Open-source manufacturing ERP, MES and QMS. Quoting, MRP, inventory, shop floor, quality and lot/serial traceability on one Postgres schema, with a REST API and MCP server. Self-host or use Carbon Cloud.
TypeScript ai-agentsbill-of-materialserpinventory-managementleanmanufacturingmanufacturing-execution-systemmcp-servermesmrpopen-source-erppostgresqlproduction-planningqmsquality-management-systemreact-routerself-hostedsupabasetraceabilitytypescript
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
// Carbon (github.com/crbnos/carbon). Modified or adapted versions of this file,
// including ports, remain AGPLv3; serving them over a network requires releasing their source.
// Pure request-security decisions shared by every app. No env or I/O here, so the
// rules are unit-tested as plain functions; the middleware in
// ../middleware/security.server.ts wires them to requests.
import { getRequestHost } from "@carbon/utils";
type HeaderReader = Pick<Headers, "get">;
const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]);
/**
* Endpoints browsers call from other origins by design: MCP clients register,
* exchange tokens and talk to the MCP transport from wherever they run. None of
* them reads the session cookie.
*/
const CROSS_ORIGIN_ENDPOINTS = ["/token", "/register", "/api/mcp"];
/**
* CSRF check for a state-changing request (the algorithm of Go's
* `http.CrossOriginProtection`). Browsers always send `Sec-Fetch-Site` or
* `Origin` on a cross-origin POST; servers (webhooks, Inngest, the assembler,
* API-key clients) send neither and are not relying on our cookies.
*
* `same-site` is refused on purpose: the session cookie is set on the parent
* domain, so every `*.carbon.ms` host is same-site to the ERP.
*/
export function isCrossOriginRequestAllowed(
method: string,
pathname: string,
headers: HeaderReader
): boolean {
if (SAFE_METHODS.has(method.toUpperCase())) return true;
// Browser submissions arrive as React Router single-fetch `…/path.data`.
const path = pathname.replace(/\.data$/, "").replace(/(.)\/$/, "$1");
if (CROSS_ORIGIN_ENDPOINTS.includes(path)) return true;
const site = headers.get("sec-fetch-site");
if (site) return site === "same-origin" || site === "none";
const origin = headers.get("origin");
if (!origin) return true;
// The host the browser addressed, never `request.url`'s (the internal origin
// behind the proxy).
const host = getRequestHost({ headers });
if (!host) return false;
try {
return new URL(origin).host === host;
} catch {
// `Origin: null` (sandboxed documents, privacy redirects).
return false;
}
}
/**
* A top-level navigation started on another site. A loader that writes on GET
* (the kanban QR flow, MES start/end) refuses these: a scanned QR code or typed
* URL is `none`, and the ERP→MES redirect is `same-site`.
*/
export function isCrossSiteNavigation(headers: HeaderReader): boolean {
return headers.get("sec-fetch-site") === "cross-site";
}
export function createNonce(): string {
return btoa(
String.fromCharCode(...crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)))
);
}
type Directive =
| "default-src"
| "script-src"
| "style-src"
| "img-src"
| "font-src"
| "connect-src"
| "frame-src"
| "worker-src"
| "media-src"
| "object-src"
| "base-uri"
| "frame-ancestors";
export type ContentSecurityPolicyOptions = {
nonce: string;
/** Browser Supabase URL: REST, storage and realtime (ws/wss). */
supabaseUrl?: string;
posthogHost?: string;
/** `new Function` in the ERP configurator; remove with that follow-up. */
allowEval?: boolean;
/** Extra sources per directive (e.g. Google Fonts for academy). */
extra?: Partial<Record<Directive, string[]>>;
reportUri?: string;
};
const originOf = (url: string | undefined) => {
if (!url) return null;
try {
return new URL(url).origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
};
/**
* The strict app policy: scripts run only when they carry this response's nonce
* or are loaded by one that does ('strict-dynamic'), so injected markup cannot
* run script. Why each exception exists is in .ai/plans/2026-09-28-csp-csrf.md.
*/
export function buildContentSecurityPolicy({
nonce,
supabaseUrl,
posthogHost,
allowEval = false,
extra = {},
reportUri
}: ContentSecurityPolicyOptions): string {
const supabase = originOf(supabaseUrl);
const posthog = originOf(posthogHost);
const directives: Record<Directive, string[]> = {
"default-src": ["'self'"],
"script-src": [
`'nonce-${nonce}'`,
"'strict-dynamic'",
"'wasm-unsafe-eval'",
...(allowEval ? ["'unsafe-eval'"] : []),
// Ignored by CSP3 browsers (nonce + strict-dynamic win); the fallback for
// older ones.
"https:",
"'unsafe-inline'"
],
"style-src": ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'", "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net"],
"img-src": ["'self'", "data:", "blob:", "https:"],
"font-src": ["'self'", "data:", "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net"],
"connect-src": [
"'self'",
...(supabase ? [supabase, supabase.replace(/^http/, "ws")] : []),
...(posthog
? new URL(posthog).hostname.endsWith("posthog.com")
? ["https://*.posthog.com"]
: [posthog]
: []),
"https://places.googleapis.com",
"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net"
],
"frame-src": [
"'self'",
"blob:",
"data:",
"https://www.youtube.com",
"https://www.youtube-nocookie.com",
"https://www.loom.com",
"https://challenges.cloudflare.com"
],
"worker-src": ["'self'", "blob:", "data:"],
"media-src": ["'self'"],
"object-src": ["'none'"],
"base-uri": ["'self'"],
"frame-ancestors": ["'self'"]
};
for (const [name, sources] of Object.entries(extra)) {
directives[name as Directive].push(...(sources ?? []));
}
const policy = Object.entries(directives).map(
([name, sources]) => `${name} ${[...new Set(sources)].join(" ")}`
);
if (reportUri) policy.push(`report-uri ${reportUri}`);
return policy.join("; ");
}