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fix: reject malformed workspace names on SCIM token rotation
Dannydac3704ace4b
diff --git a/backend/api/v1/setting_service_directory_sync_test.go b/backend/api/v1/setting_service_directory_sync_test.goindex 1396caada1..f23c589c6a 100644--- a/backend/api/v1/setting_service_directory_sync_test.go+++ b/backend/api/v1/setting_service_directory_sync_test.go@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import ("google.golang.org/protobuf/proto""google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect"+ "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/common"storepb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/store"v1pb "github.com/bytebase/bytebase/backend/generated-go/v1")@@ -44,6 +45,34 @@ func TestWorkspaceProfileReportsTokenConfigured(t *testing.T) {}}+// The ACL rejects a well-formed name for another workspace, but an empty or+// unparseable one falls back to the caller's own workspace and passes. Rotation+// invalidates a live SCIM credential, so a malformed request must be rejected+// rather than silently breaking the caller's integration — which means the+// handler has to parse the name itself.+func TestRotateDirectorySyncTokenRejectsMalformedNames(t *testing.T) {+ for _, tt := range []struct {+ name string+ wantErr bool+ }{+ {"", true},+ {"garbage", true},+ {"workspaces/", true},+ {"workspaces/ws1/extra", true},+ {"projects/p1", true},+ {"workspaces/ws1", false},+ } {+ t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {+ _, err := common.GetWorkspaceID(tt.name)+ if tt.wantErr {+ require.Error(t, err, "malformed name %q must not reach the rotation", tt.name)+ return+ }+ require.NoError(t, err)+ })+ }+}+// The rotate RPC is audited, and the audit log records the response. The// plaintext token exists only in that one response, so it must be stripped// before it is written — otherwise anyone with audit-log read access gets adiff --git a/backend/api/v1/workspace_service.go b/backend/api/v1/workspace_service.goindex c75cbf28e5..27c5013a5d 100644--- a/backend/api/v1/workspace_service.go+++ b/backend/api/v1/workspace_service.go@@ -195,12 +195,23 @@ func (s *WorkspaceService) UpdateWorkspace(ctx context.Context, req *connect.Req// RotateDirectorySyncToken mints a new SCIM token and returns it once. Only the// hash is persisted, so the plaintext cannot be recovered afterwards.-//-// The request's name is resolved and matched against the caller's workspace by-// the ACL interceptor, so the workspace is taken from context here.-func (s *WorkspaceService) RotateDirectorySyncToken(ctx context.Context, _ *connect.Request[v1pb.RotateDirectorySyncTokenRequest]) (*connect.Response[v1pb.RotateDirectorySyncTokenResponse], error) {+func (s *WorkspaceService) RotateDirectorySyncToken(ctx context.Context, req *connect.Request[v1pb.RotateDirectorySyncTokenRequest]) (*connect.Response[v1pb.RotateDirectorySyncTokenResponse], error) {workspaceID := common.GetWorkspaceIDFromContext(ctx)+ // Validate the name here rather than leaning on the ACL. The interceptor+ // rejects a well-formed name for another workspace, but an empty or+ // unparseable one resolves to the workspace fallback (acl.go resolveRawResource),+ // which matches the caller's own workspace and passes. Rotation is+ // destructive — it invalidates a live SCIM credential — so a malformed+ // request must fail rather than quietly break the caller's integration.+ requested, err := common.GetWorkspaceID(req.Msg.GetName())+ if err != nil {+ return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeInvalidArgument, errors.Wrapf(err, "invalid workspace name %q", req.Msg.GetName()))+ }+ if requested != workspaceID {+ return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, errors.Errorf("workspace mismatch"))+ }+// The update path this replaces gated on the same feature. Without it an// unlicensed workspace can mint a token that reads as configured in the UI// while the SCIM middleware rejects every request that uses it.