Open-source manufacturing ERP, MES and QMS. Quoting, MRP, inventory, shop floor, quality and lot/serial traceability on one Postgres schema, with a REST API and MCP server. Self-host or use Carbon Cloud.
TypeScript ai-agentsbill-of-materialserpinventory-managementleanmanufacturingmanufacturing-execution-systemmcp-servermesmrpopen-source-erppostgresqlproduction-planningqmsquality-management-systemreact-routerself-hostedsupabasetraceabilitytypescript
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
// Carbon (github.com/crbnos/carbon). Modified or adapted versions of this file,
// including ports, remain AGPLv3; serving them over a network requires releasing their source.
import { redis } from "@carbon/kv";
import {
generateAuthenticationOptions,
generateRegistrationOptions,
verifyAuthenticationResponse,
verifyRegistrationResponse,
type WebAuthnCredential
} from "@simplewebauthn/server";
import type {
AuthenticationResponseJSON,
AuthenticatorTransportFuture,
RegistrationResponseJSON
} from "@simplewebauthn/types";
import { DOMAIN, ERP_URL, MES_URL, VERCEL_URL } from "../config/env";
// ── RP (Relying Party) configuration ────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The Relying Party is our application. WebAuthn binds passkeys to the RP_ID
// so a passkey registered on "app.carbon.ms" cannot be used on a different domain.
//
// Rules:
// - RP_ID must be a bare hostname — no protocol, no port.
// - RP_ID must be an exact match OR a registrable suffix of the page origin.
// e.g. origin "https://app.carbon.ms" → valid RP_IDs: "app.carbon.ms" or "carbon.ms"
// - ORIGIN must be the full URL the browser reports (window.location.origin),
// including protocol and port. Used server-side to verify the attestation origin.
/** The Relying Party identifier — bare hostname, no port. Exported so routes can store it. */
export const RP_ID =
DOMAIN && !DOMAIN.startsWith("localhost") ? DOMAIN : "localhost";
/** The expected origin(s) sent by the browser during registration/authentication.
* Both ERP and MES subdomains share the same RP_ID (the parent DOMAIN), so a
* passkey registered on either app works on both — but @simplewebauthn checks
* origin exactly, so we pass an array of allowed origins. */
const ORIGIN: string | string[] =
DOMAIN && !DOMAIN.startsWith("localhost")
? [`https://${DOMAIN}`, ERP_URL, MES_URL].filter(
(url, idx, arr) => !!url && arr.indexOf(url) === idx
)
: VERCEL_URL?.startsWith("http")
? VERCEL_URL
: "http://localhost:3000";
const CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 300; // 5 minutes
// ── Challenge storage in Redis ───────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Challenges are one-time random strings generated by the server and sent to
// the browser. The browser signs them (along with other data) with the passkey
// private key. The server then verifies the signature against the stored
// challenge to prevent replay attacks.
//
// Challenges are stored in Redis with a 5-minute TTL and deleted immediately
// after the first use (get-and-delete pattern).
function regChallengeKey(userId: string) {
return `passkey:reg:challenge:${userId}`;
}
function authChallengeKey(challengeId: string) {
return `passkey:auth:challenge:${challengeId}`;
}
/** Store a registration challenge for the given user. Overwrites any existing one. */
export async function storeRegistrationChallenge(
userId: string,
challenge: string
): Promise<void> {
await redis.set(
regChallengeKey(userId),
challenge,
"EX",
CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS
);
}
/**
* Retrieve and immediately delete the registration challenge for a user.
* Returns null if not found or expired — the caller should treat this as an error.
* Also returns null (never throws) when Redis is down: @carbon/kv fails soft, so
* the passkey flow rejects rather than crashing. See verifyPasskeyRegistration.
*/
export async function getAndDeleteRegistrationChallenge(
userId: string
): Promise<string | null> {
return redis.getdel(regChallengeKey(userId));
}
/** Store an authentication challenge keyed by a random challengeId (not userId,
* since we don't know who the user is yet at this point in the auth flow). */
export async function storeAuthChallenge(
challengeId: string,
challenge: string
): Promise<void> {
await redis.set(
authChallengeKey(challengeId),
challenge,
"EX",
CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS
);
}
/**
* Retrieve and immediately delete the authentication challenge.
* Returns null if not found or expired. Also returns null (never throws) when
* Redis is down: @carbon/kv fails soft, so the passkey flow rejects rather than
* crashing. See verifyPasskeyAuthentication.
*/
export async function getAndDeleteAuthChallenge(
challengeId: string
): Promise<string | null> {
return redis.getdel(authChallengeKey(challengeId));
}
// ── Registration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Generate PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions to send to the browser.
*
* Key decisions:
* - attestationType "none": we don't need device attestation (reduces friction).
* - authenticatorAttachment "platform": device-bound authenticators only
* (Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello). Excludes USB security keys.
* - requireResidentKey true: the passkey is stored on the device (discoverable),
* so the user doesn't need to type their email before using it.
* - excludeCredentials: prevents the same device registering twice for this user.
*/
export async function getPasskeyRegistrationOptions(
userId: string,
userEmail: string,
userDisplayName: string,
existingCredentialIds: string[]
) {
const options = await generateRegistrationOptions({
rpName: "Carbon",
rpID: RP_ID,
userName: userEmail,
userDisplayName: userDisplayName || userEmail,
userID: new Uint8Array(
new TextEncoder().encode(userId)
) as unknown as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>,
attestationType: "none",
excludeCredentials: existingCredentialIds.map((id) => ({
id,
type: "public-key"
})),
authenticatorSelection: {
authenticatorAttachment: "platform",
requireResidentKey: true,
residentKey: "required",
userVerification: "required"
},
// -7 = ECDSA P-256, -257 = RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
supportedAlgorithmIDs: [-7, -257]
});
await storeRegistrationChallenge(userId, options.challenge);
return options;
}
/**
* Verify the registration response from the browser and extract the credential
* data to persist in the database.
*
* Throws if the challenge is missing/expired or if verification fails.
*/
export async function verifyPasskeyRegistration(
userId: string,
response: RegistrationResponseJSON
) {
const challenge = await getAndDeleteRegistrationChallenge(userId);
if (!challenge)
throw new Error("Registration challenge not found or expired");
const verification = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
response,
expectedChallenge: challenge,
expectedOrigin: ORIGIN,
expectedRPID: RP_ID,
requireUserVerification: true
});
if (!verification.verified || !verification.registrationInfo) {
throw new Error("Registration verification failed");
}
const { credential, aaguid, credentialDeviceType, credentialBackedUp } =
verification.registrationInfo;
const userHandle = Buffer.from(new TextEncoder().encode(userId)).toString(
"base64url"
);
return {
id: credential.id,
publicKey: credential.publicKey,
counter: credential.counter,
transports:
(response.response.transports as AuthenticatorTransportFuture[]) || null,
deviceType: credentialDeviceType,
backedUp: credentialBackedUp,
aaguid: aaguid || "",
credentialName: getCredentialName(aaguid),
userHandle,
rpId: RP_ID
};
}
// ── Authentication ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Generate PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions to send to the browser.
*
* allowCredentials is intentionally empty — this triggers "discoverable credential"
* mode, where the browser shows a picker of all passkeys the user has for this RP,
* without requiring them to type their email first.
*
* The challengeId is a random ID we generate and send alongside the options so
* the verify endpoint can retrieve the right challenge from Redis.
*/
export async function getPasskeyAuthenticationOptions(challengeId: string) {
const options = await generateAuthenticationOptions({
rpID: RP_ID,
allowCredentials: [],
userVerification: "required"
});
await storeAuthChallenge(challengeId, options.challenge);
return options;
}
/**
* Verify the authentication response from the browser.
* Returns the new counter value so the caller can update the DB.
* Throws if the challenge is missing/expired or verification fails.
*/
export async function verifyPasskeyAuthentication(
challengeId: string,
response: AuthenticationResponseJSON,
credential: WebAuthnCredential
) {
const challenge = await getAndDeleteAuthChallenge(challengeId);
if (!challenge)
throw new Error("Authentication challenge not found or expired");
const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
response,
expectedChallenge: challenge,
expectedOrigin: ORIGIN,
expectedRPID: RP_ID,
requireUserVerification: true,
credential: {
id: credential.id,
publicKey: credential.publicKey,
counter: credential.counter,
transports: credential.transports || undefined
}
});
if (!verification.verified) {
throw new Error("Authentication verification failed");
}
return {
newCounter: verification.authenticationInfo.newCounter
};
}
// ── AAGUID → provider name ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// AAGUID (Authenticator Attestation GUID) is a UUID that identifies the make
// and model of the authenticator. We use it to display a friendly name like
// "iCloud Keychain" instead of a raw credential ID.
//
// Source: https://passkeydeveloper.github.io/passkey-authenticator-aaguids/
const AAGUID_NAMES: Record<string, string> = {
"ea9b8d66-4d01-1d21-3ce4-b6b48cb575d4": "Google Password Manager",
"adce0002-35bc-c60a-648b-0b25f1f05503": "Chrome on Mac",
"fbfc3007-154e-4ecc-8c0b-6e020557d7bd": "iCloud Keychain",
"08987058-cadc-4b81-b6e1-30de50dcbe96": "Windows Hello"
// "b93fd961-f2e6-462f-b122-82002247de78": "Android Fingerprint",
// "6d44ba9b-f6ec-2e49-b930-0c8fe920cb73": "Chrome on Android",
// "17290f1e-c212-34d0-1423-365d729f09d9": "Chrome on iPhone",
// "f8a011f3-8c0a-4d15-8006-17111f9edc7d": "Security Key"
};
export function getCredentialName(aaguid?: string): string {
if (!aaguid) return "Passkey";
return AAGUID_NAMES[aaguid] || "Passkey";
}