Open-source manufacturing ERP, MES and QMS. Quoting, MRP, inventory, shop floor, quality and lot/serial traceability on one Postgres schema, with a REST API and MCP server. Self-host or use Carbon Cloud.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Carbon-Commercial
// Carbon Enterprise file, licensed only under the Carbon Commercial License
// (packages/ee/LICENSE). Not AGPL. Running, modifying, or copying it beyond those terms requires a commercial license.
import { verifyHmacSha256Signature } from "../../integrations/webhook-signature";
/**
* Verify a Ramp webhook delivery.
*
* SIGNING SCHEME (PENDING Task 1 verification): Ramp signs the RAW request body
* with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the per-webhook `secret` and delivers the digest in
* `X-Ramp-Signature`. Unlike Rillet there is NO composite signed payload — Ramp
* signs the body only. The ENCODING is not pinned by any doc we can read, so both
* hex and base64 are accepted (see below). Once Task 1's sandbox probe records
* which one a real delivery uses, narrow this to that encoding and say so here.
*
* Comparison is constant-time; any decode failure returns false (fail-closed).
*/
export function verifyRampWebhookSignature(args: {
signature: string;
body: string;
secret: string;
}): boolean {
// Tolerate a scheme prefix (`sha256=<sig>`, `v1,<sig>`) — several providers
// qualify the digest and Ramp's exact wire format is not pinned by a doc we
// can read.
const signature = args.signature?.trim().replace(/^(sha256=|v1[,=])/i, "");
// Accept HEX or BASE64. Which one Ramp actually sends has never been confirmed
// against a real delivery (the docs render client-side and the llms.txt bundle
// omits the webhooks guide), and picking wrong fails CLOSED and SILENTLY: a hex
// digest base64-decodes to 48 bytes against an expected 32, so the length guard
// rejects every delivery and the endpoint can never complete Ramp's activation
// challenge. Both candidates are HMACs of the same body under the same secret,
// so trying both concedes nothing — an attacker still has to produce a correct
// digest in one of two encodings, and each attempt goes through the same
// alphabet-checked, constant-time primitive.
return (["hex", "base64"] as const).some((encoding) =>
verifyHmacSha256Signature({ ...args, signature, encoding })
);
}