAccess(input), hours(input.DurationHours), link, useAfterApproval(input.Export))}}}, output, nil
+ "Requested %s: %s for %s from approval. %s\nIssue: %s\n%s",
+ grant.Name, describeRequestedAccess(input), hours(input.DurationHours), approval, link, next)}}}, output, nil
+}
+
+// unapprovableStep drops the note on a failed read, not the result: an agent
+// shown an error could file the request again.
+func (s *Server) unapprovableStep(ctx context.Context, issue string) *review.UnapprovableStep {
+ step, err := s.findUnapprovableStep(ctx, getWorkspaceID(ctx), issue)
+ if err != nil {
+ slog.Warn("failed to check whether anyone can approve an access grant request", slog.String("issue", issue), log.BBError(err))
+ return nil
+ }
+ return step
+}
+
+func describeUnapprovableStep(step *review.UnapprovableStep) string {
+ if step.CreatorHoldsRole {
+ return fmt.Sprintf("No other person can approve it: step %d of its approval flow needs %s, which no other active workspace member holds, and this project does not allow self-approval.", step.Position, step.Role)
+ }
+ return fmt.Sprintf("No person can approve it: step %d of its approval flow needs %s, which no active workspace member holds.", step.Position, step.Role)
+}
+
+// wayAroundUnapprovableStep never suggests allowing self-approval: the setting
+// covers every issue type in the project, not only this request.
+func wayAroundUnapprovableStep(unmask bool) string {
+ way := "An approver can be added only in the Bytebase console, by granting someone that role."
+ if unmask {
+ way += " If the statement already runs for you with the values masked, a project owner can grant a masking exemption with grant_masking_exemption to read them without this request."
+ }
+ return way
}
// useAfterApproval says how to run the statement once the grant applies. Only
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request_test.go
index 0f72dd8232..ea45ca9271 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_access_request_test.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package mcp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
+ "errors"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/config"
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/review"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1/v1connect"
)
@@ -32,8 +34,13 @@ type accessGrantMock struct {
// refusalStatus and refusal, when set, are how the request is refused.
refusalStatus int
refusal map[string]any
- reads []string
- requests []map[string]any
+ // unapprovable and unapprovableErr are what the approval-flow check
+ // reports for the filed request.
+ unapprovable *review.UnapprovableStep
+ unapprovableErr error
+ reads []string
+ requests []map[string]any
+ checks []string
}
func (m *accessGrantMock) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -69,6 +76,19 @@ func (m *accessGrantMock) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
+func (m *accessGrantMock) findUnapprovableStep(_ context.Context, workspace, issue string) (*review.UnapprovableStep, error) {
+ m.mu.Lock()
+ defer m.mu.Unlock()
+ m.checks = append(m.checks, workspace+" "+issue)
+ return m.unapprovable, m.unapprovableErr
+}
+
+func (m *accessGrantMock) checked() []string {
+ m.mu.Lock()
+ defer m.mu.Unlock()
+ return append([]string(nil), m.checks...)
+}
+
func (m *accessGrantMock) calls() (reads []string, requests []map[string]any) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
@@ -80,6 +100,7 @@ func connectToAccessGrantServer(t *testing.T, mock *accessGrantMock) *mcp.Client
profile := &config.Profile{Mode: common.ReleaseModeDev, ExternalURL: "https://bb.example.com"}
s, err := newServerWithStore(newTestServerStore(), profile, revalidationSecret, mock)
require.NoError(t, err)
+ s.findUnapprovableStep = mock.findUnapprovableStep
e := echo.New()
s.RegisterRoutes(e)
ts := httptest.NewServer(e)
@@ -138,6 +159,63 @@ func TestRequestAccessGrantFilesTheRequest(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
require.JSONEq(t, `{"accessGrant":"projects/hr/accessGrants/g1","issue":"projects/hr/issues/7",
"durationHours":4,"link":"https://bb.example.com/projects/hr/issues/7"}`, string(output))
+ require.Equal(t, []string{"ws-test projects/hr/issues/7"}, mock.checked(), "the filed issue's approval flow is checked in the session's workspace")
+}
+
+func TestRequestAccessGrantSaysWhenNoOneCanApprove(t *testing.T) {
+ for name, tt := range map[string]struct {
+ step *review.UnapprovableStep
+ unmask bool
+ want string
+ }{
+ "only the requester holds the role": {
+ step: &review.UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: "roles/projectOwner", CreatorHoldsRole: true},
+ unmask: true,
+ want: "Requested projects/hr/accessGrants/g1: run the statement on projects/hr/instances/prod/databases/hr, unmasked for 4 hours from approval. " +
+ "No other person can approve it: step 1 of its approval flow needs roles/projectOwner, which no other active workspace member holds, and this project does not allow self-approval.\n" +
+ "Issue: https://bb.example.com/projects/hr/issues/7\n" +
+ "An approver can be added only in the Bytebase console, by granting someone that role. " +
+ "If the statement already runs for you with the values masked, a project owner can grant a masking exemption with grant_masking_exemption to read them without this request.",
+ },
+ "no person holds the role": {
+ step: &review.UnapprovableStep{Position: 2, Role: "roles/workspaceDBA"},
+ want: "Requested projects/hr/accessGrants/g1: run the statement on projects/hr/instances/prod/databases/hr for 4 hours from approval. " +
+ "No person can approve it: step 2 of its approval flow needs roles/workspaceDBA, which no active workspace member holds.\n" +
+ "Issue: https://bb.example.com/projects/hr/issues/7\n" +
+ "An approver can be added only in the Bytebase console, by granting someone that role.",
+ },
+ } {
+ t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ mock := &accessGrantMock{project: "projects/hr", unapprovable: tt.step}
+ session := connectToAccessGrantServer(t, mock)
+
+ res := callRequestAccessGrant(t, session, map[string]any{
+ "database": "projects/hr/instances/prod/databases/hr",
+ "statement": "SELECT 1",
+ "unmask": tt.unmask,
+ "reason": "a look",
+ "durationHours": 4,
+ })
+ require.False(t, res.IsError, resultText(t, res))
+ require.Equal(t, tt.want, resultText(t, res))
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestRequestAccessGrantKeepsItsResultWhenTheApprovalCheckFails(t *testing.T) {
+ mock := &accessGrantMock{project: "projects/hr", unapprovableErr: errors.New("connection refused")}
+ session := connectToAccessGrantServer(t, mock)
+
+ res := callRequestAccessGrant(t, session, map[string]any{
+ "database": "projects/hr/instances/prod/databases/hr",
+ "statement": "SELECT 1",
+ "reason": "a look",
+ "durationHours": 4,
+ })
+ require.False(t, res.IsError, "the request is filed, so a failed check must not read as a failed request: %s", resultText(t, res))
+ require.Contains(t, resultText(t, res), "A person approves it in Bytebase before it takes effect.")
+ _, requests := mock.calls()
+ require.Len(t, requests, 1)
}
func TestRequestAccessGrantFilesInTheDatabaseProject(t *testing.T) {
@@ -212,26 +290,18 @@ func TestRequestAccessGrantFilesNothingWhenTheDatabaseReadFails(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRequestAccessGrantPassesPermissionDenialsThrough(t *testing.T) {
- for name, tt := range map[string]struct {
- message string
- suggestion string
- }{
- "a request no person would approve": {
- "/bytebase.v1.AccessGrantService/CreateAccessGrant is not available to MCP sessions for this request because no approval rule requires a person to approve it, " +
- "so the access would be granted at once with no human step. Ask a workspace admin to give access requests " +
- "an approval rule that names an approver, or request the access in the Bytebase console.",
- "",
- },
- "a missing permission": {
- `permission denied for method "/bytebase.v1.AccessGrantService/CreateAccessGrant", user does not have permission "bb.accessGrants.create", extra map[]`,
- "ask your workspace admin to grant you the bb.accessGrants.create permission",
- },
+ for name, message := range map[string]string{
+ "a request no person would approve": "/bytebase.v1.AccessGrantService/CreateAccessGrant is not available to MCP sessions for this request because no approval rule requires a person to approve it, " +
+ "so the access would be granted at once with no human step. Ask a workspace admin to give access requests " +
+ "an approval rule that names an approver, or request the access in the Bytebase console.",
+ "a missing permission": `permission denied for method "/bytebase.v1.AccessGrantService/CreateAccessGrant", user does not have permission "bb.accessGrants.create", extra map[]`,
+ "a plan feature": "feature FEATURE_JIT is a ENTERPRISE feature, please upgrade to access it",
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
mock := &accessGrantMock{
project: "projects/hr",
refusalStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
- refusal: map[string]any{"code": "permission_denied", "message": tt.message},
+ refusal: map[string]any{"code": "permission_denied", "message": message},
}
session := connectToAccessGrantServer(t, mock)
@@ -244,7 +314,7 @@ func TestRequestAccessGrantPassesPermissionDenialsThrough(t *testing.T) {
require.True(t, res.IsError)
var denial toolError
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(resultText(t, res)), &denial))
- require.Equal(t, toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: tt.message, Suggestion: tt.suggestion}, denial)
+ require.Equal(t, toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: message}, denial, "the server's message is the whole answer")
})
}
}
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_change.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_change.go
index 2b9fdc851a..f68df7cc9f 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_change.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_change.go
@@ -551,22 +551,14 @@ func (s *Server) callAPI(ctx context.Context, path, operation, permission string
// Returns nil if the response is OK, or a structured error otherwise.
func checkAPIResponse(resp *apiResponse, operation, permission string) error {
if resp.Status == http.StatusForbidden || resp.Status == http.StatusUnauthorized {
- // A 403 here is not always a missing permission: the MCP enforcement
- // chain answers the same status for the method class, the ceiling, the
- // request's own shape and the masked-write guard. No grant lifts a
- // workspace setting, so those keep their own remedy and get no advice.
+ // The server's message goes alone. A 403 is not always a missing
+ // permission (a plan feature, the MCP ceiling, the request's own shape),
+ // and the ACL refusal names the permission itself.
message := parseError(resp.Body)
- if IsPolicyRefusal(message) {
- return &toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: message}
- }
if message == "" {
- message = fmt.Sprintf("you don't have permission to %s", operation)
- }
- return &toolError{
- Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED",
- Message: message,
- Suggestion: fmt.Sprintf("ask your workspace admin to grant you the %s permission", permission),
+ message = fmt.Sprintf("you don't have permission to %s, which requires %s", operation, permission)
}
+ return &toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: message}
}
if resp.Status >= 400 {
return errors.Errorf("%s failed: HTTP %d: %s", operation, resp.Status, parseError(resp.Body))
@@ -594,12 +586,11 @@ func formatChangeStepError(err error, defaultCode string, partialRefs map[string
func formatChangeStepErrorWithHint(err error, defaultCode string, partialRefs map[string]string, hint string) *mcp.CallToolResult {
var te *toolError
if errors.As(err, &te) && te.Code == "PERMISSION_DENIED" {
- // Passed through rather than re-derived: re-deriving overwrote a policy
- // denial's own remedy with the permission advice.
+ // A permission denial keeps its code and the server's words; the step's
+ // hint is about something else.
return formatChangeError(&changeError{
Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED",
Message: te.Message,
- Suggestion: te.Suggestion,
PartialRefs: partialRefs,
})
}
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_change_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_change_test.go
index 3d4e9f91f4..d20d4be350 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_change_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_change_test.go
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ func TestChange_IssueCreateFailed_SqlReview(t *testing.T) {
func TestChange_PermissionDenied_Sheet(t *testing.T) {
mock := newChangeMock(employeeDB())
mock.sheetStatus = http.StatusForbidden
- mock.sheetResponse = map[string]any{"message": "permission denied"}
+ mock.sheetResponse = map[string]any{"message": `user does not have permission "bb.sheets.create"`}
s := newChangeTestServer(t, mock)
result, _, err := s.handleChange(testContext(), nil, ChangeInput{
@@ -961,12 +961,11 @@ func TestChange_PermissionDenied_Sheet(t *testing.T) {
text := result.Content[0].(*mcpsdk.TextContent).Text
require.Contains(t, text, "PERMISSION_DENIED")
require.Contains(t, text, "bb.sheets.create")
+ require.NotContains(t, text, "suggestion", "the server's message is the whole answer")
}
-// TestChange_PolicyDenialKeepsItsOwnRemedy is the other half of
-// checkAPIResponse. An MCP policy refusal already says what to do, and no grant
-// lifts a workspace setting, so appending the permission advice would send the
-// agent at a dead end.
+// TestChange_PolicyDenialKeepsItsOwnRemedy: an MCP policy refusal already says
+// what to do, so it reaches the agent unchanged.
func TestChange_PolicyDenialKeepsItsOwnRemedy(t *testing.T) {
mock := newChangeMock(employeeDB())
mock.sheetStatus = http.StatusForbidden
@@ -993,7 +992,7 @@ func TestChange_PolicyDenialKeepsItsOwnRemedy(t *testing.T) {
func TestChange_PermissionDenied_Plan(t *testing.T) {
mock := newChangeMock(employeeDB())
mock.planStatus = http.StatusForbidden
- mock.planResponse = map[string]any{"message": "permission denied"}
+ mock.planResponse = map[string]any{"message": `user does not have permission "bb.plans.create"`}
s := newChangeTestServer(t, mock)
result, _, err := s.handleChange(testContext(), nil, ChangeInput{
@@ -1008,12 +1007,13 @@ func TestChange_PermissionDenied_Plan(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, text, "PERMISSION_DENIED")
require.Contains(t, text, "bb.plans.create")
require.Contains(t, text, "sheets/1001") // partialRefs
+ require.NotContains(t, text, "suggestion", "the server's message is the whole answer")
}
func TestChange_PermissionDenied_Issue(t *testing.T) {
mock := newChangeMock(employeeDB())
mock.issueStatus = http.StatusForbidden
- mock.issueResponse = map[string]any{"message": "permission denied"}
+ mock.issueResponse = map[string]any{"message": `user does not have permission "bb.issues.create"`}
s := newChangeTestServer(t, mock)
result, _, err := s.handleChange(testContext(), nil, ChangeInput{
@@ -1029,6 +1029,7 @@ func TestChange_PermissionDenied_Issue(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, text, "bb.issues.create")
require.Contains(t, text, "sheets/1001") // partialRefs
require.Contains(t, text, "plans/2002") // partialRefs
+ require.NotContains(t, text, "suggestion", "the server's message is the whole answer")
}
// --- Link construction tests ---
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_decide_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_decide_test.go
index 48f78488e2..a7d79001c3 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_decide_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_decide_test.go
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ func TestDecideIssueReportsTheRefusalInTheServersWords(t *testing.T) {
for name, refusal := range map[string]string{
"the workflow": "cannot approve because self-approval is not allowed for this project",
"the ceiling": "/bytebase.v1.IssueService/ApproveIssue is a WRITE method and this workspace's MCP capability ceiling is READ_ONLY, " +
- "which serves READ methods. Ask a workspace admin to raise the MCP ceiling in the workspace settings, " +
+ "which serves READ methods. Ask a workspace admin to raise the MCP ceiling under Integration > MCP > Access policy, " +
"or perform this action signed in to the Bytebase console instead",
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_query.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_query.go
index c625d6c0de..e41871f6bb 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_query.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_query.go
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import (
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
+
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/permission"
)
const (
@@ -194,6 +196,11 @@ type queryResult struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Statement string `json:"statement"`
Masked []maskingReason `json:"masked"`
+ // PermissionDenied is set when the SQL access check refused the statement.
+ PermissionDenied *struct {
+ RequiredPermissions []permission.Permission `json:"requiredPermissions"`
+ Resources []string `json:"resources"`
+ } `json:"permissionDenied"`
}
// maskingReason holds the MaskingReason fields the tool reports.
@@ -234,16 +241,11 @@ func (s *Server) executeQuery(ctx context.Context, resolved *resolvedDatabase, i
if errMsg == "" {
errMsg = fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d", resp.Status)
}
- suggestion := "check your SQL syntax and try again"
- if resp.Status == http.StatusForbidden || resp.Status == http.StatusUnauthorized {
- // A refusal that already names its own way out gets none added.
- // Telling an agent to request a project role for one sends the
- // person it acts for after a grant that cannot lift a workspace
- // setting.
- suggestion = ""
- if !IsPolicyRefusal(errMsg) {
- suggestion = "you may not have permission to query this database — request the SQL Editor role on the project"
- }
+ // A refusal at this level gets no advice: no access grant lifts a
+ // missing bb.databases.get, which the ACL checks first, or an MCP policy.
+ suggestion := ""
+ if resp.Status != http.StatusForbidden && resp.Status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+ suggestion = "check your SQL syntax and try again"
}
return nil, &toolError{
Code: "QUERY_ERROR",
@@ -267,10 +269,18 @@ func (s *Server) executeQuery(ctx context.Context, resolved *resolvedDatabase, i
result := qr.Results[0]
if result.Error != "" {
+ suggestion := "check your SQL syntax and try again"
+ if result.PermissionDenied != nil {
+ // MCP sessions cannot file role requests, so the only advice is a grant.
+ suggestion = ""
+ if denied := result.PermissionDenied; grantLifts(denied.RequiredPermissions) && withinDatabase(denied.Resources, resolved.resourceName) {
+ suggestion = grantAdvice(input.Statement, result.Statement)
+ }
+ }
return nil, &toolError{
Code: "QUERY_ERROR",
Message: result.Error,
- Suggestion: "check your SQL syntax and try again",
+ Suggestion: suggestion,
}
}
@@ -402,22 +412,46 @@ func parseLatencyMs(latency string) int64 {
return d.Milliseconds()
}
-// IsPolicyRefusal reports whether a 403 came from the MCP enforcement chain
-// rather than from the caller's own RBAC. It matches wording because the verdict
-// crosses a process boundary as an error body and nothing else survives the
-// trip; the producers call this, not a copy of it, in
-// TestMCPRefusalsNameThemselvesToTheQueryTool (backend/api/v1).
-func IsPolicyRefusal(message string) bool {
- for _, phrase := range []string{
- "MCP capability ceiling",
- // Singular, so it also matches the plural the gate uses and the
- // refusals taken in handlers.
- "MCP session",
- "MCP classification",
- } {
- if strings.Contains(message, phrase) {
- return true
+// grantLifts reports whether an approved access grant lifts a refusal that
+// required these permissions. Writes and DDL cannot be granted, and a granted
+// target still needs bb.sql.explain (SQLService.accessCheckWithGrantedTargets).
+func grantLifts(required []permission.Permission) bool {
+ if len(required) == 0 {
+ return false
+ }
+ for _, p := range required {
+ if p != permission.SQLSelect && p != permission.SQLInfo {
+ return false
}
}
- return false
+ return true
+}
+
+// withinDatabase reports whether every denied resource is the database or lies
+// inside it. request_access_grant files a grant for that one database, and a
+// grant exempts only its own targets.
+func withinDatabase(resources []string, database string) bool {
+ if len(resources) == 0 {
+ return false
+ }
+ for _, resource := range resources {
+ if resource != database && !strings.HasPrefix(resource, database+"/") {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ return true
+}
+
+// grantAdvice names the refused statement when the input was a batch. Query
+// runs a batch one statement at a time and stops at the first refusal
+// (queryRetryStopOnError), and a grant applies only to the exact read-only
+// statement it names (hashAccessGrantQuery).
+func grantAdvice(input, refused string) string {
+ const howTo = "(the project must allow just-in-time access); otherwise the user requests access in the SQL Editor"
+ refused = strings.TrimSpace(refused)
+ if refused == "" || refused == strings.TrimSpace(input) {
+ return "in a Read-write session, request an access grant for this statement with request_access_grant " + howTo
+ }
+ return fmt.Sprintf("the batch stopped at %q: in a Read-write session, request an access grant for that statement alone "+
+ "with request_access_grant and, once approved, run it by itself %s", refused, howTo)
}
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_query_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_query_test.go
index 749ec937f6..bd00c06b17 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_query_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_query_test.go
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ func TestQueryDatabase_WorkspacePermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
- "message": "permission denied",
+ "message": `user does not have permission "bb.databases.list"`,
"code": "PERMISSION_DENIED",
})
})
@@ -327,8 +327,8 @@ func TestQueryDatabase_WorkspacePermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
var te *toolError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &te)
- require.Equal(t, "PERMISSION_DENIED", te.Code)
- require.Contains(t, te.Suggestion, "bb.databases.list")
+ require.Equal(t, toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: `user does not have permission "bb.databases.list"`}, *te,
+ "the server's message names the permission, and nothing is added")
}
func TestQueryDatabase_Ambiguous(t *testing.T) {
@@ -669,10 +669,10 @@ func TestQueryDatabase_QueryError(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, text, "syntax error")
}
-// TestQueryDatabase_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice is the same contract on the
-// read tool. The masked-write guard refuses through SQLService/Query, and a
-// project role cannot lift a workspace setting.
-func TestQueryDatabase_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice(t *testing.T) {
+// TestQueryDatabase_PolicyDenialGetsNoAccessAdvice: the masked-write guard
+// refuses through SQLService/Query, and no access grant lifts a workspace
+// setting.
+func TestQueryDatabase_PolicyDenialGetsNoAccessAdvice(t *testing.T) {
databases := []map[string]any{
makeDatabase("instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db", "instances/prod-pg", "projects/hr-system", "POSTGRES", "ds-admin-1"),
}
@@ -700,8 +700,7 @@ func TestQueryDatabase_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice(t *testing.T) {
text := result.Content[0].(*mcpsdk.TextContent).Text
require.Contains(t, text, "******")
- require.NotContains(t, text, "SQL Editor role",
- "no project role lifts a workspace setting")
+ require.NotContains(t, text, "suggestion", "the refusal names its own way out")
}
func TestQueryDatabase_PermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
@@ -731,6 +730,127 @@ func TestQueryDatabase_PermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
text := result.Content[0].(*mcpsdk.TextContent).Text
require.Contains(t, text, "permission denied")
+ require.NotContains(t, text, "suggestion", "the ACL refuses a missing bb.databases.get before any access grant applies")
+}
+
+// The SQL access check answers inside a 200 result, the shape the server
+// returns when the caller can see the database but not read its tables.
+func TestQueryDatabase_TableAccessDenialAdvisesAnAccessGrant(t *testing.T) {
+ databases := []map[string]any{
+ makeDatabase("projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db", "projects/hr/instances/prod-pg", "projects/hr", "POSTGRES", "ds-admin-1"),
+ }
+ for name, tt := range map[string]struct {
+ statement string
+ result map[string]any
+ want string
+ }{
+ "the access check refused the tables": {
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: [projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db/schemas/public/tables/employee]",
+ "statement": "SELECT first_name FROM employee",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{
+ "requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.select"},
+ "resources": []string{"projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db/schemas/public/tables/employee"},
+ },
+ },
+ want: "in a Read-write session, request an access grant for this statement with request_access_grant " +
+ "(the project must allow just-in-time access); otherwise the user requests access in the SQL Editor",
+ },
+ // A grant must name a read-only statement and applies only to that exact
+ // statement, so the batch as a whole can neither be granted nor use the grant.
+ "the access check refused a read in a batch that also writes": {
+ statement: "SELECT first_name FROM employee; UPDATE employee SET first_name = 'x'",
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: [projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db/schemas/public/tables/employee]",
+ "statement": "SELECT first_name FROM employee;",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{
+ "requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.select"},
+ "resources": []string{"projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db/schemas/public/tables/employee"},
+ },
+ },
+ want: `the batch stopped at "SELECT first_name FROM employee;": in a Read-write session, request an access grant for that statement alone ` +
+ "with request_access_grant and, once approved, run it by itself " +
+ "(the project must allow just-in-time access); otherwise the user requests access in the SQL Editor",
+ },
+ "the access check refused a metadata read": {
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{
+ "requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.info"},
+ "resources": []string{"projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db"},
+ },
+ },
+ want: "in a Read-write session, request an access grant for this statement with request_access_grant " +
+ "(the project must allow just-in-time access); otherwise the user requests access in the SQL Editor",
+ },
+ // A grant from request_access_grant targets the queried database only.
+ "the access check refused a table in another database": {
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: [projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/payroll/schemas/public/tables/salary]",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{
+ "requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.select"},
+ "resources": []string{"projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/payroll/schemas/public/tables/salary"},
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ "the access check refused tables in this and another database": {
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: [two tables]",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{
+ "requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.select"},
+ "resources": []string{
+ "projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db/schemas/public/tables/employee",
+ "projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db2/schemas/public/tables/salary",
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ // No grant lifts these: a grant's statement must be read-only, and a
+ // granted target still needs bb.sql.explain from IAM.
+ "the access check refused a write": {
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: [projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db/schemas/public/tables/employee]",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{"requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.dml"}},
+ },
+ },
+ "the access check refused an EXPLAIN": {
+ result: map[string]any{
+ "error": "permission_denied: permission denied to access resources: projects/hr/instances/prod-pg/databases/employee_db",
+ "permissionDenied": map[string]any{"requiredPermissions": []string{"bb.sql.explain"}},
+ },
+ },
+ "a statement the engine rejected": {
+ result: map[string]any{"error": `syntax error at or near "SELEC"`},
+ want: "check your SQL syntax and try again",
+ },
+ } {
+ t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ if strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "SQLService/Query") {
+ w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+ _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"results": []any{tt.result}})
+ return
+ }
+ mockListDatabases(databases).ServeHTTP(w, r)
+ })
+ s := newTestServerWithMock(t, handler)
+ statement := tt.statement
+ if statement == "" {
+ statement = "SELECT first_name FROM employee"
+ }
+
+ result, _, err := s.handleQueryDatabase(testContext(), nil, QueryInput{
+ Database: "employee_db",
+ Statement: statement,
+ })
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.True(t, result.IsError)
+ var denial toolError
+ require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].(*mcpsdk.TextContent).Text), &denial))
+ require.Equal(t, tt.result["error"], denial.Message)
+ require.Equal(t, tt.want, denial.Suggestion)
+ })
+ }
}
// --- Task 6 tests: masked values and timeout ---
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve.go
index 47299dc768..a8d768bfb8 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve.go
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
- "net/http"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -122,18 +121,8 @@ func (s *Server) listDatabases(ctx context.Context, filter string) ([]databaseEn
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to list databases")
}
- if resp.Status == http.StatusForbidden {
- if message := parseError(resp.Body); IsPolicyRefusal(message) {
- return nil, &toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: message}
- }
- return nil, &toolError{
- Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED",
- Message: "you don't have permission to list databases in this workspace",
- Suggestion: "ask your workspace admin to grant you the bb.databases.list permission",
- }
- }
- if resp.Status >= 400 {
- return nil, errors.Errorf("failed to list databases: HTTP %d: %s", resp.Status, parseError(resp.Body))
+ if err := checkAPIResponse(resp, "list databases", "bb.databases.list"); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
}
var listResp listDatabasesResponse
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve_test.go
index 71cfc95ae9..7c88d2da4f 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_resolve_test.go
@@ -90,11 +90,9 @@ func TestResolve_ProjectInstanceDatabaseAndFilter(t *testing.T) {
)
}
-// TestResolve_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice covers the resolve door. It answers
-// 403 when the stored ceiling is unserved, which is exactly the case where
-// telling the agent to ask for bb.databases.list would send the person it acts
-// for after a grant that cannot fix a broken setting.
-func TestResolve_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice(t *testing.T) {
+// TestResolve_PolicyDenialPassesThrough: an unserved ceiling refuses the lookup,
+// and the refusal names its own way out.
+func TestResolve_PolicyDenialPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "DatabaseService/ListDatabases") {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
@@ -117,9 +115,9 @@ func TestResolve_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice(t *testing.T) {
require.Empty(t, te.Suggestion, "no grant fixes a stored ceiling this build does not serve")
}
-// TestTranslateMetadataError_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice is the same contract
-// on the get_schema door.
-func TestTranslateMetadataError_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice(t *testing.T) {
+// TestTranslateMetadataError_PassesTheRefusalThrough is the same contract on
+// the get_schema door.
+func TestTranslateMetadataError_PassesTheRefusalThrough(t *testing.T) {
body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"message": "/bytebase.v1.DatabaseService/GetDatabaseMetadata is not available to MCP sessions",
})
@@ -131,10 +129,10 @@ func TestTranslateMetadataError_PolicyDenialGetsNoRoleAdvice(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, te.Message, "MCP sessions")
require.Empty(t, te.Suggestion)
- plain, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"message": "permission denied"})
+ plain, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"message": `user does not have permission "bb.databases.getSchema"`})
require.NoError(t, err)
got = translateMetadataError(&apiResponse{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Body: plain})
require.ErrorAs(t, got, &te)
- require.Contains(t, te.Suggestion, "bb.databases.getSchema",
- "a plain ACL denial keeps the permission advice")
+ require.Equal(t, toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: `user does not have permission "bb.databases.getSchema"`}, *te,
+ "an ACL denial names its permission, and nothing is added")
}
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema.go
index 0ce6e42b96..9a59807ec6 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema.go
@@ -402,14 +402,7 @@ func translateMetadataError(resp *apiResponse) error {
Suggestion: "check the database name or use search_api to list available databases",
}
case http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusUnauthorized:
- if IsPolicyRefusal(errMsg) {
- return &toolError{Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED", Message: errMsg}
- }
- return &toolError{
- Code: "PERMISSION_DENIED",
- Message: "you don't have permission to read this database's schema",
- Suggestion: "ask your workspace admin to grant you the bb.databases.getSchema permission",
- }
+ return checkAPIResponse(resp, "read this database's schema", "bb.databases.getSchema")
case http.StatusInternalServerError:
suggestion := "check instance connectivity in the Bytebase UI"
if errMsg != "" {
diff --git a/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema_test.go b/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema_test.go
index 45e94a386e..00c2705e64 100644
--- a/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/mcp/tool_schema_test.go
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ func TestGetSchema_PermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
- "message": "permission denied",
+ "message": `user does not have permission "bb.databases.getSchema"`,
"code": "PERMISSION_DENIED",
})
return
@@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ func TestGetSchema_PermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
text := result.Content[0].(*mcpsdk.TextContent).Text
require.Contains(t, text, "PERMISSION_DENIED")
require.Contains(t, text, "bb.databases.getSchema")
+ require.NotContains(t, text, "suggestion", "the server's message is the whole answer")
}
func TestGetSchema_InvalidIncludeValue(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/backend/api/oauth2/consent_audit_test.go b/backend/api/oauth2/consent_audit_test.go
index 5e9a5f236a..fe07c0067a 100644
--- a/backend/api/oauth2/consent_audit_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/oauth2/consent_audit_test.go
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func TestConsentRefusal(t *testing.T) {
name: "MCP turned off",
capability: storepb.MCPSetting_DISABLED,
message: "turned MCP access off",
- page: []string{"<title>MCP access is turned off</title>", "turned MCP access off for this workspace", "in the workspace settings"},
+ page: []string{"<title>MCP access is turned off</title>", "turned MCP access off for this workspace", "Access policy"},
},
{
name: "a ceiling this build does not serve",
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate.go b/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate.go
index 226f73231a..edb0e1e8a4 100644
--- a/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate.go
+++ b/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate.go
@@ -442,9 +442,9 @@ func (in *internalMCPGateInterceptor) refuseByCeiling(ctx context.Context, proce
}
return nil, true, connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, errors.Errorf(
"%s is a %v method and this workspace's MCP capability ceiling is %v, which serves %s. "+
- "Ask a workspace admin to raise the MCP ceiling in the workspace settings, "+
+ "Ask a workspace admin to raise the MCP ceiling under %s, "+
"or perform this action signed in to the Bytebase console instead",
- procedure, class, settings.Capability, describeServedClasses(served)))
+ procedure, class, settings.Capability, describeServedClasses(served), auth.MCPCeilingLocation))
}
// describeServedClasses renders a mode's serving list for a denial message.
@@ -583,9 +583,12 @@ func grantIssueRefusal(issueType v1pb.Issue_Type) (reason, wayOut string) {
reason = fmt.Sprintf("an ACCESS_GRANT issue is filed by %s, not created directly",
v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure)
return reason, "Request the access with the request_access_grant tool instead"
+ case v1pb.Issue_ROLE_GRANT:
+ reason = "a ROLE_GRANT issue changes the project's IAM policy once approved, and MCP sessions " +
+ "cannot change IAM policy, whatever the approval rules say"
+ return reason, "To run a read-only statement, request an access grant with the request_access_grant tool; " +
+ "to get a role, request it signed in to the Bytebase console"
default:
- return fmt.Sprintf(
- "a %v issue completes on creation whenever the workspace approval rule produces no template, "+
- "which grants access with no human step", issueType), mcpConsoleWayOut
+ return fmt.Sprintf("MCP sessions create DATABASE_CHANGE issues only, not %v", issueType), mcpConsoleWayOut
}
}
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate_test.go b/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate_test.go
index 9c463719c3..dca73bf852 100644
--- a/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/v1/mcp_gate_test.go
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ func TestMCPGateUnderAReadOnlyCeiling(t *testing.T) {
require.False(t, got.dispatched)
require.Equal(t, connect.CodePermissionDenied, connect.CodeOf(got.err))
require.Contains(t, got.err.Error(), "READ_ONLY", "the denial must name the ceiling in force")
- require.Contains(t, got.err.Error(), "raise the MCP ceiling", "the denial must name the way out")
+ require.Contains(t, got.err.Error(), "raise the MCP ceiling under "+auth.MCPCeilingLocation, "the denial must name the way out")
require.True(t, got.auditMarked)
})
}
@@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ func TestMCPGateRefusesGrantIssues(t *testing.T) {
wayOut []string
notWayOut string
}{
- v1pb.Issue_ROLE_GRANT: {[]string{mcpConsoleWayOut}, v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure},
+ v1pb.Issue_ROLE_GRANT: {[]string{"whatever the approval rules say", "request_access_grant", "Bytebase console"}, v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure},
v1pb.Issue_ACCESS_GRANT: {[]string{v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure, "request_access_grant"}, mcpConsoleWayOut},
} {
t.Run("CreateIssue refuses "+issueType.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1836,7 +1836,8 @@ func TestRejectMCPOriginatedGrantIssue(t *testing.T) {
wayOut []string
notWayOut string
}{
- "an MCP session may not create a role grant": {mcpCtx, v1pb.Issue_ROLE_GRANT, []string{mcpConsoleWayOut}, v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure},
+ "an MCP session may not create a role grant": {mcpCtx, v1pb.Issue_ROLE_GRANT,
+ []string{"whatever the approval rules say", "request_access_grant", "Bytebase console"}, v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure},
"an MCP session may not create an access grant": {mcpCtx, v1pb.Issue_ACCESS_GRANT,
[]string{v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure, "request_access_grant"}, mcpConsoleWayOut},
"an MCP session may not create an unknown type": {mcpCtx, v1pb.Issue_Type(9999), []string{mcpConsoleWayOut}, v1connect.AccessGrantServiceCreateAccessGrantProcedure},
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/mcp_masking_test.go b/backend/api/v1/mcp_masking_test.go
index 4ec6da3de7..9541cb6cc7 100644
--- a/backend/api/v1/mcp_masking_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/v1/mcp_masking_test.go
@@ -9,13 +9,11 @@ import (
"connectrpc.com/connect"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
- "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/api/mcp"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/component/masker"
storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"
v1pb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1/v1connect"
- "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/store"
)
// mcpSessionContext is a request as the gate hands it to a handler: a
@@ -222,91 +220,6 @@ func TestMaskedWriteGuardCoversTheExecutionDoor(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, exported.err.Error(), masker.DefaultFullMaskSubstitution)
}
-// TestMCPRefusalsNameThemselvesToTheQueryTool is a contract between two
-// processes that meet only over an error body.
-//
-// query_database drops its own "request the SQL Editor role" advice when it
-// recognizes an MCP policy refusal, because no project role lifts a workspace
-// setting. It recognizes one by wording, so every producer's wording has to stay
-// inside the list the consumer keys on — including the masked-write guard, which
-// is the newest producer and the one whose refusal names a literal rather than a
-// policy.
-func TestMCPRefusalsNameThemselvesToTheQueryTool(t *testing.T) {
- readWrite := readWriteCeiling()
- maskedWrite := "UPDATE employee SET secret = '" + masker.DefaultFullMaskSubstitution + "'"
-
- for _, row := range []struct {
- name string
- stores mcpGateStore
- class v1pb.MCPMethodClass
- request connect.AnyRequest
- }{
- {
- name: "the masked-write guard",
- stores: readWrite,
- class: v1pb.MCPMethodClass_READ,
- request: connect.NewRequest(&v1pb.QueryRequest{Statement: maskedWrite}),
- },
- {
- name: "the ceiling gate",
- stores: mcpGateStore{ceiling: storepb.MCPSetting_READ_ONLY},
- class: v1pb.MCPMethodClass_WRITE,
- request: connect.NewRequest(&v1pb.QueryRequest{}),
- },
- {
- name: "an unclassified method",
- stores: readWrite,
- class: v1pb.MCPMethodClass_MCP_METHOD_CLASS_UNSPECIFIED,
- request: connect.NewRequest(&v1pb.QueryRequest{}),
- },
- } {
- t.Run(row.name, func(t *testing.T) {
- got := invokeMCPGate(t, row.stores, &common.AuthContext{
- MCPMethodClass: row.class,
- DelegatedGrant: &common.DelegatedGrant{},
- }, "/bytebase.v1.SQLService/Query", row.request)
-
- require.Error(t, got.err)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(got.err.Error()),
- "query_database would append project-role advice to %q", got.err.Error())
- })
- }
-
- // Each producer that refuses outside the gate turns on a fact the request
- // shape cannot carry, so each is checked on its own message.
- clamped := refuseNonReadOnlyStatement(storepb.Engine_POSTGRES, "UPDATE employee SET id = 1")
- require.Error(t, clamped)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(clamped.Error()))
-
- mcpCtx := contextWithAuth(&common.AuthContext{DelegatedGrant: &common.DelegatedGrant{}})
- grantIssue := rejectMCPOriginatedGrantIssue(mcpCtx, v1pb.Issue_ROLE_GRANT)
- require.Error(t, grantIssue)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(grantIssue.Error()))
-
- tokenMint := (&AuthService{}).rejectMCPOriginatedTokenMint(mcpCtx, nil, "switch workspaces")
- require.Error(t, tokenMint)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(tokenMint.Error()))
-
- approvalProject := &store.ProjectMessage{
- ResourceID: "p",
- Setting: &storepb.Project{RequireIssueApproval: true},
- }
- issueless := rejectMCPOriginatedIssuelessRollout(mcpCtx, approvalProject, nil, "create a rollout")
- require.Error(t, issueless)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(issueless.Error()))
-
- unattended := refuseUnattendedMCPAccessGrant(mcpCtx, &storepb.IssuePayloadApproval{ApprovalFindingDone: true})
- require.Error(t, unattended)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(unattended.Error()))
-
- unconfirmed := invokeMCPGate(t, readWrite, &common.AuthContext{
- MCPMethodClass: v1pb.MCPMethodClass_WRITE,
- DelegatedGrant: &common.DelegatedGrant{},
- }, v1connect.IssueServiceApproveIssueProcedure, connect.NewRequest(&v1pb.ApproveIssueRequest{Name: "projects/p/issues/1"}))
- require.Error(t, unconfirmed.err)
- require.True(t, mcp.IsPolicyRefusal(unconfirmed.err.Error()))
-}
-
// TestMaskPlaceholderMatchIsDeliberatelyBroad records which side of the trade
// the guard sits on. It is a substring scan, so an asterisk banner is refused
// and a placeholder abutting other characters is caught. The first is a message
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp.go b/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp.go
index f6ec01a520..2594a4fce6 100644
--- a/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp.go
+++ b/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp.go
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"connectrpc.com/connect"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/api/auth"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common"
storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"
parserbase "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/plugin/parser/base"
@@ -126,6 +127,6 @@ func describeClampUnit(index, total int) string {
func refuseClampedStatement(reason string) error {
return connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, errors.Errorf(
"this workspace's MCP capability ceiling is READ_ONLY, so an MCP session may only run statements Bytebase can show are reads: %s. "+
- "Ask a workspace admin to raise the MCP ceiling in the workspace settings, "+
- "or run this statement signed in to the Bytebase console instead", reason))
+ "Ask a workspace admin to raise the MCP ceiling under %s, "+
+ "or run this statement signed in to the Bytebase console instead", reason, auth.MCPCeilingLocation))
}
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp_test.go b/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp_test.go
index f0024df0c1..e5c6cf21c7 100644
--- a/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp_test.go
+++ b/backend/api/v1/mcp_sql_clamp_test.go
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"connectrpc.com/connect"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/api/auth"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common"
storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"
v1pb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1"
@@ -378,7 +379,7 @@ func TestMCPClampRefusesWhatItCannotShowIsARead(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), row.reason)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "READ_ONLY",
"the denial must name the ceiling that refused")
- require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "raise the MCP ceiling",
+ require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "raise the MCP ceiling under "+auth.MCPCeilingLocation,
"the denial must name the way out")
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Bytebase console",
"the denial must name where the human can do it instead")
diff --git a/backend/component/review/evaluator.go b/backend/component/review/evaluator.go
index 10a871c66c..5f92a0e3e1 100644
--- a/backend/component/review/evaluator.go
+++ b/backend/component/review/evaluator.go
@@ -1237,10 +1237,26 @@ func collectStatementTypes(celVarsList []map[string]any) []string {
return result
}
-// getApproversForRole returns the people who hold the role in the project or
-// workspace IAM policy, for a notification to mention. A service account or
-// workload identity that holds the role can approve too, but has nobody to notify.
+// getApproversForRole returns the people who hold the role, for a notification
+// to mention. On an error it still returns the people who resolved.
func getApproversForRole(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, projectID string, role string) ([]webhook.User, error) {
+ people, err := activeRoleHolders(ctx, stores, projectID, role)
+ approvers := make([]webhook.User, 0, len(people))
+ for _, person := range people {
+ approvers = append(approvers, webhook.User{
+ Name: person.Name,
+ Email: person.Email,
+ Phone: person.Phone,
+ })
+ }
+ return approvers, err
+}
+
+// activeRoleHolders returns the people who hold the role in the project or
+// workspace IAM policy. Service accounts and workload identities can approve but
+// are not people; a deactivated account keeps its bindings but cannot sign in.
+// After a failed member lookup it returns the people who resolved and the error.
+func activeRoleHolders(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, projectID string, role string) ([]*store.UserMessage, error) {
// Get project to determine workspace
project, err := stores.GetProjectByResourceID(ctx, projectID)
if err != nil {
@@ -1263,7 +1279,7 @@ func getApproversForRole(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, projectID str
}
// Get all users with the specified role
- users := utils.GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
+ users, lookupErr := utils.UsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
ctx,
stores,
project.Workspace,
@@ -1275,21 +1291,14 @@ func getApproversForRole(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, projectID str
workspaceIAM.Policy,
)
- // Convert to webhook.User format, filtering by END_USER principal type
- approvers := make([]webhook.User, 0, len(users))
+ people := make([]*store.UserMessage, 0, len(users))
for _, user := range users {
- // Only include END_USER principals as approvers
- if user.Type != storepb.PrincipalType_END_USER {
+ if user.Type != storepb.PrincipalType_END_USER || user.MemberDeleted {
continue
}
- approvers = append(approvers, webhook.User{
- Name: user.Name,
- Email: user.Email,
- Phone: user.Phone,
- })
+ people = append(people, user)
}
-
- return approvers, nil
+ return people, lookupErr
}
// NotifyApprovalRequested sends the ISSUE_APPROVAL_REQUESTED webhook event for the next pending approval stage.
@@ -1314,8 +1323,7 @@ func NotifyApprovalRequested(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, webhookMa
// Get approvers for this role
approvers, err := getApproversForRole(ctx, stores, issue.ProjectID, role)
if err != nil {
- slog.Warn("failed to get approvers", log.BBError(err))
- approvers = []webhook.User{} // Continue with empty list
+ slog.Warn("failed to get every approver", log.BBError(err))
}
if !project.Setting.GetAllowLastPlanEditorApproval() && issue.Type == storepb.Issue_DATABASE_CHANGE && issue.PlanUID != nil {
plan, err := stores.GetPlan(ctx, &store.FindPlanMessage{ProjectID: issue.ProjectID, UID: issue.PlanUID})
@@ -1350,6 +1358,64 @@ func NotifyApprovalRequested(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, webhookMa
})
}
+// UnapprovableStep is a remaining approval step that no person can approve.
+type UnapprovableStep struct {
+ // Position counts the steps of the approval flow from 1.
+ Position int
+ // Role is the role the step requires, e.g. "roles/projectOwner".
+ Role string
+ // CreatorHoldsRole is set when the issue's creator holds the role and the
+ // project refuses self-approval.
+ CreatorHoldsRole bool
+}
+
+// FindUnapprovableStep returns the first remaining step of the issue's approval
+// flow that no active person can approve, or nil. People are found as approval
+// notifications find them. One with no workspace binding still counts, since
+// sign-in can add one (self-hosted login, workspace SSO).
+func FindUnapprovableStep(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, workspace, issueName string) (*UnapprovableStep, error) {
+ projectID, issueUID, err := common.GetProjectIDIssueUID(issueName)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ project, err := stores.GetProject(ctx, &store.FindProjectMessage{Workspace: workspace, ResourceID: &projectID})
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get project %s", projectID)
+ }
+ if project == nil {
+ return nil, errors.Errorf("project %s not found", projectID)
+ }
+ issue, err := stores.GetIssue(ctx, &store.FindIssueMessage{Workspace: workspace, ProjectIDs: []string{projectID}, UID: &issueUID})
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get issue %s", issueName)
+ }
+ if issue == nil {
+ return nil, errors.Errorf("issue %s not found", issueName)
+ }
+ approval := issue.Payload.GetApproval()
+ roles := approval.GetApprovalTemplate().GetFlow().GetRoles()
+ for i := len(approval.GetApprovers()); i < len(roles); i++ {
+ people, err := activeRoleHolders(ctx, stores, projectID, roles[i])
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ approvable, creatorHoldsRole := false, false
+ for _, person := range people {
+ if person.Email == issue.CreatorEmail {
+ creatorHoldsRole = true
+ }
+ if !refusesSelfApproval(project, issue.CreatorEmail, person.Email) {
+ approvable = true
+ }
+ }
+ if approvable {
+ continue
+ }
+ return &UnapprovableStep{Position: i + 1, Role: roles[i], CreatorHoldsRole: creatorHoldsRole}, nil
+ }
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
// NotifyIssueApproved sends the ISSUE_APPROVED webhook event when all approval steps complete.
// It notifies the issue creator that their issue has been fully approved.
func NotifyIssueApproved(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, webhookManager *webhook.Manager, issue *store.IssueMessage, project *store.ProjectMessage, approver *store.UserMessage) {
diff --git a/backend/component/review/workflow.go b/backend/component/review/workflow.go
index d0c60c9e74..ee0230a1c7 100644
--- a/backend/component/review/workflow.go
+++ b/backend/component/review/workflow.go
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ func (w *Workflow) applyReviewAction(ctx context.Context, project *store.Project
return nil, workflowReasonError(ErrorPermissionDenied, ReasonApproverRoleRequired,
"cannot %s because the user does not have the required permission", verb)
}
- if !project.Setting.GetAllowSelfApproval() && issue.CreatorEmail == input.Actor.Email {
+ if refusesSelfApproval(project, issue.CreatorEmail, input.Actor.Email) {
return nil, workflowError(ErrorPermissionDenied, "cannot %s because self-approval is not allowed for this project", verb)
}
if input.Action == ActionApprove && !project.Setting.GetAllowLastPlanEditorApproval() && plan != nil {
@@ -412,6 +412,12 @@ func (w *Workflow) applyReviewAction(ctx context.Context, project *store.Project
}
}
+// refusesSelfApproval reports whether the project refuses the actor's review,
+// approval or rejection, of an issue the actor created.
+func refusesSelfApproval(project *store.ProjectMessage, creatorEmail, actorEmail string) bool {
+ return !project.Setting.GetAllowSelfApproval() && creatorEmail == actorEmail
+}
+
func effectiveLastPlanEditor(plan *store.PlanMessage) string {
if plan.LastPlanEditor != nil {
return *plan.LastPlanEditor
diff --git a/backend/component/review/workflow_test.go b/backend/component/review/workflow_test.go
index 6679ae1a75..51d3a5ba15 100644
--- a/backend/component/review/workflow_test.go
+++ b/backend/component/review/workflow_test.go
@@ -1437,6 +1437,228 @@ func TestApproverRoleRefusalCarriesItsReason(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+func TestFindUnapprovableStep(t *testing.T) {
+ const owner, releaser = "roles/projectOwner", "roles/projectReleaser"
+ grant := func(member, role string) func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store) {
+ return func(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, stores *store.Store) {
+ _, err := stores.PatchWorkspaceIamPolicy(ctx, &store.PatchIamPolicyMessage{Workspace: "default", Member: member, Roles: []string{role}})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ }
+ }
+ // grantInProject binds the role in the project policy only, so the member
+ // gets no workspace binding from it.
+ grantInProject := func(member, role string) func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store) {
+ return func(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, stores *store.Store) {
+ _, err := stores.PatchIamPolicy(ctx, "default", storepb.Policy_PROJECT, common.FormatProject("project-a"), func(policy *storepb.IamPolicy) error {
+ policy.Bindings = append(policy.Bindings, &storepb.Binding{Role: role, Members: []string{member}})
+ return nil
+ })
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ }
+ }
+ for _, test := range []struct {
+ name string
+ flow []string
+ setup []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store)
+ // approved counts the steps approved before the check.
+ approved int
+ want *UnapprovableStep
+ }{
+ {
+ name: "only the creator holds the role, and self-approval is off",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){grant("users/[email protected]", owner)},
+ want: &UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: owner, CreatorHoldsRole: true},
+ },
+ {
+ name: "only the creator holds the role, and the project allows self-approval",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){
+ grant("users/[email protected]", owner),
+ func(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, stores *store.Store) {
+ require.NoError(t, stores.UpdateProjects(ctx, &store.UpdateProjectMessage{
+ Workspace: "default", ResourceID: "project-a", Setting: &storepb.Project{AllowSelfApproval: true},
+ }))
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ name: "another person holds the role",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){grant("users/[email protected]", owner), grant("users/[email protected]", owner)},
+ },
+ {
+ name: "another person holds the role through a group",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){
+ func(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, stores *store.Store) {
+ _, err := stores.CreateGroup(ctx, &store.GroupMessage{
+ Workspace: "default",
+ Email: "[email protected]",
+ Title: "Approvers",
+ Payload: &storepb.GroupPayload{Members: []*storepb.GroupMember{{Member: "users/[email protected]", Role: storepb.GroupMember_MEMBER}}},
+ })
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ },
+ grant("groups/[email protected]", owner),
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ name: "no person holds the role",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ want: &UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: owner},
+ },
+ {
+ name: "a later step",
+ flow: []string{owner, releaser},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){grant("users/[email protected]", owner)},
+ want: &UnapprovableStep{Position: 2, Role: releaser},
+ },
+ {
+ name: "an approved step is not checked",
+ flow: []string{releaser, owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){grant("users/[email protected]", owner)},
+ approved: 1,
+ },
+ {
+ name: "the other holder is deactivated",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){
+ grant("users/[email protected]", owner),
+ grant("users/[email protected]", owner),
+ func(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, stores *store.Store) {
+ reviewer, err := stores.GetUserByEmail(ctx, "[email protected]")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ _, err = stores.UpdateUser(ctx, reviewer, &store.UpdateUserMessage{Delete: new(true)})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ },
+ },
+ want: &UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: owner, CreatorHoldsRole: true},
+ },
+ {
+ name: "the other holder is bound under another principal type",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){
+ grant("users/[email protected]", owner),
+ grant(common.FormatServiceAccountEmail("[email protected]"), owner),
+ },
+ want: &UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: owner, CreatorHoldsRole: true},
+ },
+ {
+ name: "the other holder has a project binding and no workspace binding",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){
+ grant("users/[email protected]", owner),
+ grantInProject("users/[email protected]", owner),
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ name: "only a service account holds the role",
+ flow: []string{owner},
+ setup: []func(context.Context, *testing.T, *store.Store){
+ func(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, stores *store.Store) {
+ _, err := stores.GetDB().ExecContext(ctx,
+ `INSERT INTO service_account (name, email, workspace, service_key_hash) VALUES ('bot', '[email protected]', 'default', 'unused')`)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ account, err := stores.GetAccountByEmail(ctx, "[email protected]")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.Equal(t, storepb.PrincipalType_SERVICE_ACCOUNT, account.Type, "the holder must resolve to an account")
+ },
+ grant(common.FormatServiceAccountEmail("[email protected]"), owner),
+ },
+ want: &UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: owner},
+ },
+ } {
+ t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ ctx := context.Background()
+ stores := setupWorkflowStore(ctx, t)
+ for _, setup := range test.setup {
+ setup(ctx, t, stores)
+ }
+ var approvers []*storepb.IssuePayloadApproval_Approver
+ for range test.approved {
+ approvers = append(approvers, &storepb.IssuePayloadApproval_Approver{
+ Status: storepb.IssuePayloadApproval_Approver_APPROVED, Principal: "users/[email protected]",
+ })
+ }
+ issue, err := stores.CreateIssue(ctx, &store.IssueMessage{
+ ProjectID: "project-a",
+ CreatorEmail: "[email protected]",
+ Title: "access grant request",
+ Type: storepb.Issue_ACCESS_GRANT,
+ Payload: &storepb.Issue{Approval: &storepb.IssuePayloadApproval{
+ ApprovalFindingDone: true,
+ ApprovalTemplate: &storepb.ApprovalTemplate{Flow: &storepb.ApprovalFlow{Roles: test.flow}},
+ Approvers: approvers,
+ }},
+ })
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+
+ got, err := FindUnapprovableStep(ctx, stores, "default", common.FormatIssue("project-a", issue.UID))
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.Equal(t, test.want, got)
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+// The check counts a holder only where the approval check would let them
+// approve: a binding names a typed principal, not an email.
+func TestFindUnapprovableStepAgreesWithTheApprovalCheckOnPrincipalType(t *testing.T) {
+ ctx := context.Background()
+ stores := setupWorkflowStore(ctx, t)
+ for member, role := range map[string]string{
+ "users/[email protected]": "roles/projectOwner",
+ common.FormatServiceAccountEmail("[email protected]"): "roles/projectOwner",
+ } {
+ _, err := stores.PatchWorkspaceIamPolicy(ctx, &store.PatchIamPolicyMessage{Workspace: "default", Member: member, Roles: []string{role}})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ }
+ _, issue := createPendingDatabaseChangeApproval(ctx, t, stores, []string{"roles/projectOwner"})
+
+ step, err := FindUnapprovableStep(ctx, stores, "default", common.FormatIssue("project-a", issue.UID))
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.Equal(t, &UnapprovableStep{Position: 1, Role: "roles/projectOwner", CreatorHoldsRole: true}, step)
+
+ reviewer, err := stores.GetUserByEmail(ctx, "[email protected]")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ _, err = NewWorkflow(stores).ReviewIssue(ctx, IssueInput{
+ Workspace: "default",
+ ProjectID: "project-a",
+ IssueUID: issue.UID,
+ Actor: reviewer,
+ Action: ActionApprove,
+ })
+ var workflowErr *Error
+ require.ErrorAs(t, err, &workflowErr)
+ require.Equal(t, ReasonApproverRoleRequired, workflowErr.Reason, "the approval check refuses the same person")
+}
+
+// A holder the lookup cannot resolve leaves the answer unknown, so the check
+// fails instead of reporting that no one else can approve.
+func TestFindUnapprovableStepFailsWhenAHolderCannotBeResolved(t *testing.T) {
+ ctx := context.Background()
+ stores := setupWorkflowStore(ctx, t)
+ for _, member := range []string{"users/[email protected]", "users/"} {
+ _, err := stores.PatchWorkspaceIamPolicy(ctx, &store.PatchIamPolicyMessage{Workspace: "default", Member: member, Roles: []string{"roles/projectOwner"}})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ }
+ issue, err := stores.CreateIssue(ctx, &store.IssueMessage{
+ ProjectID: "project-a",
+ CreatorEmail: "[email protected]",
+ Title: "access grant request",
+ Type: storepb.Issue_ACCESS_GRANT,
+ Payload: &storepb.Issue{Approval: &storepb.IssuePayloadApproval{
+ ApprovalFindingDone: true,
+ ApprovalTemplate: &storepb.ApprovalTemplate{Flow: &storepb.ApprovalFlow{Roles: []string{"roles/projectOwner"}}},
+ }},
+ })
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+
+ step, err := FindUnapprovableStep(ctx, stores, "default", common.FormatIssue("project-a", issue.UID))
+ require.ErrorContains(t, err, `failed to parse email from identifier users/`)
+ require.Nil(t, step)
+}
+
func TestApproverRoleLookupFailureIsNotARefusal(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
db, stores := setupWorkflowStoreWithDB(ctx, t)
diff --git a/backend/generated-go/v1/access_grant_service.pb.go b/backend/generated-go/v1/access_grant_service.pb.go
index 78f72d2e9f..72df64d3db 100644
--- a/backend/generated-go/v1/access_grant_service.pb.go
+++ b/backend/generated-go/v1/access_grant_service.pb.go
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ type AccessGrant struct {
// Format: projects/{project}/accessGrants/{access_grant}
// The {access_grant} segment is a server-generated unique ID.
Name string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=name,proto3" json:"name,omitempty"`
- // The creator of the access grant.
+ // The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it.
// Format: users/{email}
Creator string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=creator,proto3" json:"creator,omitempty"`
// The status of the access grant.
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ const file_v1_access_grant_service_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x1dv1/access_grant_service.proto\x12\vbytebase.v1\x1a\x1cgoogle/api/annotations.proto\x1a\x17google/api/client.proto\x1a\x1fgoogle/api/field_behavior.proto\x1a\x19google/api/resource.proto\x1a\x1egoogle/protobuf/duration.proto\x1a\x1fgoogle/protobuf/timestamp.proto\x1a\x13v1/annotation.proto\"\xe8\x05\n" +
"\vAccessGrant\x12\x12\n" +
"\x04name\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x04name\x12\x1d\n" +
- "\acreator\x18\x02 \x01(\tB\x03\xe0A\x02R\acreator\x12<\n" +
+ "\acreator\x18\x02 \x01(\tB\x03\xe0A\x03R\acreator\x12<\n" +
"\x06status\x18\x03 \x01(\x0e2\x1f.bytebase.v1.AccessGrant.StatusB\x03\xe0A\x03R\x06status\x12=\n" +
"\vexpire_time\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampH\x00R\n" +
"expireTime\x122\n" +
diff --git a/backend/tests/mcp_access_request_test.go b/backend/tests/mcp_access_request_test.go
index 710adb7c08..495b78b689 100644
--- a/backend/tests/mcp_access_request_test.go
+++ b/backend/tests/mcp_access_request_test.go
@@ -90,4 +90,8 @@ func TestMCPRequestsAccessWithTheDedicatedTool(t *testing.T) {
a.Equal(2*time.Hour, grant.GetTtl().AsDuration(), "a ttl starts at approval")
a.Contains(text, "Requested "+grant.Name+":")
a.Contains(text, grant.Issue)
+ // The project's creator is its only owner, and new projects refuse self-approval.
+ a.Contains(text, "No other person can approve it: step 1 of its approval flow needs roles/projectOwner, which no other active "+
+ "workspace member holds, and this project does not allow self-approval.", text)
+ a.Contains(text, "grant_masking_exemption", "an unmask request names the exemption tool as the way around")
}
diff --git a/backend/tests/mcp_gate_test.go b/backend/tests/mcp_gate_test.go
index 2ad643cd13..27550fc140 100644
--- a/backend/tests/mcp_gate_test.go
+++ b/backend/tests/mcp_gate_test.go
@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ func TestMCPGrantIssuesAndAccessRequests(t *testing.T) {
})
a.Equal(http.StatusForbidden, grant.Status)
a.Contains(grant.Error, "ROLE_GRANT", "the denial must name the issue type it refused")
- a.Contains(grant.Error, "no human step")
+ a.Contains(grant.Error, "whatever the approval rules say", "the denial must not read as if an approval rule would lift it")
+ a.Contains(grant.Error, "request_access_grant", "the denial must name the way to run a statement")
upsert := callAPIOnSession(ctx, t, session, "IssueService/UpdateIssue", map[string]any{
"issue": map[string]any{
diff --git a/backend/utils/member.go b/backend/utils/member.go
index 0f1e3dcfb8..95c4311261 100644
--- a/backend/utils/member.go
+++ b/backend/utils/member.go
@@ -3,10 +3,13 @@ package utils
import (
"context"
+ "errors"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"time"
+ pkgerrors "github.com/pkg/errors"
+
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common"
"github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common/log"
storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"
@@ -30,8 +33,9 @@ func FormatGroupName(group *store.GroupMessage) string {
return common.FormatGroupEmail(group.ID)
}
-// GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy gets users in the iam policy.
-// The role can be either with or without the "roles/" prefix.
+// GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy returns the users bound to the role in the
+// policies. A failed lookup is logged and its member skipped; a caller whose
+// decision changes with a missing user uses UsersByRoleInIAMPolicy.
func GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
ctx context.Context,
stores *store.Store,
@@ -40,11 +44,30 @@ func GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
allowAllUsers bool,
policies ...*storepb.IamPolicy,
) []*store.UserMessage {
+ users, err := UsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(ctx, stores, workspace, role, allowAllUsers, policies...)
+ if err != nil {
+ slog.Error("failed to resolve every user bound to the role", slog.String("role", role), log.BBError(err))
+ }
+ return users
+}
+
+// UsersByRoleInIAMPolicy returns the users bound to the role in the policies,
+// and the failed lookups joined into one error. The users that resolved are
+// returned either way.
+func UsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
+ ctx context.Context,
+ stores *store.Store,
+ workspace string,
+ role string,
+ allowAllUsers bool,
+ policies ...*storepb.IamPolicy,
+) ([]*store.UserMessage, error) {
roleFullName := role
if !strings.HasPrefix(role, common.RolePrefix) {
roleFullName = common.FormatRole(role)
}
var users []*store.UserMessage
+ var failures []error
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, policy := range policies {
@@ -64,12 +87,15 @@ func GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
ShowDeleted: false,
})
if err != nil {
- slog.Error("failed to list all users for role", slog.String("role", role), log.BBError(err))
+ failures = append(failures, pkgerrors.Wrapf(err, "failed to list all users for role %s", role))
continue
}
- return allUsers
+ return allUsers, nil
+ }
+ userMessages, err := usersByMember(ctx, stores, workspace, member)
+ if err != nil {
+ failures = append(failures, err)
}
- userMessages := GetUsersByMember(ctx, stores, workspace, member)
for _, user := range userMessages {
if seen[user.Email] {
@@ -82,78 +108,92 @@ func GetUsersByRoleInIAMPolicy(
}
}
- return users
+ return users, errors.Join(failures...)
}
// GetUsersByMember gets user messages by member.
// The member should be in users/{email}, serviceAccounts/{email}, workloadIdentities/{email}, or groups/{email} format.
+// A failed lookup is logged and skipped.
func GetUsersByMember(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, workspace string, member string) []*store.UserMessage {
- var users []*store.UserMessage
- if strings.HasPrefix(member, common.UserNamePrefix) {
- user := getUserByIdentifier(ctx, stores, member, common.UserNamePrefix)
- if user != nil {
- users = append(users, user)
- }
- } else if strings.HasPrefix(member, common.ServiceAccountNamePrefix) {
- user := getUserByIdentifier(ctx, stores, member, common.ServiceAccountNamePrefix)
- if user != nil {
- users = append(users, user)
- }
- } else if strings.HasPrefix(member, common.WorkloadIdentityNamePrefix) {
- user := getUserByIdentifier(ctx, stores, member, common.WorkloadIdentityNamePrefix)
- if user != nil {
- users = append(users, user)
- }
- } else if strings.HasPrefix(member, common.GroupPrefix) {
+ users, err := usersByMember(ctx, stores, workspace, member)
+ if err != nil {
+ slog.Error("failed to resolve every user of the member", slog.String("member", member), log.BBError(err))
+ }
+ return users
+}
+
+func usersByMember(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, workspace string, member string) ([]*store.UserMessage, error) {
+ prefix := ""
+ switch {
+ case strings.HasPrefix(member, common.UserNamePrefix):
+ prefix = common.UserNamePrefix
+ case strings.HasPrefix(member, common.ServiceAccountNamePrefix):
+ prefix = common.ServiceAccountNamePrefix
+ case strings.HasPrefix(member, common.WorkloadIdentityNamePrefix):
+ prefix = common.WorkloadIdentityNamePrefix
+ case strings.HasPrefix(member, common.GroupPrefix):
group, err := stores.GetGroupByName(ctx, workspace, member)
if err != nil {
- slog.Error("failed to get group", slog.String("group", member), log.BBError(err))
- return users
+ return nil, pkgerrors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get group %s", member)
}
if group == nil {
slog.Error("cannot found group", slog.String("group", member))
- return users
+ return nil, nil
}
+ var users []*store.UserMessage
+ var failures []error
for _, member := range group.Payload.Members {
- user := getUserByIdentifier(ctx, stores, member.Member, common.UserNamePrefix)
- if user != nil {
+ user, err := userByIdentifier(ctx, stores, member.Member, common.UserNamePrefix)
+ if err != nil {
+ failures = append(failures, err)
+ continue
+ }
+ if user != nil && formatMemberNameByType(user) == member.Member {
users = append(users, user)
}
}
+ return users, errors.Join(failures...)
+ default:
+ return nil, nil
}
- return users
+ user, err := userByIdentifier(ctx, stores, member, prefix)
+ if err != nil || user == nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ // The permission check matches a member by its typed name
+ // (GetUserIAMPolicyBindings), so an account of another type that shares the
+ // email is not this member.
+ if formatMemberNameByType(user) != member {
+ return nil, nil
+ }
+ return []*store.UserMessage{user}, nil
}
-// getUserByIdentifier gets user message by identifier.
-// The identifier should be in {prefix}{email} format where prefix is one of:
-// users/, serviceAccounts/, or workloadIdentities/
-func getUserByIdentifier(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, identifier, prefix string) *store.UserMessage {
+// userByIdentifier gets the user an identifier in {prefix}{email} format names,
+// where prefix is users/, serviceAccounts/ or workloadIdentities/. A principal
+// that does not exist is nil with no error.
+func userByIdentifier(ctx context.Context, stores *store.Store, identifier, prefix string) (*store.UserMessage, error) {
var email string
var err error
switch prefix {
- case common.UserNamePrefix:
- email, err = common.GetUserEmail(identifier)
case common.ServiceAccountNamePrefix:
email, err = common.GetServiceAccountEmail(identifier)
case common.WorkloadIdentityNamePrefix:
email, err = common.GetWorkloadIdentityEmail(identifier)
default:
- // Fallback to user email for backward compatibility
email, err = common.GetUserEmail(identifier)
}
if err != nil {
- slog.Error("failed to parse email from identifier", slog.String("identifier", identifier), log.BBError(err))
- return nil
+ return nil, pkgerrors.Wrapf(err, "failed to parse email from identifier %s", identifier)
}
account, err := stores.GetAccountByEmail(ctx, email)
if err != nil {
- slog.Error("failed to get principal by email", slog.String("identifier", identifier), log.BBError(err))
- return nil
+ return nil, pkgerrors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get principal %s", identifier)
}
if account == nil {
- return nil
+ return nil, nil
}
- return userMessageFromAccount(account)
+ return userMessageFromAccount(account), nil
}
func userMessageFromAccount(account *store.AccountMessage) *store.UserMessage {
diff --git a/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.d.ts b/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.d.ts
index 55b1f741b6..ed8bba3055 100644
--- a/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.d.ts
+++ b/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.d.ts
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ export declare type AccessGrant = Message<"bytebase.v1.AccessGrant"> & {
name: string;
/**
- * The creator of the access grant.
+ * The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it.
* Format: users/{email}
*
* @generated from field: string creator = 2;
diff --git a/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.js b/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.js
index c7df5a8f3a..0b667b9d69 100644
--- a/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.js
+++ b/frontend/src/types/proto-es/v1/access_grant_service_pb.js
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import { file_v1_annotation } from "./annotation_pb";
* Describes the file v1/access_grant_service.proto.
*/
export const file_v1_access_grant_service = /*@__PURE__*/
- fileDesc("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", [file_google_api_annotations, file_google_api_client, file_google_api_field_behavior, file_google_api_resource, file_google_protobuf_duration, file_google_protobuf_timestamp, file_v1_annotation]);
+ fileDesc("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", [file_google_api_annotations, file_google_api_client, file_google_api_field_behavior, file_google_api_resource, file_google_protobuf_duration, file_google_protobuf_timestamp, file_v1_annotation]);
/**
* Describes the message bytebase.v1.AccessGrant.
diff --git a/proto/gen/grpc-doc/openapi.yaml b/proto/gen/grpc-doc/openapi.yaml
index 62849a7933..65c8d6b324 100644
--- a/proto/gen/grpc-doc/openapi.yaml
+++ b/proto/gen/grpc-doc/openapi.yaml
@@ -16788,8 +16788,9 @@ components:
type: string
title: creator
description: |-
- The creator of the access grant.
+ The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it.
Format: users/{email}
+ readOnly: true
status:
allOf:
- $ref: '#/components/schemas/bytebase.v1.AccessGrant.Status'
@@ -16851,7 +16852,6 @@ components:
description: The container name to execute the query against, used for CosmosDB only.
title: AccessGrant
required:
- - creator
- targets
bytebase.v1.AccessGrant.Status:
type: string
diff --git a/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/README.md b/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/README.md
index 1aaf3124d7..482279a880 100644
--- a/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/README.md
+++ b/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/README.md
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ The line against FORBIDDEN is reversibility. An admin-capable ceiling, if one is
| Field | Type | Label | Description |
| ----- | ---- | ----- | ----------- |
| name | [string](#string) | | The name of the access grant, generated by the server. Format: projects/{project}/accessGrants/{access_grant} The {access_grant} segment is a server-generated unique ID. |
-| creator | [string](#string) | | The creator of the access grant. Format: users/{email} |
+| creator | [string](#string) | | The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it. Format: users/{email} |
| status | [AccessGrant.Status](#bytebase-v1-AccessGrant-Status) | | The status of the access grant. An ACTIVE grant with `expire_time` in the past is effectively expired and no longer authorizes access. Use `expire_time` to determine whether an ACTIVE grant has expired. |
| expire_time | [google.protobuf.Timestamp](#google-protobuf-Timestamp) | | The expiration time of the access grant. |
| ttl | [google.protobuf.Duration](#google-protobuf-Duration) | | Input only. The time-to-live duration for the access grant. The server computes `expire_time` from this value at activation time. |
diff --git a/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/index.html b/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/index.html
index c118ffcc75..7a6b2dc42f 100644
--- a/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/index.html
+++ b/proto/gen/grpc-doc/v1/index.html
@@ -3692,7 +3692,7 @@ The {access_grant} segment is a server-generated unique ID. </p></td>
<td>creator</td>
<td><a href="#string">string</a></td>
<td></td>
- <td><p>The creator of the access grant.
+ <td><p>The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it.
Format: users/{email} </p></td>
</tr>
diff --git a/proto/v1/v1/access_grant_service.proto b/proto/v1/v1/access_grant_service.proto
index 3ed2f53e2b..099b6f6b47 100644
--- a/proto/v1/v1/access_grant_service.proto
+++ b/proto/v1/v1/access_grant_service.proto
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ message AccessGrant {
// The {access_grant} segment is a server-generated unique ID.
string name = 1;
- // The creator of the access grant.
+ // The creator of the access grant, the caller who requested it.
// Format: users/{email}
- string creator = 2 [(google.api.field_behavior) = REQUIRED];
+ string creator = 2 [(google.api.field_behavior) = OUTPUT_ONLY];
// The status of the access grant.
// An ACTIVE grant with `expire_time` in the past is effectively expired