Open-source manufacturing ERP, MES and QMS. Quoting, MRP, inventory, shop floor, quality and lot/serial traceability on one Postgres schema, with a REST API and MCP server. Self-host or use Carbon Cloud.
TypeScript ai-agentsbill-of-materialserpinventory-managementleanmanufacturingmanufacturing-execution-systemmcp-servermesmrpopen-source-erppostgresqlproduction-planningqmsquality-management-systemreact-routerself-hostedsupabasetraceabilitytypescript
// SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Carbon-Commercial
// Carbon Enterprise file, licensed only under the Carbon Commercial License
// (packages/ee/LICENSE). Not AGPL. Running, modifying, or copying it beyond those terms requires a commercial license.
import { createHmac } from "node:crypto";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { verifyRampWebhookSignature } from "../webhook";
const secret = "whsec_ramp_test_secret";
const body = JSON.stringify({
id: "evt_11111111",
type: "transaction.ready_to_sync",
business_id: "bus_22222222"
});
function sign(signingSecret: string, payload: string): string {
return createHmac("sha256", signingSecret).update(payload).digest("base64");
}
describe("verifyRampWebhookSignature", () => {
it("accepts a valid signature over the raw body", () => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: sign(secret, body),
body,
secret
})
).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects when the body was tampered with", () => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: sign(secret, body),
body: body.replace("2222", "3333"),
secret
})
).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects a signature from a different secret", () => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: sign("other-secret", body),
body,
secret
})
).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects malformed base64 without throwing", () => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: "!!!not-base64!!!",
body,
secret
})
).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects an empty signature or missing secret", () => {
expect(verifyRampWebhookSignature({ signature: "", body, secret })).toBe(
false
);
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: sign(secret, body),
body,
secret: ""
})
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("signature encoding tolerance", () => {
const secret = "whsec_test_secret";
const body = JSON.stringify({
type: "webhooks.verification",
challenge: "abc"
});
const digest = createHmac("sha256", secret).update(body).digest();
it("accepts a HEX digest", () => {
// The encoding Ramp's own docs example uses (`.digest("hex")`). Base64-only
// verification rejects this: 64 hex chars decode to 48 bytes, not 32, so the
// length guard fails and EVERY delivery 401s — including the activation
// challenge, which is why the endpoint could never leave "Pending
// verification".
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: digest.toString("hex"),
body,
secret
})
).toBe(true);
});
it("still accepts a BASE64 digest", () => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: digest.toString("base64"),
body,
secret
})
).toBe(true);
});
it.each(["sha256=", "v1,", "v1="])("tolerates a %s prefix", (prefix) => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: `${prefix}${digest.toString("hex")}`,
body,
secret
})
).toBe(true);
});
it("still rejects a wrong digest in either encoding", () => {
const wrong = createHmac("sha256", "other").update(body).digest();
for (const enc of ["hex", "base64"] as const) {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: wrong.toString(enc),
body,
secret
})
).toBe(false);
}
});
it("rejects a tampered body", () => {
expect(
verifyRampWebhookSignature({
signature: digest.toString("hex"),
body: `${body} `,
secret
})
).toBe(false);
});
});